民法视野下的人体法益构造——以人体物性的科技利用为背景

近现代民法体系所持的"人体为主体人格之一部"的立场系建立在传统人物两分理论基础之上,该理论虽有助于彰显人的主体价值和尊严,但在处理因人的活体、尸体、离体组织和基因的科技利用所生法律问题上,已显现出部分失灵和易加剧人体物性利用与人性尊严保障之间价值冲突的不足。人与物或人格与财产的区分并非绝对不容许因应时代变迁而作必要修正。通过逻辑的、价值的、实践的和法释义学的综合考量,理论上可以得出,有限地承认人体为物,并将"人体财产权"和人类作为物种享有的"类的人性尊严"纳入到人体法益构造体系之中,能较好地克服以上不足。在以公序良俗原则限制人体或其一部的利用和处分时,应建立和实践"人性尊严关联度原则"。     

Human Dignity in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and its Interpretation Before the European Court of Justice

This article argues that the EU Charter’s dignity provisions must be given a specific, expansive European meaning that underpins the importance the EU places on fundamental rights protection as a principle EU value. To this end, the article examines the EU Charter provisions on dignity and critically analyses the case law before the EU Charter had full legal effect and after it did. It finishes with looking at three areas in which the potential for an expansive interpretation of dignity could help bring the EU closer to its people and fully respect and protect dignity: asylum, criminal justice and sexual orientation.     

“杨佳的说法”与杀人逻辑的权利悖论

杨佳的个人尊严维护中"讨说法"与其恶意杀人之间存在着社会价值观念异常即轻视生命权利的社会氛围支持。在弱个体仇视某一职业强群体的社会学视野中,仇警文化是一种社会价值观念个体异常向群体异常演进的表现。而在法律经济学视野,1个人"讨"的所谓说法,等于要6个人生命的死亡、5个人身体的受伤,而竟然会有那么多网友叫好,则是一种忽视生命权利,在生命权与人格尊严之间,价值选择的错位。至于法律文化学领域,人权的核心是生命权,人存在的本源意义当中,生命权应当高于人的尊严,杨佳为了所谓的个人尊严而可以乱杀人的逻辑,是非常荒谬的。     

Two Challenges for Dignity as an Expressive Norm

The concept of dignity figures prominently in legal and moral discussion on such topics as human rights, euthanasia, abortion, and criminal punishment. Yet the notion has been criticized for being indeterminate and either insufficient or redundant (or both) in justifying the kinds of legal and moral rights and views its proponents use it to vindicate. The criticisms have inspired some novel conceptions of dignity. One of them is Tarunabh Khaitan??s proposal that dignity should be understood as an expressive norm. In this article, I assess Khaitan??s suggestion. I maintain that it faces two challenges that its advocates should be able to solve for the proposal to be plausible.     

中西思想家对“人的尊严”的论述

"人的尊严"是一个拥有丰富内涵的、被当代法律制度引入的哲学观点,探讨"人的尊严"的源与流,通过对中西思想家关于"人的尊严"的论述来考查它的产生、发展的流变历程。     

Dignity, Democracy, Civilisation

This paper contributes to international discussion about the difficulty of defining human dignity as a legal concept by locating it at the heart of (European) democracy and human rights. Focusing on emerging dignity case law in the United Kingdom, the paper explores the connections among dignity, human rights and democracy, and the uses of dignity to enhance and refine democracy. While judges are key actors in the construction of dignity, they operate within the boundaries of a particular democratic ‘civilisation’ anchored in the core prohibitions of art 2, 3 and 4 European Convention on Human Rights, combined with those of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (art. 2, 3, 4 and 5). This normative core, the paper argues, is to be understood in the wider time frame of democracy and dignity, which is equally important for refining and thickening human dignity’s conceptual and normative definition, as well as for reflecting on the legitimacy of its (judicial) uses.     

宪法“人格尊严”条款的规范地位之辨

规范地位是指某一条款在基本权利内部乃至宪法规范体系中的效力,取决于该条款在特定宪法秩序中的法律属性。尊严条款因其法理基础、宪法文本表述及宪法解释实践的差异在各国宪法上享有不同的地位,归纳起来可分为宪法原则、基础价值、规定功能的宪法概念。我国宪法第38条人格尊严的哲学基础不同于其他国家的人是目的、人格发展、交往理论,而是着重于个人的名誉与荣誉保护;宪法文本表述并非人的尊严、人性尊严,而是人格尊严,且该条既未规定在总纲中,亦未置于"公民的基本权利和义务"一章之首,即使与"国家尊重与保护人权"一款结合起来阅读,亦无法取得与其它国家宪法上的规范地位。人格尊严在我国宪法上属于独立条款,也是公民的一项基本权利,具有具体的法律内容,在宪法解释过程中可作为规范与特定宪法事实相涵摄,证明公民的人格尊严受到了侵犯。     

Human Dignity as a Sui Generis Principle

This paper argues that human dignity is a sui generis status principle whose function lies in unifying our normative orders. More fully, human dignity denotes a basic status to be preserved in any institution or process; it is a principle demanding determination in different contexts; and it has its most characteristic application where the legal, moral, and political place competing obligations on individuals. The implication of this account is that we should not seek to reduce human dignity to either a legal norm or a legal principle.     

Observations on the Development of Human Dignity and Personality in German Constitutional Law: An Overview

This paper provides an overview of the development of the constitutional value of human dignity under German constitutional law. First, it provides a background to the German constitutional order then it places the constitutional value of dignity within the framework of the constitutional court’s jurisprudence on personality rights. It then progresses to an examination of specific cases that have developed personality rights and the importance of the constitutional court’s interpretation of personality and dignity in the personal and outer spheres within the framework of the German legal order. The article concludes with some observations and comparisons between German and American law in this area.     

安乐死的民法学思考——亦谈安乐死的合法化问题

关于安乐死问题学者多是从哲学、宗教、伦理、医学等诸方面进行研究,而较少从民法基本理论角度进行分析。本文拟尝试以法益分析的方法从民法学之生命权和人格尊严权角度对安乐死做一初步考量。并在此基础上提出选择安乐死是自然人的一项天然权利,应给安乐死合法地位。     

Social Values and the Multiple Sources of European Social Law

Abstract: The paper aims at describing the current status of European social law, by examining different sources. These include the most recent directives; the Protocol attached to the Maastricht Treaty; the Commission's latest White papers on social policies and on economic growth and unemployment; and the case law of the European Court of Justice. In such a variegated legal landscape, a significant role could be played by non-binding measures; the notion of soft law is slowly acquiring its own dignity in European social law and is emerging for open interpretation. Yet, European labour law houses a fragile body of norms. The spreading of social values would become a tangible prospect if the potential of the multiple sources here examined were better exploited by all actors. Although a coherent legal structure is still to come, a legal culture is being created which should be strengthened through action by all Community institutions.     

论民法典中人格权的实证概念

尽管我国民法典以独立成编的方式规定了人格权,但是,由于对人格权的概念存在巨大争议,所以,从民法典人格权编的具体内容和规范来反观人格权的实证概念对于理论研究和司法实践更具有意义。从我国民法典的内容看,我国民法典人格权编实际上包括了两个部分:一是对人格权的保护,二是对人格尊严的保护。隐私权与信息的二元保护就清楚地说明了这一问题。因此,不能认为人格权编中保护的都是人格权。必须把人格权的概念与人格利益区分开来,从而决定其保护程度与救济措施的差别。另外,从表面上看,虽然看起来都是相同的权利(人格权),但是,法人和非法人组织的人格权与自然人的人格权建立在完全不同或者说完全不相关的基础之上--自然人的人格权是以人的自由和尊严为核心的,而法人或者非法人组织的所谓人格权完全是技术处理的结果。当然,这种处理方式也可以通过其他方式处理。荣誉权无论从哪个方面看,都不具有人格权的特征;虽然民法典对其予以了明确规定,但是,荣誉权确实不应该是人身自由和人格尊严的表现,我们在实践中应当将其作为一种特殊权利对待。总之,人格权可以定义为:自然人享有的人之所以为人的主体性权利,包括生命权、身体权、健康权、姓名权、肖像权、名誉权、荣誉权、隐私权等权利,是个人自由、尊严在民法上的具体体现。法人仅仅享有与自由和尊严无关的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权,但法人的名称权、荣誉权和名誉权在实质上不是人格权。     

Animal Dignity and the Law: Potential,Problems and Possible Implications

Liverpool Law Review - This article aims to assess the suitability of the concept of ‘animal dignity’ as a normative principle for the legal approach towards animals. Through an...     

EU Climate Change Litigation,the Role of the European Courts,and the Importance of Legal Culture

The purpose of this article is to show it is only in light of legal culture that climate change jurisprudence in the European Union can be explained. Examining the case law concerning the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, this article demonstrates that climate change proceedings in the European Union raise questions that stand at the heart of the EU legal order; that is, they demand that the boundaries of the EU's regulatory competences are drawn. In effect, the EU courts focus on ensuring that EU climate change laws are in accord with the rule of law or, in the context of EU law, the borders of the EU's environmental regulatory powers. As such, this article shows that attention needs to be given to the interaction between climate change laws and the constitutional role of the EU judiciary. These interactions are considered here together with the contingency of EU climate change litigation on EU legal culture.     

The Dead, the Law, and the Politics of the Past

This article explores the role of law in cultural and political disputes concerning dead bodies. It uses three interconnecting legal frameworks: cultural and moral ownership, commemoration, and closure. It begins with a critique of the limitations of the private law notion of 'ownership' in such contexts, setting out a broader notion of cultural and moral ownership as more appropriate for analysing legal disputes between states and indigenous tribes. It then examines how legal discourses concerning freedom of expression, religious and political traditions, and human rights and equality are utilized to regulate the public memory of the dead. Finally, it looks at the relationship between law and notions of closure in contexts where the dead have either died in battle or have been 'disappeared' during a conflict, arguing that law in such contexts goes beyond the traditional retributive focus of investigation and punishment of wrongdoers and instead centres on broader concerns of societal and personal healing.     

个人信息权的体系化解释——兼论《个人信息保护法》的公法属性

《个人信息保护法》是数字时代个人信息保护的基本法。它采取了将个人信息权作为新兴公法权利的思路,确立了完整的个人信息权利保护体系,在个人信息保护问题上和《民法典》一起形成了公私法共同协力的进路。《个人信息保护法》以权利束的方式规定了个人信息主体的知情权、决定权、查阅权、复制权、更正权、删除权、可携带权和信息权利救济权等。《个人信息保护法》从立法依据、权利体系、条文设计和规制措施上都体现出鲜明的公法属性,这也可以从基本权利的双重面向和个人信息国家保护义务得到理论上的证成。这部法律是数字时代公法秩序的基石,它对公法边界的形塑仍需通过其实施来确立。     

Eugenics: progress or backward movement?]

Throughout this article there is a critical analysis of how genetics presents a dilemma for "human progress". So much so, that the legal world aims to create unequivocal norms and guarantees in relation with eugenics in order to avoid attempting against human dignity. The document makes the reader reflect on the ethical problems that eugenics can entail.     

A-Legality: Postnationalism and the Question of Legal Boundaries

This paper critically examines the prevailing assumption that legal boundaries are becoming irrelevant in postnationalism. While the boundaries of the nation-state are forfeiting some of their hold on human behaviour, postnational legal orders are simply not legal orders unless they can in some way draw the spatial, temporal, material and subjective boundaries that make it possible to qualify human behaviour as legal or illegal. This implies that reflexively constituted legal orders – whether national or postnational – must be presented as legal unities. To the extent that boundaries are the necessary condition of national and postnational legal orders, and therewith of legal unity, they also spawn the possibility of political plurality, manifested in behaviour that resists the very distinction between legality and illegality, as drawn by an order of positive law: a-legality. Rather than signalling the demise of legal boundaries, postnationalism ushers in a novel way of dealing therewith – and with a-legality.     

Legal Consciousness: Some Observations

This article argues that US studies of 'legal consciousness' have much to offer UK socio-legal studies. It is, perhaps, surprising that so little attention has been paid to this set of understandings. I seek to rectify that imbalance in the transatlantic relationship by outlining legal consciousness and its critiques. I then draw on homelessness applicant interview data to discuss their 'legal consciousness', illustrating the importance of the value of dignity; how they make sense of their decisions; and the spaces in which legal consciousness may be produced. The study is a limited examination, but it enables us to question the assertion that welfare applicants 'know the law' and (ab-)use it.     

Honor and Dignity in the Film Unforgiven: Implications for Sociolegal Theory

This article calls attention to "honor" and "dignity" as two fundamental, antithetical bases of unique value systems, both highly significant to social orders and legal systems in the contemporary Western world. The article argues that in this comparative context, the relatively new dignity-based value system may be better defined and articulated; at the same time, the overlooked, traditional honor-based value system, which underlies much of contemporary reality, can be better identified and replaced or at least modified by a dignity-based one. Rather than look to specific sociolegal realities, the article presents this line of thought from a "law-and-film" perspective, i.e., through the close reading of a single feature film: Clint Eastwood's Unforgiven . This contemporary, widely familiar, and immensely popular Western exposes the ugly face of the honor-based value system at the heart of the Western film genre; further, it subversively undermines this value system, replacing it with a dignity-based one. In so doing, the film expresses deep faith in the human capacity to transform, calling on real-world social and legal systems to follow in its footsteps and apply the same critical analysis and reformative activism to Western law and society at large.