Adoption,Homosexuality and the European Convention on Human Rights: Gas and Dubois v France

On 15 March 2012 the European Court of Human Rights (the Court) issued its first judgment addressing the differential treatment of same‐sex and opposite‐sex couples in respect of the adoption of a child. 1 The Court held that excluding same‐sex couples in civil partnerships, who have no legal right to marry, from adoption provisions available to married opposite‐sex couples does not violate rights guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention). I argue that the Court's reasoning in Gas and Dubois v France is unpersuasive and unsustainable in light of its wider case law.     

EU Accession to the ECHR: Between Autonomy and Adaptation

After the European Union's accession to the European Convention on Human Rights the EU will become subject to legally binding judicial decisions of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and participate in statutory bodies of the Council of Europe (Parliamentary Assembly; Committee of Ministers) when they act under the Convention. Convention rights and their interpretation by the ECtHR will be directly enforceable against the EU institutions and against Member States when acting within the scope of EU law. This will vest the ECHR with additional force in a number of Member States, including Germany and the UK. All Member States will further be subject to additional constraints when acting under the Convention system. The article considers the reasons for, and consequences of the EU's primus inter pares position under the Convention and within the Council of Europe, and the likely practical effect of the EU's accession for its Member States.     

Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom: Sensible Dialogue or a Bad Case of Strasbourg Jitters?

In Animal Defenders International v United Kingdom a majority of the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights held that the UK's statutory broadcasting ban on political advertisements under the Communications Act 2003 did not breach the right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The judgment departs from the Court's established case law and, it is argued, raises several issues of concern both with regard to freedom of expression, and for human rights adjudication more generally. In particular, the Court's use of a doctrine of ‘general measures’ led it to place a great deal of reliance on the quality and quantity of legislative debate that preceded the UK ban, rather than its actual impact upon the applicant.     

O'Keeffe v Ireland: The Liability of States for Failure to Provide an Effective System for the Detection and Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse in Education

In O'Keeffe v Ireland, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights found that Ireland failed to protect the applicant from sexual abuse suffered as a child in an Irish National School in 1973 and violated her rights under Article 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading treatment) and Article 13 (right to an effective remedy) of the European Convention on Human Rights. This note argues that the decision is important in expanding the Court's jurisprudence regarding positive obligations under Article 3 to child sexual abuse in a non‐state setting where there was no knowledge of a ‘real and immediate’ risk to the applicant. It also argues that the case raises concerns about the Court's methodology for the historical application of the Convention and about the interaction of Article 3 positive obligations with vicarious liability in common law tort regimes.     

Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Victim Status,Extraterritoriality and the Search for Principled Reasoning

In Human Rights Watch v Secretary of State for the Foreign and Commonwealth Office the UK Investigatory Powers Tribunal found that the relevant standard of ‘victim status’ that applies in secret surveillance cases consists in a potential risk of being subjected to surveillance and that the European Convention on Human Rights does not apply to the surveillance of individuals who reside outside of the UK. This note argues that the Tribunal's finding regarding the victim status of the applicants was sound but that the underlying reasoning was not. It concludes that the Tribunal's finding on extraterritoriality is unsatisfactory and that its engagement with the European Court of Human Rights case law on the matter lacked depth. Finally, the note considers the defects of the Human Rights Watch case, and the case law on extraterritoriality more generally, against the backdrop of the place of principled reasoning in human rights adjudication.     

Workplace Monitoring and the Right to Private Life at Work

In Barbulescu v Romania, the European Court of Human Rights clarified the application of the Article 8 right to private life in the workplace, and the extent of the state's positive obligations to protect the right against workplace monitoring. The decision establishes that there is an irreducible core to the right to private life at work that does not depend on an employee's reasonable expectations of privacy, and sets out clear principles for striking a fair balance between Article 8 and the employer's interests in the context of workplace monitoring. This article considers the nature of states’ positive obligation to protect human rights at work, the scope of the right to private life, and the impact of the decision on domestic law of unfair dismissal.     

Confronting Religion: Veiled Witnesses,the Right to a Fair Trial and the Supreme Court of Canada's Judgment in R v N.S.

The Supreme Court of Canada's decision in R v N.S. is significant because the majority seems to endorse an understanding of confrontation that assumes a defendant's right to a fair trial is imperilled by a witness who seeks to give evidence while wearing the niqab. The case is of interest because it permits reflection upon the interrelationship between the right to a fair trial and the right to confront witnesses enshrined in Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Given that the European Court of Human Rights conceptualises confrontation in epistemic terms, it is argued that it would be unlikely to find that a conviction based upon evidence from a niqab‐wearing witness would infringe the right to a fair trial. This note examines the value of demeanour evidence and whether the majority in R v N.S. was correct that the abrogation of the ability to assess demeanour evidence necessarily undermines trial fairness.     

Accommodating Religious Beliefs: Harm,Clothing or Symbols,and Refusals to Serve Others

Is there a middle path between the existing case law of the European Court of Human Rights, which rarely requires accommodation of a religious individual's beliefs, and a ‘general right to conscientious objection’, which would exempt religious individuals from all anti‐discrimination and other rules interfering with manifestations of their beliefs? The author argues that failure to accommodate is better analysed as prima facie indirect discrimination, to highlight the exclusionary effects of non‐accommodation on religious minorities, and that the presence or absence of direct or indirect harm to others (or cost, disruption or inconvenience to the accommodating party) could guide case‐by‐case assessments of whether the prima facie indirect discrimination is justified. The author then applies a harm analysis to the examples of religious clothing or symbols and religiously motivated refusals to serve others, recently considered by the European Court of Human Rights in Eweida and Others v United Kingdom.     

Case Comment: The Legality of ‘Kettling’ after Austin

This case comment considers the European Court of Human Rights decision of Austin v United Kingdom (2012) 55 EHRR 14. Austin claimed, unsuccessfully, that police kettling at a public protest in London amounted to a violation of her right to liberty under Article 5 of the European Convention of Human Rights. This case comment suggests that the court took an unexpected and unorthodox approach to the issue of ‘deprivation’ within Article 5. This decision may come to undermine the protections afforded by Article 5 and extend the current exceptions to Article 5 to an indefinite range of situations.     

How to control interception-does the UK strike the right balance?

This Article critically analyses the regime for intercepting the content of communications under the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 in the light of the recent ruling by the European Court of Human Rights in Kennedy v the UK. It looks at the safeguards for privacy protection provided such as the requirement for a warrant and the roles of the Investigatory Powers Tribunal and the Interception of Communications Commissioner and whether these safeguards are compliant with Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights.     

‘Notice and staydown’ and social media: amending Article 13 of the Proposed Directive on Copyright

ABSTRACT

This paper critically assesses the compatibility of content recognition and filtering technology or so-called notice and staydown approach with the right of social network platforms and users to a fair trial, privacy and freedom of expression under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (1950) (ECHR). The analysis draws on Article 13 of the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive on Copyright, the case-law of the Strasbourg and Luxembourg Court and academic literature. It argues that the adoption of content recognition and filtering technology could pose a threat to social network platforms and user human rights. It considers the compliance of ‘notice and staydown’ with the European Court of Human Rights’ (ECtHR) three-part, non-cumulative test, to determine whether a ‘notice and staydown’ approach is, firstly, ‘in accordance with the law’, secondly, pursues one or more legitimate aims included in Article 8(2) and 10(2) ECHR and thirdly, is ‘necessary’ and ‘proportionate’. It concludes that ‘notice and staydown’ could infringe part one and part three of the ECtHR test as well as the ECtHR principle of equality of arms, thereby violating the rights of social network platforms and users under Articles 6, 8 and 10 of the Convention.     

The rule of law as the lodestar of the European Convention on Human Rights: The Strasbourg Court and the independence of the judiciary

The rule of law is a constitutional principle under the European Convention on Human Rights. Throughout its history, the rule of law has been the lodestar guiding the development of the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights. In recent years, the normative impact of this principle has been increasing in the case-law of the Court, in particular in cases dealing with the independence of the judiciary. The article discusses the conceptual core of the rule of law under the Convention system as a fundamental component of “European public order”. Subsequently, the three-dimensional normative status of the rule of law is explored as well as the Court's statement that the principle is “inherent in all the Articles of the Convention”. On this basis, an in-depth analysis is undertaken of the application in recent Strasbourg case-law of the independence of the judiciary as a fundamental organic component of the rule of law. Finally, the author reflects on the “symbiotic” relationship in the field of judicial independence between the Strasbourg Court and the Court of Justice of the European Union.     

Taking Care of Strasbourg: The Status of the European Convention on Human Rights and the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights in Kosovo’s Domestic Legal System

This paper addresses the position of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) and the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case-law in Kosovo’s domestic legal order. To begin with, it reviews the background of the issue of human rights in Kosovo highlighting its distinct position and perspective. This article then analyses the position held by the European Convention on Human Rights and its protocols in Kosovo’s legal order while also addressing the ECHR’s constitutionalization, its direct effect and the constitutional review on basis of it. The paper then examines whether the case-law of the ECtHR is binding in Kosovo, whether it is directly effective, and whether Kosovo’s Constitutional Court can use it as a ground in the conduct of constitutional reviews. This paper argues that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR both hold a privileged status under Kosovo’s constitutional law, despite Kosovo not being a party to the ECHR and, therefore, having no international liability to implement the ECHR. In addition, the paper offers certain arguments regarding the relative positions of the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR within the current practice of Kosovo’s judicial system. This paper concludes with the argument that the ECHR and the case-law of the ECtHR hold a privileged status in the context of Kosovo’s domestic legal order—one which could serve as a precedent in respecting human rights and freedoms.     

A study of section 3 of the Maltese Official Secrets Act,its Canadian and British counterparts and its effects on freedom of expression

This article answers the question whether s 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act breaches freedom of expression as contained in art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta. Article 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights is briefly analysed in the light of obtaining case law of the European Court of Human Rights. Section 3(1) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act – which finds counterparts in several Commonwealth criminal law statutes – is subsequently studied by reference to United Kingdom and Canadian case law. A freedom of expression impact assessment of s 3(1) of the Official Secrets Act is carried out with the ensuing conclusion being that only s 3(1)(c) of the Maltese Official Secrets Act might, in certain circumstances, constitute a breach of art 10 of the European Convention of Human Rights and s 41 of the Constitution of Malta.     

Adverse Possession and Article 1 of the European Convention

In the post-human rights era the question has arisen on several occasions as to whether the automatic and arbitrary termination of the registered owner’s title through the common law and statutory principles governing adverse possession of land is contrary to the Article 1, Protocol 1 of the European Convention. The matter fell to be decided in J.A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd v United Kingdom ([2005] 3 EGLR 1) where the European Court of Human Rights held that the automatic termination of a registered owners title after 12 years possession was indeed a violation of Article 1, Protocol 1. More recently, the decision of the European Court has been overturned by the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights where the Grand Chamber has held that a squatters’ right to another persons land are not disproportionate (J. A. Pye (Oxford) Ltd and Another v United Kingdom, The Times, October 1st 2007). This short article examines the decision of the Grand Chamber.

The Reasonable Expectation of Privacy and the Criminal Suspect

In In re JR38, the Supreme Court unanimously dismissed an appeal from a 14 year‐old boy who argued that the dissemination of his image, taken whilst he was participating in sectarian rioting, to local newspapers, violated his rights under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). However, the Court was divided on whether or not the measures taken by the police engaged the applicant's Article 8(1) rights at all. This case raises fundamental questions as to the scope of private life in the context of criminal investigations, and the place of the European Court of Human Rights’ ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ test in determining whether Article 8(1) of the ECHR is engaged. This case comment subjects the majority's interpretation of Article 8(1) to critical scrutiny, concluding that this interpretation may unduly restrict the scope of Article 8 protection for those subject to criminal investigations.     

Denying Foreign State Immunity on the Grounds of the Unavailability of Alternative Means

Granting immunity from suit to a foreign state or an international organisation, deprives the plaintiff of access to court and appears incompatible with the rule of law. Since the European Court of Human Rights judgment in Waite v Germany (1999), the availability of alternative means for dispute settlement has been emphasised in the context of international organisation immunity. However in the case of foreign state immunity, this approach was not taken by the European Court of Human Rights in Al-Adsani v United Kingdom (2001) nor by the House of Lords in Jones v Ministry of the Interior of Saudi Arabia (2006). Likewise, foreign state immunity would be granted under the UN State Immunity Convention of 2004, regardless of whether there are alternative means. This Convention, rather than enhancing the rule of law, could lead to its attenuation. That several of these cases involve immunity in cases of torture sharpens their sensitivity.     

Constrained Waiver of Trial Rights? Incentives to Plead Guilty and the Right to a Fair Trial

This article develops an interpretative framework to examine when incentives to plead guilty should be found to constrain defendant choice to waive fair trial rights under the European Convention on Human Rights. This framework is informed by existing jurisprudence, specifically the judgments of the European Court of Human Rights in Natsvlishvili and Togonidze v. Georgia and Deweer v. Belgium, and socio‐legal literature. According to the framework, an incentive to plead guilty should be found to violate fair trial rights where it makes it unreasonable to expect defendants to exercise their right to a full trial, is independent of the projected outcome at trial, and causes the defendant to plead guilty. An empirical analysis of guilty‐plea practice in England and Wales informed by this new framework identifies problematic incentives and suggests such incentives may disproportionately influence vulnerable defendants.     

Facial recognition technology,democracy and human rights

On 4 July 2023, the Third Section of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) delivered the first judgment on the compatibility of facial recognition technology with human rights in Glukhin v. Russia. The case concerned the use of facial recognition technology (FRT) against Mr Glukhin following his solo demonstration in the Moscow underground. The Court unanimously found a violation of Article 8 (right to respect for private life) and Article 10 (freedom of expression) of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR). Regarding FRT, the Court concluded that the use of highly intrusive technology is incompatible with the ideals and values of a democratic society governed by the rule of law. This case note analyses the judgment and shows its relevance in the current regulatory debate on Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems in Europe. Notwithstanding the importance of this decision, we argue that the Court has left crucial questions unanswered.     

Regulating surrogacy--a contravention of human rights?

On the 2nd of October 2000, The Human Rights Act 1998 came into full force, signalling the incorporation of The European Convention on Human Rights into U.K. law. Areas of law believed to be inconsistent with the Convention may now be challenged in both The European Court of Human Rights and domestic courts. This article considers whether existing laws on the regulation of access to infertility services, in particular surrogacy, will be deemed incompatible with the ECHR. Human rights as enshrined within Articles 8 and 12 will be examined in light of recent suggestions that there may arise legal challenges by those who have had access to reproductive services restricted or denied. It will be shown that, although existing and potential future controls may arguably infringe these rights, it is nevertheless unlikely that they will be held to be in contravention of The Human Rights Act 1998.