Group specific public goods, orchestration of interest groups with free riding

We consider a situation in which two groups contest group-specific public goods. Each member of the group may have a different valuation of the prize. Our model can be interpreted as the contestants’ cost of lobbying efforts being non-linear, or the returns to their efforts being decreasing. We show that the level of free-riding depends on the return of the investment. We consider the situation under which one group initiates a contest to which different individuals and/or groups can be added. The question we pose is what is the optimal structure of additional groups?     

Endogenous choice of amendment agendas: types of voters and experimental evidence

A stylized model of three parties choosing an amendment agenda and voting over three policy alternatives is analyzed. The analysis yields a classification of five types of voters: random, sincere, strategic, risk-averse, and EUS (expected utility sophisticated) proposed by Enelow (J. Polit. 43:1062–1089, 1981). Laboratory experiments suggest that the choice of agendas can be partially explained by the sincere voting model (26% of voters) and strategic voting model (47% of voters), even when players’ preferences are common knowledge. Risk-aversion may explain choices of up to 56% of the voters. Finally, the EUS voting model explains up to 73% of the observed voting behavior.     

Public servants in parliament: theory and evidence on its determinants in Germany

This paper addresses the personal linkages between the public service and the legislature that emerge because public servants pursue a political mandate. There are concerns that the representation of public servants in parliaments generates a conflict of interest. We present a cost-benefit calculus and analyze specific legal provisions for the German Laender to understand the selection of public servants into parliaments. We find that a legal incompatibility of a position in the public service and a political mandate decreases and a compensation for having to hold one’s office in abeyance increases the fraction of public servants in Laender parliaments.     

The prison in economics: private and public incarceration in Ancient Greece

Recent histories of Ancient Greece describe a transition from customary law to public criminal justice between 800 and 400 B.C. This narrative contains three pieces of evidence against the presumption that prisons are a public good and government must provide incarcerations. First, before the rise of a formal government, Ancient Greece had a functioning system of criminal law enforcement. Second, the timeline surrounding the rise of government institutions in Ancient Greece originated with Solon’s penal reforms. Lastly, the rise of a government system was more the result of private rather than public interest.     

The role of institutional and governance factors in public–private partnerships infrastructure investments in emerging economies

The overall development and sustained growth of any economy depend heavily on its infrastructure provisioning. Emerging economies are usually characterised by constrained public investments in infrastructure. Budgetary constraints of the governments are one of the major hurdles to these investments. Due to these reasons that governments of emerging economies continuously seek collaborations with the private sector for additional sources of funding infrastructure. Economies with solid institutional and governance frameworks are known to provide a conducive environment for enhanced private sector attraction in the sector. However, emerging economies face greater institutional and governance issues than developed economies, and they sometimes fall short of luring private investments in the infrastructure sector. The objective of this study is to empirically evaluate the role of institutional and governance aspects in private sector attraction in emerging economies. This study provides empirical evidence with a sample of 114 emerging economies over a period of 20 years. Various econometric estimates were developed to explore the interplay between public-private partnership investments and governance factors. The results of the study provide an evidence of a positive association between these factors and private investments in public-private partnership arrangements.     

The impact of surplus sharing on the portfolio mix of public sector defined benefit pension plans: a public choice approach

The riskiness of state employee pension plan portfolios varies across states. We investigate whether this variation is related to how public employees and taxpayers share actuarial surpluses of pension accounts. We focus on two determinants of a plan’s asset mix: the relative influence of public employees to taxpayers; and whether a surplus-sharing contract is specified. Our theoretical model demonstrates that the effect of public employee influence on the asset mix is ambiguous. Our empirical results corroborate this complex theoretical result. In our theoretical and empirical analyses, if a surplus sharing rule is specified, plans adopt a more aggressive investment allocation.     

Distribution of surplus in sequential bargaining with endogenous recognition

I examine a sequential bargaining situation in which agents contest the right to propose an allocation. The contest can either take place at a pre-bargaining stage, yielding “persistent recognition” to propose, or recur throughout the bargaining, yielding “transitory recognition”. Equilibrium analysis reveals that surplus is distributed more unequally under persistent recognition; social cost is higher under persistent recognition if and only if it attracts a sufficient number of “active” bargainers; and individual’s incentive to propose under transitory recognition may actually increase in the number of agents, while this incentive always diminishes under persistent recognition.     

Geographical redistribution with disproportional representation: a politico-economic model of Norwegian road projects

Politicians bias public policies to favor particular election districts. According to the traditional common pool model, districts facing low tax shares should receive relatively large government projects. We suggest a swing-voter model where the number of voters on the ideological cut point, lack of party identification and number of district representatives per voter determine project sizes. We analyze the allocation of state road investments in Norway from 1973–1997 exploiting unique data on characteristics of voters, legislative representation and tax prices in 19 election districts. Geographical representation to parliament is biased, mostly due to an ancient constitution. Shares of swing voters and legislative over-representation lead to higher levels of road investments, while high levels of party identification reduce investments.     

The policy impact of unified government: evidence from 2000 to 2002

Do the outcomes of government action differ between periods of unified and divided government? Using “event study” methodology, this articles addresses the question by looking at sudden shifts between divided and unified government—Bush v. Gore, the Jeffords switch, and the 2002 election. The results show that oil and gas stocks (i.e. Republican “constituent firms”) rose abruptly as Republicans took unified control, while renewable energy stocks (i.e. Democratic “constituent firms”) fell. The pattern reversed, however, when Democrats took back control of the Senate. These outcomes call into question non-partisan theories of law making.     

Not it: opting out of voluntary coalitions that provide a public good

Most coalitions that form to increase contributions to a public good do not require full participation by all users of the public good, and therefore create incentives for free riding. If given the opportunity to opt out of a voluntary coalition, in theory, agents should try to be among the first to do so, forcing the remaining undecided agents to bear the cost of participating in the coalition. This study tests the predicted sequence of participation decisions in voluntary coalitions using real-time threshold public goods experiments. We find that subjects’ behavior is more consistent with the theoretical predictions when the difference in payoffs between coalition members and free-riding non-members is relatively large.     

Strategic voting in open primaries: evidence from?Rush?Limbaugh��s ��operation chaos��

Open primaries create the possibility of strategic crossover voting. On his March 3, 2008 program and subsequent broadcasts, radio personality Rush Limbaugh called on his listeners to extend the Democratic presidential contest by crossing over to vote for Sen. Hillary Clinton. Using voter registration data from North Carolina and election return data from Indiana, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania (states with open, semi-closed, and closed primaries, respectively), I find no evidence of a Limbaugh-motivated switch in political party registration or of a large or statistically significant Limbaugh-motivated increase in voting for Sen. Clinton.     

Pension politics in France: Patterns of co‐operation and conflict in two recent reforms

This article looks at the political side of pension reform in France. Policy makers are caught between two contrasting pressures: increasing expenditure on the one hand, and strong public support for existing arrangements on the other. In the last few years, the government has attempted to deal with the issue on two occasions, with rather different results. First, in 1993 a pension reform was successfully adopted after negotiations with the unions. Later, in 1995 the government had to abandon plans for a second reform as a result of a massive union‐led protest movement. The article argues that the different fortunes of the two reforms are related to changes in the configuration of power between the two events. It also claims that the popularity of current pension arrangements constitutes a strong pressure on the government to adopt a negotiated solution to the pension problem.     

Politics and the implementation of public policy: The case of the US military housing allowance program

Are bureaucracies in fact controlled by the president, Congress, or legislation? We analyze a 1998 policy change in the Department of Defense’s (DoD) $6.5 billion annual military housing allowance program. Results show that both the president and Congress were able to influence the bureaucracy, even in the presence of an exceedingly specific law that outlined the manner in which the DoD was to allocate the funds. After policy implementation, allowances were disproportionately higher in locations that (a) supported the president in the 1996 election and (b) were represented by members of the House or Senate Armed Services Committees.     

Policy processes sans frontières: interactions in transnational governance of global health

Policy Sciences - National policy on global health (NPGH) arenas are multisectoral governing arrangements for cooperation between health, development, and foreign affairs sectors in government...     

The uniqueness of pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in rent-seeking games with risk-averse players

This article proves that if each player’s measure of absolute risk aversion is nonincreasing in his/her wealth, then there exists a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in the general rent-seeking game, where risk-averse players can coexist with risk-neutral players, attitude toward risk can differ among players, and concave production functions for lotteries are not necessarily the same among players.     

‘Responsibilty’ as a strategy of governance: regulating people living with AIDS and lesbians and gay men in Ontario

This paper investigates responsibility/irresponsibility as an important regulatory strategy, in two instinct but interrelated social sites – people living with AIDS and HIV, and lesbians and gay men, especially within the Canadian province of Ontario. This responsibility/irresponsibility technique of governance is developing in response to the struggles of people with AIDS and community-based AIDS groups and lesbians and gay men and the alternative strategies of regulation articulated through these struggles. Practices of ‘resistance’ and activism alter the grounds of hegemonic regulation/governance and point towards new techniques of governance. I show how responsibilizing and normalizing strategies in the context of social struggles over AIDS and sexual regulation allows for those constructed as ‘responsible’ to be managed through forms of self-regulation and professional forms of goverance of their live. For those who continue to be constructed as ‘irresponsible’ forms of criminal law, policing and public health governance are called into action.     

Success in opposition – failure in government: explaining the performance of right-wing populist parties in public office

Drawing on a conceptual distinction between traditional right-wing extremist and right-wing populist parties, this article examines the performance of the latter in public office. The central argument is that the specific populist aspects of such parties allow them to succeed in opposition and to do well at the game of elections. Once in government, their unique strengths turn into disadvantages. Significant structural weaknesses inherent in populist parties pose nearly insurmountable problems that make their long-term success in government questionable. The analysis also shows that the rise of right-wing populism has substantially increased the opportunity structures of conservative parties. Following the theoretical discussion, the article examines the case of the Austrian Freedom Party and draws parallels with the Italian and Dutch cases.     

The present and future of public sector extension in Africa: contracting out or contracting in?

Public sector extension has come under increasing pressure to downsize and reform. Contracting out—the use of public sector funds to contract non‐governmental and private service providers—is often held up as a potential tool in reform efforts. Much has been written about the possible advantages of contracting out of agricultural extension and it is being encouraged and promoted by numerous international organizations. However, a look at field experience in Africa shows that contracting out is relatively infrequent, especially compared with the reverse—contracting in—where private sector and non‐governmental organizations finance public sector extension delivery. Case studies from Uganda and Mozambique indicate that on the ground attempts to come up with solutions to providing services to farmers are resulting in innovative contracting approaches and combined public and private institutional arrangements. Contracting in and public–private coalition approaches, in contrast to purely public sector extension (characterized by ineffectiveness and inefficiencies) and purely private for profit extension (which may ignore public goods and concerns), may help achieve extension services which are both demand led and which internalize public concerns such as environmental protection, food security and socio‐economic equity. These coalition approaches can be improved and facilitated. They deserve greater analysis and may contribute to a better understanding of extension contracting and the roles of private and public organizations. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Designing stakeholder consultations: Reinforcing or alleviating bias in the European Union system of governance?

Consultations with stakeholders are a policy instrument widely used by policy makers to design policies and prepare legislative proposals across national and supranational systems of government. The European Union has recently reviewed its stakeholder consultation regime and asked for stakeholders’ policy input. This offers an opportunity to examine empirically stakeholders’ own evaluation of the regime and to ask a fundamental question about its democratic credentials: Do stakeholders recognise the EU consultation regime as reinforcing bias in interest representation by benefiting policy insiders, or conversely as an instrument that alleviates bias in supranational policy making? Building on rational choice institutionalism, this article outlines the potential distributional outcomes of the regime and argues that they are likely to vary along the lines of a classic divide in policy making that opposes policy insiders to outsiders. Two competing narratives are discussed in relation to the expected direction of this variation by focusing on insiders’ incentives to support or oppose the regime. The observable implications are tested empirically on an original dataset containing information about stakeholders’ positions on the evaluation of the regime status quo, its proposed further institutionalisation and their recommendations for change. The findings describe a consultation regime that seems to have created conditions alleviating bias in stakeholders’ participation in supranational policy making. This is evident in the lack of systematic, significant differences between insiders and outsiders in the evaluation of the consultation regime. Where differences do occur, they are consistent with the image of a consultation regime that has not reinforced bias in favour of policy insiders. These actors are found to be more critical of the regime status quo, its institutionalisation and more inclined to recommend policy improvements. This supports an optimistic view over the democratic credentials and legitimacy of the EU consultation regime and outlines an additional scenario under which policy actors that are traditionally associated with exerting more power and influence find themselves stripped of their privileged position in the context of European supranational governance.     

Linking two levels of governance: Citizens’ trust in domestic and European institutions over time

This article puts forward a comprehensive framework for explaining the complex and dynamic relationship between trust in the domestic government and trust in the EU, considering time, country and individual-level variation. Using longitudinal comparative data from 32 Eurobarometer survey waves (2004–2018), we first establish that the link between attitude formation at the national and the EU supranational levels is present over time. Second, we show that during ‘extraordinary’ times of crisis the strength of that relationship intensifies. Third, we posit that the European sovereign debt crisis changed the mechanism for this relationship in two ways: during ‘extraordinary’ times, the link is much stronger in countries hardest hit by the crisis, and the relationship holds independent of individuals' political sophistication across all countries. Our findings have implications for understanding the drivers of EU support and theories of institutional trust.