宪法权利与法律权利:区别何在?

宪法权利的主体是整体性的个人,法律权利的主体是个体化的个人或部分个人的集合体(法人).某一公民可以放弃自己的法律权利,但人民不可能放弃全体公民的宪法权利.宪法权利作为母权利可以派生出一群大小不等的法律权利(子权利).宪法权利不仅是重要的权利,还应是抽象的权利.     

道德权利与法律权利

道德从某一方面反应统治阶级的正当性要求。权利就是一种正当的要求,它反映了人们对行为"正当性"的评价。我们知道,这种正当性的评价根据既可以是法律,也可以是道德、风俗习惯,所以权利就不应局限于法的领域。它应当体现在社会习惯、道德、宗教、法律等诸多方面,包含着习惯权利、道德权利、宗教权利、法律权利等许多内容。     

论正义和法律正义

正义分为个人正义和制度正义。制度正义的关键是法的正义。对社会契约、自然法、人权、各种价值的论证都是为了阐述正义的法。严格意义的法的正义仅指法的本体正义,其中包括:法的形式正义——围绕着建构社会秩序法律应当具有的普遍性、明确性、统一性、稳定性、先在性、可行性、公开性;法的实质正义——为了满足人们深层次的、最基本的需要法律所应当具有的保障安全、维护平等、促进自由、增进效率的性状和特征。     

获得司法正义的权利

引　言2 0 0 3年 3月 1 0日 - 1 1日 ,中国与欧盟联合国人权两公约学术交流网络第二次研讨会在北京召开。会议由中国社会科学院法学研究所主办 ,研讨的主题是“获得司法正义的权利(AccesstoJustice)”。参加会议的近 5 0名中外专家就诉诸法院的权利、公正审判的程序与制度、司法职业化与合格的司法、法律援助、纠纷的非诉讼解决等议题广泛而深入地交换了意见。我们约请其中的 7位专家提供论文 ,作为会议的部分研究成果呈现在这里 ,以便读者能够从中了解会议的概貌 ,同时也能对“获得司法正义的权利”这一话题所涉及的理论和实践问题获得一…     

权利与原则:撩开说话的法律面纱

说话权利的保护程度表征着一个国家的民主、开放和宽容.综观人类在说话方面的权利及其法律原则,我们可以将其归结为:可以说话的权利与事先限制之禁止原则;说真话的权利与真实抗辩原则;说真实谎言的权利与真正的恶意原则;说意见性言论的权利与合理评论原则;不说话的权利与精神自由原则;要求说话的权利与媒体接近原则;用行为说话的权利与背景限制原则.     

法律正义与法律价值之关系辨正

法律正义在中外自古都是一个高度抽象、有着丰富涵义的词汇,它以一定的法律价值给予说明.正义虽然也是法律的价值,但它是对作为正义标准的法律价值进行辩证综合后的抽象性价值.与作为法律正义标准的各个法律价值相比,正义是更高层次的价值.法学界通常把法律的正义价值与作为法律正义标准的各个法律价值作同位概念看待,这是一种概念使用上的逻辑错误,公平与正义并用就是如此.公平正义虽然在概念使用上没有逻辑错误,但这容易导致唯公平才正义的误读.     

论法律正义与法律价值的辩证关系

法律正义在中外自古都是一个高度抽象、有着丰富涵义的词汇,它以一定的法律价值给予说明。＂正义＂虽然也是法律的价值,但它是对作为正义标准的法律价值进行辩证综合后的抽象性价值。与作为法律正义标准的各个法律价值相比,＂正义＂是更高层次的价值。法学界通常把法律的正义价值与作为法律正义标准的各个法律价值作同位概念看待,这是一种概念使用上的逻辑错误,＂公平＂与＂正义＂并用就是如此。     

诉讼权利的滥用:程序正义的比较标准

一、APR概述综观各种法律制度,给人总体感觉是:滥用诉讼权利(the Abuse of Procedural Right,缩写为APR)的问题随处可见。但各国并未真正意识到司法中的权利滥用现象,对于APR问题的意义和重要性的认识也未达成统一,那种相信在任何地方都存在能够预防和制裁诉讼权利滥用现象的有效可行的救济方式是没有根据的。有人也许会说,没有一个法律制度完全不关注APR问题,但这只是问题的开始,而不是问题的结束,因为,诉讼权利滥用的形式是多种多样的。实际上,各国的情况大不相同:有些国家,例如法国,明确规定了APR的一般规则并授予法院处罚权〔1…     

Sickness Absence and the Court of Justice: Examining the Role of Fundamental Rights in EU Employment Law

Being absent from work due to sickness is a critical issue for individuals and their employers, but it has traditionally fallen outside the scope of EU employment legislation. This article argues that this is changing; it examines case‐law under the Working Time and Employment Equality Directives. The article considers the justifications that the Court of Justice has advanced to explain this expansion in EU employment law. It finds that the Court has, at times, invoked fundamental social rights as a basis for interpreting employment legislation in a manner favourable to workers. Yet the way in which the Court deploys rights‐based reasoning can be difficult to anticipate, not least the countervailing weight attached to the interests of employers. The case studies indicate that fundamental rights discourse offers a possible foundation for more extensive readings of employment legislation, but it is not a simple ‘trump card’ for advocates of stronger worker protection.     

Rights,Justice and War: A Reply*

I offer a response to Rodin’s, Statman’s, Stilz’s, and Tadros’ papers on my book Cosmopolitan War.     

Public Law and Popular Justice

Group litigation is becoming commonplace. Rules of standing have been relaxed to allow groups to bring representative actions on behalf of their members or to act 'in the public interest'. Groups increasingly intervene in actions between third parties, presenting amicus briefs. This article traces the origins of group action in courts and speculates on the possible effects of changes which blur traditional distinctions between legal and political process, concluding that the legal process must be kept broadly within traditional boundaries, if the qualities of independence, rationality and finality for which it is valued are to be maintained.     

Introduction: Procedural Justice, Law and Policy

Over the last few years, procedural justice has become one of the most debated fields in social science and law. Modern thinking about law, democracy and public policy inevitably leads to a consideration of appropriate procedures. Images of such procedures are culturally bound and also formed by individual cognition. The word "fair" seems to encompass the most desired features of procedures.     

Luhmann: Law,Justice, and Time

Time is central to Luhmann’s writings on social systems. Social systems, as systems of meaning, operate within three dimensions: factual, social and temporal. Each of these dimensions entails selections of actualities from potentialities (or contingencies) within horizons. Whilst the factual dimension involves selections based on distinguishing ‘this’ from ‘something else’, and the social distinguishes between alter and ego (asking with respect to any meaning whether another experiences it as I do), the temporal dimension operates with the primary distinction of before and after. In the temporal dimension, everything is ‘ordered only according to the when and not to the who/what/where/how of experience and action’ (Luhmann in Social systems. Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995, p. 78). In this paper, we explore the connection between the temporal dimension of meaning within the legal system and its connection to justice. We begin by setting out succinctly the role played by justice within the legal system, as presented by Luhmann, particularly in his book Law as a social system (2004). From this beginning, we move on to consider the relationship between law, justice and time, taking two examples. The first is the temporality of judicial decisions. The second concerns the relationship between the temporal meaning of law’s own operations, and the presumption of innocence.     

Theorising Children's Rights in Youth Justice: The Significance of Autonomy and Foundational Rights

This paper develops a theoretical approach to children's rights in youth justice, located within a wider rights‐based theory of criminal justice which emphasises the centrality of citizens' autonomy. Understanding what is special about children's rights in the youth justice system requires an understanding of how children's autonomy differs from that of adults. One difference is that within the legal system children are not considered to be fully autonomous rights‐holders, because childhood is a time for gathering and developing the assets necessary for full autonomy. These assets should be protected by a category of ‘foundational’ rights. It is argued that an essential component of a rights‐based penal system for children is that it should not irreparably or permanently harm the child's foundational rights. The concept of foundational rights can then underpin and strengthen international children's rights standards, including those relating to the minimum age of criminal responsibility, differential sentencing for children and adults and a rights‐based system of resettlement provision.     

Tort Law and Corrective Justice

This article offers arefutation of the corrective justiceinterpretation of tort law – the view that itis essentially a system of corrective justice. It introduces a distinction between primary andsecondary tort duties and claims that tort lawis best understood as the union of its primaryand secondary duties. It then advances twoindependent criticisms of the correctivejustice interpretation. The article firstargues that primary tort duties have nothingfundamentally to do with corrective justice andthat, if one understands what is meant by``primary tort duties,' one is compelledto regard this fact as a decisive objection tothe corrective justice interpretation. Second,it argues that, whatever relation thereis between secondary tort duties and correctivejustice, that relation also holds betweencorrective justice and secondary duties ofother legal branches. In sum, the concept ofcorrective justice is neither capable ofunifying tort law nor of demarcating it fromother legal branches.The article also offers a general alternativeinterpretation of tort law. Rather thanbeing essentially corrective, tort law isessentially protective. Under this picture, iftort law has a most important point, it is theprotection of legal subjects and valuablesocial interests from harm. This is theoverarching ambition that unifies primary andsecondary tort duties. It does not, however,demarcate tort law from other legal branches.