21世纪初俄罗斯军事战略的调整方向

在新世纪到来之际,为实现国家振兴与长远发展,俄正在做出新的规划.21世纪初的俄罗斯军事战略将以对付面临的军事威胁为基本目标,贯彻以核武器为基本手段的战略遏制方针,建设一支均衡发展的现代化军队,加强对各种战略行动样式的研究和准备,推进以军事合作为基础的联盟防御,做好应付中小战争和武装冲突的准备.     

THE EU CODE OF CONDUCT ON ARMS EXPORTS—ENHANCING THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF ARMS EXPORT POLICIES?

Agreed within the institutional framework of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy, the EU Code of Conduct for Arms Exports is the most comprehensive regional arms export control regime to date. Adding a European dimension to a policy area traditionally limited to national decision-making raises the question, whether the much debated democratic deficit of the EU applies to the area of arms exports. This article argues that, although the original 1998 document provides for neither public transparency nor parliamentary scrutiny, the Code has effectively led to increased transparency of arms export policies and an enhanced role for parliament.     

Negotiating Verification: International Diplomacy and the Evolution of Nuclear Safeguards, 1945–1972

Nuclear safeguards have been an essential part of the global order since the beginnings of the nuclear age. The International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], an international bureaucracy that is supposed to be a non-political, technical institution administers this global nuclear safeguards regime. Even though safeguards have always been controversial, they have turned out to be the most enduring item in the international community’s toolbox to prevent or slow down the spread of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear states. This analysis shows that nuclear safeguards, whilst they survived the fall of the Iron Curtain, were a genuine invention of the Cold War. At the beginning of the nuclear age, there was an overall understanding that safeguards were not strong enough to prevent the global spread of nuclear weapons. It was only over the course of the late 1950s and 1960s that safeguards moved from the margins to the centre of diplomatic negotiations about global nuclear order. Newly declassified records from the IAEA Archives in Vienna offer insights into the evolution of early nuclear safeguards and suggest that negotiation patterns, proceedings, and settings affected the outcome of this nuclear diplomacy.     

Pre-emption,Deterrence, and Self-Defence: A Legal and Historical Assessment

The policy of the United States, outlined in the 2002 National Security Strategy, whereby the US claims a right under international law to engage in pre-emptive use of force to prevent a rogue state's development of nuclear weapons, or any weapons of mass destruction (WMD), is unnecessary and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. This conclusion is reached through a comprehensive and intensive assessment of the normative reactions of politically effective actors to China's development of nuclear weapons during a two-year period between the Cuban Missile Crisis and China's first test in October 1964. While pre-emptive use of force against China, a rogue state, was considered by both the United States and most likely by the Soviet Union, neither used force to prevent it developing nuclear weapons. Since a policy of pre-emptive use of force was unnecessary for either state's self-defence, it would have been unlawful under customary international law. Given that the current strategic scenario of states vis-à-vis rogue states is the same under most circumstances, notwithstanding the existence of international terrorist networks, the article concludes that the proposed claim of the United States is, prima facie, unnecessary to its self-defence, and therefore unlawful under customary international law of self-defence. It shifts the burden of proof to policymakers claiming that all rogue states can be lawfully prevented through pre-emptive use of force from acquiring nuclear weapons, to establish that a particular state cannot be deterred from the use of nuclear weapons. Though the preventive war claim of the US National Security Strategy 2002 may turn out to be an effective strategic bluff in limiting WMD proliferation, the wisdom of the threat should not be confused with the illogic of preventive war.     

The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime: An Historical Perspective

As the twenty-first century appears to be entering a more intensified globalised nuclear age, nations and academics alike consistently criticise the frameworks and foundational agencies created to ensure non-proliferation, security, and multi-lateral negotiations. Notwithstanding the significant reductions in nuclear arsenals made over the last several decades, thanks to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the numerous nuclear agencies and watchdogs, it is evident that the risks emanating from nuclear weapons and their associated materials have continually expanded. By ensuring that the global community has protections and safeguards in place to promote international dialogue and nuclear non-proliferation—including the Cooperative Nuclear Threat Reduction Program, International Atomic Energy Agency, Global Threat Reduction Initiative, as well as nuclear free zones and review processes—the nuclear non-proliferation regime can arguably ensure that the devastating threat to humankind is reduced. However, as countries scramble to once again refine and modernise their nuclear stockpiles, the necessity to review, re-shape, and re-think these foundational safeguards is more vital than ever.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

西伯利亚天然气工业的发展前景

俄罗斯天然气的储量和开采量均占世界第一位。天然气工业是俄罗斯燃料动力工业中发展最快的部门。西伯利亚地区是俄罗斯主要的天然气产区。这里的天然气不仅储量大,而且质量高,是俄实现与亚太地区国家能源合作的重要基础。天然气工业集团是西伯利亚地区天然气资源国际合作的主要运作者,依靠控股公司实现对西伯利亚地区天然气资源的勘探、开采及运输。     

Engaging China in Nuclear Disarmament Debates： Is There a Role for Australia？

China has demonstrated some interest in the resurgence of nuclear disarmament debates over the past few years,but because its own nuclear arsenal is relatively small,because this capability is predicated on a very specific Chinese posture and security concerns,and because it believes firmly that the responsibility for moving towards a world without nuclear weapons belongs in the first instance to the United States and Russia-who between them possess 95% of the world’s existing nuclear weapons-it has displayed a somewhat limited contribution to this debate so far.     

THE PROCESS OF DEMILITARIZATION AND THE REVERSIBILITY OF THE PEACE PROCESS IN NORTHERN IRELAND

The process of militarization has permeated Northern Ireland society both overtly and in more subtle and pervasive ways. Since the Good Friday Agreement in 1998, reductions in state military personnel and infrastructure have been made and several acts of paramilitary decommissioning of weapons carried out. However, the political culture and discourse remains combative and bifurcated as the democratic institutions and processes struggle to achieve viability. Support for the Agreement has faltered as the raised expectations of improvements in quality of life, particularly in communities worst affected by the Troubles, have not been met. Vacuums such as the rolelessness amongst former combatants and gaps in policing have contributed to internecine conflict. As in South Africa, there has been a transition from political to criminal violence in local communities. A formal process of demobilization, demilitarization and reintegration of former paramilitary actors, combined with training in political skills would resolve some of these issues and ensure the irreversibility of the peace process itself.     

Isn't it Time to Say Farewell to Nukes in Turkey?

Abstract

The attitude of Turkish officials toward the US nuclear weapons deployed in Turkey for over four decades has been static. Officials have understandable arguments, based on their threat analysis, as to why these weapons should be retained in Turkey. However, since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the international security environment has undergone radical changes. The classical deterrent value of nuclear weapons no longer applies with these emerging threats. At the same time, there is an increased probability of unauthorized use of crude radiological devices or nuclear weapons by terrorist organizations. In addition to increased security at storage sites, bolder steps must be taken by concerned countries to get rid of nuclear weapons. Such steps should begin with drawing-down US nuclear weapons deployed in allied countries including Turkey.     

Difficult Europeans: NATO and Tactical/Non-strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Cold War

This analysis examines NATO’s tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons in the Cold War both for their perceived deterrent value against the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact and as potential war fighting weapons. Within this debate lay questions related to extended deterrence, security guarantees, regional or theatre conflict, and escalatory potential. A central tenet that emerged in Europe was that nuclear weapons needed emplacement on the territory of non-nuclear NATO members to make deterrence more tangible. It raised huge questions of consultation. Once the Soviet Union had intercontinental missiles, the credibility of American readiness to use nuclear weapons in defence of its allies came into question. European alternatives and different consultation mechanisms to facilitate nuclear use became central to intra-NATO relations. Actively debated across NATO, they directly concerned above all the United States, Britain, and France—the nuclear weapons states in the NATO area—and West Germany, the potential main battleground in a Warsaw Pact invasion. Although dormant in NATO since the end of the Cold War, these issues will likely see revisiting in both Europe and other regional trouble spots.     

Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion

A rising and influential tide of opinion is pressing for the United States to take major steps towards actually realizing “a world without nuclear weapons,” including by taking steps towards dismantling its nuclear arsenal. This article argues that a world without nuclear weapons, and particularly American nuclear weapons, is not desirable nor is real and effective nuclear disarmament possible. Therefore, while non-proliferation is an important objective, the United States should not abandon or move substantially towards the abandonment of its arsenal in pursuit of nuclear abolition. Instead, the United States should seek the worthy goal of preventing and retarding the spread of nuclear weapons while maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, a policy that can be followed by de-linking non-proliferation from disarmament.     

Nuclear proliferation and ‘realistic deterrence’ in a new century

Deterrence became an all‐purpose theory and policy solution during the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has caused theorists and policy‐makers to ask whether deterrence is still either practicable or theoretically compelling. The prospect of additional and angry state and non‐state actors armed with nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), together with long‐range delivery systems, threatens to shake the foundations of deterrence stability. In this article we consider whether this is so. First, we examine some of the theoretical arguments for a benign world with nuclear proliferation and some reasons to be skeptical about those arguments. Second, we consider the current status of nuclear weapons spread and some of the particular challenges presented to deterrence and arms race stability by nuclear proliferation.     

Politics,proximity and paranoia: the evolution of Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint

This article traces the evolution of Kashmir as a “nuclear flashpoint,” and the relationship between Kashmir, nuclear weapons, and regional security. The first section discusses the concept of a geopolitical flashpoint, providing a definition and a series of historical examples. The Kashmir issue and its role in the broader Indo-Pakistani conflict fit reasonably neatly into this definition. A second section briefly traces the history of nuclear weapons programs in the region, as the potential for nuclear escalation by competing powers or their allies is a key factor in defining nuclear flashpoints (a post-1945 phenomenon). The third section examines the evolution of the Kashmir issue and successive Indo-Pakistani crises within a nuclearized regional environment from 1984 to 2003. The final section assesses the prospects for Kashmir in the near future, and concludes that due to underlying political factors, Kashmir will remain a nuclear flashpoint for the foreseeable future.     

Mismatched Deterrents: Preventing the Use of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons

The basic logic of graduated deterrence worked fairly well against the Soviet Union, as each level of aggression was to be deterred by a matching response. But this logic has now been undermined vis-à-vis future rogue state chemical and biological attacks by the spread of dual-use technologies that can be diverted to weapons, and by decisions of the United States and other democracies to forego possession of chemical or biological weapons. This article identifies some of the serious difficulties of alternative approaches to deterring chemical or biological attacks, ranging from nuclear escalation to a reliance on supposed American advantages in conventional weapons. Lumping chemical and biological weapons together with nuclear weapons into a new category of "weapons of mass destruction" is a very imperfect solution.     

Nuclear Proliferation in the Post-Cold War Era

Nuclear weapons look set to stay with us, fulfilling as they do a different role from that of conventional weapons, in terms of their deadly potential for massive destruction. Indeed, nuclear weapons served as a stabilizing force during the hostile Cold War period. Sine the end of the Cold War, our world has undergone huge changes. Relative peace continues to be maintained on the basis of the logic of a ＂balance of terror＂, but the nuclear cloud hanging over human beings has never quite left us. Both the U.S. and Russia retain large nuclear arsenals, and a significant number of state and non-state actors on the stage of world politics continue to show interest in this lethal weapon. So-called ＂nuclear crises＂ flare up and test the wodd＇s nerves every now and again, and with some major nuclear powers continuing to make adjustments to their nuclear policies, the world nuclear proliferation position appears to be undergoing significant and profound change and transformation. In this article the author intends to help readers to become acquainted with the nuclear status quo as well as the characteristics of post-Cold War nuclear proliferation. The author also aims to help readers to understand the causes of the post-Cold War nuclear proliferation.     

Force or Friendship? Explaining Great Power Nonproliferation Policy

Why do great powers take such different approaches to the issue of nuclear proliferation? Why do states oppose nuclear proliferation more vigorously in some cases than in others? In short, what explains great power nonproliferation policy? To answer these questions, this article tests two competing theories of nonproliferation policy. The first, political relationship theory, suggests that states oppose nuclear proliferation to their enemies but are less concerned when friends acquire nuclear weapons. The second, power-projection theory, argues that states oppose the spread of nuclear weapons to states over which they have the ability to project military power because nuclear proliferation in those situations would constrain their military freedom of action. In contrast, states will be less likely to resist, and more likely to promote, nuclear proliferation to states against which they cannot use force. To test these hypotheses, this article uses evidence from great power nonproliferation policy from 1945 to 2000. While both theories find some support, the power-projection theory performs significantly better. The findings of this article have important implications for international relations theory and US nonproliferation policy.     

Frustration and Delay: The Secondary Effects of Supply-Side Proliferation Controls

Abstract

Do trade barriers help slow the spread of nuclear weapons? Supply-side controls on proliferation equipment and material are often dismissed as ineffective because nuclear weapons–seeking states can develop methods to circumvent the controls. However, these global export controls have important secondary effects. By creating barriers to trade, export controls force states to develop costly and inefficient methods that interfere with progress toward nuclear weapons development. Using case evidence beginning with the advent of the Nuclear Suppliers Group’s export control regime in 1974, I argue that the resulting delay and frustration can change leaders’ strategic calculations regarding the value of their nuclear weapons programs. These findings demonstrate that proliferation controls do slow the spread of nuclear weapons, both by delaying existing programs, and by decreasing the likelihood that leaders will make decisions to continue with, or even start, nuclear weapons programs.     

Ceci n'est pas une…American nuclear weapon in Belgium

There is hardly anybody in Belgium who publicly defends the continued deployment of US tactical nuclear weapons on Belgian territory. The longer these weapons stay, the more the existing nuclear weapons policy and by extension North Atlantic Treaty Organization itself will be regarded as illegitimate. While one should not expect massive demonstrations similar to that at the beginning of the 1980s, the pressure to protest increases. By describing the different societal and political actors in Belgium and their respective views on the possible withdrawal of US tactical nuclear weapons, this article tries to explain the gap between policymakers and citizens on this issue. The main explanatory variables are a low-profile diplomatic culture and the lack of a strong link between the anti-nuclear movement and the political parties in power, resulting in the absence of political leaders at the governmental level, who clearly speak out in favor of withdrawal.