Secret Laws

There is a thesis that legal rules need to be made public because people cannot guide their conduct by rules they cannot know. This thesis has been a mainstay of anti‐positivism and the controversy over it continues apace. However, positivism can accommodate the secret laws thesis. The deeper import of the debate over secret laws concerns our understanding of law's nature. In this regard secrecy merits attention as a candidate necessary connection between law and immorality. In addition the mediating role of lawyers as experts in ascertaining the law should be highlighted. It has been widely overlooked despite the fact that lawyers are criterial in Hart's concept of law.     

侵犯商业秘密罪疑难问题探讨

侵犯商业秘密罪在刑法理论与司法实务中存在着颇多的争议。立足于TRIPS协议,商业秘密具有秘密性、价值性、保密性的法律特征。从侵犯商业秘密罪的罪过形式来看,“应知”是一种疏忽大意的过失的心理态度,应当明确“重大损失”的认定标准,应当用无形资产的评估方法来衡量被侵犯的商业秘密的价值。     

Discolouring Democracy? Policing,Sensitive Evidence,and Contentious Deaths in the United Kingdom

This article examines recent United Kingdom government proposals for secret inquests, which, it is argued, are part of a general push for secrecy discernible across common law jurisdictions, and which include developments such as increased recourse to sensitive evidence in forensic settings and the normalization of intelligence‐led policing. While the push for secrecy is justified by national security claims, the article shows that in cases of contentious death involving police, the issue is less about national security and more about the use of intercept evidence, covert surveillance, and intelligence‐led policing, all of which have implications for police trust, accountability, and reputation management.     

Regulatory Pragmatism,Legal Knowledge and Compliance with Law in Areas of State Weakness

The literature suggests that compliance with law is unlikely in areas of state weakness absent additional state capacity. Utilizing three novel data sets collected in adjacent districts in India and Nepal, this article demonstrates that weak states can significantly increase compliance by fostering accurate legal knowledge—something the literature often assumes is widespread. This assumption is problematic because principal–agent problems prevent many weak states from behaving consistently; target populations often lack education and competent legal advice and struggle to learn about the law via observation. States that employ regulatory pragmatism, however, may overcome this challenge; they do so by designing implementation strategies for on‐the‐ground realities. I investigate two such efforts—delegated enforcement and information dissemination through local leaders. The data indicate that strategies consistent with regulatory pragmatism, in contrast to those that are legally doctrinaire or deterrence based significantly increase legal knowledge and compliance, even where the state is locally weak.     

Secret Law and the Value of Publicity*

Abstract. Revelations in the United States of secret legal opinions by the Department of Justice, dramatically altering the conventional interpretations of laws governing torture, interrogation, and surveillance, have made the issue of “secret law” newly prominent. The dangers of secret law from the perspective of democratic accountability are clear, and need no elaboration. But distaste for secret law goes beyond questions of democracy. Since Plato, and continuing through such non‐democratic thinkers as Bodin and Hobbes, secret law has been seen as a mark of tyranny, inconsistent with the notion of law itself. This raises both theoretical and practical questions. The theoretical questions involve the consistency of secret law with positivist legal theory. In principle, while a legal system as a whole could not be secret, publicity need not be part of the validity criteria for particular laws. The practical questions arise from the fact that secret laws, and secret governmental operations, are a common and often well‐accepted aspect of governmental power. This paper argues that the flaw of secret law goes beyond accountability and beyond efficiency to the role that law plays, and can only play, in situating subjects’ understanding of themselves in relation to the state. Secret law, as such, is inconsistent with this fundamental claim of the law to orient us in moral and political space, and undermines the claim to legitimacy of the state's rulers.     

Trade Secrecy Injunctions,Disclosure Risks,and eBay's Influence

Historically, intellectual property (IP) owners could rely on injunctive remedies to prevent continued infringement. The Supreme Court's eBay v. MercExchange decision changed this, however. After eBay, patent courts no longer apply presumptions that push the deliberative scales in favor of injunctions (or “property rule” protection). Instead, patent injunctions require a careful four‐factor analysis, where plaintiffs must demonstrate irreparable injury (i.e., that money damages cannot compensate). Without question, eBay has made it harder for patent plaintiffs to secure injunctions, and has led many district courts to consider innovation policy concerns (e.g., the strategic behavior of patent “troll” plaintiffs) in the injunction calculus. By and large, courts’ more deliberative approach to patent injunctions post‐eBay has been viewed as beneficial for the patent system. Over the past decade, eBay’s influence has migrated to other areas of IP. This article offers the first account of eBay’s impact on federal trade secrecy injunctions. Important differences between trade secret law and other areas of IP—for example, the hard‐to‐quantify risk that disclosure poses to trade secret owners—has lessened eBay’s influence on trade secrecy injunctions. This article argues that disclosure risks justify a bifurcated approach to trade secrecy injunctions. That is, in cases involving the dissemination of trade secrets, courts should presume irreparable injury in the injunction calculus. However, in cases involving the unauthorized use of a trade secret—that is, where a defendant builds upon a plaintiff's trade secret but does not disseminate it—courts should not presume irreparable harm and, instead, should apply the eBay framework. As part of this assessment, courts should consider policy concerns related to cumulative innovation and employee mobility.     

论我国商业秘密的立法完善

论述我国商业秘密保护立法的现状,分析我国现行立法存在的问题。在现有立法模式的基础上,在界定商业秘密的保护范围、完善相关法律、增设惩罚性赔偿责任、明确免责条件等方面提出了完善我国商业秘密法律保护的构想。     

Taking Language Seriously: An Analysis of Linguistic Reasoning and Its Implications in EU Law

This article discusses legal reasoning at the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The following questions are addressed. First, the authors look at the way linguistic arguments are used in ECJ case‐law. Second, they consider whether the requirements of legal certainty, and more specifically that of predictability, may be fulfilled by reference to linguistic arguments in a multilingual legal system. The theoretical starting‐point is that of open‐endedness of language: no means exists to definitely pin down the meaning of words. Defining the meaning of words in a legal context is necessarily a matter of choice involving evaluative considerations. Consequently, when the ECJ uses linguistic arguments to justify a decision, it is an active agent choosing the meaning of words in a specific case. Essentially, the authors argue that legal reasoning based on linguistic arguments is particularly problematic from the viewpoint of legal certainty and predictability. In this respect, the key importance of systemic and teleological argumentation is emphasised in assuring convincing, acceptable and transparent legal reasoning especially in the context of multilingual EU law.     

Principle of Proportionality as Principle of Economic Efficiency

The principle of proportionality is at the cornerstone of EU law, and precisely of the case‐law of the European Court of Justice (ECJ). In the law and economics literature, the general principles of law are commonly opposed to legal rules in terms of efficiency. On the one hand, the legal formalistic approach consists of apprehending the law as principled, whereby principles of law do not and should not encompass an efficiency rationale and should be self‐sufficient. On the other hand, the legal nihilism denying the existence or relevance of the general principles of law favours legal rules that are said to incorporate an efficiency rationale. I intend to analyse the efficiency rationale of probably the most important general principles of EU law—the proportionality principle. In this paper, I shall assert that not only does the EU proportionality principle encapsulate an efficiency rationale, but most importantly, it has been interpreted by the ECJ as such—hence, I propose the representation of the principle of proportionality as a principle of economic efficiency. After having introduced the principle of proportionality (1), I shall decipher the proportionality principle both from a law and economics perspective, and from a comparative perspective (2). Then, I shall delve into the jurisprudence of the ECJ so that the judicial reasoning of the Court as this reasoning proves the relevance of the proposed representation (3). Finally, I conclude in light of the findings of this paper (4).     

The Limits of Institutionalised Legal Discourse*

Abstract. One of the most powerful accounts of the necessary connection between law and morality grounded on the openness of communication is provided by Robert Alexy, who builds a discourse theory of law on the basis of Habermas’ theory of general practical discourse. In this article I argue that the thesis based on the openness of legal discourse is problematic in that it does not provide a convincing account of the differentiation of legal discourse from other practical discourses. I offer an understanding of the institutionalisation of legal discourse as the tacit commitment of the participants to their shared normative experience and in particular in: 1) the possibility of containing normative force in space, 2) the possibility of transforming word into deed, 3) the possibility of grasping and controlling time and 4) the possibility of transforming deed into word. That commitment of participants in legal discourse is revealed as a set of fundamental assumptions embedded in all legal utterances, which provide the necessary bedrock that makes communication possible. It also provides a basis for the institution of legal discourse, to the effect that their problematisation signifies a departure from the latter.     

Karl Olivecrona's Legal Philosophy. A Critical Appraisal*

I argue in this article (i) that Karl Olivecrona's legal philosophy, especially the critique of the view that law has binding force, the analysis of the concept and function of a legal rule, and the idea that law is a matter of organized force, is a significant contribution to twentieth century legal philosophy. I also argue (ii) that Olivecrona fails to substantiate some of his most important empirical claims, and (iii) that the distinction espoused by Olivecrona between the truth and the correctness of legal statements is problematic but not needed in Olivecrona's legal philosophy.     

美中商业秘密内涵的思考

从美国商业秘密法的发展来看,商业秘密的内涵呈现出从秘密性、实用性至秘密性、价值性和管理性再至秘密性和价值性的一个变化过程,而我国有关法律及规定明确认为商业秘密在内涵上需要具备秘密性、实用性、价值性和管理性四个构成要件。从两国的规定看,两国对商业秘密内涵的理解在新颖性、实用性、管理性三个方面存在较大分歧。     

The Path of the Law Review: How Interfield Ties Contribute to Institutional Emergence and Buffer against Change

Early neoinstitutional theory tended to assume institutional reproduction, while recent accounts privilege situations in which alternative models from outside an organizational environment or delegitimizing criticism from within precipitate institutional change. We know little about institutions that persist despite such change conditions. Recent advances in sociological field theory suggest that interfield ties contribute to institutional change but under‐theorize how such ties may reinforce institutions. Extending both approaches, I incorporate self‐reinforcing mechanisms from path‐dependence scholarship. I elucidate my framework by analyzing the student‐edited, student‐reviewed law review. Despite its anomalous position relative to the dominant peer‐reviewed journal model of other disciplines, and despite sustained criticisms from those who publish in them, the law review remains a bedrock institution of law schools and legal scholarship. I combine qualitative historical analyses of legal scholarship and law schools with quantitative analyses of law‐review structures and field contestation. The analysis covers law review's entire historical trajectory—its emergence, its institutionalization and coherence of a field around it, and its current state as a contested but persistent institution. I argue that self‐reinforcing mechanisms evident in law review's ties to related fields‐legal practice, law schools, the university, and legal periodicals—both enabled its emergence and have buffered it against change.     

Mobilizing the Law in China: "Informed Disenchantment" and the Development of Legal Consciousness

This article critically examines the development of legal consciousness among legal aid plaintiffs in Shanghai. It is based on 16 months of research at a large legal aid center and in‐depth interviews with 50 plaintiffs. Chinese legal aid plaintiffs come to the legal process with high expectations about the possibility of protecting their rights; however, they also have only a vague and imprecise knowledge of legal procedure and their actual codified rights. Through this process of legal mobilization, plaintiffs' legal consciousness changes in two separate dimensions: changes in one's feelings of efficacy and competency vis‐à‐vis the law, and changes in one's perception/evaluation of the legal system. Put another way, the first dimension is “How well can I work the law?” and the second is “How well does the law work?” In this study I observe positive changes in feelings of individual efficacy and competency that are combined with more negative evaluations/perceptions of the legal system in terms of its fairness and effectiveness. The positive feelings of efficacy and voice provided by the legal process encourage labor dispute plaintiffs in the post‐dispute period to plan new lawsuits and to help friends and relatives with their legal problems. Disenchantment with the promises of the legal system does not lead to despondency, but to more critical, informed action. This study provides new evidence on the nature of China's developing legal system with a focus on the social response to the state‐led “rule of law” project.     

Instituting Authority. Some Kelsenian Notes

A rule of recognition for a legal order L seems utterly circular if it refers to behaviour of “officials.” For it takes a rule of recognition to identify who, for L, counts as an official and who does not. I will argue that a Kelsenian account of legal authority can solve the aporia, provided that we accept a, perhaps unorthodox, re‐interpretation of Kelsen's norm theory and his idea of the Grundnorm. I submit that we should learn to see it as the vanishing point rather than the final basis of validity in a legal order. To prepare the ground for this proposal, I will briefly explore the claim to authority that is characteristic of politics. Then I sketch a multi‐layered canonical form of the legal norm, including their “empowering” character (Paulson) in terms of performative operators. I show how it leads to a “perspectival” account of the basic norm. In conclusion, I briefly point to the example of sovereignty and acquis communautair in international law to illustrate this view     

Bodily Integrity,Embodiment, and the Regulation of Parental Choice

In this article we develop a new model of bodily integrity that we designate ‘embodied integrity’. We deploy it to argue that non‐therapeutic interventions on children should be considered within a decision‐making framework that prioritizes embodied integrity. This would counter the excessive decision‐making power that law currently accords to parents, protecting the child's immediate and future interests. Focusing on legal responses to genital cutting, we suggest that current legal understandings of bodily integrity are impoverished and problematic. By contrast, adoption of an ‘embodied integrity’ model carves out a space for children's rights, while avoiding these negative consequences. We propose that embodied integrity should trump competing values in any best‐interests assessment where a non‐therapeutic intervention is requested. Drawing on Drucilla Cornell and Joel Feinberg's theories we argue that protecting a child's embodied integrity is essential to guarantee his/her right to make future embodied choices and become a fully individuated person.     

Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal Justification

In this article, I distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of legal normativity, and argue that legal positivists can account for law's normativity in the strictly legal but not in the moral sense, while pointing out that normativity in the former sense is of little interest, at least to lawyers. I add, however, that while the moral conception of law's normativity is to be preferred to the strictly legal conception from the rather narrow viewpoint of the study of law's normativity, it is less attractive than the latter from the broader viewpoint of the study of the nature of law. I then distinguish between a moral and a strictly legal conception of the normative force of legal justification, and argue that legal positivists may without contradiction embrace the moral conception, and that therefore the analysis of the normative force of legal justification need not be a problem for legal positivists. I conclude that, on the whole, we have reason to prefer legal positivism to natural law theory. I begin by introducing the subject of jurisprudence (section 1). I then introduce the natural law/legal positivism debate, suggesting that we ought to understand it as a debate about the proper way to explicate the concept of law (section 2). I proceed to argue that legal decision-making is a matter of applying legal norms to facts, and that syllogistic reasoning plays a prominent role in legal decision-making thus conceived (section 3). Having done that, I discuss law's normativity (section 4), the normative force of legal justification (section 5), and the relation between the former and the latter (section 6). I conclude with a critical comment on Joseph Raz' understanding of the question of law's normativity (appendix).     

ON THE ALLEGEDLY INVISIBLE DUTCH CONSTRUCTION SECTOR CARTEL

This paper considers an extensive cartel contamination of marketsin the Dutch construction sector. Overwhelming legal evidenceof bid rigging in this sector was obtained in 486 leniency applicationsin which complete secret accounts were submitted. I offer acase study and a broadly based post mortem of methodologiesthat were applied earlier to detect malfunctioning markets inthe Netherlands, but failed to identify the construction sectoras problematic. It is concluded that these studies were seriouslyflawed. Theoretical and empirical economic forensics (if properlyapplied) creates value for antitrust authorities in detectionof antitrust violations directly, or by informing them whereto look for direct evidence.     

The Legality of Law

Abstract. In this paper I outline various different objects of investigation that may be picked out by word “law” (or its cognates). All of these objects must be investigated in an integrated way before one can provide a complete philosophical explanation of the nature of law. I begin with the distinction between laws (artefacts) and law (the genre to which the artefacts belong). This leads me to the distinction between the law (of a particular legal system) and law (the genre of artefacts). Then I discuss the contrast between law (the genre of artefacts) and law (the practice). Finally I comment on legality as the name of an ideal for laws and legal systems to live up to. I commend H. L. A. Hart's explanation of the nature of law for investigating these various objects in an integraed way, while nevertheless respecting the distinctions among them. I also criticise some of R. M. Dworkin's work for failing to respect the same distinctions.