Rival Foreign Office Perceptions of Germany, 1936-39

This article examines the charge that, especially during the period when Sir Robert Vansittart was Permanent Under-Secretary, the Foreign Office was anti-German in its orientation. It also analyzes the role played by three successive ambassadors, Sir Horace Rumbold, Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Nevile Henderson in influencing the Foreign Office perception of Germany, and examines the Foreign Office's attitude to the anti-Nazi Germany opposition. Finally, the article looks at the evidence for continuity between the Vansittart period, and that which followed under Sir Alexander Cadogan, before concluding that the latter was more inclined to accept the appeasement of Germany.     

Dealing with the Intractable: A Possible Negotiating Position for the New British Ambassador to Berlin,Summer 1933

Foreign Office diplomats recognised the danger to British security posed by Adolph Hitler’s accession to the chancellorship of Germany in January 1933 but differed on how to meet this challenge. This article reproduces the hitherto unpublished draft instructions prepared by Owen O’Malley, a ranking official at the Foreign Office, for the newly appointed ambassador to Germany, Sir Eric Phipps, on taking up his posting in autumn 1933. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent under secretary, who took a sceptical but not entirely hostile view of O’Malley’s proposals, minutes O’Malley’s suggestion of a clear warning to Hitler, accompanied by the opening of negotiations with Nazi Germany recognising its enhanced position and the justice of some of its claims. Vansittart did not forward the draft memorandum to the foreign secretary, Sir John Simon, and there is, as far as I know, no copy of this in the public archives. Included is additional information on the clashes between the two men on how dictators should be treated as well as biographical information on the careers of the three men involved in this debate.     

Sir Eric Phipps, the British Government, and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933-1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps' reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933-1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps' attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Sir Eric Phipps,the British Government,and the Appeasement of Germany, 1933–1937

This article argues that Sir Eric Phipps’ reputation as an “anti-appeaser” of Germany during his Berlin embassy 1933–1937 is not accurate. While Phipps was not in favor of placating Hitler by making territorial concessions, he had much in common with those who had sought a rapprochement with Germany in the 1920s through a policy of inclusion and reconciliation. Particular importance is placed on Phipps’ attitude towards the League of Nations, with detailed consideration also being accorded to his relationship with the British Foreign Secretaries and Foreign Office officials of the period, as well as his views on the Entente Cordiale.     

Sir Alexander Cadogan and Lord Halifax's 'Damascus road' conversion over the Godesberg terms 1938

The article challenges the recent perception that Lord Halifax was the hero of the Czech crisis in 1938, when in fact the real credit for his revolt against the Godesberg terms belonged to Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office. It does on to argue that Halifax was ill suited by nature to be Foreign Secretary and that his subsequent record shows him to have been a natural appeaser, still loyal to Chamberlain, who argued for an accommodation with Hitler in the summer of 1940.     

Sir Alexander Cadogan and Lord Halifax's ‘Damascus road’ conversion over the Godesberg terms 1938

The article challenges the recent perception that Lord Halifax was the hero of the Czech crisis in 1938, when in fact the real credit for his revolt against the Godesberg terms belonged to Sir Alexander Cadogan, the Permanent Under‐Secretary at the Foreign Office. It does on to argue that Halifax was ill suited by nature to be Foreign Secretary and that his subsequent record shows him to have been a natural appeaser, still loyal to Chamberlain, who argued for an accommodation with Hitler in the summer of 1940.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922-24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923-4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

British Policy and the Ruhr Crisis 1922–24

This article provides an overview of British policy during a defining episode in the interwar period — the Ruhr crisis of 1923–4. The author assesses the external considerations influencing Britain's policy (especially the roles of France, Germany, and the United States), and also explores the processes of foreign policy making within Britain's complex bureaucratic system. In particular, the relationship between the Foreign Office and the Treasury is analyzed and its impact on European policy assessed. The article challenges traditional views of British policy at this time, concluding that it was far more complex, but also far more limited and constrained, than previous studies would suggest.     

The “New Look” of German Diplomacy: The West German Foreign Service after the Second World War

When established in 1951, the West German Foreign Office resembled its pre-1945 Berlin Ministry predecessor in many ways. Notably, about 45 percent of Bonn’s diplomats came from the old service. Such continuities raised concerns about a restoration of old diplomatic traditions and attitudes. However, significant changes in German diplomacy—its West German variant—soon became evident, not least in terms of diplomatic style and methods. This analysis explores how the Foreign Office’s staff adopted, promoted, or rejected such changes. It assesses institutional processes of transformation and examines why diplomats were willing to “re-learn” diplomacy after the Second World War. Likewise evaluated are the problems and limits of re-orientation. By focussing on (dis)continuities within the Foreign Service in the 1950s and 1960s, the analysis contributes to the general field of research on processes of transition in West Germany after the end of the Third Reich.     

Curzon, Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919-22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an 'eclipse' in this period.     

Curzon,Lloyd George and the control of British foreign policy, 1919–22: A reassessment

This article reappraises the complex relationship between Lord Curzon and Lloyd George in the years between the former's appointment as Foreign Secretary and the latter's fall from office as Prime Minister in 1922. It argues that the widely held view that Lloyd George held Curzon in contempt and marginalized him in the conduct of foreign affairs is not accurate. Their relationship is presented as being one of mutual respect and significant levels of cooperation. The article thus questions the extent to which the Foreign Office suffered an ‘eclipse’ in this period.     

"The Quest": The Strange Life of W. J. Garnett

This article investigates the career of a British diplomat, William Garnett, whose unusual life has until know been neglected by historians. Garnett's papers, held at Lancashire Record Office, are a particularly rich source for historians of British diplomacy, the British Foreign Office, and overseas travel in the first two decades of the twentieth century. Garnett was often outspoken and indiscreet in his private correspondence and his archive, on which this article draws, provides valuable insights into British representation and British policy in the countries to which he was posted in the period 1902-1919.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office,the admiralty,and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936–37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

The politics of naval aid: the foreign office, the admiralty, and Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation, 1936-37

This article examines the interdepartmental friction caused by Soviet requests for technical naval assistance from Britain between 1936 and 1937. With an eye to the deteriorating global situation, the Admiralry remained wedded to the view that any help leading to the strengthening of the Soviet navy would only wreck Germanys commitment to crucial qualitative and quantitative naval restrictions. Adopting a different tack, the Foreign Office welcomed the opportuniry to accommodate Soviet fleet requirements as a means of forging Anglo-Soviet amiry and a European balance of power. Ultimately however, the fate of Anglo-Soviet technical cooperation was determined by the exigencies of British rearmament.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919-26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the 'oppressed nationalities' of Austria-Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

The Eurafrique Initiative,Ernest Bevin and Anglo–French Relations in the Foreign Office, 1945–1950

This analysis examines the prevalence of Eurafrican thinking in the British Foreign Office throughout the late 1940s. Drawing on British and French diplomatic archives, it reveals the centricity of the Foreign Office, and British Embassy at Paris to a project largely confined to the mental map of the Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin. The financial stains facing Britain, often misinterpreted as “decline”, seemed a temporary phenomenon that “multilateral European cooperation” could rectify. Although shelved in 1949–1950, the Eurafrique initiative has seen few historians analyse its strategies across the corridors of power. This analysis reappraises British desires for Western European “co-operation” and a renewed faith in the Entente Cordiale as a geo-political counterweight to growing East–West bipolarity. Discussions of strategies to pool African possessions to recover the European economy were short-lived. Yet they challenged prospects of long-term economic dependence upon the United States in favour of an Anglo–French led European bloc.     

'Almost a law of nature'? Sir Edward Grey, the foreign office, and the balance of power in Europe, 1905-12

This article considers the concept of the balance of power as it was applied by the British Foreign Office before the First World War, focusing on 1905-12. The place of the balance of power in British thinking is discussed, focusing on the ideas of the small number of individuals that shaped British foreign policy in this period. The balance of power in the years before the war was a product of more than the military balance sheet but also of the diplomatic dynamics.     

Viorel Virgil Tilea and the Origins of the Second World War: An Essay in Closure

The 'Tilea Affair' of March 1939 is among the most contentious of the short-term events leading to the Second World War. V.V. Tilea, the Romanian minister in London, brought information to the British Foreign Office, about an alleged German threat to his country. The guarantee to Poland soon followed and, in turn, the outbreak of the war. This article examines the evidence offered by contemporary British witnesses, the ensuing historical controversy - bringing to bear a variety of new revelations, including materials derived from the author's acquaintance with Tilea - and the present state of historical knowledge. It concludes that closure can be applied to most aspects of the 'Tilea Affair'.     

Sir George Clerk and the struggle for British influence in central Europe, 1919–26

During the Great War, Sir George Clerk was a senior Foreign Office official, strongly sympathetic to the cause of the ‘oppressed nationalities’ of Austria‐Hungary and the liberal ideals associated with the journal, The New Europe. In 1919 he was granted a unique opportunity to shape the face of the New Europe when he embarked on his mission to Hungary. As British minister to Czechoslovakia in the early 1920s, Clerk harnessed his idealism for the Czechs to his ambition to make Prague a centre of British influence and power in central Europe. Though this policy ultimately failed, Clerk showed a greater rapport and sympathy for the Czechs than any of his successors.     

Britain,the united states and the control of nuclear weapons: The diplomacy of the Thor deployment 1956–58

The 'Tilea Affair' of March 1939 is among the most contentious of the short-term events leading to the Second World War. V.V. Tilea, the Romanian minister in London, brought information to the British Foreign Office, about an alleged German threat to his country. The guarantee to Poland soon followed and, in turn, the outbreak of the war. This article examines the evidence offered by contemporary British witnesses, the ensuing historical controversy - bringing to bear a variety of new revelations, including materials derived from the author's acquaintance with Tilea - and the present state of historical knowledge. It concludes that closure can be applied to most aspects of the 'Tilea Affair'.