The Genesis of the Austrian Model of Constitutional Review of Legislation

Abstract The European model of the constitutional review of legislation, characterized by the concentration of the constitutional review power in a single constitutional court, had its origin in the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. This is all the more remarkable when one considers that this Constitution established at the same time a parliamentary system of government in a fairly radical form. As the author explains, this “invention” of a constitutional court is attributable to two factors. One factor is the federal aspect. The Court was conceived by the framers of the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920 as an umpire between federal legislation and the legislation of the states or Länder. In this respect it was meant as a substitute for the principle of the priority of federal law over state or Land law. This is manifest in the initial draft of the Constitution, where actions on questions of the constitutionality of legislation could only be brought by the Federal government (against the legislation of one or another of the states or Länder) and by the State or Land governments (against federal legislation). Right from the beginning, however, the Court could examine a parliamentary act ex officio when it had to apply such an act in another proceeding. It was this power of the Court that triggered the development of constitutional review. Its exercise gradually transformed the Court into a guardian of the Constitution as a whole, in particular, the fundamental rights of citizens. The author traces this development in the context of the concept of state and law that prevailed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This concept included specific restrictions on constitutional review. On the basis of a different understanding of the functions of a constitution, the Court gave up these restrictions and followed the examples of the European Court of Human Rights, the German Constitutional Court and—indirectly—the American Supreme Court.     

“Our People in General Have a High Degree of Freedom”

This article considers the United States Supreme Court’s ruling in National Federation of Independent Business et al v Sebelius, which questioned the constitutionality of President Obama’s signature healthcare reforms of 2009, which have become colloquially known as ‘Obamacare’. Although the Supreme Court upheld the Act as constitutional, this article contends that the Supreme Court’s reasoning can be read as another battle in the long-standing debate in American politics over the correct size and limits of the Federal Government. In upholding the healthcare reforms as a tax, rather than under the Constitution’s Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court has endorsed a view of limited government in line with the principles of classical liberalism. This has the potential to greatly restrict the scope of the Federal Government to pursue large scale expansive social welfare programmes in the future.     

Speech, privacy, and the power of the purse: lessons from the abortion "gag rule" case.

In Rust v. Sullivan, 59 U.S.L.W. 4451 (1991), the US Supreme Court ruled that neither the privacy interests of family planning clients nor the 1st Amendment interests of their counselors prevented the government from banning all discussion of abortions in federally funded family planning clinics. In doing so, the Court also reaffirmed its view that the state and federal legislatures have virtually unlimited discretion in limiting or conditioning social welfare programs, a view having even greater long-term implications for American health policy than the implications of Rust for the constitutional protection of abortion. Rust upheld the Department of Health and Human Services' 1988 directive prohibiting the use of any funds from Title X of the Public Health Service Act (authorizing family planning programs) in programs where abortion is a method of family planning. This means that a clinician may lawfully respond to a client's inquiry about abortion only with a denial that abortion is an option. Thus, while allowing women the constitutional protection to chose an abortion, the Court has allowed the legislature to freely use the power of the purse to discourage or prevent the choice of abortion. Rust's greatest impact may well be in its acceptance of the enormous power wielded by the government over funded activities, especially in health policy. Justice Rehnquist believes there is not constitutional right to health, welfare, or any other government benefit; the legislative branches of the government cannot be required by judicial interpretation of the Constitution to provide any particular benefit or service to anyone. Even when the government chooses to fund a particular benefit, it is free to condition that benefit with virtually no judicially enforceable limits on that discretion.     

Referring Discovery Tasks to Special Masters: Is Rule 53 a Source of Authority and Restrictions?

The author concludes that federal judges who want to appoint special masters to perform duties related to civil discovery may not look to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for authority to do so. By examining the historical backdrop against which the original rules were written, as well as the minutes of the proceedings of the first Advisory Committee, Brazil demonstrates that neither Rule 53 nor any other rule was designed to grant federal trial courts power to assign pretrial discovery tasks to special masters. In fact, the evidence the author marshalls shows that the original Advisory Committee explicitly rejected the idea that the Federal Rules should authorize even a limited role for special masters in connection with discovery depositions.
Finding no authority for such appointments in the Federal Rules, the author turns to the judiciary's "inherent power." Drawing principles from the seminal Supreme Court opinion in this area, Brazil infers that in some circumstances the courts' inherent authority is a sufficient premise for delegating discovery tasks to special masters. Noting that the reported cases contain no clear guidelines about when or how federal judges should use this authority in making pretrial appointments, Brazil concludes by calling for a new federal rule covering this important subject.     

当下中国宪法司法化的路径与方法

法院适用法律必须解释法律,而解释法律又必须进行合宪解释,合宪解释是目前我国宪法在司法中适用的最好方式,是现行体制下我国宪法司法化的最佳路径。各级人民法院在民事、刑事和行政诉讼中审理每一起案件适用法律时都应当考虑到宪法,进行合宪解释。每一位法官都是合宪解释的主体,都享有法律解释权和宪法解释权,但这并不否定最高人民法院的最高司法解释权以及全国人大常委会对法律和宪法的最终解释权。法院通过合宪解释方式间接适用宪法,不必将宪法作为裁判依据而引用,但应当在裁判说理部分引用宪法条款。法院在合宪解释过程中发现法律明显违宪时,应当中止诉讼,逐级上报,由最高人民法院报送全国人大常委会处理。     

A bad trip for health-related human rights: implications of Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957

Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 85 ALJR 957; [2011] HCA 34 arose from a prosecution for drug trafficking brought under the Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances Act 1981 (Vic). The Australian High Court held that the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic) (the Charter) validly conferred a power on the Victorian Supreme Court and Court of Appeal to interpret legislation in a manner consistent with a defined list of human rights. By a slim majority it also held that the Charter validly created a judicial power to "declare" a law inconsistent with one or more enumerated human rights. In reaching its decision, however, the majority supported a narrow interpretation likely to undermine the intended capacity of the Charter to act as a remedial mechanism to reform laws, regulations and administrative practices which infringe human rights and freedoms. Although Momcilovic involved interpretation of a specific State human rights law, the High Court judgments allude to significant problems should the Federal Government seek to introduce a similar charter-based human rights system. Momcilovic, therefore, represents a risk to future efforts to develop nationally consistent Australian human rights jurisprudence. This has particular relevance to health and medically related areas such as the freedom from torture and degrading and inhuman treatment and, in future, enforceable constitutional health-related human rights such as that to emergency health care.     

TRIAL COURTS' RESPONSES TO SUPREME COURT POLICY CHANGES

This is an exploratory study focusing on the response of federal district courts to Supreme Court changes in three policy areas: economic regulation, civil liberties, and criminal justice. An analysis of federal district court opinions published in the Federal Supplement before and after the Supreme Court decisions announcing the policy changes indicated that opinion-writing patterns of federal district judges changed in a manner consistent with the Supreme Court's new direction. Further study of the federal district courts' role in the policy process is recommended and suggestions for such research are made.     

Freedom of information applications as an "evergreening" tactic: Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing v iNOVA Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd (2010) 191 FCR 573; [2010] FCA 1442

A recent decision of the Federal Court of Australia illustrates how patent-holding pharmaceutical companies are attempting to use Australia's Freedom of Information Act 1982 (Cth) to force Australian safety, quality and efficacy regulators to disclose whether generic competitors are attempting to enter the market. In Secretary, Department of Health and Ageing v iNova Pharmaceuticals (Australia) Pty Ltd (2010) 191 FCR 573; [2010] FCA 1442 a single judge of the Federal Court overturned a decision of the Administrative Appeals Tribunal (AAT) that would have compelled the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA) to reveal whether they were in possession of an application to register generic versions of two iNova products: imiquimod and phentermine. In its justification to the AAT for refusing to confirm or deny the existence of any application, the TGA argued that to reveal the existence of such a document would prejudice the proper administration of the National Health Act 1953 (Cth) as it could compromise the listing of a generic on the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme. The AAT failed to appreciate the extent to which this revelation to a competitor would have undercut 2004 amendments to the Therapeutic Goods Act 1989 (Cth) that provided penalties for evergreening tactics involving TGA notifications to drug patent-holders and 2006 amendments to the Patents Act 1990 (Cth) which protected the right of generic manufacturers to "springboard". The decision of the Federal Court is one of the first to explore the use of freedom of information legislation by patent-holders as a potential "evergreening" technique to prolong royalties by marginalising generic competition. Because of the significant amounts of money involved in ensuring rapid market entry of low-cost generic products, the issue has considerable public health significance.     

后Bilski时代电子商务商业方法专利之因应与挑战

美国法院早期以商业方法属于数学演绎方法为由,将商业方法排除在专利保护之外.受此影响,商业方法在美国一直被认为不应授予专利.后来法院提出如果抽象的商业方法与运用这种方法后发生了某种物理转换或者有形的装置相联系,则应承认其具有可专利性.1998年更是表明只要该项发明能导出“实用、具体、有形之结果”者,仍不失其可专利性,否认了商业方法在美国《专利法》中存在例外.虽然联邦巡回上诉法院在In re Bilski案中,提出美国《专利法》第101条规定的方法发明须符合“机器或转换测试法”,试图限缩商业方法专利的范围,但联邦最高法院在 Bilski v.Kappos案中否认其为审查商业方法专利唯一的判断标准.在迄今为止仍存较大争议的背景下,如果既无技术贡献,亦无技术特征,更未与其实现所必须的计算机设备或计算程序相结合,而仅系解决商业经营的程序、步骤或者流程者,商业方法即应为人类智力活动的规则或方法,属于思想的范畴,而不属于专利权的保护客体.     

Quarantine in times of emergency: the scope of s 51(ix) of the Constitution

This article explores the scope of s 51(ix) of the Constitution, the power of the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to "quarantine". While this power has sustained the Quarantine Act without a challenge since 1908, it may be that future national public health emergencies, such as epidemics or bioterrorism, will (as has happened in other countries) demand a level of federal preparedness that requires augmented public health powers at a national level. If so, will the scope of the quarantine power, as determined by the High Court, be wide enough allow the Commonwealth to implement these powers? While there is some advantage in a national approach, there is also some authority suggesting that the quarantine power could not extend to domestic public health controls. If there is uncertainty about the scope of the power, what are the options? Should there be another approach, with the States, Territories and the Commonwealth moving towards uniform legislation and co-operative arrangements?     

The Carhart case and late-term abortions -- what's next in Australia?

A recent case in the United States Supreme Court has indicated a change in course on the issue of abortion rights. In Gonzales v Carhart 127 S Ct 1610 (2007), the Supreme Court, in April 2007, upheld federal legislation banning a particular late-term abortion procedure with no exceptions (even to preserve the mother's life). This column examines the case in the context of recent Australian cases involving abortion issues. It extrapolates from Carhart to consider the potential for the Australian High Court to disrupt access to safe, medically supervised and performed abortion.     

论法人的基本权利主体地位

美国宪法并没有规定公司是基本权利主体,美国联邦最高法院在很多判例中亦认定美国宪法的特权与豁免条款不适用于公司。宪法第14修正案通过后,尤其是自19世纪80年代以来,美国联邦最高法院逐渐将宪法的保护扩大适用于公司,使得公司成为某些宪法基本权利的主体。这一转变迎合了美国经济发展的需要,使得国内统一大市场的建立成为可能。本文借鉴美国的宪法实践,细致梳理了公司作为基本权利主体的相关理论。     

Brief for bioethicists for privacy as amicus curiae supporting appellees

Amicus, an ad hoc group of philosophers, theologians, attorneys, and physicians, believe that adults should consult their doctor when making personal decisions. The doctor-patient relationship would be protected under the Constitution. In "Griswold v. Connecticut," the Supreme Court said that a state law which forbid married couples from using contraceptives was unconstitutional; that the couples should have a right to privacy. In "Roe," the Supreme Court recognized that a patient and her doctor should have privacy. In "Doe v. Bolton," the Supreme Court found that the State of Georgia was violating the patients' and physician's freedom. In "Planned Parenthood of Missouri v. Danforth," the Supreme Court said that a general informed consent provision was alright because it did not take away the abortion decision. The post- Roe state laws were ways to control doctors and patients so that a particular philosophical view could be imposed. The major question in Webster is whether personal decisions should be made by doctors and patients or the state. Both parties must agree to the decision. Section 188.205 of the Missouri law was before the Court in Webster. This section makes it illegal for public funds to be used to encourage a woman to have an abortion that wasn't necessary to save her life. There are medical conditions for which abortion is reasonable - Tay-Sachs disease, for instance. The child usually dies by 3 years of age. Without genetic screening, many at-risk couples would abort all pregnancies. 95% of all prenatal screenings are negative. State medical treatment decisions are arbitrary and impersonal. Having control over important personal decisions is necessary for freedom.     

Regulation of Cohabitation and Marriage in Canada

Marriage in Canada had lost much of its legal significance because of the extension of many of the incidents of marriage to unmarried cohabitants of the same or opposite sex. This process has resulted in large part from decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or marital status is constitutionally impermissible. In a decision that seemed to many a surprising reversal of this trend, the Supreme Court of Canada in 2002 ruled that legislators could constitutionally exclude unmarried couples from family property laws. The effect of this decision has been to revive the legal significance of marriage. At the same time, courts have resurrected the social significance of marriage by accepting the argument of same-sex marriage advocates that a "separate but equal" civil union institution would not respect the constitutional guarantee of equality and by endorsing the constitutional right of same-sex couples to the symbolic value of marriage as a public and legal celebration of a relationship. Same-sex marriages may now be legally celebrated in three Canadian provinces, and the federal government has made a commitment to open up civil marriage to same-sex couples across the country. While some same-sex couples and unmarried cohabitants have fought for spousal or marital status, others have sought to avoid the burdens associated with spousal status. After the same-sex marriage debate is concluded, Canada will be ready to move on to consider whether all of the legal privileges and burdens now assigned to those in conjugal relationships, whether married, unmarried, same-sex or opposite-sex, can be justified.     

The German Constitutional Court and the European Arrest Warrant: 'Cryptic Signals' from Karlsruhe

In an important 2005 judgment, the German Federal ConstitutionalCourt declared void the German Act that was meant to implementthe European Union Framework Decision on the European ArrestWarrant. However, according to the Constitutional Court, theFramework Decision itself did not necessarily provoke a breachof the German Constitution. If the German legislator had madeadequate use of the tolerance provided by the Framework Decision,he could have avoided any conflict with the Constitution. While,at first sight, the Court's criticism solely seems to referto German national law, a closer look at some statements thatdeal with European law reveals a high potential for future disagreementbetween the German Constitutional Court and European institutions:they do not share the same view as to the development of Europeancooperation in criminal matters.     

Scrutiny Land: Scrutiny Land is the place where government needs to justify to a court its restrictions on the liberties of the people

Scrutiny Land is the place where government needs to justify to a court its restrictions on the liberties of the people. In the 1930s, the Supreme Court began limiting access to Scrutiny Land. While the New Deal Court merely shifted the burden to those challenging a law to show that a restriction of liberty is irrational, the Warren Court made the presumption of constitutionality effectively irrebuttable. After this, only one road to Scrutiny Land remained: showing that the liberty being restricted was a fundamental right. The Glucksberg Two-Step, however, limited the doctrine of fundamental rights to those (1) narrowly defined liberties that are (2) deeply rooted in tradition and history. In this Article, I explain how the ability to define accurately almost any liberty as broad or narrow improperly gives courts complete discretion to protect liberty or not as it chooses. I then describe an alternative that is suggested by the approach taken by the Court in Lawrence v. Texas: a general presumption of liberty. Not only is such an approach practical, it is also more consistent with the text and original meaning of the Constitution than is the Glucksburg Two-Step.     

Federal antitrust jurisdiction in peer review cases: the Pinhas decision

In Summit Health Ltd. v. Pinhas, the United States Supreme Court by a narrow majority found that the exclusion of an ophthalmologist from a hospital in Los Angeles had a sufficient effect on interstate commerce to establish federal jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. In resolving a split among the federal circuit courts of appeal, the Court applied the broad jurisdictional test from McLain v. Real Estate Board of New Orleans, Inc. to peer review proceedings. Despite many ambiguities in the majority opinion by Justice Stevens and a scathing dissent by Justice Scalia, the effect of Pinhas will be to increase the suits in federal court on antitrust grounds brought by aggrieved medical staff members and applicants denied appointments or privileges, and to decrease, if not eliminate, the likelihood of preliminary dismissal on jurisdictional grounds. This, in turn, should serve to emphasize the importance of complying with the Health Care Quality Improvement Act in order to obtain immunity from damages under federal antitrust and state laws.     

MAGNA CARTA AND THE AMERICAN POLITICAL IMAGINATION: TWO INSTANCES OF HABEAS CORPUS VINDICATED

Magna Carta has long been understood as a source of inspiration for the U.S. Constitution, and especially its enshrinement of the writ of habeas corpus — the right of any prisoner to test his or her detention according to the law. In the “Suspension Clause” of the U.S. Constitution (Article I, Section 8), Congress is granted permission to suspend habeas corpus only “when in cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.” This article surveys two failed attempts by the U.S. government to suspend the writ of habeas corpus. The first (which was actually the very first such attempt) was in 1807 and followed revelations of the so-called Burr Conspiracy. The second (incidentally the most recent in American history) occurred during the War on Terror and culminated with the Supreme Court’s decision of Boumediene vs Bush in 2008. A close examination of these two historical episodes reveals just how different were the constitutional processes of the early republic and contemporary times. Additionally, comparing the uses of Magna Carta during the two episodes demonstrates marked changes in American political culture. Historical consciousness, vital to early Americans’ understanding of their political system, has shifted to an elite level. Likewise, the protection of fundamental liberties has migrated from the popular branch of government (Congress) to the elite one (the Supreme Court). This article considers the implication of this shift in both constitutional processes and historical consciousness.     

The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Austria 1918–1920

Abstract.   Constitutional review was the most original idea stemming from the Austrian Federal Constitution of 1920. It is argued that the politician Karl Renner gave birth to the idea of a constitutional court. Hans Kelsen played the predominant role in the drafting of constitutional provisions. The new Constitutional Court provided for a centralized system of review, with an eye to a number of politically important issues. Owing to the pressure that stemmed from various discussions between and among the politicians of the national state and the Länder , Kelsen was obliged to depart from the German model of the federal state and to develop in its place a new theory.