Ideology and Interests in the Political Marketplace

I develop a statistical method to measure the ideology of candidates and political action committees (PACs) using contribution data. The method recovers ideal points for incumbents that strongly correlate with ideological measures recovered from voting records, while simultaneously recovering positions for PACs, unsuccessful challengers, and open‐seat candidates. As the candidate ideal points are estimated independently of voting records, they represent a useful new resource for testing models of legislative behavior. By incorporating nonideological covariates known to influence PAC contributions, the method also shows promise as a platform for furthering our understanding of PAC contribution behavior.     

Separated Powers in the United States: The Ideology of Agencies,Presidents, and Congress

Government agencies service interest groups, advocate policies, provide advice to elected officials, and create and implement public policy. Scholars have advanced theories to explain the role of agencies in American politics, but efforts to test these theories are hampered by the inability to systematically measure agency preferences. We present a method for measuring agency ideology that yields ideal point estimates of individual bureaucrats and agencies that are directly comparable with those of other political actors. These estimates produce insights into the nature of the bureaucratic state and provide traction on a host of questions about American politics. We discuss what these estimates reveal about the political environment of bureaucracy and their potential for testing theories of political institutions. We demonstrate their utility by testing key propositions from Gailmard and Patty's (2007) influential model of political control and endogenous expertise development.     

Dynamic estimation of ideal points for the US Congress

Theories of candidate positioning suggest that candidates will respond dynamically to their electoral environment. Because of the difficulty of obtaining “bridge votes”, most existing approaches for estimating the ideal points of members of Congress generate static ideal points or ideal points that move linearly over time. We propose an approach for dynamic ideal point estimation using Project Vote Smart’s National Political Awareness Test to construct bridge votes. We use our dynamic estimates to measure aggregate change, to measure individual-level change, and to study the institutional and structural factors that explain the changing positions of House candidates and members of Congress. We demonstrate that while the Republican Party has been selecting increasingly extreme candidates, Democratic incumbents have become more extreme while in office. We also find that the congruence between elected members of Congress and their constituents is mostly explained by the selection as opposed to the responsiveness of the candidate. Nonetheless, we find evidence of dynamic responsiveness of incumbents in specific circumstances. We find that competitiveness, midterm elections, and sharing the president’s party affiliation are associated with greater responsiveness. Conversely, retirement is not associated with a change in responsiveness. We find no evidence of responsiveness of challengers. Finally, we find that close elections draw challengers who are more in line with the district’s ideology.     

Less is more: The paradox of choice in voting behavior

How does the number of candidates competing in an election affect voting behavior? In theory, as the number of candidates running for office increase, citizens’ utility from voting also increases. With more candidates, voters are more likely to have candidates that are close to their ideal points. Practically, however, more candidates also means a higher cognitive burden for voters who must learn more during campaigns in order to find their “ideal” candidate. In this paper, we examine how choice set size affects voting behavior. Using a survey experiment, we show that subjects presented with many options learn less about candidates, are more likely to vote based on meaningless heuristics, and are more likely to commit voting errors, when compared with subjects who choose between only a few candidates.     

The impact of state governance structures on management and performance of public organizations: A study of higher education institutions

Legislative statutes are passed by political majorities which support structures that insulate the implementing agency from its political opponents over time. Political actors also respond to different constituencies. Depending on the broad or narrow base of these constituencies, actors favor different kinds of governance structures. We apply this theoretical framework to the question of whether the state governance structures of boards of higher education affect the way university managers allocate resources, develop sources of revenue, and promote research and undergraduate education. Over the past two decades state governments have given considerable attention to state governance issues, resulting in many universities operating in a more regulated setting today. This paper develops a classification of higher education structures and shows the effects of differences in these structures on university management and performance using a data set that covers the period from 1987 to 1998. The analysis suggests that, for most of the measures, productivity and resources are higher at universities with a statewide board that is more decentralized and has fewer regulatory powers. © 2004 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Saying versus doing: a new donation method for measuring ideal points

Scaling methods pioneered by Poole and Rosenthal (Am J Polit Sci 29(2):357–384, 1985) redefined how scholars think about and estimate the ideologies of representatives seated in the US Congress. Those methods also have been used to estimate citizens’ ideologies. Whereas studies evaluating Congress typically use a behavioral measure, roll call votes, to estimate where representatives stand on the left-right ideological spectrum, those of the public most often have relied on survey data of stated, rather than revealed, preferences. However, measures of individuals’ preferences and, accordingly, estimates of their ideal points, may differ in important ways based on how preferences are elicited. In this paper, we elicit the same individuals’ preferences on the same 10 issues using two different methods: standard survey responses measured on a Likert scale and a donation exercise wherein individuals are forced to divide $1.50 between interest groups with diametrically opposed policy preferences. Importantly, expressing extreme views is costless under the former, but not the latter, method. We find that the type of elicitation method used is a significant predictor of individuals’ ideal points, and that the elicitation effect is driven primarily by Democratic respondents. Under the donation method, the ideal points of Democrats in the aggregate shift left, particularly for those Democrats who are politically engaged. In contrast, wealthy Democrats’ ideal points shift to the right. We also document effects for Republicans and Independents and find that overall polarization is similar under both elicitation methods. We conclude with a discussion of our results, and the consequences and tradeoffs of each elicitation method.     

Do female politicians empower women to vote or run for office? A regression discontinuity approach

Persistent gender gaps in political officeholding and mass political participation jeopardize women's equal representation in government. This paper brings new evidence to the longstanding hypotheses that the presence of additional female candidates and officeholders helps address these gaps by empowering other women to vote or run for office themselves. With a regression discontinuity approach and data on 3813 US state legislative elections where a woman opposed a man, I find that the election of additional women in competitive US state legislative elections has no discernible causal effects on other women's political participation at the mass or elite levels. These estimates are precise enough to rule out even substantively small effects. These results stand in stark contrast to a number of findings from India, suggesting that although electing the first women in a society can have these empowering effects, remaining barriers to women's inclusion in American democracy go beyond what further increases in female officeholding can themselves erode.     

Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999

At the heart of attitudinal and strategic explanations of judicialbehavior is the assumption that justices have policy preferences.In this paper we employ Markov chain Monte Carlo methods tofit a Bayesian measurement model of ideal points for all justicesserving on the U.S. Supreme Court from 1953 through 1999. Weare particularly interested in determining to what extent idealpoints of justices change throughout their tenure on the Court.This is important because judicial politics scholars oftentimesinvoke preference measures that are time invariant. To investigatepreference change, we posit a dynamic item response model thatallows ideal points to change systematically over time. Additionally,we introduce Bayesian methods for fitting multivariate dynamiclinear models to political scientists. Our results suggest thatmany justices do not have temporally constant ideal points.Moreover, our ideal point estimates outperform existing measuresand explain judicial behavior quite well across civil rights,civil liberties, economics, and federalism cases.     

Taxation and the Unequal Reach of the State: Mapping State Capacity in Ecuador

Even though the unequal reach of the state has become an important concern in the literature on developing democracies in Latin America, empirical measures of intracountry variation in state capacity are scarce. So far, attempts to develop valid measures of the reach of the state have often been hampered by inadequate data. Leveraging insights from national‐level scholarship, this article proposes a tax‐based measure to capture such intracountry variation. Drawing on a comprehensive data set of municipal finance and estimates of economic activity derived from nighttime lights, it maps state capacity in Ecuador. The article validates the measure on the basis of survey data collected by the Latin American Public Opinion Project. A multilevel analysis demonstrates that citizens tend to be more satisfied with the services provided by the state in municipalities with higher state capacity, which strengthens confidence that the measure picks up relevant differences.     

Politics of the precautionary principle: assessing actors’ preferences in water protection policy

This paper analyzes the prospects for introducing the precautionary principle in water protection policy. In situations where a problem enters the political agenda and scientific uncertainties remain about causes or effects, political actors can justify state intervention based on the precautionary principle. It allows for public action even if risks related to the problem remain unclear. While the precautionary principle is widely applied in health and environmental policy fields all over the world, the mechanisms leading to its adoption are not fully understood. To close this gap, the paper investigates decision-makers preferences for the precautionary principle and further asks: Which factors promote political actors’ preferences for precautionary policy measures? In order to answer this question we study the case of emerging micropollutants—a water quality issue that recently entered political agendas, where many uncertainties remain about sources and effects. We rely on data gathered through a standardized survey among the political elite in Switzerland, which represents one of the first countries that adopted policy measures to reduce micropollutants in water bodies, despite the uncertainties that remain. Results analyzed through a temporal network autocorrelation model reveal that actors embedded in collaborative governance arrangements have the tendency to prefer precautionary action. Certain aspects of policy design, such as problem prioritization and target group membership, also impact the prospects for introducing the precautionary principle.     

Party competition and citizens' political attitudes in the American states

Democratic theorists argue that vigorous competition between candidates/parties is essential for democracy to flourish because it engages citizens' political interest and ultimately makes elected officials more accountable to their constituents. Using data on citizens' perceptions of government responsiveness to their political opinions from the American National Election Studies and the Ranney measure of party competition for control of state government, we examine the effects of competition on citizens' political attitudes from 1952 to 2008. Our analysis reveals that citizens feel government is more responsive to them when there is greater competition between the two parties for control of government in their state. However, this relationship is confined only to citizens who identify with the party that controls government in their state. We also find that the relationship between competition and efficacy is strongest among citizens with lower levels of education and income. These results suggest that vigorous competition for control of state government can have important implications for citizens' political attitudes.     

Macro Research on Campaign Mobilization in the United States

ABSTRACT

This essay reviews the macro or aggregate-level academic literature on campaign mobilization and voter turnout in the United States. The conclusion that emerges from this literature is that hard-fought, high-stimulus electoral contests get out the vote. In part, the level of turnout on election day is a product of the efforts of strategic political actors (e.g., candidates, campaign contributors, and political parties) in the pursuit of elective office. The essay suggests that the academic literature on campaign mobilization would benefit from greater appreciation of how real world campaigns operate. A lesson that academics should draw from the practitioners is that strategic campaigns target and attempt to get out their voters. Careful consideration of the flows of information in campaigns would lead to a richer theory of mobilization. Looking at campaigns in a differentiated fashion, future research should recognize some fundamental points about their turnout implications: what campaigns do and whom they target may be more important than simply how much they do.     

Less is more or the more the merrier? Analysing attitudes towards multiple-mandate holding among local officeholders

The practice of multiple-mandate holding is widespread across Europe. Critics argue that this practice contributes to a concentration of political power, a higher risk for conflicts of interest and damage to the public image of political actors. Advocates meanwhile claim that it provides clear benefits, such as local embeddedness of the national or regional political decision-making and a greater degree of professionalisation in politics. However, little is known about how political actors themselves look upon this practice. This especially in a context like Finland, where this practice is said to be embedded in the political culture and where another institutional level has recently been implemented, making it possible for political actors to simultaneously hold political mandates at the local-, regional- and national levels. This paper examines attitudes towards multiple-mandate holding among local political decision-makers using unique survey data gathered through a new online panel. The results suggest that councillors from a populist radical right party and those who perceive corruption and partial treatment as more common were the most negatively disposed towards this practice, while councillors from the traditionally strongest rural party were the most in favour.     

Campaign finance reform and electoral competition

Using state senate data from 1984 through the beginning of 2002, this paper finds that campaign donation regulations clearly reduce the competitiveness in political races. This is reflected in several dimensions. Conservative estimates indicate that different donation limits are associated with anywhere from a 4 to over a 23 percentage point increase in win margins. The regulations increase the probability that only one candidate will run for office. And they increase the probability that incumbents win re-election. Campaign finance regulations also tend to reduce the number of candidates who run for office by an average of about 20 percent.     

Extreme idealism and equilibrium in the Hotelling–Downs model of political competition

In the classic Hotelling–Downs model of political competition, no pure strategy equilibrium with three or more strategic candidates exists when the distribution of voters’ preferred policies is unimodal. I study the effect of introducing two idealist candidates to the model who are non-strategic (i.e., fixed to their policy platforms), while allowing for an unlimited number of strategic candidates. Doing so, I show that equilibrium is restored for a non-degenerate set of unimodal distributions. In addition, the equilibria have the following features: (1) the left-most and right-most candidates (i.e., extremists) are idealists; (2) strategic candidates never share their policy platforms, which instead are spread out across the policy space; and (3) if more than one strategic candidate enters, the distribution of voter preferences must be asymmetric. I also show that equilibria can accommodate idealist fringes of candidates toward the extremes of the political spectrum.     

Ideologically Sophisticated Donors: Which Candidates Do Individual Contributors Finance?

Individuals are the single largest source of campaign contributions, yet we know little about their motivations. For instance, the existing literature questions whether individual contributors sophisticatedly differentiate among candidates according to policy positions, particularly among same‐party candidates. We analyze this issue by combining data from a new survey of over 2,800 in‐ and out‐of‐state donors associated with the 2012 Senate elections, FEC data on contributors’ professions, and legislative records. Three major findings emerge. First, policy agreement between a donor's positions and a senator's roll calls significantly influences the likelihood of giving, even for same‐party contributors. Second, there is a significant effect of committee membership corresponding to a donor's occupation; this holds even for donors who claim that other motivations dominate, but it does not appear to be motivated by an expectation of access. Third, conditional upon a donation occurring, its size is determined by factors outside a legislator's control.     

Campaign Learning and Vote Determinants

How campaigns shape voters' decisions is central to the study of political behavior. The basic conclusion is simple: campaigns matter. While we know who campaigns influence, there is no clear empirical evidence of why or how campaigns matter. This comes from two things. First, despite different theories about campaigns, the existing studies measure the campaign as a function of time. Second, these studies ignore the individual-level psychological mediators of these effects. We know that there are differences across time during a campaign, but we do not know how or why. In this article I suggest that campaigns work by altering voters' uncertainty about the candidates and combine aggregate and individual-level data using a hierarchical logit estimated via Markov chain Monte Carlo methods. I find that voters change how they weigh their attitudes during the campaign because of changes in their uncertainty about the candidates.     

Candidate Entry and Political Polarization: An Antimedian Voter Theorem

We study a citizen‐candidate‐entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition as candidates, whereas more “moderate” types never enter. It generally leads to substantial political polarization, even when the electorate is not polarized and citizens understand that they vote for more extreme candidates. We show that polarization increases in the costs of entry and decreases in the benefits from holding office. Moreover, when the number of citizens goes to infinity, only the very most extreme citizens, with ideal points at the boundary of the policy space, become candidates. Finally, our polarization result is robust to changes in the implementation of a default policy if no citizen runs for office and to introducing directional information about candidates’ types that is revealed via parties.     

Political Participation and Civic Courage: The Negative Effect of Transparency on Making Small Campaign Contributions

This study assesses whether public disclosure of campaign contributions affects citizens’ willingness to give money to candidates. In the American states, campaign finance laws require disclosure of private information for contributors at relatively low thresholds ranging from $1 to $300. The Internet has made it relatively easy to publicize such information in a way that changes the social context for political participation. Drawing on social influence theory, the analysis suggests that citizens are sensitive to divulging private information, especially those who are surrounded by people with different political views. Using experimental data from the 2011 Cooperative Congressional Election Studies, it demonstrates how individuals refrain from making small campaign contributions or reduce their donations to avoid disclosing their identities. The conclusion discusses the implications of transparency laws for political participation, especially for small donors.     

Piecemeal Reform in Plato's Laws

Karl Popper has called Plato a dangerous Utopian who offers an unworldly blueprint for society. I argue that, in making this criticism, Popper offers an incomplete reading of Plato's political thought, overlooking the more worldly and modest blueprint of the Laws. In addition, I show that a better understanding of the relationship between the Republic and the Lans - between Plato's philosophical ideal and politically best possible state - demonstrates the necessity of considering Plato's Laws in any discussion of implementation. In fact, a more complete reading of Plato is required by the very criteria Popper employs in advancing his critique. When the political programme of Plato's Laws is viewed in light of Popper's famous distinction between piecemeal social engineering and Utopian social engineering, the problems of applying these characterizations to Plato become apparent.