The Impact of Subsequent Customary International Law on Treaties: Pushing the Boundaries of Interpretation?

Conflicts between treaty and customary norms are endemic to international law and are increasingly frequent. Yet there is nothing automatic or mechanical about interpreting and resolving such conflicts, which require a high degree of contextual sensitivity. Their identification and interpretation test the limits of the rules of treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, particularly where treaty modifications by subsequent customary law are concerned. This article endeavours to sketch how the latter phenomenon occurs, and the interpretative and evidentiary challenges involved—many of which remain underexplored. The analysis begins with the identification and interpretation of newly emerged customary norms, before delving into the process of determining their treaty-modifying potential. This involves the side-by-side interpretation of the pre-existing treaty and the customary norm to assess whether there is a genuine incompatibility that cannot be resolved through harmonious interpretation. The final inductive step is to ascertain the parties’ consent to displace the treaty norm in favour of the customary norm, subject to certain crucial requirements. Against the backdrop of the organic and continuous interplay between treaties and customary international law, these interpretative and evidentiary steps serve to ensure that the parties’ intention remains paramount.

     

The Uses of the Outputs of the International Law Commission in International Adjudication: Subsidiary Means or Artefacts of Rules?

This paper examines the methods which international courts and tribunals (ICTs) employ when using ILC outputs for the purpose of determining rules of international law and their content. Specifically, it identifies common patterns in the ways in which ICTs, first, justify their reliance on ILC outputs and, second, deal with their ambiguities. The paper argues in favour of a consistent methodology for the treatment of ILC outputs in international adjudication. Such a framework is based on the distinction between the identification of the status of a normative proposition contained in these texts and the determination of its content or its interpretation. The identification of the status of a normative proposition requires a critical assessment and reconstruction of the evidence leading up to its development taking also into account that these instruments are not a monolith from the perspective of sources. However, the interpretation of a proposition whose status is uncontested follows a line of inquiry akin to treaty interpretation. This observation has broader implications for the process of interpretation in international law. Specifically, apart from the context of treaty interpretation, international courts or tribunals interpret the normative propositions contained in ILC outputs as a methodological shortcut for the interpretation of rules of customary international law or general principles of law. Conversely, the employment of methods akin to treaty interpretation in this context can constitute evidence of the emergence of common rules, principles, or good practices of interpretation that are also applicable to unwritten international law.

     

Investment Treaty Law and the Fear for Sovereignty: Transnational Challenges and Solutions

This article addresses the vagueness, and the interpretative challenges associated with, international investment agreements (IIAs) and develops a new normative framework for interpreting these treaties. It focuses on the historical embedding of investment protection as a means of facilitating economic development as well as upon its synthetic public law nature. The analysis shows that a teleological approach to interpretation imposes boundaries on the meaning of substantive IIA provisions. The article then elaborates how the transnational dimension of IIAs provides a benchmark, which is the level of protection offered to economic actors against interference by the state in countries with the highest rule of law standards. The article then shows how the resulting challenges of comparative public law could be addressed through the methodology of re‐ and pre‐statement of transnational uniform ‘principles’: sophisticated and detailed rules striking the proper balance between private economic interests and the public regulatory interest, so as to provide more legal certainty for both investors and host states.     

国际公法在WTO争端解决中的作用与应用

WTO法是在国际公法的大背景中创制的,WTO协定不是存在于一个不受一般国际法影响的制度中。WTO法从来就不是一个封闭的、自给自足的法律制度,WTO规则是更广泛的国际公法内容的一部分,它在国际公法的框架内运作,并不是脱离国际公法的法律子系统。至少在解释的层面,它们总是会有某种程度的互动。国际公法可为WTO规则提供规范背景,有助于WTO无具体规定的某些方面的运作或提供解释性指导。在解释WTO协定的必要范围内,专家组和上诉机构有权使用或考虑其他条约、习惯和一般法律原则。但是,它们并非作为法律适用。在WTO争端解决中,其他国际法规则的作用是有限的、辅助的。     

Bridging the Gap: Humanitarian Protection and the Convergence of Laws in Europe

This article uses the thematic of humanitarian protection to examine the convergence of laws in Europe. It considers the heterogeneous architecture of the Refugee Convention and European Convention on Human Rights then analyses the homogenous framework of the EU's Common Asylum System and, in particular, the Qualification Directive. It argues that in an area where international, regional and national laws intersect, convergence needs to be underpinned by Member States adopting a common interpretative methodology that has international law at its core. Article 15 of the Qualification Directive (QD) is used to illustrate how this can be achieved. The article adds to the growing literature on the convergence of laws in Europe and illustrates the importance of adopting a common interpretative methodology. It suggests a paradigm for protection regimes around the world and a methodology that could be transplanted to other areas of law involving the intersection of international, regional and national laws.     

Why Do the European Court of Justice Judges Need Legal Concepts?

The article considers the reasons why the European Court of Justice (ECJ) judges need legal concepts when they pronounce their judgments. It points out that the ECJ as a law‐interpreting and an ipso facto law‐making court needs legal concepts to communicate results of its interpretative and law‐making enterprise. The article also shows how in the context of Article 234 EC preliminary ruling procedure legal concepts become useful tools of portraying ECJ judgments as mere products of interpretation and not as the results of subsuming the facts of the case into a legal provision. It is by means of application of legal concepts, that the ECJ judges are able to justify that they are not overstepping the mandate they have been entrusted with. In the same time the use of legal concepts enables them to engage in dialogue with national judges, who seek guidance as to the content of EC law rules, and to maintain a strong doctrine of precedent. Most importantly, however, the use of concepts promotes coherence which, the article maintains, is the primary source of Community law's authority, and thus constitutes the foundational technique of persuading the relevant audience that Community law is indeed a legal system.     

The Authority and Interpretation of Regulations

In the past half century, governments have increasingly relied on regulations—secondary legislation issued by administrative bodies and departments—to impose obligations on private parties, multiplying the occasions for regulatory interpretation. This article develops a theory of regulatory interpretation. It argues that such a theory involves understanding the authority of regulations. Turning to the public law of the UK, US, and Australia, this article identifies an intriguing similarity; in each case, regulations have authority when they rationally and nonarbitrarily implement delegated power within the means permitted by statute. The article then argues that this account of regulatory authority justifies a common approach to interpretation in which the object of interpretation is the purpose the regulation seeks to implement, discerned from the regulation's text and accompanying explanation of its purpose, and constrained by background legal norms.     

Expanding the Borders of Common Article 3 in Non-International Armed Conflicts: Amending Its Geographical Application Through Subsequent Practice?

The geographic footprint of contemporary warfare often challenges the existing understanding of the term ‘non-international armed conflict’, a term not defined in international humanitarian treaty law. This article examines whether the opening lines of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions include a geographical requirement. Controversy surrounds this question which until recently has received little attention. The customary interpretation of Common Article 3 is that it has a geographical scope of application limited to non-international armed conflicts which take place exclusively within the borders of a single member state (internal armed conflict). The 2016 ICRC Commentaries to the First Geneva Conventions challenges this traditional view and argues in favour of a broader interpretation of the scope of application of Common Article 3. This re-interpretation recently has gained traction in scholarship. The ICRC’s position serves as a possible solution to prevent a lacuna in humanitarian protection in situations where conflicts fit neither the understanding of ‘international armed conflict’ nor ‘internal armed conflict’. By evaluating the merits of the arguments posed by the ICRC, the article assesses whether the phrase ‘conflict not of an international character’, as included in Common Article 3, conclusively limits its geographical application to an armed conflict occurring within the boundaries of a single state.

     

Treaty Interpretation and the WTO Appellate Body Report in US - Gambling: A Critique

‘Before the game begins players should agree on a dictionaryto use in case of a challenge.’ (from the Official Rulesof SCRABBLE®)

Treaty interpretation in WTO law continues to represent a topicof highly theoretical and practical importance. The Panel’sand the Appellate Body’s reports in the recent US –Gambling dispute have critically turned on ascertaining themeaning of the United States’ GATS Schedule and ArticleXVI GATS on the basis of the public international law rulesof treaty interpretation as codified in the Vienna Conventionon the Law of Treaties. The paper’s principal aim is toreview the interpretative approach followed in particular bythe Appellate Body in reaching its decision in US – Gambling.Its main argument is that, although the Appellate Body appearsto be trying to emancipate itself from a rigorous textual approach,it has not yet embraced a holistic approach to treaty interpretation,one in which the treaty interpreter looks thoroughly at allthe relevant elements of the general rule on treaty interpretationpursuant to Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.     

外国法解释模式研究

外国法解释不同于外国法查明。借助解释模式这一概念，可将外国法解释的目标、主体、对象和途径等不同要素统合为有机整体，置于国际私法和法律解释理论的双重脉络中予以探究。在现有外国法解释模式中，解释目标一般为确定外国法在其所属国的意义，故裁判者须完全摒弃先见，作为忠实的外部观察者摹写外国法律共同体对外国法的客观理解。此模式在司法实践中的困境揭示出其在相当程度上偏离了法律解释的内在规律。应重新厘定外国法解释目标，结合外国法适用的“情境化”特点，以法律论证理论重构外国法解释模式。     

Protecting Supremacy from External Influences: A Precondition for a European Constitutional Legal Order?

The number of international law obligations that have binding force on the Union and/or its Member States is sharply increasing. This paper argues that in this light the well‐functioning of the European Union ultimately depends on the protection of the principle of supremacy from law originating outside of the EU legal order. The supremacy of EU law is essential to ensuring that Member States cannot use national rules to justify derogation from EU law. As a matter of principle, international treaties concluded by the Member States rank at the level of ordinary national law within the European legal order and below all forms of European law (both primary and secondary). Article 351 TFEU exceptionally allows Member States to derogate from primary EU law in order to comply with obligations under anterior international agreements. It does not however allow a departure from the principle of supremacy that underlies the European legal order. In Kadi I, the Court of Justice of the European Union stated that Article 351 TFEU, while it permits derogation from primary law, may under no circumstances permit circumvention of the “very foundations” of the EU legal order. This introduces an additional condition that all acts within the sphere of EU law need to comply with a form of “super‐supreme law”. It also strengthened the principle of supremacy and gave the Court of Justice the role of the guardian of the Union's “foundations”. The Court of Justice acted on the necessity of defending the Union as a distinct legal order, retaining the autonomous interpretation of its own law, and ultimately ensuring that the Union can act as an independent actor on the international plane.     

Are There Methods of Reasoning on ‘Meta‐Legislation’? The Interpretation of Legislative Competence Norms within the Methodology of European Constitutional Law

Legislative competence norms are paradigmatic elements of European constitutional law and the supranational, post‐federal era. The article aims to address legislative competence norms from the viewpoint of methodology by considering significant features of reasoning on European legislative competence norms. The discussion will be based on understanding legislative competences as ‘meta‐legislation’. That concept encompasses a substantive rather than formalistic, and a politically informed rather than strictly positivist account of legislative competences and their methodology. Against that background, the interpretation of competence norms is assessed. Subsequently, the process of interpretation is discussed according to judicial practice, constitutional theory and general legal methodology. A consideration of the significance of the—usually vast—wording of competence norms completes that discussion. Finally, consequences about the political inclusiveness of interpreting competence norms and the issue of ‘clarity’ are drawn. A conclusion summarises the results.     

Judges as Readers,Authors and Dialecticians: Legal Interpretation in the EC<Emphasis Type="Italic">t</Emphasis>HR Cases on Mental Disability

The wording of major human rights texts—constitutions and international treaties—is very similar in those provisions, which guarantee everyone the right to family, privacy, protection against discrimination and arbitrary detention, and the right to access the court. However, judges of lower national courts, constitutional judges and judges of the European Court of Human Rights often read the same or seemingly the same texts differently. This difference in interpretation gives rise not only to disputes about the hierarchy of interpretative authorities, but to more general disputes about limits of judicial construction and validity of legal arguments. How it may happen, that the national courts, which apply constitutional provisions or provisions of national legislative acts, which are seemingly in compliance with the international human rights standards, come to different results with the international judges? Do they employ different interpretative techniques, share different values or develop different legal concepts? Do international judges ‘write’ rather than ‘read’ the text of the Convention? Who is, in Plato’s terms, a name-giver and who has a power to define the ‘correctness’ of names? The answers to these questions from the rhetorical and semiotic perspectives are exemplified by the texts of the judicial decisions on the rights of persons with mental disabilities.     

Do Victims of War Need International Law? Human Rights Education Programs in Authoritarian Sudan

Drawing on ethnographic fieldwork in Sudan, this article illuminates the consequences of human rights educational workshops as a form of humanitarian assistance in war‐ravaged areas. These projects are built on flawed assumptions about Sudanese politics and about the likelihood that human rights education empowers the war‐ravaged poor. The beneficial impacts of human rights discourse stem from its side effects, which fulfill urgent and symbolic needs, and not from the core content of human rights. The case of an authoritarian regime exposes an alternative site of rights promotion, outside the established or struggling democracies where most literature on rights resides. Bridging the literature on rights in Western, democratic contexts and on human rights in Africa, this article argues that law is not enough—and is potentially dangerous—in the insecure and impoverished areas where the international aid community has been encouraging it to flourish.     

The Role of the Jurist: Reflections around Radbruch

Many different kinds of professionals work with law, but often they seek to use law for particular governmental or private purposes, they focus on some specific areas or aspects of its creation, interpretation or application, or they study it for its interest judged by criteria that are given by fields of scholarly practice outside it. Is there a special significance for a role exclusively concerned with analysing, protecting and enhancing the general well‐being or worth of law as a practical idea? This article argues that such a role is important. Building on Gustav Radbruch's juristic thought, it asks how that role could be elaborated and how a professional responsibility for discharging it might be envisaged. Many professionals concerned with law adopt such a role incidentally or intermittently, but it needs more prominence and clear demarcation. The article suggests that it might be seen as the specialised role of the jurist, treated as a particular kind of legal professional. The term “jurist” would then have not just an honorific connotation. It would indicate a Weberian “pure” type that may approximate some current understandings of “juristic” practice; but it would also identify a normative ideal—something intrinsically valuable. Seen in this way, the jurist is one who assumes a certain unique responsibility for law.     

The Force of International Law: Lawyers' Diplomacy on the International Scene in the 1920s

Where does international law (IL) draw its authority from a still weakly institutionalized international scene deprived of the warrants of a state? To address this classical debate, the article draws from a case study on the social and professional structure of the “international legal community” as it emerged during the 1920s as part of the rise of multilateralism and international organizations. It focuses on the “situation of the international lawyers” of the time, starting with the multiple and often antagonistic roles they play (as legal advisers, scholars, judges, diplomats, politicians, etc.) and the variety of interests and causes they defend (states, international organizations, professional interests, etc.) in international politics. It argues this heteronomy of international lawyers helps understand the autonomization of international law. Far from being opposed to one another it has often been assumed—realism and idealism, national loyalty and international loyalty, political logic and learned logic—actually gain when analyzed as various modes of affirming a single cause—that of an international rule of law. This attention given to the “situation of international lawyers” and to the way they manage their various allegiances also accounts for the particular vision of the “International” and of “Law and Politics” relationships that are encapsulated in this emerging international corpus juris.     

International agreements

This article discusses the place of non liquet in the statute and practice of the International Court of Justice. It argues that although there is no prohibition of non liquet in the statute of the court, the completeness of the court of international law in article 38(1) of the statute makes no room for the court to declare non liquet in practice. The author argues that the inclusion of general principles of law and judicial decisions in article 38(1) makes the sources of international law available to the court complete, thereby affording the court the means to avoid non liquet through judicial creativity.     

符合法律的宪法解释与宪法发展

符合法律的宪法解释是在宪法有复数解释时以法律为准据而选择宪法解释的方法,与合宪性解释的方向恰恰相反。在我国宪法实践上,全国人大常委会曾经将《宪法》第40条上的公安机关解释为涵盖国家安全机关,这是较为典型的符合法律的宪法解释。从理论上说,为化解违宪疑虑,也可以通过这种解释方法将《宪法》第40条上的通信解释为排除通讯记录,而将检察机关解释为涵盖监察机关在内。与合宪性解释不同的是,符合法律的宪法解释属于逆向的"以宪就法",因此通过这种方法得出的结论须接受宪法上的再审查。这种解释方法既能维持宪法的最高性,恪守宪法与法律之间的界分,同时又能容纳宪法含义新的发展。     

The Function of the Proportionality Principle in EU Law

In this article the author assesses the proportionality principle in EU law from a legal theoretical and constitutional perspective with the aim of discovering the function of the principle. Having first discussed the implications of the proportionality principle being a general principle of law, and what function it has—namely to secure legitimacy for judicial decisions—the author suggests that there are several ways in which the principle can be interpreted. There is, nevertheless, a limit to this interpretation determined by the proposed function of the principle. In the third part of the article, the European Court of Justice's (ECJ's) interpretation of the principle is assessed. The assessment clearly shows that the ECJ is interpreting the principle in different distinguishable ways. The question could, however, be raised as to whether the ECJ in some areas is interpreting the principle in a way that undermines the very function of it.     

The Right to Development in International Law: New Momentum Thirty Years Down the Line?

The right to development (RTD) is contested in international law, politics and practice. This remains the case, despite the 30-year existence of the United Nations Declaration on the Right to Development (UNDRTD), the many substantive leads that current international law provides, and the renewed inspiration that can be drawn from Agenda 2030 and its sustainable development goals. This article explores whether there is a possible new momentum for the RTD in international law. Deep substantive and political divisions about the exact content and implications of the RTD prevail between—and within—the North and the South. Up to now these divisions have stood in the way of achieving greater normative clarity, follow-up and implementation action. This state of affairs has directed us to adopt a pragmatic approach, by which we consider the scope for revitalizing the RTD through existing provisions of international law, rather than by creating additional normative frameworks. Thus, after a short sketch of the historical evolution of the RTD, we examine the nature, substance and implications of this right as conceived in the UNDRTD. Then, we pursue the question of how existing provisions of international law could be mobilized more explicitly for the sake of revitalizing the RTD and more in particular for its actual realization in the future. Three concrete means of implementation provide at least some prospect for positive change: international cooperation for development, accountability and monitoring mechanisms, and regional and inter-regional instruments and procedures.