Post‐Sovereignty and the European Legal Space

The political constitution of the European polity has become strained in recent years by insistent pressures on its institutional capacity to resolve social problems. The article examines the EU's polity crisis in the context of the development of a distinctive modern conception of secular constitutional authority, focused on the ideal of sovereign self‐determination. As the work of Neil MacCormick illustrates, the EU provides a radical challenge to the on‐going capacity of the concept of sovereignty to provide a framework to address problems of legitimacy. The article explores the nature of this challenge, its historical context and its consequences with reference to debates over the nature of constitutional pluralism. It sets out a path to the renewal of the European constitutional debate through a re‐consideration of secular constitutional authority and the necessity of its connection to the idea of sovereignty. The article seeks to re‐engage in the task of ‘questioning sovereignty’.     

The Perils of ‘As If’ European Constitutionalism

This review article offers thoughts on Kaarlo Tuori's recent book, European Constitutionalism, and more particularly on what he calls the ‘disciplinary contest over the legal characterisation of the EU and its law’. As the book's title suggests, Tuori privileges the constitutional perspective in that contest, so much so—he freely admits—that his analysis ‘predetermine[s] how the EU and its law will be portrayed’. And therein also lies the book's main weakness. Tuori's predetermined ‘constitutional’ interpretation, like so much of the dominant legal discourse in the EU today, ultimately obscures the core contradiction in EU public law. National institutions are increasingly constrained in the exercise of their own constitutional authority but supranational institutions are unable to fill the void because Europeans refuse to endow them with the sine qua non of genuine constitutionalism: the autonomous capacity to mobilise fiscal and human resources in a compulsory fashion. The EU's lack of constitutional power in this robust sense derives from the absence of the necessary socio‐political underpinnings for genuine constitutional legitimacy—what we can call the power‐legitimacy nexus in EU public law. To borrow Tuori's own evocative phrase, the EU possesses at best a ‘parasitic legitimacy’ derived from the more robust constitutionalism of the Member States as well as from the positive connotations that using ‘constitutional’ terminology evokes regardless of its ultimate aptness. The result is an ‘as if’ constitutionalism, the core feature of which is an increasingly untenable principal‐agent inversion between the EU and the Member States, one with profound consequences for the democratic life of Europeans. The sustainability of integration over the long term depends on confronting these adverse features of ‘European constitutionalism’ directly, something that legal elites—whether EU judges, lawyers, or legal scholars—ignore at their peril.     

Democracy and emergency: finding the constitutional foundation of the knowledgeable state in social dynamics

This article aims to bring to light the law–society dynamic relationship in constitutional governance by engaging with the question of political constitutionalism from the perspective of institutional epistemology. It first reframes the debate surrounding legal and political constitutionalism as one concerning the state's ‘epistemic competence’ in governance shaped by the constitution, and then traces how constitutional ordering has given rise to the ‘knowledgeable state’ by setting a unique social dynamic in motion: the ‘epistemico-political constitution’. Using the example of the World Health Organization's initial response to the COVID-19 pandemic, a the article presents a two-part argument. First, constitutional ordering institutes a process of knowledge production embedded in the interaction between the state and society – a unique law–society dynamic – that responds to governance needs. Second, given the current law–society dynamic in the suprastate political landscape, the legitimacy challenge facing expertise-steered global governance is further intensified as more crisis responses are expected from outside the state.     

From Balance to Conflict: A New Constitution for the EU

As the crisis (and the Union's response to it) further develops, one thing appears clear: the European Union post‐crisis will be a very different animal from the pre‐crisis EU. This article offers an alternative model for the EU's constitutional future. Its objective is to invert the Union's current path‐dependency: changes to the way in which the Union works should serve to question, rather than entrench, its future objectives and trajectory. The paper argues that the post‐crisis EU requires a quite different normative, institutional and juridical framework. Such a framework must focus on reproducing the social and political cleavages that underlie authority on the national level and that allow divisive political choices to be legitimised. This reform project implies reshaping the prerogatives of the European institutions. Rather than seeking to prevent or bracket political conflict, the division of institutional competences and tasks should be rethought in order to allow the EU institutions to internalise within their decision‐making process the conflicts reproduced by social and political cleavages. Finally, a reformed legal order must play an active role as a facilitator and container of conflict over the ends of the integration project.     

Self‐Determination in the Constitutional Future of the EU

This article analyses three prominent proposals for the functional and political transformation of the EU from a constitutional perspective. It argues that existing EU reform proposals, to varying degrees, entrench rather than reverse the challenges to individual and political self‐determination brought about by the EU's response to its Euro crisis. As the article will conclude, challenging ‘authoritarian liberalism' in an EU context may require the development of a constitutional structure for the Union able to contest, rather than set in stone, the EU's existing economic and political goals.     

There Must Be Some Way Out of Here: The Crisis,Labour Rights and Member States in the Eye of the Storm

This article considers the impact of the economic, social and political crisis on the labour law regimes of two of the Member States of the EU most affected; Greece and Ireland. Both countries have been the recipients of ‘bail‐out’ deals, negotiated and monitored by what has become known as the ‘Troika’ of the European Commission, the European Central Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The article considers the extent to which both countries have been required to make amendments to their labour law regimes as a condition of their bail‐outs. It argues that the changes demanded reflect the basic norm now governing the EU legal order, namely that of ‘competition’; the logic of market integration based on the primacy of economic competition. The article sets the reforms in Greece and Ireland within the broader context of the ‘social deficit’ problem of the EU construction.     

European Civil Society: Shaped by Discourses and Institutional Interests

Abstract: During recent years, the concept of European civil society has gained increasing popularity. The European Institutions themselves have developed a discourse on civil society and civil dialogue. Institutional interests have shaped this discourse. Reframing the normative context for EU democracy, this discourse suits some institutions better than others. In particular, the European Economic and Social Committee and the European Commission have made recourse to it; the former to redefine its proper role and combat the risk of marginalisation within the European institutional set‐up; the latter first to build support for policy initiatives in the social sphere and subsequently to respond to the legitimacy crisis of the Brussels’ bureaucracy. These institutional interests have inspired a conceptualisation of civil society as ‘functional participation’ and ‘functional representation’ rather than as ‘politicisation’ or ‘decentralisation’. However, while the Commission and the ESC have had some success in selling their discourse, to be successful in the longer run some problematic assumptions of the discourse should be tackled and both the different rationales for civil society involvement as well as the multi‐level character of European civil society and European policymaking should be taken into account.     

Delegation of Regulatory Powers in a Mixed Polity

It is a common place of academic and political discourse that the EC/EU, being neither a parliamentary democracy nor a separation‐of‐powers system, must be a sui generis polity. Tocqueville reminds us that the pool of original and historically tested constitutional models is fairly limited. But however limited, it contains more than the two systems of rule found among today's democratic nation states. During the three centuries preceding the rise of monarchical absolutism in Europe, the prevalent constitutional arrangement was ‘mixed government’—a system characterised by the presence in the legislature of the territorial rulers and of the ‘estates’ representing the main social and political interests in the polity. This paper argues that this model is applicable to the EC, as shown by the isomorphism of the central tenets of the mixed polity and the three basic Community principles: institutional balance, institutional autonomy and loyal cooperation among European institutions and Member States. The model is then applied to gain a better understanding of the delegation problem. As is well known, a crucial normative obstacle to the delegation of regulatory powers to independent European agencies is the principle of institutional balance. By way of contrast, separation‐of‐powers has not prevented the US Congress from delegating extensive rule‐making powers to independent commissions and agencies. Comparison with the philosophy of mixed government explains this difference. The same philosophy suggests the direction of regulatory reform. The growing complexity of EC policy making should be matched by greater functional differentiation, and in particular by the explicit acknowledgement of an autonomous ‘regulatory estate’. At a time when the Commission aspires to become the sole European executive, as in a parliamentary system, it is particularly important to stress the importance of separating the regulatory function from general executive power. The notion of a regulatory estate is meant to emphasise this need.     

A two‐tier conception of European Union peoplehood: A realist study of European citizens’ bonds of collectivity

The European Union (EU) struggles to legitimate its rule. This realist study develops a conception of peoplehood in the EU polity, because, in contemporary Europe, ‘the people’ remains the sole source of political legitimacy. From a realist perspective, a conception of peoplehood should yield a coherent story why EU citizens should accept, or at least acquiesce, to EU rule. This study explores the possibility of a pluralistic conception being either multi‐layered, multi‐faceted or both. Taking a practice‐dependent approach, I first analyse the institutional systems that structure relationships between EU citizens. I secondly propose conceptions of EU citizens’ bonds of collectivity. Thirdly, I develop a novel two‐tier conception of EU peoplehood in which individuals remain bound together as national peoples, while these peoples are in turn united by commercial and liberal bonds. I submit that this conception can lay the foundation for a convincing story to legitimate EU rule.     

Democratic legitimacy in the European Union: Fulfilling the institutional logic

The European Union's delicate institutional balance between intergovern‐mentalism and supranationalism has been the source of both the EU's successes and its problems. This balance is under scrutiny as representatives of Member States and EU institutions pursue their particular visions of democratic legitimacy in the course of the 1996–97 Intergovernmental Conference. This essay examines three competing conceptualisations of democratic legitimacy: the Gaullist view, which associates legitimacy narrowly with national sovereignty; a national culture perspective that posits a unique correspondence of national character and national parliaments; and a parliamentary view that associates legitimacy with the role played by parliaments in scrutinising the behaviour of executives, whether at national or European level. Only the last of these perspectives acknowledges that democratic legitimacy is a continuous variable rather than an all‐or‐nothing concept, and that the EU may therefore accumulate legitimacy by improving both the process and substance of policy making within the logic of existing institutional structures.     

Does the Emperor Have Financial Crisis Clothes? Reflections on the Legal Basis of the European Banking Authority

The European Union institutional package launched in response to the financial crisis used Article 114 TFEU as its legal basis. The author explores the legal basis for one of the European Supervisory Authorities recently established – the European Banking Authority (EBA). The use of Article 114 TFEU, the main Treaty basis used to harmonise laws in order to further the internal market, as the foundation for the EBA, is considered in detail. A paradox of contemporary EU institutional law is assessed here, considering whether on the one hand, the EBA is functionally both too narrow and too broad as a matter of law, while on the other hand, it may prove to be central to restoring confidence in EU regulatory powers, rendering it ‘too big to fail,’ despite its slender foundations in Article 114 TFEU.     

The economic constitution and the political constitution: seeking the common good in the post-national setting

In the post-national setting, the concept of the ‘economic constitution’ has been seen as design template and saviour; whether based on transactional certitude or founded on ordoliberal precepts, the economic constitution is assumed to legitimate economic integration across national borders in the absence of comprehensive political settlement. Nevertheless, recent tensions – not only within the European Union (EU) but also, more strikingly, within the World Trade Organization context – indicate the limits of economic constitutionalism. This article seeks to identify the roots of recent dysfunction within the history and theory of economic constitutionalism. It traces the evolution of an adjudicational economic constitutionalism and its place within the EU legal order, including the new EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, and contrasts this vision with the more comprehensive and/or socialized models of economic constitutionalism found not only within the Weimar Republic but also within the post-revolutionary/post-conflict constitutional context. The article also places a major emphasis on theorizing around the apex of economic-constitutional thought, ordoliberalism, but concludes that no concept of the economic constitution can be seen in isolation from its social-political context, or from notions of the common good. To this exact degree, failures in modern economic constitutionalism may derive from a misplaced universalism – a technocratic absolutism that abdicates political responsibility for the common good, locating it instead in an ‘idolatry of the factual’ or a new naturalism of market inevitability.     

National social spaces as adjustment variables in the EMU: A critical legal appraisal

The article critically engages with the reconfiguration of the role and status of national social spaces within the EU constitutional fabric after the reform of European economic governance. Its main contention is that these reforms have converted national social spaces into adjustment variables whose main function is to contribute to the pursuit of EMU‐related objectives. This transformation alters the balance between the economic and the social dimension in the EU legal order, deforming one of the defining traits of its constitutional identity.     

The Lisbon Judgment of the German Constitutional Court,the Primacy of EU Law and the Problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz: A Conflict between Right and Right in Which There is No Praetor1

The ECJ has long asserted its Kompetenz‐Kompetenz (the question of who has the authority to decide where the borders of EU authority end) based on the Union treaties which have always defined its role as the final interpreter of EU law. Yet, no national constitutional court has accepted this position, and in its Lisbon Judgment of 2009 the German Constitutional Court (FCC) has asserted its own jurisdiction of the final resort' to review future EU treaty changes and transfers of powers to the EU on two grounds: (i) ultra vires review, and (ii) identity review. The FCC justifies its claim to constitutional review with reference to its role as guardian of the national constitution whose requirements will constrain the integration process as a standing proviso and limitation on all transfers of national power to the EU for as long as the EU has not acquired the indispensable core of sovereignty, i.e. autochthonous law‐making under its own sovereign powers and constitution, and instead continues to derive its own power from the Member States under the principle of conferral. Formally therefore, at least until such time, the problem of Kompetenz‐Kompetenz affords of no solution. It can only be ‘managed’, which requires the mutual forbearance of both the ECJ and FCC which both claim the ultimate jurisdiction to decide the limits of the EU's powers—a prerogative which, if asserted by both parties without political sensitivity, would inevitably result in a constitutional crisis. The fact that no such crisis has occurred, illustrates the astute political acumen of both the FCC and the ECJ.     

EU Constitutionalism in Flux: Is the Eurozone Crisis Precipitating Centralisation or Diffusion?

The Lisbon Treaty was supposed to mark the end of an almost‐decade‐long period of treaty reform. After the tumult of the failed Constitutional Treaty, the settlement it imposed struck a sustainable balance between the competing forces of centralisation and the diffusion that characterise European integration. Yet this constitutional settlement is now threatened by the Eurozone debt crisis and official responses to it, most notably the proposed fiscal compact. A prevalent view regards the crisis as an opportunity to complete the process of political and economic union that the Maastricht Treaty began. However, this article cautions against such a view, which would jettison the post‐Lisbon Treaty constitutional settlement in favour a peculiar kind of German‐led, intergovernmental centralisation. Whether the crisis response measures achieve their stated aims remains to be seen, but the integration project will be reconfigured in the process. Thus, EU constitutionalism is bound to remain in a state of flux.     

Justice,Legitimacy and the Authority of Legislation within the European Union

What are we to make of the authority of legislation within the EU? EU lawyers have questioned the significance of legislative decision‐making within the EU. This article challenges these views and argues that the EU legislature must enjoy adequate freedom to shape EU law with the general interest in mind. Institutional accounts that seek to curtail the authority of legislation tend to rest upon ‘content‐dependent’ conceptions of political legitimacy, according to which the legitimacy of a decision depends on its moral qualities. Such conceptions overlook reasonable disagreements on justice and rest upon an overly optimistic (pessimistic) view of the Court (the legislature). The article argues for a content‐independent conception of legitimacy, following which the benefits of legislative decision‐making are more easily understood. The authority of legislation deserves wider recognition among EU lawyers for reasons of political legitimacy and because the EU legislature is better positioned to decide in the general interest.     

Europe Entrapped

The EU in 2013 finds itself at the crossroads of either something considerably better or something much worse than the status quo; in other words, in a crisis. That much is nearly universally understood, both within Europe and widely beyond. So I am certainly not alone in believing that the current crisis, a crisis that is the cumulative outcome of a financial market, sovereign debt and EU integration/democratic deficit crises, is an extremely serious and unprecedented one, frightening due to its complexity and uncertainty. If it cannot soon be resolved (but nobody knows how soon is ‘soon enough’) through a major institutional overhaul of the EU, both the political project of European integration and the global economy will suffer badly—to say nothing about the massive social suffering it has caused already in the countries of the European periphery.     

After the Crash: A Perspective on Multilevel European Democracy

From a social‐market perspective, European integration has reduced the capacity of democratic politics to deal with the challenges of global capitalism, and it has contributed to rising social inequality. The article summarises the institutional asymmetries which have done most to constrain democratic political choices and to shift the balance between capital, labour and the state: the priority of negative over positive integration and of monetary integration over political and social integration. It will then explain why efforts to democratise European politics will not be able to overcome these asymmetries and why politically feasible reforms will not be able to remove them. On the speculative assumption that the aftermath of a deep crisis might indeed create the window of opportunity for a political re‐foundation of European integration, the concluding section will outline institutional ground rules that might facilitate democratic political action at both European and national levels.     

The EU ‘Stress Tests’: The Basis for a New Regulatory Framework for Nuclear Safety

Among the constitutional tensions at the heart of the European integration process, the relationship between ‘mainstream’ EU Law (framed by the Treaty on European Union) and Euratom Law has often been overlooked. Nonetheless, the EU's response to the nuclear power plant accident in Fukushima provides an opportunity to revisit this relationship. This article specifically aims to highlight the dysfunctions of the prevailing understanding of the Euratom's provisions on nuclear safety matters as well as to identify, under a joint interpretation of all EU Treaties, how to develop a European nuclear safety regime that reinforces the compensatory role of EU law and contributes to enhance the EU's legitimacy.     

A systematic justification for the EU's pouvoir constituant mixte: Principles of constitutional politics in supranational polities

This article presents a rational reconstruction of the practice of constitutional politics in supranational polities. In doing so, it seeks to refocus the ongoing debate about constituent power in the EU on the question of who, under what conditions, is entitled to decide on the EU constitutional order. The analysis leads to a number of principles of democratic legitimacy, which include the political autonomy of the members of the state demoi as well as the political autonomy of the members of a cross‐border demos. In explicating these parallel entitlements to political autonomy, I provide a systematic justification for the notion of a pouvoir constituant mixte, according to which the citizens should take control of EU constitutional politics in two roles: as European citizens and as Member State citizens.