Voting Weights and Formateur Advantages in the Formation of Coalition Governments

Over the last two decades a large and important literature has emerged that uses game theoretic models of bargaining to study legislative coalitions. To test key predictions of these models, we examine the composition of coalition governments from 1946 and 2001. These predictions are almost always expressed in terms of parties' minimal-integer voting weights. We calculate such weights for all parliamentary parties. In addition, we develop a statistical model that nests the predictions of many of these models of the distribution of posts. We find that for parties that join (but did not form) the government, there is a linear relationship between their share of the voting weight in parliament and their share of cabinet posts. The party that forms the government (the formateur) receives a substantial "bonus" relative to its voting weight. The latter finding is more consistent with proposal-based bargaining models of coalition formation and suggests that parties gain disproportionate power not because of their size but because of their proposal power.     

Do Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments?: The Evidence from an Expert Survey

This article tests the hypothesis that parties in West European parliamentary systems operate under the constraint of "policy horizons," that is, limits or bounds on the extent to which they can compromise on policy for the purpose of entering coalition governments. The test is based on a new expert survey covering thirteen West European parliamentary democracies in which respondents were asked not only to locate party positions on a number of policy dimensions, but also to estimate the parties' limits of acceptable compromise on each dimension. The survey data are first analyzed using a new computer program, Horizons 3D, to determine which parties have intersecting horizons in these systems—and hence the ability to form coalition governments under the hypothesis. These calculations are then employed to assess whether policy horizons structure the choice of governing coalition beyond any effect conveyed by the policy distances among parties. Although the potential for error in these data is considerable, the estimated horizons, with few exceptions, appear to play the role hypothesized for them .     

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.     

Coalition Governments Versus Minority Governments: Bargaining Power, Cohesion and Budgeting Outcomes

Recent empirical work investigating the role of minoritygovernments in the selection of fiscal policies has shown thatthe majority status does not affect the budget size. Thispaper presents an analytical framework which accounts for thisresult. It combines a government formation game and a budgetgame involving cabinet and parliament. A general indifferenceresult applies. An exogenous shock to the bargaininigenvironment which absorbes the cohesion of the governmentincreases the demand for expenditures. At the same time theconditions for the formation of a minority government arefulfilled. If the formateur is strong, a minority governmentcan be a device for cutting expenditures.     

Norwegian Coalition Governments and the Management of Party Relations*

The aim of this article is to analyse the political leaders efforts to organize and manage relations between relevant party actors in a way that is suitable for the operation and preservation of coalition governments. Five coalition governments serve as illustrative cases showing how these relations have been managed in post-war Norway. The similarities between the different government coalitions arc obvious. There are, however, interesting variations concerning the priority given to coordination and unity versus party differences and profilation.     

Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Design: The Case of the Danish Committee on Gender Equality

This article contributes to the literature on parliamentary design in general and the pioneer literature on parliamentary bodies specialized in gender equality in particular. It does so by establishing a frame for the critical assessment of the impacts of such an institutional design. Moreover, by using interviews and data on the behavior of committee members, it demonstrates the advantages of applying a mixed method within a field that has mostly relied on participant interviews. A systematic analysis of the impact of the Danish Committee on Gender Equality shows that although this particular committee has not succeeded in adding the perspective of gender equality to legislation, it has increased parliamentary control with the government. Furthermore, it has enabled much better interaction between parliament and civil society organizations.     

Developments in Danish Parliamentary Democracy: Accountability, Parties and External Constraints

Danish parliamentary developments since the Second World War include the consolidation of minority rule, a reduction in the power of established political parties, and more external constraints on parliamentary actors. They also involve a number of more specific changes to the various steps of delegation and accountability. The evidence tends to support the thesis of a paradox in the development of parliamentary democracy. On the one hand, changes in the constitutional chain of delegation and accountability have, on the whole, favoured the principals (voters, parliament, ministers) compared with their agents (parliament, ministers, civil servants). On the other hand, the established parties have declined somewhat and there are more external constraints than there used to be. This implies that the power of democratic principals has increased within narrower limits of action. In such a situation, the principals can be said to 'decide more about less' because of the stronger national and (not least) international constraints. However, the emergence of a partially new system of governance cannot unequivocally be called better or worse than the traditional Danish system of democratic governance.     

Parties and Policymaking in Multiparty Governments: The Legislative Median,Ministerial Autonomy,and the Coalition Compromise

In parliamentary democracies, governments are typically composed of multiple political parties working together in a coalition. Such governments must confront a fundamental challenge in policymaking—the preferences of coalition parties often diverge significantly, but the government can adopt only one common policy on any specific issue. This fact raises a critical question that has far‐reaching implications for the quality of democratic representation: Whose preferences are ultimately reflected in coalition policy choices? In this study, we explore three competing answers to this question derived from the theoretical literature on multiparty governance and parliamentary institutions. Our findings, based on an analysis of the legislative history of more than 1,000 government bills from three parliamentary democracies, strongly suggest that coalition policies reflect a compromise between government parties rather than the preferences of the ministers proposing them or the preferences of the median party in the legislature.     

A Political Perspective on Contracting Out: The Politics of Good Times. Experiences from Danish Local Governments

Privatization has been on the political agenda for the last two decades. The literature points to two major explanations of privatization. One explanation is political-ideological, considering privatization to be a Liberal-Conservative strategy. Economic crisis or fiscal stress is the other main explanation of privatization. The two theses are investigated by evaluating the determinants of contracting out in Danish local governments. The analysis shows that fiscal stress is strongly, but inversely related to contracting out, while Liberal-Conservative political leadership is not associated with higher levels of contracting out than Social Democratic governance. Thus, the richer a local government becomes, the more it contracts out. Although party politics is not decisive for contracting out, the motivation seems to be political rather than economical. Specifically, it is argued that in a strongly decentralized public sector with influential public employees, contracting out is possible in good times when revenue and public expenditure are easier to increase, which reduces public employee resistance to contracting out.     

The Impact of the European Union on Coalition Formation in a Minority System: The Case of Denmark

Does European Union membership influence coalition patterns in national parliaments? For governments in the Scandinavian countries – with their relatively high share of minority governments requiring external parliamentary support to form parliamentary majorities – the question of ‘coalition management’ is highly relevant. This article provides an empirical test of three central arguments in the Europeanisation literature on the impact of EU membership on national parliaments when political parties pass legislation in the Danish Folketing. The effect of EU content in a law on coalition patterns is compared across policy areas and four electoral periods from 1998 to 2011 encompassing 2,894 laws. The data provide support for the argument that the loss of national agenda‐setting over the legislative process has an impact on coalition patterns in the Danish parliament. It is shown that the coalition patterns on Europeanised legislation are both broader and more stable compared to national, non‐EU‐related legislation. The focus on Europeanisation of legislative coalitions goes beyond previous analysis with an institutional focus, and demonstrates an example of how the EU systematically has an effect on legislative coalition formation in a national parliamentary system.     

Political Ethics and Public Policy: Homosexuals between Moral Dilemmas and Political Considerations in Danish Parliamentary Debates

Political science has abundantly proved that politics involves power, conflict, and self-serving interests. Much less frequently does political science deal with ethics in public policymaking. This article analyses the appeal to moral principles in the political process of drafting three bills, all concerning homosexuals, in which the Danish parliamentary parties, in contrast to normal practice, allowed their members to deviate from the party line and vote in accordance with their 'conscience'. Analysis of the cases indicates that moral considerations are capable of structuring and constraining arguments and that they are decisive for some politicians' positions in some situations. The cases also raise doubts concerning the widely held view that decisions based on votes of conscience, because they are informed by 'ethical' rather than 'political' considerations, are qualitatively superior to ordinary political decisions.

MANKIND
Men, said the Devil,
Are good to their brothers:
They don't want to mend
Their own ways, but each other's.
– grook by Piet Hein

     

The Politics of Parliamentary Strengthening

Parliament's International Development Committee made a powerful case this year that DFID should put more money into parliamentary strengthening in developing countries. Arguing that parliaments were central to tackling corruption, improving economic development and building stable political settlements, they recommended that parliaments should be at the ‘heart of DFID's governance work’. The report, though, also touched on wider issues of how DFID commissions and monitors its political programmes, suggesting fundamental changes to both. DFID recognises these challenges, and offered either full or partial agreement with most of the recommendations. The challenge that remains, though, is moving from the rhetoric of ‘engaging with politics’ to a much improved form of political and parliamentary programming.