Exploring the Budgetary Base in Georgia

This article is an exploratory study of the budgetary base in Georgia. Using agency, gubernatorial, and legislative estimates for all state agencies during the fiscal years 1980 to 1987, it examines the place of budgetary base decisions in the politics of state budgeting, and seeks to improve the theoretical understanding of that concept.     

Budgetary Practices in Smaller Units of Government

Budgetary practice in smaller units of local government has not been the subject of systematic examination. A survey of 122 towns, villages, and cities less than 25,000 population in upstate New York was conducted in spring 1987. This survey indicates that most key policymakers are satisfied with current practices and have been involved with budgeting for more than three years. Budgetary innovation has affected smaller governmental units, and the actual application is related to the educational levels of the official charged with budget preparation.     

Management Strategies and Budgetary Politics

The study of public sector budgeting, particularly at the state level, has been dominated by incremental models of decision making. As a result, the budget has not always been viewed as an effective management tool for governors and other senior state officials. However, there are several critical issues which state leaders repeatedly face and for which the budget is the principal instrument for implementing decisions. This article identifies four key issues for the strategic management of state government and relates alternative approaches to each issue to the nature of budgetary politics. The first section raises the issues in the form of four questions. The next sections present alternative answers and discuss their political implications. Where appropriate, examples from the state of New York are included.     

Do Legislatures Matter in Budgetary Reform?

A recurring problem in the implementation of budgetary reforms at the state level is whether and how to engage legislatures in the effort. This paper posits that legislatures are critical for effective implementation and that different legislative institutional arrangements may have differential effects on both legislative and agency implementation. Drawing on a multistate survey, the analysis shows that higher levels of legislative responsibility for budgeting as well as legislative engagement in oversight of performance information are significantly associated with increased use of performance measures in making budgetary decisions both at the legislative and agency levels.     

Participation in the Budgetary Process in Local Government

Direct democracy is seen as a means of reengaging citizens in the political process. However, it is a contested concept that requires further development by being grounded in a specific context. This article reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government where the New Public Management (NPM) has been in evidence for a number of decades which according to the literature has impacted on accountability to the broader community. The possibility of consultation and citizen participation in the local government budgetary process was examined. The results reported suggest that participation in the budgetary decisions in local government is possible.     

Budgetary constraints and municipal revenue forecasting

Conclusion The objective of this research has been to determine whether key budget participants see forecasting as making significant contributions to the budgetary process. The issue is important for at least two reasons. Budgetary tools will be used to the degree budget players perceive them as providing net budgettary benefits. Moreover, the continuing trend toward technological sophistication gives governments opportunities, red herrings or not, to incorporate the technology into the budget process. The issue is also very timely; with the demise of packaged budget reforms but not the values of budget reforms, there may be new opportunities for improving budgeting on a less grandiose, more piecemeal basis, such as using forecasts to analyze budgetary options. The findings here provide some insight into two questions concerning governmental forecasting. First, why do governments use complex methods? In support of previous research, since cities most dependent on intergovernmental aid tend to use complex forecasting, such methods may indeed be seen as a way to help cope with fiscal stress. Also, reflecting the ambiguity of current research, since cities tend to use relatively simple techniques regardless of the revenue source being forecasted, the source is at best a partial determinant of complexity. The most important predictor of complexity, however, was budget format; cities that emphasize reform methods, especially planning, tend to use the most complex forecast methods. The forecasting process was not as important as expected.Second, so what? Does forecasting influence budgetary choices? The evidence from the second part of the study suggest that it can, but within definable limits. Budget directors are more likely than councils to value outyear estimates, but both actors are much less likely to value long-term estimates. The survey results also indicate that revenue forecasts are not as useful for making political decisions as for making management decisions: the forecast is usually used as an internal document, is only sometimes intended to affect council decisions, and is not usually included in the budget. In short, the forecast may be most useful for making managerial decisions since that is what most cities want out of it. It also tends to be more useful if the budget format is less traditional. Finally, the findings indicate that forecasting may be more useful to management to the degree the council finds it politically useful. This is extremely important since it suggests that as powerful as technology may be, budgetary tools that do not meet political needs will be managerially confined.Clearly, more research is needed in this area. Does forecasting actually shape long-range plans? In the long run, will the forecasting effort change the ways cities budget? Can the availability of forecasting information strengthen one actor relative to another? These are important questions that need answering to clarify the impact of forecasting and other technologies on the budget process.     

Budgetary politics in the federal republic of Germany

The purpose of this article is to advocate a more careful approach towards the analysis of the factors that are decisive for the comparative evaluation of system performance and the reasons given for output variations. Using budgetary politics in the Federal Republic of Germany as an example, it is argued that the majority of the ‘Does politics matter?’ literature is oversimplifying reality by overlooking the institutional variable.     

Taxes,Budgetary Rule and Majority Voting

This paper studies majority voting outcomes fora specific class of two-dimensional policies. One policyinstrument influences efficiency and the other redistribution.Absent the political process, the two dimensions can beaddressed separately. With a two dimensional vote, the twoaspects will interact in a non-trivial way. The illustrativepolicy we consider, requires taxing an externality-generatinggood and determining a budgetary rule which specifies theproportions of the tax proceeds that go to wage earners and tocapital owners. We show: First, a sequential vote wherein thetax rate is determined first and the budgetary rule second,always possesses an equilibrium and that this equilibrium isthe median-endowed individual's most-preferred policy. Second,the reverse sequential choice implies that the median-endowedindividual may, but need not, be decisive. Third, the``Shepsle procedure'' also implies that the equilibrium is thepolicy most favored by the median individual. Fourth, thisequilibrium constitutes, under certain circumstances, theCondorcet winner for the unrestricted simultaneous votinggame.     

Viewing Spatial Consequences of Budgetary Policy Changes

While the research community is often very concerned with the distributional effect of public policy decisions, the geographic distribution of the affected populations is often overlooked. This paper argues that seemingly geographically neutral policies have spatial consequences and that the choice of how to measure them is important. We suggest that maps provide a powerful tool for communicating these ideas to policy makers and that geographical information systems supplemented by spatial statistics yield information that assist policy debates. We develop metrics to illustrate how geographic information provides insights into the spatial consequences of Medicaid expenditure changes in Ohio.     

Budgetary Consequences of Selling Federal Power Assets

This article reports on an analysis of the long-term budgetary effects of selling federal power programs at market value. The analysis looks at changes in future budgetary receipts and costs for power operations and at changes in future federal taxes as a result of new ownership. Under current rate-setting policy, federal agencies must generate a future operating surplus (and hence, budgetary income) worth about $46 billion in today's dollars to repay past capital investments. With optimistic assumptions about rising power rates, market values for all federal power assets (including the power-generation assets of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Corps of Engineers) could be as high as $62 billion. In that case, their sale would produce long-term budgetary savings of about $16 billion, in today's dollars. The analysis also notes that budgetary savings are not a measure of the gains in economic efficiency from privatization. Such considerations as efficiency or fairness to particular groups will be important in any debate about the future of federal power programs.     

Budgetary Policy With Unified and Decentralized Appropriations Authority

The divestiture of the House Appropriations Committee in the1880's has received considerable attention of an empiricalnature. This paper presents a formal model of legislativedecisionmaking, using a common agency formulation to representinterest group lobbying of legislators. This framework is usedto analyze the effects of decentralizing appropriationsauthority. The conditions under which decentralization leadsto higher spending are characterized. It is argued that theconventional view that divestiture caused higher levels ofspending only holds if decentralization created barriers tolobbying and political bargaining across different committees.In addition, the role of specialized committee knowledge isexamined.