Parliamentary scrutiny of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy

Abstract

This paper analyses under what conditions parties engage in parliamentary scrutiny of the European Union’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. With insights from comparative literature on parliamentary oversight, two main incentives are identified. On the one hand, opposition parties initiate scrutiny to reduce their information asymmetry vis-à-vis the government; on the other hand, coalition parties use parliamentary scrutiny to control their partners. Empirically, the article uses information on scrutiny activities in six EU member states (Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, United Kingdom) covering 13 years and 21 governments. The findings suggest that opposition parties scrutinise the government if they have access to strong oversight instruments. In contrast, the strength of oversight instruments is not important for coalition partners. They resort to means of scrutiny if the leading minister is weak. Coalitions with a greater number of parties engage in scrutiny less often. Moreover, scrutiny is especially observed in questions with more direct distributional consequences (‘intermestic’ issues).     

Parliamentary questions and oversight in the European Union

Delegation in the European Union (EU) involves a series of principal‐agent problems, and the various chains of delegation involve voters, parties, parliaments, governments, the European Commission and the European Parliament. While the literature has focused on how government parties attempt to monitor EU affairs through committees in national parliaments and through Council committees at the EU level, much less is known about the strategies opposition parties use to reduce informational deficits regarding European issues. This article argues that the European Parliament (EP) offers opposition parties an arena to pursue executive oversight through the use of written parliamentary questions. Using a novel dataset on parliamentary questions in the EP, this article examines why Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) ask questions of specific Commissioners. It transpires that MEPs from national opposition parties are more likely to ask questions of Commissioners. Questions provide these parties with inexpensive access to executive scrutiny. This finding has implications for the study of parliamentary delegation and party politics inside federal legislatures such as the EP.     

The Ties that Bind? Intra-party Information Exchanges of German MPs in EU Multi-level Politics

As political authority is successively transferred from the national to the EU level, national parliaments are often considered to lose control over the domestic political agenda. Yet recent studies suggest that national parliaments cannot simply be labelled ‘losers’ of European integration. National parliaments have institutionally adapted to the EU in order to better scrutinise and control their governments in EU affairs. While existing research shows how parliaments employ their institutional opportunities to exercise scrutiny in the national arena, this paper suggests that MPs also employ informal strategies to obtain information on EU affairs to control and influence their governments. It argues that MPs primarily act through political parties, which are viewed here as multi-level organisations, and make use of their partisan ties to regional, transnational and supranational party actors to obtain information on EU issues. The article probes this argument by drawing on original data obtained through a survey of German MPs in 2009.     

National versus European: Party Control over Members of the European Parliament

This article examines different strategies of national governmental parties to influence ‘their’ Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), posing the following questions: Do national parties try to control voting behaviour of their MEPs? And do control mechanisms enhance the probability that an MEP toes a national party line rather than following his or her European party group? The analysis reveals differences between individual parties, indicating that at least some national parties actively attempt to control their MEPs. Furthermore, the article evaluates the success of the various approaches, taking compliance with the position of the minister in the Council as a benchmark. The results show that the overall effect of control mechanisms remains small. Instead of toeing the line of their national party's minister, MEPs tend to vote with their European group.     

Eurosceptic Challenger Parties and Political Opposition in European Union Politics: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?

Despite extensive research on Eurosceptic challenger parties, our knowledge of their influence on political opposition has so far been sparse. In this article we make an in‐depth assessment of parliamentary EU opposition, based on 4,264 statements made by national parliamentarians in the European Affairs Committees (EACs) of Denmark and Sweden. Our analysis shows that the presence of Eurosceptic challenger parties in the national parliamentary arena impacts patterns and practices of EU opposition significantly. A greater presence of ‘hard’ Eurosceptic parties in parliament is associated with more opposition in EU politics. These parties deliver a vast majority of the polity‐oriented opposition towards the EU and present more policy alternatives than mainstream parties. The findings presented have implications for our understanding of national parliamentary EU opposition as well as for the assessment of the impact of Eurosceptic challenger parties on the process of European integration.     

An International Comparison of the Incidence of Public Sector Whistle‐Blowing and the Prediction of Retaliation: Australia,Norway, and the US

We compare results of several large‐scale survey studies of whistle‐blowing by public sector employees, from samples in Australia, Norway, and the United States. Specifically, we review incidence rates of wrongdoing, whistle‐blowing and retaliation, as perceived by thousands of respondents employed by many government agencies in these countries. Despite differences in measurement in the studies and variation in results, findings suggest that wrongdoing was quite frequently observed and was reported in many cases. Retaliation resulted for far fewer than half of the whistle‐blowers, in all three nations. We also compare findings from the various studies concerning variables that predicted retaliation against whistle‐blowers in the different samples. Differences in results across the three countries add to existing evidence that country and workplace cultures can affect the whistle‐blowing process.     

The 2004 Greek Election: PASOK's Monopoly Ends

What determines a government's position inside the Council of the European Union? This article takes up recent arguments according to which Council decision-making is driven not only by ‘objective’ national interests but also by the ideological preferences of the member states' representatives. On the basis of a study of Germany, Austria and Sweden and their positions with regard to the Services Directive, it seeks to advance the debate by specifying the conditions under which ideological preferences are more likely to dominate. Applying a principal–agent model it is argued that the relative impact of ideological preferences crucially depends on the relationship between the ministers sitting in the Council and the governing parties at the national level: the less a minister is exposed to parliamentary and intra-governmental control, the more a country's position is susceptible to the ideological preferences of the minister.     

Clawing Back Lost Powers? Parliamentary Scrutiny of the Transposition of EU Social Policy Directives in the Netherlands

For quite some time parliaments were seen as the losers of European integration. As a reaction, several parliaments have sought to exert more control over the executive branch in EU decision-making. An alternative venue for ‘clawing back’ these lost powers is by influencing the domestic transposition of EU policies. Surprisingly, this opportunity for greater parliamentary involvement has not received much scholarly attention. Under what conditions do the parties in parliament engage in ex post scrutiny over transposition? To shed light on this question, this article provides a detailed study of scrutiny by the Dutch parliament over the transposition of two social policy directives, investigating four hypotheses regarding vote-seeking, policy-seeking and office-seeking incentives for parliamentary oversight. The analysis shows that the ex post scrutiny that takes place can mostly be summarised as low-profile scrutiny aimed at information-gathering and position-taking, especially by opposition parties.     

Bicameralism in the European Union: parliamentary scrutiny as a tool for reinforcing party unity

During recent years, the European Union has increasingly been portrayed as a bicameral political system in which political parties build bridges across the European Parliament (EP) and the Council. From this perspective, national parties’ representation in the Council should affect their members’ voting behaviour in the EP. Survey evidence reveals that most members of the EP (MEPs) frequently receive voting instructions from ‘their’ ministers. Accordingly, these MEPs should have a higher likelihood of defecting from their European Political Group. The observed voting instructions imply that the voting preferences of MEPs and their ministers differ. This article argues that parliamentary scrutiny may be one way effectively to coordinate on a common position at an early stage and, consequently, reinforce party unity at the voting stage. However, effective scrutiny depends on national parliaments being strong enough. On the empirical side, this article studies the voting behaviour of MEPs from eight member states during the Sixth EP. We include four national parliaments which the literature conceives of as being strong (DK, DE, SF, SK) and four parliaments conceived of as being weak (FR, IE, IT, UK). Overall, the results support the theoretical argument, thereby demonstrating how domestic-level scrutiny affects EU-level voting behaviour.     

‘No politics in the agenda-setting meeting’: plenary agenda setting in the Netherlands

The process of agenda setting is fundamental to politics, yet there is surprisingly little research about this process in parliamentary systems. The reason for this lacuna is that agenda setting tends to occur behind closed doors. The Dutch Tweede Kamer is an exception to this rule: decisions about the parliamentary agenda are made in public. This study examines agenda setting in the Dutch parliament from an issue-competition perspective. It looks at a sample of more than 400 agenda-setting meetings of the Dutch parliament between 1998 and 2017. It finds that opposition parties which stand far from the government make proposals on issues that they ‘own’; these proposals are supported by other opposition parties, parties that stand close to them and focus on the same issue. Coalition parties and parties that stand far away sabotage these proposals.     

Do Politics in Europe Benefit from Politicising Corruption?

In this article, two unexplored trends in European electoral politics are highlighted. Using newly collected data the article tracks the politicisation of corruption in electoral campaigns from 1981 to 2011, an electoral strategy that has been increasing over time in most European countries. It then empirically tests two aspects of this campaign strategy. First, what are the factors that are systematically associated with a party’s decision to politicise corruption? Second, what are the electoral effects in terms of relative vote share for parties that politicise corruption? Using an original data-set that employs multi-level data (parties nested in countries) the results demonstrate first that politicisation of corruption occurs systematically more often among established parties from the main opposition, new parties and parties on the political right, and occurs as a function of country-level corruption, district magnitude and public party financing. Second, it is found that the main opposition and new parties that use such a campaign strategy make significant electoral gains relative to the previous election compared to parties that do not politicise corruption. Yet gains are offset in low-corruption countries. The findings demonstrate salient implications for research on party systems, corruption studies and democratic legitimacy, among other areas of investigation.     

Opposition party policy shifts in response to no‐confidence motions

No‐confidence motions (NCMs) are attempts by opposition parties to publicise the government's failings in a salient policy arena, and previous research has shown that they often negatively affect citizens' evaluations of governing parties' competence and damage their electoral prospects. Yet currently there is a lack of understanding of how opposition parties respond ideologically to these NCMs. It is argued in this article that opposition parties should distance themselves from the government challenged by NCMs to show that they are different from the incompetent government and to compete for the votes that the government is likely to lose. Using a sample of 19 advanced democracies from 1970–2007, empirical evidence is presented that NCMs encourage political parties to move their positions away from the government's position, especially in the presence of reinforcing negative signals about government performance. These results have important implications for our understanding of opposition party policy change, for the economic voting literature, and for the spatial and valence models of party competition.     

The relationship between government and opposition in the bundestag and house of commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty

This article analyses modes of interaction between government and opposition in the German Bundestag and the British House of Commons in the run‐up to the Maastricht Treaty, and the implications of co‐operation or a lack thereof for the parties involved. The article is based on the premise that the government—opposition relationship is not derived solely from power relationships and institutional factors, but is also a matter of democratic legitimacy. Three indicators are used to ascertain the level of government—opposition co‐operation: the creation of parliamentary committees, information exchange and incentive management. Based on an institutional analysis and interviews with legislators, the finding is that although parties in Germany and the UK have created parliamentary committees dealing with European affairs, only in the former did the government utilise the new tool for co‐operation with the opposition, in terms of information exchange and incentive management. Consequently, informal co‐operation in Germany brought about an outcome compatible with the interests of the parties involved. By contrast, the lack of co‐operation with opposition parties in Britain led to an extreme parliamentary crisis.     

A Rising Tide? The Salience of Immigration and the Rise of Anti‐Immigration Political Parties in Western Europe

In this article, we consider the causes of the increase in voting for anti‐immigration parties in western Europe in the past decade. We first note that one of the most commonly assumed reasons for this increase is an associated increase in anti‐immigration sentiment, which we show is likely to be false. We also outline the major theoretical explanations, which we argue are likely to be incomplete. We then introduce our proposed explanation: these parties have benefitted from a sharp increase in the salience of immigration amongst some voters. We show that there are strong correlations over time between the salience of immigration and the polling of such parties in most western European countries. We argue that aspects of immigration in the last decade have activated pre‐existing opposition to immigration amongst a shrinking segment of the populations of western European states.     

Trying not to lose: The electoral consequences of unilateral reform efforts and the social pact formation process

The existing social pact literature claims that governing parties offer social pact proposals because they anticipate they will receive an electoral benefit from social pact agreements. Yet the available data on social pacts inform us that in a substantial minority of cases social pact proposals fail to become social pact agreements. In an effort to better determine the political calculations made by governments before they propose a social pact, this article examines the effect of implementing reform legislation unilaterally, social pact proposals, social pact proposal failures and social pact agreements on the vote share of government parties in 15 Western European countries between 1981 and 2006. It is found that social pact proposals do not have any electoral consequences for governing parties, unilateral legislation and social pact proposal failures reduce the vote share of governing parties, and social pact agreements provide an electoral benefit to parties in minority governments only. These findings suggest that governing parties propose social pacts in a good faith effort to complete a social pact agreement; and that such an agreement is not a way for these parties to gain votes, but to avoid the electoral punishment associated with enacting unpopular reforms unilaterally.     

Bargaining in legislatures,portfolio allocation,and the electoral costs of governing

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties’ office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. This article adds to the portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalised by voters for participating in government, increasing the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This ‘cost of governing’ shifts their seat reservation price – the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomised survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties’ behaviour between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters’ reactions.     

How and when do presidents influence the duration of coalition bargaining in semi‐presidential systems?

How and when do presidents influence the government formation process in semi‐presidential systems? Presidents have both a formal role and vested interest in the formation of the cabinet, yet their influence has been overlooked in studies of the duration of government formation. In this article, it is argued that the president's influence over government formation can be explained by his or her perceived legitimacy to act in the bargaining process and their partisanship. In this first case, it is argued that the legitimacy to act derives from a president's constitutional powers and more powerful presidents simplify cabinet bargaining, leading to shorter government formation periods. In the second case, it is proposed that presidents and their parties have overlapping preferences. Therefore, when the president's party holds greater bargaining power in government formation negotiations, the bargaining process is less uncertain and less complex. Thus, government formation processes will be shorter. Using survival models and data from 26 European democracies, both propositions are confirmed by the analysis. The results enhance our understanding of the dynamics of cabinet bargaining processes and contribute to the wider study of semi‐presidentialism and executive‐legislative relations. One broader implication of these results is that the president's party affiliation is an important motivation for them as political actors; this contrasts with some previous studies which conceive of presidents as non‐partisan actors.     

Who sets the agenda and who responds to it in the Danish parliament? A new model of issue competition and agenda‐setting

Inspired by the agenda‐setting literature, this article outlines a model of issue competition focusing on the interaction between government and opposition parties through the party‐system agenda. Unlike previous studies of issue competition, the model makes it possible to answer questions such as why some parties have greater success than others in forcing other parties to address unpleasant issues. One of the central implications of the model is that opposition parties are freer to focus continually on issues that are advantageous to themselves, whereas government parties more often are forced to respond to issues brought up on the party‐system agenda. Using data on issue competition in Denmark covering 25 years and 23 issue categories, the issue competition model is evaluated and finds strong support in a set of cross‐sectional time‐series analyses.     

Die Einflussmöglichkeiten der Europäischen Kommission auf die europäische Politik

The means of the European Commission to influence European policies are being discussed predominantly with view to its agenda-setting powers. Institutionalist analyses have shown how the Commission can use agenda setting to bring to bear its own political preferences on the Council. With view to other Commission rights, in contrast, there have not been similar systematic analyses to show the Commission’s impact on European policies. In this article it is shown how the Commission can use its rights following from its role as a guardian of the Treaty and from competition law strategically. By simultaneously imposing threats on the Member States, the Commission can present its proposals to the Council as a “lesser evil”, pressurizing the Council into acceptance. The paper shows the scope and limits of this strategy and takes into consideration how other studies discussing the Commission’s powers fit into this framework of analysis.     

Policing the Bargain: Coalition Government and Parliamentary Scrutiny

Policymaking by coalition governments creates a classic principal‐agent problem. Coalitions are comprised of parties with divergent preferences who are forced to delegate important policymaking powers to individual cabinet ministers, thus raising the possibility that ministers will attempt to pursue policies favored by their own party at the expense of their coalition partners. What is going to keep ministers from attempting to move policy in directions they favor rather than sticking to the “coalition deal”? We argue that parties will make use of parliamentary scrutiny of “hostile” ministerial proposals to overcome the potential problems of delegation and enforce the coalition bargain. Statistical analysis of original data on government bills in Germany and the Netherlands supports this argument. Our findings suggest that parliaments play a central role in allowing multiparty governments to solve intracoalition conflicts.