Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination.

     

人格权法的发展与完善——以人格尊严的保护为视角

从人格权法的发展趋势出发,现代人格权制度的核心在于保护人格尊严。从保障人格尊严的角度出发,我国人格权法应该依据宪法尊重和保障人格尊严的规定,以人格尊严的保护为中心,在《民法通则》确认的人格权基础上,对隐私权、个人信息、网络环境下的人格权作出确认和完善。     

Criminalizing Behaviour to Protect Human Dignity

The purpose of this article is to discuss the criminalization of conduct based on human dignity arguments. It proposes a modest version of integrating human dignity into discussions about criminalization. After a critical examination of both the notion of ??human dignity as an objective value?? and the assumption that the meaning of human dignity can be explained by referring to Kant??s moral philosophy, human dignity violations are characterized as severe humiliations.     

宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

人性尊严的宪法解释方法及其问题——以克隆人宪法争议为例

在克隆人的宪法争议中,人性尊严常常是反对克隆人技术的论者所采用的抗辩事由。由于这个极其抽象的概念给解释者留下足够的闪转腾挪的空间,它的具体涵义为何一直存在巨大争议。传统宪法解释理论缺乏事实面向,在这一争议上的表现并不能令人满意。因此,需要反思传统宪法解释方法,在维护宪法文本的前提下,进行后果考量,以结果取向的解释方法作为解决这一问题的手段。     

个人信息权的体系化解释——兼论《个人信息保护法》的公法属性

《个人信息保护法》是数字时代个人信息保护的基本法。它采取了将个人信息权作为新兴公法权利的思路,确立了完整的个人信息权利保护体系,在个人信息保护问题上和《民法典》一起形成了公私法共同协力的进路。《个人信息保护法》以权利束的方式规定了个人信息主体的知情权、决定权、查阅权、复制权、更正权、删除权、可携带权和信息权利救济权等。《个人信息保护法》从立法依据、权利体系、条文设计和规制措施上都体现出鲜明的公法属性,这也可以从基本权利的双重面向和个人信息国家保护义务得到理论上的证成。这部法律是数字时代公法秩序的基石,它对公法边界的形塑仍需通过其实施来确立。     

人权视野下传统工具主义刑法观之价值超越——对“许霆案”有罪判决的批判与反思

“法无明文规定不为罪”是罪刑法定原则的核心内涵。许霆无罪是贯彻和落实罪刑法定原则的应有之意。“许霆案”有罪判决的根源在于传统工具主义刑法观偏颇运行。超越传统工具主义刑法观，必须以维护人性尊严为前提，以树立目的权利观为核心，重新建构刑法机能的价值序列。     

个人信息权的宪法(学)证成——基于对区分保护论和支配权论的反思

《个人信息保护法》最终纳入“根据宪法”条款,表征着个人信息保护法律体系在底层逻辑上的更动。民法学上权利与利益的区分保护原理,难以适用于整个合宪性法秩序。应将个人信息权确立为宪法位阶的基本权利,并以基本权利作为针对国家的主观防御权和辐射一切法领域的客观价值秩序的原理,协调个人信息保护的私法机制和公法机制。通过对人权条款笼罩下的通信权和人格尊严条款的解释,可以在学理上证立“基本权利束”性质的个人信息权。但其具体保护则应分别归入不同基本权利条款,作出区分化、差异化的多层次构造。个人信息保护的支配权思维有其局限,告知同意模式的式微是重要表现。应将个人信息权的规范目标调整为人格的自由发展,指向免于他人的人格干预。从支配权到人格发展权的思维转换,有助于规制对已收集信息的不当利用、破除“信息茧房”、缓和个人信息保护与利用之间的紧张,以及在“个人—平台—国家”的三方关系中有效保护个人的自决,同时为数据产业保留发展空间。     

Human Dignity of “Offenders”: A Limitation on Substantive Criminal Law

The paper argues for attaching a significant role to the dignity of offenders as a limitation on the scope of substantive criminal law. Three different aspects of human dignity are discussed. Human dignity is closely connected with the principle of culpability. Respecting the dignity of offenders requires that we assign criminal liability according to the actual attitudes of the offenders towards the interests protected by the offence. The doctrine of natural and probable consequence of complicity, which allows us to assign liability for mens rea offenses to a negligent offender, violates the dignity of the offender; it treats the incautious offender as if she had willfully expressed disrespect towards the protected interest. The human dignity core of privacy is invaded by criminalizing the private possession of child pornography. By extending the prohibition of the creation, sale and distribution of child pornography to the private possession of pornography, the State attempts to control the way the individual expresses an essential part of the self—his sexual fantasies—within himself. Dignity demands that our actions convey an attitude of respect towards human beings. The expressive meaning of disrespect is culture-dependent. The historical association with totalitarian regimes explains our reluctance to impose a legal duty to report past crime: the individual who is legally required to turn a suspect into the police is viewed as an “informant.”     

Genetic Determinism and Discrimination: A Call to Re-Orient Prevailing Human Rights Discourse to Better Comport with the Public Implications of Individual Genetic Testing

Genetic testing can not only provide information about diseases but also their prevalence in ethnic, gender, or other vulnerable populations. While offering the promise of significant therapeutic benefits and serving to highlight our commonality, genetic information also raises a number of sensitive human rights issues touching on identity and the perception thereof, as well as the possibility of discrimination and social stigma. It stands to reason that the results of individual screenings could haplessly be used to make general assumptions about entire ethnic or gender groups. In this manner, genetic information can directly influence identity by impacting and perhaps even reframing conceptions of group rights and dimensions of self-identification, thus importing constitutional scrutiny on questions of dignity and discrimination in particular. Is there a risk of collective stigmatization deriving from discrete testing of self-identified individuals? Would such stigmatization impinge on individual dignity by the exogenous imposition of ethnic or gender/sexual identity? If so, what norms can most adequately respond if and when individual and group interests diverge? These questions are examined from a comparative perspective.     

从威权型法到自由民主型法——法治发展的全球趋势

法治社会的生成是一个不断削弱政治专权、捍卫个体尊严的过程。威权型法作为政治权力的孳息物 ,具有人格贬损、话语霸权、政法合一、严刑峻法等特征 ,从而使人不成其为人 ,使法不成其为法。从威权型法转向自由民主型法是全球化时代的法治发展趋势。自由民主型法的价值取向是权利至上 ;制度支撑是宪政体制 ,具体内容包括人民主权、权力分割、违宪审查、司法独立和政党守法等内容。     

Hatred,A Solidification of Meaning

While friend/enemy are commonly perceived to be mutually constitutive opposites, it is not so evident that hatred is the opposite of love. Hatred is oriented by two ideologies specific to European thought—‘nature’ as an illusory universal, and the ‘ego’ (me, moi), distinct from the ‘I’, as an irreducible expression of identity. The origins of racial hatred in naturalised hierarchical classification at the time of European colonial expansion demonstrates how naturalism and egoism combined to produce an over-valuation of one’s own self or group as authentic or pure. Drawing on Pascal, Fanon and Derrida, this essay challenges the autonomous, self-loving and naturalised sense of self. It calls for education as a form of action against racial hatred, including hate-speech. It suggests that the dignity or absoluteness of each individual or group should be thought as a ‘sense’ which cannot be reduced to a meaning. This is in contrast to hatred which presupposes closed or solidified meanings.     

Human Dignity as a Sui Generis Principle

This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.     

Reflexiones sobre la dignidad humana en la actualidad

The concept of human dignity has its origin in ancient Greece, but is enriched in meaning and scope throughout the development of human history. From being a concept linked to social position, to express the autonomy and moral capacity of people, making it the undisputed foundation of human rights. Human dignity has special relevance, as an element to confront and develop standards for social transformations caused by scientific and technological development. In this paper we focus on addressing those concerning the beginning of human life and its end.     

The Ethics of Care,Dependence, and Disability*

According to the most important theories of justice, personal dignity is closely related to independence, and the care that people with disabilities receive is seen as a way for them to achieve the greatest possible autonomy. However, human beings are naturally subject to periods of dependency, and people without disabilities are only “temporarily abled.” Instead of seeing assistance as a limitation, we consider it to be a resource at the basis of a vision of society that is able to account for inevitable dependency relationships between “unequals” ensuring a fulfilling life both for the carer and the cared for. **     

Dignity, Democracy, Civilisation

This paper contributes to international discussion about the difficulty of defining human dignity as a legal concept by locating it at the heart of (European) democracy and human rights. Focusing on emerging dignity case law in the United Kingdom, the paper explores the connections among dignity, human rights and democracy, and the uses of dignity to enhance and refine democracy. While judges are key actors in the construction of dignity, they operate within the boundaries of a particular democratic ‘civilisation’ anchored in the core prohibitions of art 2, 3 and 4 European Convention on Human Rights, combined with those of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). This normative core, the paper argues, is to be understood in the wider time frame of democracy and dignity, which is equally important for refining and thickening human dignity’s conceptual and normative definition, as well as for reflecting on the legitimacy of its (judicial) uses.     

论民法典中人格权的实证概念

尽管我国民法典以独立成编的方式规定了人格权,但是,由于对人格权的概念存在巨大争议,所以,从民法典人格权编的具体内容和规范来反观人格权的实证概念对于理论研究和司法实践更具有意义。从我国民法典的内容看,我国民法典人格权编实际上包括了两个部分:一是对人格权的保护,二是对人格尊严的保护。隐私权与信息的二元保护就清楚地说明了这一问题。因此,不能认为人格权编中保护的都是人格权。必须把人格权的概念与人格利益区分开来,从而决定其保护程度与救济措施的差别。另外,从表面上看,虽然看起来都是相同的权利(人格权),但是,法人和非法人组织的人格权与自然人的人格权建立在完全不同或者说完全不相关的基础之上--自然人的人格权是以人的自由和尊严为核心的,而法人或者非法人组织的所谓人格权完全是技术处理的结果。当然,这种处理方式也可以通过其他方式处理。荣誉权无论从哪个方面看,都不具有人格权的特征;虽然民法典对其予以了明确规定,但是,荣誉权确实不应该是人身自由和人格尊严的表现,我们在实践中应当将其作为一种特殊权利对待。总之,人格权可以定义为:自然人享有的人之所以为人的主体性权利,包括生命权、身体权、健康权、姓名权、肖像权、名誉权、荣誉权、隐私权等权利,是个人自由、尊严在民法上的具体体现。法人仅仅享有与自由和尊严无关的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权,但法人的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权在实质上不是人格权。     

人权：弱势群体法律保护的价值基础——兼议我国弱势群体权益保护立法的完善

人权是弱势群体法律保护的价值基础。人权的核心价值在于维护人之为人的基本尊严。人权的普遍性和平等性是这一核心价值的必然体现。弱势群体保护是由人权的普遍性和平等性推导出的必然结果。保护弱势群体,首要的任务是将弱势群体的人权实证化为法律权利。因此,完善我国保护弱势群体的法律制度,建立起完善的弱势群体权益保障机制是我们面临的迫切任务。     

论我国基因信息不知情权的确立

基因信息对健康状况具有强烈的预测性,出于诸种原因当事人未必想知晓基因信息.为充分尊重自我决定权,比较法上承认权利人享有基因信息不知情权.基因信息不知情权指权利人有权预先决定是否接受基因信息的披露,其核心要义为“知情拒绝权”.基因信息不知情权旨在保障权利人对基因信息的自主控制,在我国隐私权与个人信息区分规制的立法模式下,...     

人格权的伦理分析

罗马法中的人与人格是一种关于身份的理论,在法国民法典中也没有人格权的规定。人格权是伦理学发展到一定阶段并随着民法在技术上的成熟而在德国民法典中最终确立的,康德的人格主义伦理学构成了德国民法典的精神基础。精神基础与制度基础的分离使得人格权进入法典面临诸多技术上的障碍。人格权的伦理内涵在于人的尊严,人格权的客体是“人的伦理价值”,人格权中的人只能是自然人,法人不具有伦理上的人格。人具有尊严,作为一个定言命令是相互的,人格权之侵权责任的实质也源于“尊重”。