Deficits and Devolution in the 104th Congress

Deficit reduction was an important impetus for the devolutioninitiatives thai moved through the 104th Congress, but it wasnot the only cause. Other objectives, notably building an alliancewith Republican governors and transforming the American welfarestate, also helped to drive devolution. Although the Republicandeficit and devolution agendas appeared mutually reinforcingat first, arguments over the terms of devolution (e.g., entitlementstatus, program mandates, and funding formulas) helped to slowdown and build opposition to those agendas. The use of omnibuslegislation helped to gel Republican proposals through the Congressin 1995, but packaging together popular and highly unpopularprovisions in a single bill ultimately provided President BillClinton with political cover to veto the legislation. The unpopularityof Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) and Clinton'spledge to "end welfare as we know it" propelled a more limiteddevolution agenda focused on AFDC in the lead-up to the 1996presidential election. Devolution ofMedicaid was dropped, however,while Food Stamps and child nutrition programs experienced budgetcuts but little devolution.     

Negative and Positive Partisanship in the 2016 U.S. Presidential Elections

Political Behavior - Negative partisanship captures the notion that disdain for the opposing party is not necessarily accompanied by strong in-party attachments. Yet, lack of a theoretical...     

Biennial Budgeting by the U.S. Congress

The president's budget is a political document, a prediction and an institution. As a political document, its version of the past and vision of the future are open to criticism. As a prediction, its projections arguable in the light of experience and professional judgment. As an institution, its contribution to the general capacity of government is subject to debate.     

U.S.-China Space Cooperation: Balancing Act between the U.S. Congress and President

There are a growing number of U.S. space scientists and managers calling for reinitiating cooperation with China in space. It is well-known that investigations of the U.S. Congress into various allegations involving China have resulted in a series of laws curtailing space cooperation between these two countries. By surveying the concurrent political developments within the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, this article attempts to reveal the domestic compulsions that propelled changes in the U.S. space policy towards China. The fundamental impetus is the power struggle and differences between the U.S. president and Congress in their perception of U.S. economic interests and national security in the context of space technology that strained these relations. Recent U.S. presidents who inherited this situation added to the discourse based on their own perceptions about outer space and China. These perceptions either found congruence with the policy of the U.S. Congress or led to finding ways to circumvent its legal restrictions. Based on these developments, it is concluded that the view of the U.S. president has alternated between necessary, desirable, and objectionable on the issue of U.S.-China space cooperation, and the U.S. Congress has thus shifted from supporting to restricting and then legally banning cooperation.     

Regulatory Reform in the 104th Congress: Revolution or Evolution?

This article examines the regulatory reform efforts of the 104thCongress. The focus is on congressional efforts to (1) relaxregulations, (2) shift responsibilities to the states, and (3)scrutinize new regulations. Analysis of legislation in eachof these three areas is followed by consideration of whetherthe laws that have been and will be enacted during the 104thCongress are truly revolutionary, or whether such laws representthe continual evolution of relations between the federal governmenton the one hand and the states, localities, and private sectoron the other.     

Issues and Institutions: "Winnowing" in the U.S. Congress

“Winnowing” is the pre‐floor process by which Congress determines the small percentage of bills that will receive committee attention. The vast majority of proposals languish in this vital agenda‐setting stage, yet our understanding of winnowing is nascent. Why do some bills move forward while most fail? I examine that question here by developing and testing a theoretical framework of winnowing grounded in bounded rationality, which includes institutional and sponsor cues and also incorporates the unique issue milieu. A heteroskedastic probit model is utilized to analyze the winnowing fate of all bills introduced across five issue areas in the House and Senate from 1991 to 1998. The findings counter much received wisdom and suggest that the process is indeed cue based. The majority party helps structure this critical process in both chambers, though party effects appear stronger in the House. Contrary to recent work on the rise of Senate individualism, the seniority of the sponsor has significant effects in both the Senate and House, but again exhibits a stronger effect in the House. Surprisingly, presidential proposals are no more likely to survive than typical bills. The findings further suggest that the entrepreneurial efforts of bill sponsors breathe life into this process.     

Deregulating Federalism? The Politics of Mandate Reform in the 104th Congress

This article examines the politics and substance of mandatereform in the 104th Congress. It briefly describes the evolutionof the mandate issue, examines the process by which the issuewas placed on the national agenda, and traces the formulationof a legislative response. It analyzes in detail the politicsof enacting mandate-reform legislation, paying particular attentionto patterns of support and opposition and to changes in thesepatterns over time. It concludes by examining the prospectsfor successful implementation of the legislation and its likelyconsequences for the intergovernmental system.     

Sino-U.S. Decoupling: The Roles of U.S. Congress

Journal of Chinese Political Science - The Sino-U.S. relations tumbled during the Trump Administration. The talk of decoupling permeated the decision-making circle in Washington D.C. Many factors...     

The U.S. Senate and Federalism Policy in the 96th and 97th Congresses

Although the Congress of the United States has a major influenceon American federalism, there has been little systematic attentiongiven to what factors influence congressional voting on federalismissues. This article is an initial effort to address this question.Drawing on previous literature which has attempted to explainvoting decisions of congressmen, senators' "federalism" votingin the 96th and 97th Congresses is considered. The analysisindicates that ideology and party, especially the former, arethe major influences on senators' votes. Moreover, the variablesfound to be most important to senators' federalism votes appearsomewhat distinct from those that influence other domestic policies.Some suggestions for further research are also offered.     

Representation,neighboring districts,and party loyalty in the U.S. Congress

Legislative scholars often assume that legislators are motivated by concerns over re-election. This assumption implies that legislators are forward-looking and are motivated by a concern over what their re-election constituency will look like during their next electoral cycle. In this research, we show how the forward-looking nature of legislators motivates members of the U.S. House of Representatives to represent both their home district and their neighboring districts in their choices regarding when to support their own party. Using survey responses to the 2006, 2008, and 2010 Cooperative Congressional Elections Study to construct measures of Congressional District ideology, empirical analysis is strongly supportive of our claims. Legislators’ choices are strongly influenced both by the ideology of their home district and that of the districts that neighbor their home district. Thus, the electoral connection between citizens and representatives extends beyond a legislator’s own constituents to include the constituents in neighboring districts.     

The U.S. Congress Responds to Online Communication Needs

Abstract

The U.S. Congress, after a relatively slow start in the 1990s, is now making some progress in meeting the demands of online communications. Fueled by the growing use of e-mail by constituents and the development of online grassroots efforts, Congress has been inundated with e-mail. By using filtering systems, better software and hardware, and, most of all, better management techniques, many offices are now equipped to handle the great increase in electronic mail. While several steps behind the private sector, through fits and starts, Congress is attempting to catch up and meet the rising demand and volume of electronic communication. In some offices, there has been considerable progress in developing effective, interactive Web sites. These exceptional Web sites should serve as models of dynamic online communications, but for most congressional Web sites, there is a long way to go. Much depends on the attitudes and priorities set by lawmakers and their senior Staff.     

State Government Influence in the National Policy Process: Lessons from the 104th Congress

During the last several decades, state officials increasinglyconcluded that their interests are not adequately representedin national policymaking and sought to increase their influencethrough the constitutional amendment process, the federal judiciary,and the political process. This article evaluates the extentto which these institutional mechanisms were effective in advancingstate interests during the 104th Congress. United States Constitutionalamendments were improbable and ineffective devices. Litigationwas slightly more successful, though it provided an uncertainsource of long-term security for state interests. Efforts towork through the political process, either through securingthe passage of legislation that increases congressional responsivenessor by engaging in direct lobbying, were moderately effectiveunder certain conditions.     

Party Government in Presidential Democracies: Extending Cartel Theory Beyond the U.S. Congress

Cartel Theory (and partisan theory more generally) expertly explains the functioning of the U.S. Congress. However, as a theory originally developed to study a single legislature where the institutional context differs greatly from that found in other presidential democracies, its applicability to these democracies has been questioned. Between one extreme represented by the United States (where legislators control their own political future) and the other represented by centralized party systems (where the national party leadership controls legislators' future) exists an intermediate group of democracies where subparty bosses are the key actors, controlling the future of subsets of a party's legislative delegation. We analyze one of these intermediate democracies, Argentina, and demonstrate the general applicability of Cartel Theory to an institutional context that differs notably from that found in the United States. We highlight how the theory can be adapted to a political system where subparty bosses, not individual legislators, are the most relevant political actors .     

Revisiting Adjusted ADA Scores for the U.S. Congress, 1947-2007

Philip Habel Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University Carbondale, Mailcode 4501, Carbondale, IL 62901 This paper replicates and extends Groseclose, Levitt, and Snyder,"Comparing Interest Group Scores Across Time and Chambers: AdjustedADA Scores for the U.S. Congress," which appeared in the AmericanPolitical Science Review (1999/93:33–50). We replicatethe most recent unpublished extension by Dr. Groseclose andresearch assistants for years 1947–1999, and then we extendthe analysis to include years 2000 through 2007. We make availableinflation-adjusted ADA scores from 1947 through 2007, allowingscholars to incorporate the most recent interest group scoresinto their analyses. Author's Note: Authors are listed alphabetically. The authorswish to thank Tim Groseclose for making available both the nominalADA scores from 1947 to 1999 and the Matlab program files usedin this analysis. SA gratefully acknowledges the support ofthe Hoover Institution during her time there as the 2006–07W. Glenn Campbell and Rita Ricardo-Campbell National Fellowand the Robert Eckles Swain National Fellow. PH wishes to thankboth the Dirksen Congressional Center and the National ScienceFoundation, doctoral dissertation improvement division grant493469, for their generous support. He also wishes to acknowledgethe valuable research assistance of James Lewis, Joshua Mitchell,and Matt Bergbower. Special thanks to J. Tobin Grant, ScottMcClurg, and Wendy Tam Cho for their helpful feedback and assistance.All errors are the responsibility of the authors. Replicationmaterials and programs are available on the Political AnalysisWeb site.