Spanish Supreme Court provides limited relief for data controllers

Earlier this year the Spanish Supreme Court gave judgment on an application to annul the data protection regulations set out in Royal Decree 1720/2007 and to refer the Spanish implementation of the Data Protection Directive to the European Court of Justice. The application was partially successful. Some sections of the Royal Decree have been annulled but much of it was upheld. The Supreme Court also referred the Spanish implementation of the legitimate interests processing condition (art. 7(f) of the Data Protection Directive) to the European Court of Justice. The European Court of Justice’s decision could have a material impact on data controllers in Spain. If the legitimate interest condition is finally recognised it should make data protection compliance significantly easier.     

Age Discrimination, Redundancy Payments and Length of Service

This note discusses three cases which have considered objective justification for the apparent contradiction between rewarding age and length of service in redundancy payments and the need not to discriminate on the grounds of age. It considers the relevance of cases from the European Court of Justice about whether there can be a general exception to the need to justify using the criterion of length of service, or seniority, in equal pay cases.     

THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE REPUBLIC OF AUSTRIA

The aim of this article is to give an overview of the tasks and the function of the Supreme Court of Justice in interaction with the other two “Highest Courts” of the Republic of Austria on the one hand, and the European Court of Human Rights as well as the Court of Justice of the European Union on the other hand. For this purpose introductory remarks will examine the Austrian understanding of the judiciary as a state power and judicial independence. The closing part of the article will particularly look into the role of the Supreme Court as highest instance in criminal matters.     

Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities: the Danish Supreme Court's Decision in the Ajos Case and the National Limits of Judicial Cooperation

On 6 December 2016, the Supreme Court of Denmark (SCDK) ruled on the grounds of Ajos case. The ruling concerned the scope of the principle of non‐discrimination on the grounds of age and whether a national court could weigh the principle of non‐discrimination on grounds of age against the principles of legal controversy, as the protection of legitimate expectations. The ruling has caused a great deal of controversy as the SCDK defied clear guidelines from the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) in the ruling. Moreover, the case has been seen by some as an example of a new ‘sovereigntism’ in Danish law that is at odds with the project of European integration through law. This article explains the case from both an EU law and Danish constitutional law perspective. It concludes by providing a set of explanations of the new course of the SCDK in its relationship with the EU.     

Bite the Bullet

This paper discusses the Fedon case‐law of the European Court of Justice (Court of Justice), which involved a claim for compensation by Fedon (an Italian producer of eyeglass cases) from the EU for the imposition of World Trade Organization (WTO)‐authorised retaliatory trade barriers by the USA following the failure by the EU to comply with an adverse ruling by the WTO regarding its import regime for bananas. As a result of the EU non‐compliance, European banana distributors and some bananas producers benefited from WTO‐illegal protection, at the expense of a set of EU exporters, including Fedon, that were hit by US countermeasures. Fedon contested the non‐compliance by the EU before the Court of Justice and sought compensation. This paper assesses the ruling of the Court of Justice against Fedon and argues that the Court got it wrong, both in terms of legal principle and as a matter of legal technicalities.     

Sisters in Arms: European Community Law and Sex Equality in the Armed Forces

Abstract: Recently the European Court of Justice has been shedding a new light on the limits of Community competence for defence. This article analyses the rulings in Sirdar, Kreil, and Dory with regards to two interrelated issues. First it discusses the effect of Community law on the equality of men and women in the armed forces of the Member States. Second, it deals with the impact of these decisions on the constitutional order of the European Union. The article argues that Community law has a considerable impact on defence‐related national law. Therefore the analysis ultimately contributes to a narrow aspect of the constitutional debate: the demarcation of competencies between the Member States and the Community in matters related to defence.>     

The ex turpi causa principle in Hounga and Servier

In Hounga v Allen the majority of the Supreme Court employed a test for the application of the ex turpi causa defence involving the balancing of public policy arguments for and against allowing the defence. Although this has attracted some early academic support, this note will argue it is inconsistent with authority and principle. The later decision in Servier v Apotex does not address the Hounga decision directly but strongly endorses a more conservative approach to the ex turpi causa principle. The resulting tension between these two Supreme Court decisions is likely further to destabilise the law in this area. This note advances arguments in favour of the Servier approach, summarises both decisions in terms of their consistency with authority and considers the ways in which Servier may have limited the effects of Hounga.     

‘The referring court asks,in essence’: Is reformulation of preliminary questions by the Court of Justice a decision writing fixture or a decision‐making approach?

The Court of Justice can rephrase or otherwise depart from the questions referred to it by national courts under Article 267 of the Treaty of the Functioning of the European Union. It does so routinely: a practice known as reformulation. Legal literature often argues that reformulation is used to clarify national court questions and bring them within the scope of European Union law. The aim of the present article is to explore this claim systematically. To this end, it compiles a unique dataset consisting of the Orders for Reference, in which the referring courts embed the preliminary questions, and the judgments, in which the Court of Justice communicates the answers. The findings suggest that reformulation is a decision‐making approach rather than a fixture of decision writing. It's main function is to neutralize conflicts and Europeanise disputes. It underlines the Court's power to shape the preliminary ruling procedure and its outcomes.     

Internet domain names and the interaction with intellectual property

This is the fourth in a series of articles looking at the interaction between Internet domain names and intellectual property. It outlines the ICANN dispute resolution procedure for gTLDs whereby objectionable domain names can be transferred away from their registrants or cancelled. It also compares this to legal proceedings in the UK Courts and outlines a referral to the European Court of Justice on issues relating to a trade mark registration as the basis or legitimate interest for a .eu domain name registration.     

Rules for Rights: European Law,Health Care and Social Citizenship

Social citizenship is about equality. The obvious problem for European social citizenship in a very diverse Union is that Member States will not be able or willing to bear the cost of establishing equal rights to health care and similar aspects of social citizenship. Health care is a particularly good case of this tension between EU citizenship and Member State diversity. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) strengthened the right to health care in other Member States, but this cannot create an equal right to health care when Member States are so different. In its efforts to balance a European right, the Court has formulated ‘rules for rights’—not so much European social citizenship rights, as a set of legal principles by which it judges the decisions of the Member States.     

Appointment and Term of Office of Judges of International Courts: Innovations from Africa?

Non‐nationals of the Member States of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (Comesa) were in the past appointed to the Comesa Court of Justice (the Comesa Court) on the basis of their domicile rather than nationality. This article examines the relevant legal provision in this regard and points out that it is capable of far‐reaching interpretation, possibly beyond the intention of the parties to the Treaty establishing Comesa. Further, while the Treaty allows persons who are Judges or are qualified to be Judges in their home countries to be appointed, it also permits the appointment of distinguished lawyers. The article examines the emerging practice in terms of preferences between the two categories and assesses its desirability. In addition, the manner of appointing the President of the Court is mentioned and commented on in relation to its ability to promote or impair judicial independence. Finally, for a two‐year period ending in June 2005, there were no Judges in office on the Comesa Court. The stipulation that led to this hiatus is briefly noted and discussed. During the discourse, comparisons are made with the European Court of Justice and the Court of Justice of the East African Community.     

Minimum Alcohol Pricing: Balancing the ‘Essentially Incomparable’ in Scotch Whisky

This note contrasts the approaches taken by the Court of Justice of the European Union and the UK Supreme Court in the high‐profile litigation which preceded the introduction of minimum alcohol pricing in Scotland. The case of Scotch Whisky Association and others v The Lord Advocate and another hinged, ultimately, on the necessity of minimum pricing to achieve important public health goals. The notably differing viewpoints adopted by the domestic and Union courts, however, both illustrate the elusiveness of the proportionality criterion, and expose tensions between domestic and supranational control in the context of internal market regulation.     

Judicial protection of fundamental rights in the transition from the world of atoms to the word of bits: The case of freedom of speech

This article underlines the role of Courts in protecting fundamental rights in the atomic and the digital dimension. The main aim of this work is to show how the coming of the Internet has affected the exercise and the judicial protection of freedom of expression in a comparative perspective. In order to answer this research question, this study will focus on the role of Courts as ‘playmakers’ in interpreting and solving issues deriving from interconnected legal regimes affecting the protection of fundamental rights and, especially, free speech. More specifically, the comparative focus will be on the decisions of the European Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Right and the US Supreme Court.     

All Bark and No Bite: Notes on the Federal Constitutional Court's 'Banana Decision'

The Federal Constitutional Court's banana decision of 7 June 2000 continues the complex theme of national fundamental‐rights control over Community law. Whereas in the ‘Solange II’ decision (BVerfGE 73, 339) the Federal Constitutional Court had lowered its standard of review to the general guarantee of the constitutionally mandatorily required minimum, the Maastricht judgment (BVerfGE 89, 155) had raised doubts as to the continued validity of this case law. In the banana decision, which was based on the submission of the EC banana market regulation by the Frankfurt‐am‐Main administrative court for constitutional review, the Federal Constitutional Court has now confirmed the ‘Solange II’decision and restrictively specified the admissibility conditions for constitutional review of Community law as follows. Constitutional complaints and judicial applications for review of European legislation alleging fundamental‐rights infringements are inadmissible unless they show that the development of European law including Court of Justice case law has since the ‘Solange II’ decision generally fallen below the mandatorily required fundamental‐rights standard of the Basic Law in a given field. This would require a comprehensive comparison of European and national fundamental‐rights protection. This paper criticises this formula as being logically problematic and scarcely compatible with the Basic Law. Starting from the position that national constitutional courts active even in European matters should be among the essential vertical ‘checks and balances’ in the European multi‐level system, a practical alternative to the Federal Constitutional Court's retreat is developed. This involves at the first stage a submission by the Federal Constitutional Court to the Court of Justice, something that in the banana case might have taken up questions on the method of fundamental‐rights review and the internal Community effect of WTO dispute settlement decisions. Should national constitutional identity not be upheld even by this, then at a second stage, as ultima ratio taking recourse to general international law, the call is made for the decision of constitutional conflicts by an independent mediating body.     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Game of courts: A tale of principles and institutions

The ontological, terminological and conceptual confusion that surrounds the concept of ‘general principles of European Union law’ is far from being resolved. The constitutional interlocutors—the Court of Justice of the European Union and the highest courts in Member States—have at times fiercely argued about their different understanding of general principles, whereas European legal scholarship has failed to convincingly clarify the intricacies surrounding this source of law. Instead of engaging with a more abstract, theoretical question of what general principles are, this paper reflects on the practical, functionalist question: how are they used by the Court of Justice and what are some of their functions and implications? To do so, it enquires into contextual, institutional and strategic features of the Court's behaviour and jurisprudence and responses of the highest national judiciaries to this jurisprudence. The aim is to offer an alternative account of the Court's jurisprudence on general principles.     

论欧盟法影响下意大利行政法基本原则的发展与变化

欧盟行政法的基本原则对欧盟成员国行政法发展产生了重要影响,近年来,欧盟法所确定的一系列原则充实了意大利行政法基本原则的内容,如合法性原则、公正原则、良好行政原则,而欧洲法院所确定的一些原则促使意大利引入了一些原先并不存在的新原则,如比例原则、合法信赖原则等。意大利行政法基本原则的发展与变化,表明了欧盟范围内一些共同原则的形成,成员国之间的行政法形成了开放的体系,各国制度之间的效仿与移植现象也渐渐增多,欧盟行政法正在逐渐趋于一体化。     

Punishment and Rights in European Union Citizenship: Persons or Criminals?

While European Union (EU) citizenship has traditionally been key to limiting criminalisation at national level, over recent years crime has become a criterion to distinguish between the good and the bad citizen, and to allocate rights according to that distinction. This approach has been upheld by the EU Court of Justice (CJEU) in its case‐law, where crimes show the offender's disregard for the societal values of the host Member States, and deny his/her integration therein. This article argues that citizenship serves to legitimate criminal law. The Court outlines two—counterposing—types of human being: the law‐abiding citizen and the criminal. The article shows the legal unsoundness of the Court's approach. It does so by analysing and locating the case‐law over a crime–citizenship spectrum, marked at its opposing ends by Duff's communitarian approach to criminal law, on the one hand, and Jakobs' criminal law of the enemy, on the other.     

从Gubisch案看欧共体法院对国际诉讼竞合的认定

国际诉讼竞合的认定是解决国际民商事管辖权冲突的先决条件。通过对欧共体法院一则判例的分析,指出,欧共体法院对国际诉讼竞合的认定趋向于持宽松的态度,而且,这种宽松的认定方法已被目前的国际立法和司法判例所吸收和支持。