The New Federalism Game: Primacy Implementation of Environmental Policy

Federal environmental laws have substantially preempted statepowers over pollution control. Many of these laws contain aunique implementation scheme called "primacy," which offersa state the opportunity to become the primary enforcement agentfor federal policies. Primacy relieves the federal governmentfrom enforcing laws within state boundaries even while it retainsultimate control over the policies involved and sets minimumstandards. By and large, states have chosen to accept primacy.Characteristics of the units involved in the implementationprocess explain much of this success. Deviations from the expectedpatterns reveal how states can manipulate primacy to their ownadvantage. It is possible, however, that game playing by thestates under primacy could undermine the ultimate goals of nationalenvironmental policies.     

Environmental Federalism Revisited: Second‐Order Devolution in Air Quality Regulation

In this paper we examine states' use of local clean air agencies and provide a preliminary assessment of what causes states to devolve air quality policy authority to the local level. Data from a unique comparative state survey shows that states vary widely in the number of local clean air agencies they employ and the amount of authority these agencies have to set standards, monitor air quality, and enforce regulations. Multivariate analyses suggest that second‐order devolution is partly driven by a general propensity to decentralize policy authority, but that policy‐specific factors relating to the problem and interest group environment affect devolution as well. These findings indicate that local agencies play an important role in U.S. air quality regulation, and that the dynamics of state devolution to local agencies deserve further study.     

Federal Administration of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 in Oklahoma

SMCRA, which established detailed standards for the surfacemining of coal, attempted to balance the need to increase coalproduction with safeguarding the environment. The act was basedon the principle of cooperative federalism. The states wereoffered both positive and negative inducements to assume importantroles in the design and implementation of regulatory programsconsistent with the SMCRA. Oklahomas Department of Mines (DOM)carried out the provisions of the act so poorly that the federalOffice of Surface Mining (OSM) was compelled to take over SMCRAinspection and enforcement. Other provisions of the act wereadministered by DOM, which found itself in a condition of "cohabitation"with OSM from 1984–1987. During that time, DOM becamea stronger, technologically sophisticated agency; OSM gaineda greater appreciation of the difficulties of implementing astate program; the mining industry became reconciled to reclamationcontemporaneous with mining; and there was an increase in citizenparticipation. The return of primacy to Oklahoma may usher ina new federal relationship in surface mining regulation, withmore power shifting to the states as budget pressures reducefunds and the number of employees in OSM.     

Agency Escape: Decentralization or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernization of Competition Policy?

The "modernization" reforms of European antitrust are summarized and interpreted. The article uses principal–agent analysis enhanced by socio-institutional insights. The reforms in policy implementation are of historic importance. While they appear to promise decentralization to national competition authorities, more sophisticated analysis points to an increase in the centralized power of the Commission. The novel instrument of a supranational European Competition Network creates a redesigned relationship between the Commission and the member states that carries high risks of incoherence. Modernization driven by a legal epistemic community carries a less obvious risk that increased power of competition policy will unduly reinforce liberal market disciplines through a juridification of the European competition regime.     

The policy implementation process

There is an implicit assumption in most policy studies that once a policy has been formulated the policy will be implemented. This assumption is invalid for policies formulated in many Third World nations and for types of policies in Western societies. Third World governments tend to formulate broad, sweeping policies, and governmental bureaucracies often lack the capacity for implementation. Interest groups, opposition parties, and affected individuals and groups often attempt to influence the implementation of policy rather than the formulation of policy.A model of the policy implementation process is presented. Policy implementation is seen as a tension generating force in society. Tensions are generated between and within four components of the implementing process: idealized policy, implementing organization, target group, and environmental factors. The tensions result in transaction patterns which may or may not match the expectations of outcome of the policy formulators. The transaction patterns may become crystallized into institutions. Both the transaction patterns and the institutions may generate tensions which, by feedback to the policymakers and implementors, may support or reject further implementation of the policy.By application of the model, policymakers can attempt to minimize disruptive tensions which can result in the failure of policy outcomes to match policy expectations.     

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SURFACE MINING POLICY

The federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977 not only established national performance standards and permitting procedures for the coal industry, but also provided for stateprimacy. The principle of state primary is both simple and intuitively appealing: Because states do not have adequate resources to develop effective regulatory programs, the federal government would set up comprehensive procedures and criteria to guide the states in preparing their own plans. The obvious advantage of state primacy is that i t provides for flexibility in implementation.
Ultimately, state primacy is an experiment in cooperative federalism, a sharing of authority and responsibility between the states and the federal government to insure both the general welfare and sensitivity to local conditions. The history of surface mining regulation is instructive because i t points out the pitfalls and promise of cooperative federalism as well as the critical role of the courts in making state primacy work.     

Environmental Federalism at Decade's End: New Approaches and Strategies

This article examines several recent trends in environmentalpolicy that may have important effects over the next decadeon federal-state relations and on the nation's environmentalquality. It focuses on the Environmental Protection Agency'sefforts to "reinvent" environmental regulation and to encouragecommunity-based environmental protection as a more effectiveand acceptable approach to environmental policy. We considerthe extent to which these new directions are likely to improverelations between the federal government and states, localities,and the private sector, and to achieve desired levels of environmentalprotection in the United States. The new approaches are highlypromising; yet they also face significant barriers to implementation.Congressional reform of the key statutes could lend much-neededsupport to such efforts.     

Making the Harder Yards: Environmental Policy Integration in Australia

Solutions to environmental problems such as climate change, biodiversity loss, and land and water resource degradation require long term integration of economic, social and environmental policies. This poses challenges to specialised, hierarchical public administration systems. The study reported here examined strategies, structures and processes to enable environmental policy integration in six Australian states and territories, and some federal arrangements. The study found that the most prominent success factors, barriers and gaps that affect environmental policy integration relate to leadership, long term embedding of environmental policy integration and implementation capacity. Factors deserving further research and policy attention include leadership, cultural change and capacity building; embedding sustainability in structures and processes; development of a long term evidence based approach; strengthening decentralised implementation arrangements; and evaluation of policy integration initiatives.     

Protecting Sovereignty,Protecting the Planet: State Delegation to International Organizations and Private Actors in Environmental Politics

As global interdependence grows, states often use international organizations to achieve both domestic and foreign policy goals. One way states respond to demands for cooperation is to delegate to international organizations and private actors. In this article, we use new data spanning a century of international environmental law to understand when and why states delegate to international organizations to manage environmental problems. We find that delegation is a persistent phenomenon that facilitates the implementation of states' preferences. However, they make this decision with care: States tend to delegate functions with lower sovereignty costs, such as implementation and monitoring, but rarely delegate rule making and enforcement. We also find that heterogeneous preferences among states increases the likelihood of delegation. Overall, our results suggest that states seek to delegate out of a motivation both to reduce transaction costs and to establish credible commitments.     

Non-Compliance with EU Directives in the Member States: Opposition through the Backdoor?

To what extent are European rules complied with, and what are the reasons for non-compliance with EU law? According to an intergovernmentalist perspective, implementation problems should occur when member states failed to assert their interests in the European decision-making process. Focusing on 26 infringement procedures from the area of labour law, we show that such ‘opposition through the backdoor’ does occur occasionally. However, we demonstrate that opposition at the end of the EU policy process may also arise without prior opposition at the beginning. Additionally, our findings indicate that non-compliance is often unrelated to opposition, and due to administrative shortcomings, interpretation problems, and issue linkage. This study is based on unique in-depth data stemming from a ground-level analysis of the implementation of six EU Directives in all 15 member states.     

The Monitoring Capacity of Civil Society Networks: A Social Network Analysis in the Case of Gender Equality Policy

The role of civil society organizations (CSOs) as a watchdog in the implementation process is widely acknowledged. However, little is known about what determines their capacity to monitor EU policy implementation and how it differs across member states. This article accounts for social capital as well as human and financial capital to determine the monitoring capacity of CSOs. To capture sources of social capital, a network analysis is applied in a comparative case article on the monitoring networks of national platforms of the European Women’s Lobby across eight EU member states. The analysis reveals that CSOs in western member states are rich in human, financial and social capital, while CSOs in CEE member states compensate for this lack of resources by linking up with the Commission.     

The politics of external approval: Explaining the IMF's evaluation of austerity programmes

During the European debt crisis, numerous states launched austerity programmes. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) evaluates and forecasts the likelihood of member states’ success in implementing these programmes. Although IMF evaluations influence country risk perceptions on capital markets, little is known about their reasoning. This article uses fuzzy‐set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to explore on what grounds the IMF evaluated the success prospects of austerity programmes during the European debt crisis. Results reveal that IMF evaluations are heavily influenced by the programme's implementation credibility. They require a tractable policy problem, a country's institutional capacity to structure implementation, and favour expenditure reduction over revenue measures. By acting as a strict guide on the road to fiscal adjustment, the IMF indirectly influences member states’ scope of policy making through its surveillance activities. Extensive austerity programmes that need to be implemented swiftly are evaluated negatively if the country is not involved in an IMF programme.     

New Federalism and Environmental Policy

This article examines the degree of correspondence between theconceptual underpinnings of President Reagan's New Federalismand the willingness and capacity of states to assume a largershare of environmental responsibilities. The findings indicatethat many of the states have not replaced federal aid reductionswith own-source revenues. Replacements that did occur were limitedto a single year and primarily in the area of hazardous wastemanagement grants. The implications of these findings are that"decentralization and defunding" of federal programs in theenvironmental area may have had an adverse effect on the states'ability to provide solutions to pressing environmental problemsin the first half of the 1980s.     

Who governs? Parties and policies in Denmark

Abstract. The literature on party government, coalition formation, and links between party and policy tends to assume that parties in government command legislative majorities that can be used to enact desired policies. This assumption, however, does not apply in general. In Scandinavia, and especially in Denmark, the minority type of government is predominant. Minority governments cannot govern by means of their own votes. Two questions for research are therefore obvious. Why do Scandinavian countries deviate from the normal pattern of government formation? And what are the consequences of minority government for policy making? While the first question has been treated in recent research, this paper carries the analysis a step further by exploring the policy consequences of minority government in Denmark during the 1980s. It is shown that the government may in fact not always govern, that the government may actually be the opposition, and, consequently, that the party-policy link can indeed be extremely complex.     

You Get What You Pay For: Environmental Policy and Public Health

In this article, we examine the cumulative impact of state environmentalprotection policies and environmental quality on the healthof state residents in the United States. Using a series of pathanalytic models, we simultaneously analyze the effect of stateenvironmental policies on environmental pollution and healthoutcomes. Our results indicate that states with stronger environmentalprograms have lower levels of pollution and better public health.These results are robust across multiple measures and alternativemodel specifications. We also find some evidence that statesthat assume authority to implement federal environmental programshave worse health outcomes. Our findings suggest that overalllevels of public health may be affected by state choices withrespect to environmental policies and highlight the importanceof assessing programmatic consequences across policy areas.     

Governance and Coercion

The present article departs from the assumption often found in literature concerning governance, which is that coercion is the quintessence of government and that, therefore, the growing importance of new forms of governance in policy formulation and implementation will lead to the adoption of softer policy instruments. This hypothesis will first be discussed in the wider context of the instrument choice literature, whereby an opposing view is derived. The two competing hypotheses are then tested in a comparison of the alcohol control policy designs of the Swiss member states, i.e. the cantons. The results of a multivariate regression analysis show that strong governance structures understood as networks embracing both public and private actors lead to the adoption of restrictive policy designs that must be enforced by public authority and as such cannot be employed by non-public governance actors. It is concluded that in their evaluation of policy instruments, governance actors follow a logic of consequentiality rather than a logic of appropriateness.     

The Adoption of State Climate Change Policies and Renewable Portfolio Standards: Regional Diffusion or Internal Determinants?

This paper draws upon policy innovation literature and quantitatively explains the adoption of state climate change policies, leading to a broader question—what makes states more likely to adopt policies that provide a global public good? First, existing empirical evidence relating to state climate change policy adoption is reviewed. Following this brief discussion, several analytic approaches are presented that test specific hypotheses derived from the internal determinants and regional diffusion models of policy adoption. Policy diffusion is tested as a function of the motivations, resources, and obstacles of policy change. Motivations for policy innovation include environmental conditions and demands of citizens. Resources include state financial and geographic resources, such as wind and solar potential. Obstacles include a state's reliance on carbon‐intensive industries such as coal and natural gas. The results show that internal factors, particularly citizens' demands, are stronger predictors of states' policies than are diffusion effects from neighboring states.     

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION VERSUS PROGRAM DESIGN: WHICH ACCOUNTS FOR POLICY "FAILURE"?

Many influential implementation scholars now argue that "street-level" bureaucrats, rather than legislators or high-level administrators, make public policy in the U.S. Such authors as Pressman and Wildavsky cite creaming in employment and training programs as an especially clear example of well-meaning programs that fail when implemented. This paper argues that two of the most significant and lasting of these programs, the U.S. Employment Service and the Manpower Development and Training Act, were designed to encourage creaming. The essay asserts implementation scholars overstate the disconnection between program design and program implementation because they assume there is little disconnection between program legitimation and program design. A better conception of design permits one to perceive that these programs were legitimated on the grounds they would serve a large number of constituents, but were designed to do so by serving employers. The combination of these premises made creaming an imperative of program operation, and the implementors who cream remain faith ful to original program strategy. This finding suggests a redirection of policy research toward a more rlgorous analysis of program design and a better understanding of the relationship between legitimation, design, and implementation.     

Defining Environmental Justice Communities for Regulatory Enforcement: Implications from a Block‐Group‐Level Analysis of New York State

The absence of a clear definition of environmental justice areas has been cited as one of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency's major deficiencies in managing federal environmental justice programs. Several states have explicitly defined potential environmental justice areas and integrated targeted efforts into the policy‐making process. At the block‐group level, this study evaluates the effects of New York State's environmental justice policy, which defines communities of concern in terms of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics as well as mandates supplemental regulatory enforcement activities for these neighborhoods, on the agency's policy implementation practices under the Clean Air Act and Clean Water Act. The empirical findings suggest that there is inconclusive evidence regarding race/ethnicity‐ and class‐based environmental inequity. Also, the state's policy intervention is not universally effective. Moreover, task environments of a given community are a consistent determinant of the agency's regulatory compliance monitoring and assurance activities. This study then derives broader implications regarding the adoption of a policy instrument that defines and screens potential environmental justice communities.