The Special Case Thesis

The author outlines his thesis that legal discourse is a special case of general practical discourse ( Sonderfallthese ) and develops it as an attempt to cover both the authoritative, institutional, or real and free, discursive, or ideal dimension of legal reasoning. On this basis, he examines the objections raised by Habermas (1996) to the special case thesis. First, he discusses the reduction of general practical discourse to moral discourses ( genus proximum problem) holding that the former is a combination of moral, ethical, and pragmatic arguments within the priority of just; second, he examines the objection that general practical arguments change their character or nature when employed in legal contexts (subset and specification problem) and the related problems concerning legal validity and unjust law. He concludes proposing a procedural (opposite to a coherential) integration of general practical arguments in the legal context.     

The Dual Nature of Law

The argument of this article is that the dual‐nature thesis is not only capable of solving the problem of legal positivism, but also addresses all fundamental questions of law. Examples are the relation between deliberative democracy and democracy qua decision‐making procedure along the lines of the majority principle, the connection between human rights as moral rights and constitutional rights as positive rights, the relation between constitutional review qua ideal representation of the people and parliamentary legislation, the commitment of legal argumentation to both authoritative and non‐authoritative reasons, and the distinction between rules as expressing a real “ought” and principles as expressing its ideal counterpart. All of this underscores the point that the dual nature of law is the single most essential feature of law.     

The Special Case Thesis. An Assessment of R. Alexy's Discursive Theory of Law

Legal Argumentation Theories seek mainly to develop procedures, criteria and principles which can guarantee a proper justification of legal propositions within modern legal systems. In doing this, those theories solicit in general an interconnection between practical reasoning and legal reasoning. This paper refers mainly to what seems currently to be the most elaborate theory of legal argumentation, that is R. Alexy's Theorie der juristischen Argumentation. Although the discussion is mainly concentrated on critical points of R. Alexy's theory, this paper's scope is slightly broader; it attempts to present an overall view of the current discursive theory of law. This is mainly performed through the critical examination of R. Alexy's Special Case Thesis, which seems to raise a handful of counter arguments on behalf of the other proponents of Legal Argumentation. In the first part the special case thesis is presented, as well as the main objections to it. In the second part the validity of the special case thesis is checked against K. Günther's model of practical discourse, which proves to be more elaborate in certain points, when compared with the corresponding model of R. Alexy. In the third part it is shown that the special case thesis can be accepted consistently only if it is combined with a normative theory of law that advocates the interconnection of the concept of law with the idea of right morality. It is further suggested that legal discourse has to be perceived as a special case of a broader moral-political discourse that “explains” or “justifies” (morally) the various restrictions that the positive legal systems impose on the legal discourse.     

Robert Alexy and the Dual Nature of Law

Robert Alexy's claim that law of necessity has a dual nature raises many interesting philosophical questions. In this article, I consider some of these questions, such as what the meaning of the correctness thesis is, whether Alexy's discourse theory supports this thesis, and whether the thesis is defensible; whether Alexy's argument from anarchy and civil war supports the claim that law of necessity has a real dimension; and what the implications are of the use of moral arguments, such as the argument from injustice, for the status of Alexy's inquiry.     

Practical‐Political Jurisprudence and the Dual Nature of Law

Law contains many dualities, though most, if not all, of these dualities resolve into one complex puzzle: To what extent is law a matter of pure social facts, or moral value untethered to social facts? I argue that each concept of law reconciles this duality in a different way on the basis of certain beneficial consequences that might result. Instead of pitting concepts against one another universally, we should accept that the balance between law's social fact and moral value dimensions is context‐specific in relation to particular legal puzzles. This balance can be achieved only by considering both political theory and empirical data.     

经济法责任体系的二元结构及二重性

经济法律关系的主体分为国家和具有一定经济功能的个体 ,参与经济活动的任何主体的经济违法行为 ,都同时损害了社会整体利益与某一个体的经济利益。与此相应 ,经济法律责任具有二元性与二重性 ,即同时承担公法责任及私法责任     

香港基本法是宪法性法律

<中华人民共和国香港特别行政区基本法>(以下简称香港基本法)到今年已实施十周年.①香港基本法的实施,实现了"一国两制"的构想,促进了国家的和平统一,对香港的稳定与繁荣发挥了重要作用.     

The Weak Natural Law Thesis and the Common Good

The weak natural law thesis asserts that any instance of law is either a rational standard for conduct or defective. At first glance, the thesis seems compatible with the proposition that the validity of a law within a legal system depends upon its sources rather than its merits. Mark C. Murphy has nonetheless argued that the weak natural law thesis can challenge this core commitment of legal positivism via an appeal to law’s function and defectiveness conditions. My contention in the current paper is that in order to make good on the challenge, the defender of the weak natural law thesis should appeal explicitly to the common good, understood as the principal normative reason in the political domain. In section I I outline the main implications of the weak natural law thesis and clarify a common misunderstanding regarding its explanatory role. Section II then argues for the indispensability of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential thesis on the grounds that it has an essential role to play in a natural law account of law’s defectiveness conditions and the presumptive moral obligatoriness of legal norms. Finally, in section III I examine the compatibility of a strengthened version of the weak natural law thesis with legal positivism in light of the centrality of the common good to the natural law jurisprudential position.     

违法所得没收特别程序的性质与案件范围

新《刑事诉讼法》确立的违法所得没收特别程序在性质上属于程序障碍情况下实施的刑事没收中针对某些犯罪案件而特别设计的程序,2012年底最高人民法院、最高人民检察院的新司法解释扩张其案件范围的规定,实为将两种在制度目的、制度原理与立法技术等方面不同的没收制度一并纳入特别程序之中,这种设计在制度结构上存在不合理性,应有所调整。     

经济法的本质:协调主义及其经济学基础

经济法的本质是经济法学研究的基础理论问题。当前经济法学界对经济法本质的观点主要有干预主义和协调主义两种 ,作者认为二者谁也无法取代谁。作为公法私法化和私法公法化互动作用产物的经济法的本质只能是协调主义。经济法应当以协调社会利益和个体整体利益为立足点 ,和民商法、行政法携起手来 ,共同调整经济生活。     

刑法的本质

本文认为刑法的惩罚功能与教育功能是统一的 ,刑法的教育功能是通过惩罚功能体现出来的 ,即应当为教育而惩罚 ;刑法的本质要求诉讼程序公正 ,实体的正义要求程序的正当。     

政策性银行法性质探析

本文探讨了政策性银行法的性质。作者认为, 探讨政策性银行法的性质对制定我国的政策性银行法具有重要意义。政策性银行法是公法与私法的混合法, 也是经济法中重要的宏观调控法, 也是金融法（ 银行法） 的重要组成部分, 应该重视和加强对政策性银行法的深入研究。     

权威命题与法律理由的性质:一个反思性的评论

法律理由的排他性与内容独立性是支撑权威命题的基础,也是排他性法律实证主义与其他法哲学流派相竞争的根据。Wilfrid Waluchow、Heidi Hurd与Larry Alexander对法律理由性质的批评都不足以推翻法律的排他性,但排他性并不必然产生义务,因此既要坚持以法律的制度性为基础的实践权威的特征,又要改进权威合法性的证成模式,使得权威理由能够产生服从的道德义务。法律的规范性不是一个事实问题而是一个证成问题,民主参与的因素可以把实践权威的排他性与行动者实践推理的内在性结合起来,从而权威可以使服从者产生服从的道德义务。     

法学知识的属性与进步

法学理论的创新是当下学术界法治论式中的一种普遍诉求 ,但是 ,法学理论研究中的这种创新努力是建立在科学主义的法学本体论和方法论基础上的。自 1 9世纪以来形成的科学主义对人文社会科学的影响不仅在西方 ,而且在中国都是深远、厚重的 ,这种科学主义对我国法学理论和法律实践的负面影响也是广泛深刻的。由于法学理论作为一种人文社会科学知识与科学有着十分广泛且重要的区别 ,因此 ,尽管我们需要在法学理论的研究中坚持科学精神 ,但科学主义却是我们应当警惕的。否则 ,围绕理论创新所进行的各种努力恰恰可能滞碍我们所希望得到的进步     

The Nature of Law and Potential Coercion

This paper argues for a novel understanding of the relationship between law and coercion. It firstly refutes Kenneth Himma’s claim that the authorisation of coercive enforcement mechanisms is a conceptually necessary feature of law. It then claims that the best way to understand the law is as coercion‐apt. The “coercion‐aptness” of law is clarified, in part, by appealing to an essential distinction between law and morality: Whereas it can be reasonable for the law to appeal to coercive means in order to motivate compliance, it seems decidedly unreasonable for morality to do so.     

2002年环境资源法学研究的回顾与展望

2002年我国环境资源法学研究的发展主要体现在: 第一,科研力量发展.一批环境资源法教学科研机构和硕士点成立,除了专职研究人员外,越来越多的相关学科的学者关心和参与环境资源法的教学和科研活动,环境资源法学研究从初期的封闭状态日益走向开放,日益与大法学和相关的自然科学相融合.……     

刑法概念的重新界定及展开

刑法学体系本来应是刑法概念的逻辑展开,刑法的概念本来应是刑法理论研究的逻辑起点,但中外刑法学界对刑法的概念都不太重视,研究都不够深入,导致刑法理论出现诸多困惑,刑法实践出现诸多分歧。通过比较研究,刑法实质上就是国家以刑罚为手段,用以调整全体公民人权与公民个人人权之关系的刑事法律规范的总和。对刑法的概念作上述解读,不但可以从本质上回答什么样的行为可以纳入刑法调整的范围,为什么这些行为不由其他部门法调整而由刑法调整等问题,划清刑法与其他法律部门的实质边界,证明刑法的独立性,而且可以使犯罪的本质、刑罚的本质、刑罚的目的、刑罚的根据、刑法的任务等历史难题迎刃而解,使刑法学基本理论形成一个本质上相同、逻辑上相通、结构上相连的一以贯之的科学体系。     

自然的权利与环境法的变革

环境伦理的突出功能表现在对人与自然关系的调整上。本文从法学视角切入,以“权利”作为分析文本,论述了人类中心主义与非人类中心主义在“自然的权利”上的理论分歧,提出了“非人类中心主义”、“自然的权利”的环境伦理定位,并指出自然的权利是环境法的伦理基础。