Eminent domain power and afterwards: Leviathan’s post-taking opportunism

This paper investigates post-taking procedures, a research area not yet fully explored. It discusses the economic implications underlying the landowner’s ‘repurchase right (RR)’ which can be invoked upon the occurrence of a so-called ‘change in use after taking.’ RR is compared with the government’s discretion regarding such changes. The lack of post-taking accountability tends to create power ripe for abuse, and RR appears to be an effective device for constraining Leviathan’s opportunism. Finally, a parsimonious estimation supports that, under the overriding-RR regime, there exists the systematic post-taking opportunism whereby ‘original public projects are changed into inappropriate projects.’     

Maximizing behavior & market forces: the microfoundations of spontaneous order theorizing in Gordon Tullock’s contributions to Smithian political economy

I explore the microfoundations of Gordon Tullock’s contributions to political economy and argue that his approach is consistent with the “invisible hand” theorizing of Adam Smith. While Smith (and Hayek) are celebrated for their emphasis on the “bright-side” of spontaneous social cooperation, Tullock emphasized the “dark-side” of social processes when the incentives are perverse and information is distorted. By explicating the microfoundations of Tullock’s rendering of Smithian political economy this paper will set the stage for a reassessment of Tullock as a spontaneous order theorist.     

How policy instruments are chosen: patterns of decision makers’ choices

Policy instruments are a fundamental component of public policies. Policy instruments are often a result of mediation within the policy design process, whenever decision makers reshape existing instruments without introducing any real innovation. This results in imitation, layering and ambiguity in tool choice selection, and raises the theoretical problem of the logic according to which decision makers choose certain specific policy instruments rather than others. Decision makers may have different reasons for choosing certain specific instruments, although these reasons should be connected to the two main purposes of decision-making, that is, the search for effectiveness and the construction of a shared sense, a common acceptance. Thus, the choice of instruments is a question of potentially conflicting drivers that decision makers have to cope with within a specific decisional situation, when asked to solve those problems that have arisen. This paper examines this question and offers an analytical framework based on the two main factors in terms of which the selection of instruments is channelled and assessed: legitimacy and instrumentality. The boundaries created by how decision makers perceive these two dimensions mean that only four selection patterns can be chosen by decision makers: hybridization, stratification, contamination or routinization.     

Considering the council’s counsel: Advisor influence and political change

Comment on paper by Brian Goff regarding the influence of political advisors on observable measures of political outcomes.     

Parliamentary procedure: principal forms and political effects

A standard conclusion of theorists who model bargaining as a non-cooperative game is that the party designated to make the first move—the formateur party—will determine the bargaining outcome. Most empirical studies of parliamentary coalition formation have paid surprisingly little attention to the formation process. In this paper we model government formation as a two-stage unordered discrete choice problem that better reflects this process. The first step involves the selection of a formateur party, and the second involves the choice of partners by the predicted formateur. We evaluate several hypotheses for the two stages, using a data set of all cabinets formed in the Western European countries from 1970 to 2006. In our analyses of formateur selection, we find that party size is clearly the dominant feature. In the second stage, we show that when predicting government composition it is fruitful to add information drawn from a first stage analysis.     

Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.     

Dilatory or anticipatory? Voting on the Journal in the House of Representatives

In this paper, I examine a simple procedure in the United States House of Representatives, approving the Journal, and its implications for legislative business. In this paper, I examine the hypothesis that such votes are more than simply pro forma motions or dilatory tactics by the minority party. Considering the 102nd–107th Congresses, I show that votes on the Journal’s approval are just as frequently requested by the majority party as by members of the minority party. Furthermore, I find that votes recorded on days on which a vote was also recorded on the House Journal were more likely to be close and more likely to be party-line votes than those recorded on other days.     

What’s in a poll? Incentives for truthful reporting in pre-election opinion surveys

We examine the ability of pre-election polls to aggregate information about voter preferences. We show that if the electorate is small and voting costs are negligible, then an equilibrium exists in which citizens report their true political preferences. If the electorate is large or voting costs are significant, however, then no such equilibrium exists because poll respondents possess incentives to influence the voting behavior of others by misreporting their true preferences. We find that when a truthful equilibrium does exist, a poll can raise expected welfare by discouraging turnout among members of the minority.     

Projection effects and strategic ambiguity in electoral competition

Theories from psychology suggest that voters’ perceptions of political positions depend on their non-policy related attitudes towards the candidates. A voter who likes (dislikes) a candidate will perceive the candidate’s position as closer to (further from) his own than it really is. This is called projection. If voters’ perceptions are not counterfactual and voting is based on perceived policy positions then projection gives generally liked candidates an incentive to be ambiguous. In this paper we extend the standard Downsian model in order to investigate under what conditions this incentive survives in the strategic setting of electoral competition.     

Does government ideology influence deregulation of product markets? Empirical evidence from OECD countries

This paper examines how government ideology has influenced deregulation of product markets in OECD countries. I analyze a dataset of non-manufacturing regulation indicators covering energy, transport and communication industries in 21 OECD countries over the 1980–2003 period and employ two different indices of government ideology. The results suggest that government ideology has had a strong influence on the deregulation process: market-oriented governments promoted the deregulation of the energy, transport and communication industries. This finding identifies remarkable differences between leftist and rightwing governments concerning the role of government in the economy and basic elements of political order.     

Does economic freedom cause prosperity? An IV approach

A positive, statistical and economic significant relation between growth, income level and the Economic Freedom of the World (EFW) index has been amply documented. Most analyses, however, use OLS methods which, in the presence of endogenous variables do not establish causality and produce biased and inconsistent estimates. This paper uncovers the exogenous component of EFW using IV methods and finds a robust channel from economic freedom to prosperity. The findings, including instrument validity tests, support the importance of policies and institutions for development and warrants policy advice aimed at increasing economic freedom to foster prosperity.     

The curious commentary on the citation practices of Avner Greif

Rowley’s (Public Choice 140:275–285, 2009) claim that I have “expropriated” (p. 276) intellectual property rights from Professor Landa by insufficiently citing her works is vacuous. It failed, among other faults, to recognize the substantive distinction between the lines of research pursued by Professor Landa and myself. Her analysis of trust is preferences-based while my analysis is beliefs-based. We talk about similar issues but what we say is very different.     

Strategic entry deterrence and terrorism: Theory and experimental evidence

Using a two stage rent-seeking framework, we present a simple model of strategic entry/terrorism deterrence and test the model using laboratory experiments. Our contest success function highlights the potential for strategic spillovers. The theory illustrates that, relative to a cooperative outcome, negative externalities lead to over-spending on deterrence and positive externalities lead to under-spending on deterrence. Our experimental results are broadly consistent; subjects in the negative externality treatment had higher expenditures. In contrast to theoretical predictions, participation decisions, while primarily driven by the probability of winning a contest, were influenced by a subject’s ability to participate in multiple contests.     

Interest-group analysis in economic history and the history of economic thought

This article reviews Bob Tollison’s conjoined contributions to the scholarly literature in the closely related fields of economic history and history of economic thought, underscoring his integration of public choice and interest-group analysis into the historian’s purview. It identifies the overarching themes of his research and summarizes the major findings of his key publications.     

It’s the economy, and then some: modeling the presidential vote with state panel data

Using data for the 50 US states for presidential elections from 1972 to 2004 two theories for determining state voting outcomes are considered jointly: the ‘economy matters’ and ‘home grown-ness’ theories. Fixed-effects regressions show that measures of the ‘economy matters’ (real income, unemployment and a proxy for inflation) have the predicted effects on state voting patterns for presidential elections. The home grown theory receives mixed support. There is weak evidence that incumbent-party candidates garner greater support in their home states. There is strong support, however, for the proposition that incumbent-party candidates fare worse in the home state of rival-party candidates.     

Does public sector efficiency matter? Revisiting the relation between fiscal size and economic growth in a world sample

This paper revisits the relationship between fiscal size and economic growth. Our work differs from the empirical growth literature because this relationship depends explicitly on the efficiency of the public sector. We use a sample of 64 countries, both developed and developing, in four five-year time periods between 1980 and 2000. Building on the work of Afonso et al. (Public Choice 123:321–347, 2005), we construct a measure of public sector efficiency in each country and each time period by calculating an output-to-input ratio. In addition, we get an estimate of technical efficiency of public spending for 52 countries from 1995 to 2000 by employing a stochastic frontier analysis. Using these two measures, we find evidence of a non-monotonic relation between fiscal size and economic growth that depends critically on the size-efficiency mix.     

Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

We consider a situation in which two groups contest group-specific public goods. Each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize. Our model can be interpreted as the contestants’ cost of lobbying efforts being non-linear, or the returns to their efforts being decreasing. We show that the level of free-riding depends on the return of the investment. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and/or groups can be added. The question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups?     

Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence

A stylized model of three parties choosing an amendment agenda and voting over three policy alternatives is analyzed. The analysis yields a classification of five types of voters: random, sincere, strategic, risk-averse, and EUS (expected utility sophisticated) proposed by Enelow (J. Polit. 43:1062–1089, 1981). Laboratory experiments suggest that the choice of agendas can be partially explained by the sincere voting model (26% of voters) and strategic voting model (47% of voters), even when players’ preferences are common knowledge. Risk-aversion may explain choices of up to 56% of the voters. Finally, the EUS voting model explains up to 73% of the observed voting behavior.