宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

Human Dignity of “Offenders”: A Limitation on Substantive Criminal Law

The paper argues for attaching a significant role to the dignity of offenders as a limitation on the scope of substantive criminal law. Three different aspects of human dignity are discussed. Human dignity is closely connected with the principle of culpability. Respecting the dignity of offenders requires that we assign criminal liability according to the actual attitudes of the offenders towards the interests protected by the offence. The doctrine of natural and probable consequence of complicity, which allows us to assign liability for mens rea offenses to a negligent offender, violates the dignity of the offender; it treats the incautious offender as if she had willfully expressed disrespect towards the protected interest. The human dignity core of privacy is invaded by criminalizing the private possession of child pornography. By extending the prohibition of the creation, sale and distribution of child pornography to the private possession of pornography, the State attempts to control the way the individual expresses an essential part of the self—his sexual fantasies—within himself. Dignity demands that our actions convey an attitude of respect towards human beings. The expressive meaning of disrespect is culture-dependent. The historical association with totalitarian regimes explains our reluctance to impose a legal duty to report past crime: the individual who is legally required to turn a suspect into the police is viewed as an “informant.”     

民法视野下的人体法益构造——以人体物性的科技利用为背景

近现代民法体系所持的"人体为主体人格之一部"的立场系建立在传统人物两分理论基础之上,该理论虽有助于彰显人的主体价值和尊严,但在处理因人的活体、尸体、离体组织和基因的科技利用所生法律问题上,已显现出部分失灵和易加剧人体物性利用与人性尊严保障之间价值冲突的不足。人与物或人格与财产的区分并非绝对不容许因应时代变迁而作必要修正。通过逻辑的、价值的、实践的和法释义学的综合考量,理论上可以得出,有限地承认人体为物,并将"人体财产权"和人类作为物种享有的"类的人性尊严"纳入到人体法益构造体系之中,能较好地克服以上不足。在以公序良俗原则限制人体或其一部的利用和处分时,应建立和实践"人性尊严关联度原则"。     

Two Challenges for Dignity as an Expressive Norm

The concept of dignity figures prominently in legal and moral discussion on such topics as human rights, euthanasia, abortion, and criminal punishment. Yet the notion has been criticized for being indeterminate and either insufficient or redundant (or both) in justifying the kinds of legal and moral rights and views its proponents use it to vindicate. The criticisms have inspired some novel conceptions of dignity. One of them is Tarunabh Khaitan??s proposal that dignity should be understood as an expressive norm. In this article, I assess Khaitan??s suggestion. I maintain that it faces two challenges that its advocates should be able to solve for the proposal to be plausible.     

Use of the dead body in healthcare and medical training: mapping and balancing the legal rights and values

By exploring the central legal principles and issues regarding usage of the dead body in healthcare and especially in medical training, this article aims at drawing some general conclusions on the legal status of the dead body and the protection of the deceased's integrity, dignity and autonomy. The article demonstrates that the use of the cadaveric body for scientific and educational purposes involves a redrawing of the traditional boundaries between the decent and the indecent, making these acts acceptable that would otherwise be regarded as assaults on the sanctity of bodily boundaries. This is made possible by the fact that the underlying principle of dignity is not perceived to be of an absolute nature when applicable to deceased persons.     

Human Dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Interpretation Before the European Court of Justice

This article argues that the EU Charter’s dignity provisions must be given a specific, expansive European meaning that underpins the importance the EU places on fundamental rights protection as a principle EU value. To this end, the article examines the EU Charter provisions on dignity and critically analyses the case law before the EU Charter had full legal effect and after it did. It finishes with looking at three areas in which the potential for an expansive interpretation of dignity could help bring the EU closer to its people and fully respect and protect dignity: asylum, criminal justice and sexual orientation.     

Reinforcing or Challenging Stigma? The Risks and Benefits of ‘Dignity Talk’ in Sex Work Discourse

The concept of ‘human dignity’ sits at the heart of international human rights law and a growing number of national constitutions and yet its meaning is heavily contested and contingent. I aim to supplement the theoretical literature on dignity by providing an empirical study of how the concept is used in the specific context of legal discourse on sex work. I will analyse jurisprudence in which commercial sex was declared as incompatible with human dignity, focussing on the South African Constitutional Court case of S v Jordan and the Indian Supreme Court case of Budhadev Karmaskar v State of West Bengal. I will consider how these courts conceptualise dignity and argue that their conclusions on the undignified nature of sex work are predicated on particular sexual norms that privilege emotional and relational intimacy. In light of the stigma faced by sex workers I will explore how a discourse, proclaiming sex work as beneath human dignity, may impact on the way that sex workers are perceived and represented culturally, arguing that it reinforces stigma. I will go on to examine how sex workers subvert the notion that commercial sex is undignified, and resist stigma, by campaigning for the right to sell sex with dignity. I will demonstrate that an alternative legal approach to dignity and sex work is possible, where the two are not considered as inherently incompatible, concluding with thoughts on the risks and benefits of using ‘dignity talk’ in activism and campaigns for sex work law reform.     

Human Dignity as a Form of Life: Notes on Its Foundations and Meaning in Institutional Morality

In normative terms, human dignity usually implies two consequences: (a) human beings cannot be treated in some particular ways due to their condition as humans; and (b) some forms of life do not correspond to the ideal life of our community. This study consists in discussing the meaning of this idea of human dignity in contrast to the concept of humiliation in the context of institutional, i.e. political and legal, rights. Two concepts of human dignity will be discussed. The first absolute/necessary and formal/transcendental concept implies the proposition “because human beings have dignity, the following cluster of rights is valid”. Conversely, the second contingent and material concept corresponds to the thought “for being able to live in dignity, we must respect the following rights”. This paper claims that human dignity should be understood as the right to be protected from humiliation. Humiliation is the situation of incapacity or absence of self-determination.

     

依靠法治满足人民对美好生活的要求研究

美好生活是人民对于高品质生活的理想追求,而法治则在满足人民美好生活方面发挥着至关重要的作用.要通过法治的平等原则确保人人拥有平等的人格、规定人人相同的地位以及赋予人人同样的法律机会,为人的尊严感的达致奠定基础.人民福祉是法治的根本目标,要通过法律制度来缩小收入分配差距、确保不同群体之间资源的公平分配以及地域发展上的互补...     

Dignity, Democracy, Civilisation

This paper contributes to international discussion about the difficulty of defining human dignity as a legal concept by locating it at the heart of (European) democracy and human rights. Focusing on emerging dignity case law in the United Kingdom, the paper explores the connections among dignity, human rights and democracy, and the uses of dignity to enhance and refine democracy. While judges are key actors in the construction of dignity, they operate within the boundaries of a particular democratic ‘civilisation’ anchored in the core prohibitions of art 2, 3 and 4 European Convention on Human Rights, combined with those of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). This normative core, the paper argues, is to be understood in the wider time frame of democracy and dignity, which is equally important for refining and thickening human dignity’s conceptual and normative definition, as well as for reflecting on the legitimacy of its (judicial) uses.     

Overcoming Doctrinal School Thought: A Unifying Approach to Human Dignity

The concept of human dignity is criticized due to its vagueness, but by discussing the most important schools of thought, we can identify a core meaning that is common to most understandings of human dignity: Whether we conceptualize human dignity in terms of autonomy, self‐respect, social acts, or equal status, we always refer to some kind of personal identity. This personal identity consists in those aspects that we consider to be constitutive of our individual personality. Instead of remaining within doctrinal school thought, this core meaning can be taken as a common denominator for human dignity discourse.     

“Not Gods But Animals”: Human Dignity and Vulnerable Subjecthood

Drawing on earlier work on the conceptual structure of dignity, this paper will suggest a particular type of connectedness between vulnerability and human dignity; namely, that the “organizing idea” of human dignity is the idea of a particular sort of ethical response to universal human vulnerability. It is common ground among many, if not all, approaches to ethics that vulnerability requires us to respond ethically. Here, I argue that human dignity is distinctive among ethical values in that it values us because of, rather than in spite of, or regardless of, our universal vulnerability. The term “dignity” is used synonymously with “human dignity” here, since an investigation of the dignity of non-human entities forms no part of the present examination.     

中西思想家对“人的尊严”的论述

"人的尊严"是一个拥有丰富内涵的、被当代法律制度引入的哲学观点,探讨"人的尊严"的源与流,通过对中西思想家关于"人的尊严"的论述来考查它的产生、发展的流变历程。     

Observations on the Development of Human Dignity and Personality in German Constitutional Law: An Overview

This paper provides an overview of the development of the constitutional value of human dignity under German constitutional law. First, it provides a background to the German constitutional order then it places the constitutional value of dignity within the framework of the constitutional court’s jurisprudence on personality rights. It then progresses to an examination of specific cases that have developed personality rights and the importance of the constitutional court’s interpretation of personality and dignity in the personal and outer spheres within the framework of the German legal order. The article concludes with some observations and comparisons between German and American law in this area.     

论民法典中人格权的实证概念

尽管我国民法典以独立成编的方式规定了人格权,但是,由于对人格权的概念存在巨大争议,所以,从民法典人格权编的具体内容和规范来反观人格权的实证概念对于理论研究和司法实践更具有意义。从我国民法典的内容看,我国民法典人格权编实际上包括了两个部分:一是对人格权的保护,二是对人格尊严的保护。隐私权与信息的二元保护就清楚地说明了这一问题。因此,不能认为人格权编中保护的都是人格权。必须把人格权的概念与人格利益区分开来,从而决定其保护程度与救济措施的差别。另外,从表面上看,虽然看起来都是相同的权利(人格权),但是,法人和非法人组织的人格权与自然人的人格权建立在完全不同或者说完全不相关的基础之上--自然人的人格权是以人的自由和尊严为核心的,而法人或者非法人组织的所谓人格权完全是技术处理的结果。当然,这种处理方式也可以通过其他方式处理。荣誉权无论从哪个方面看,都不具有人格权的特征;虽然民法典对其予以了明确规定,但是,荣誉权确实不应该是人身自由和人格尊严的表现,我们在实践中应当将其作为一种特殊权利对待。总之,人格权可以定义为:自然人享有的人之所以为人的主体性权利,包括生命权、身体权、健康权、姓名权、肖像权、名誉权、荣誉权、隐私权等权利,是个人自由、尊严在民法上的具体体现。法人仅仅享有与自由和尊严无关的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权,但法人的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权在实质上不是人格权。     

What is so special about [free] speech?

Legal and political philosophers (e.g., Scanlon, Schauser, etc.) typically regard speech as special in the sense that conduct that causes harm should be less subject to regulation if it involves speech than if it does not. Though speech is special in legal analysis, I argue that it should not be given comparable status in moral theory. I maintain that most limitations on state authority enacted on behalf of a moral principle of freedom of speech can be retained without supposing that speech is entitled to a degree of protection not afforded to (most) other forms of conduct. My argument questions some standard assumptions made by philosophers about the relationship between moral and legal principles.     

Exile,Choice, and Loyalism: Taking and Restoring Dignity in the American Revolution

Taking a cue from Bernadette Atuahene's concept of “dignity takings” and her insight that government expropriation inflicts more than economic injury, this essay analyzes how American revolutionaries defined political membership, penalized and expropriated British loyalists, and then allowed some to join the American polity in the decade after the Revolution. Many recovered their property, professions, and legal privileges. However, because most loyalists could choose to remain loyal or join the Revolution, they did not lose human dignity as Atuahene defines it. Case studies of two reintegrating lawyers, Richard Harison and William Rawle, explore loyalism, the loss of dignities that loyalists suffered, and some paths toward reintegration. Their appointment as federal attorneys helped make the government conversant in the common law, British statutes, and the law of nations, which in turn supported the Federalist goal of reintegrating the United States into the Atlantic World: achieving, in other words, national dignity.     

L'impact du discours des droits des détenus et des normes d'équité sur le tribunal disciplinaire carcéral

Over the past two decades, the prisoners rights movement and active judicial intervention in prison law have widely expanded in Canada. This movement has had a significant impact on the emergence of new norms of correctional justice. The recentCorrections and Conditional Release Act, (November 1992), inserts notions of human dignity; due process of law; and to a certain extent, the fundamental rights of prisoners. The aim of this essay is to measure the impact of prisoners rights discourse, and the legal obligation to act fairly towards prisoners, on the practices and quality of disciplinary decisions. Based on observations made at disciplinary hearings in various penitentiaries and interview data derived from the main actors, the author assesses how the ‘judiciarization’ of social relations and the ‘legalization’ of discipline in the prison have contributed to the birth of a more humanized prison and the promotion of human dignity for those people who are incarcerated.      

人工智能时代的主体性之忧:法理学如何回应

近代以来,人超越于他物的主体性得以确立,其内容包括不可侵犯的人格尊严、自主决定、在社会和政治生活中具有重要性以及基于自身目的利用自然。然而,人工智能已经从以下方面挑战了人的主体性:冲击了人格尊严的基础,削弱了自主决定,降低了人在社会生活中的重要性。因此,亟需法理学基于整体性反思和价值视角予以回应。法理学应采取的立场包括:注重人的道德主体性以彰显其独特性,明确反对赋予人工智能法律人格,坚持对人工智能涉主体性应用的合法性审查。