Variations in Regulatory Enforcement Styles

This paper examines intra- and inter-agency variations in the enforcement styles of three regulatory inspectorates in Great Britain. It is argued that the accommodative approach typically associated with regulatory enforcement is not a homogeneous and uniform concept, rather it embraces a range of strategies. These are described and a variety of organisational, social and political factors are considered as explanations of the variations which arise.     

An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies

A variety of multivariate techniques were used to develop a taxonomy of regulatory agencies from the first comprehensive study of the disparate enforcement strategies employed by business regulatory agencies in one country. Seven types of agencies were identified: Conciliators, Benign Big Guns, Diagnostic Inspectorates, Detached Token Enforcers, Detached Modest Enforcers, Token Enforcers and Modest Enforcers. Agencies were distinguished primarily according to their orientation to enforcement versus persuasion, according to their commitment to detached (or arms length) command and control regulation versus cooperative fostering of self-regulation, and according to their attachment to universalistic rulebook regulation versus particularistic regulation. Nevertheless, it is not unreasonable to view regulatory agencies as lying on a single continuum from particularistic non-enforcers who engage in cooperative fostering of self-regulation to rulebook enforcers whose policy is detached command and control. This approximates the suggestions of Hawkins and Reiss for distinguishing regulatory agencies according to a "sanctioning/deterrence" versus "compliance" dimension. The predominant regulatory style in Australia, however, is distant from both poles, being a perfunctory regulatory approach which is neither distinctively diagnostic and educative nor litigiously "going by the book"; rather it amounts to "going through the motions". The typology also partially conforms to Black's categorisation of social control as penal, therapeutic, conciliatory and compensatory.     

Making Sense of Discrimination

Discrimination is a central moral and legal concept. However, it is also a contested one. Particularly, accounts of the wrongness of discrimination often rely on controversial and particular assumptions. In this paper, I argue that a theory of discrimination that relies on premises that are very general (rather than unique to the concept of discrimination) and widely accepted provides a plausible (exhaustive) account of the concept of wrongful discrimination. According to the combined theory, wrongful discrimination consists of allocating a benefit that is not supported by a morally significant fact (a valid reason), or in a way that involves distributive injustice, or both.     

Editor's Introduction: Understanding Regulatory Enforcement

This issue of Law & Policy adds to the growing body of empirical case studies of decision-making and enforcement in regulatory agencies. Summarizing that research, regulatory enforcement styles can be described in terms of two dimensions, one concerning the ways in which regulatory violations are defined and punished, the other concerning outcomes, described in policy-evaluative terms. In explaining variation in enforcement style, existing studies point to three sets of factors: characteristics of the regulatory "legal design"; features of agencies' "task environment"; and the regulatory "political environment." Weighting the relative importance of these factors, however, is difficult because of the number and fluidity of variables and the adaptiveness of regulatory agencies.     

Regulatory Enforcement in Local Government in Japan

The Japanese inspectors usually adopt an "informal measure-oriented" style in enforcing violations of regulatory statutes. They prefer administrative guidance with no legally binding effect to compliance orders or criminal prosecution. These formal measures, they think, would erode the cooperative relationship with the regulatee, which is believed essential for cost-effective enforcement. In contrast to that in the United States, the Japanese enforcement process lacks citizen participation and information disclosure, this enabling the inspectors to deal with violations at their own pace.     

Curbing Consumer Financial Losses: The Economics of Regulatory Enforcement

This article deals with the question of how a high level of compliance with consumer protection legislation designed to prevent financial losses can be secured. We use a theoretical framework based on economic analysis of law to address some of the key policy options, such as proactive and reactive monitoring, providing officials with postdetection enforcement discretion, administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions, and facilitating actions by victims and third parties. On the basis of our theoretical framework and a classification of jurisdictions into different groups (models of enforcement policy), we identify some key elements of an enforcement regime and indicate in what circumstances a particular solution can be expected to be more or less cost effective.     

入世对检察机关执法环境和执法观念的影响

入世以后,在实施世贸组织下的法律实施原则时将不可避免地对检察机关履行法律监督职能的执法环境和执法观产生影响。为此,检察机关要在维护国家和社会公共利益与切实保障人权的统一维护公正执法的过程中,提高检察机关社会公信度与国际公信度;在进一步转变执法观念基础上,提高办案效率。     

Dimensions of Enforcement Style: Factoring in Regulatory Autonomy and Capacity

This article explores how the concept of enforcement style can be adapted to be more analytically useful in the study of regulatory behavior and its effects in developing countries. In its first part, the article sets forth a dimensional conception of enforcement style and suggests two new dimensions to incorporate the variations in the autonomy and capacity of regulatory agencies that are so significant in developing countries. In its second part, the article uses this analytical framework to compare the enforcement styles of state environmental agencies in two Brazilian states, São Paulo and Pará.     

Regulatory Reform: Creating Gaps and Making Markets

This article argues that dispute processing reform, such as regulatory negotiation, plays a role in constructing a "crisis" in regulatory litigation and defining a new partnership between regulated interests and the state. Unlike traditional studies of regulatory reform, which tend to evaluate the behavioral impact of legal reform on policy, I argue that reforms themselves play a constitutive role in politics. The article examines the ideology of regulatory negotiation and presents empirical data on federal regulatory litigation in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (1940–1985), to demonstrate that this legal reform is part of a general drive toward a minimalist state.     

论虚开增值税专用发票案件的协查

协查是虚开增值税专用发票案件侦查中的重要环节,其内容包括协助案件主办地公安机关调查取证、抓捕犯罪嫌疑人和深挖犯罪等。在协查中,主办地公安机关应积极推进,协作地公安机关应严密部署。当前协查中还存在诸多问题,今后应建立奖惩和保障机制,提高对协查的认识,全面传递案件信息,增强工作的时效性,加强警税协作,明确协查规范,将协查与基础业务建设相结合。     

Review of Bernard S. Jackson,Making Sense in Jurisprudence

International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue internationale de Sémiotique juridique -     

The "Compliance" Trap: The Moral Message in Responsive Regulatory Enforcement

Simple deterrence will often fail to produce compliance commitment because it does not directly address business perceptions of the morality of regulated behavior. Responsive regulation, by contrast, seeks to build moral commitment to compliance with the law. This article shows that a regulator can overcome the deterrence trap to improve compliance commitment with the skillful use of responsive regulatory techniques that "leverage" the deterrence impact of its enforcement strategies with moral judgments. But this leads it into the "compliance trap." The compliance trap occurs where there is a lack of political support for the moral seriousness of the law it must enforce, such as is the case with cartel enforcement in Australia. In these circumstances, business offenders are likely to interpret the moral leveraging of responsive regulation as unfair or stigmatizing, and business perceptions of regulator unfairness are likely to have a negative influence on long-term compliance with the law. Moreover, big businesses that perceive regulatory enforcement as illegitimate are also likely to actively lobby for the political emasculation of the regulator. In these circumstances, most regulators are likely to avoid conflict by taking the easy option of enforcing the law "softly," and therefore ineffectively.     

Reconsidering Styles of Regulatory Enforcement: Patterns in Danish Agro‐Environmental Inspection

This study addresses enforcement styles of regulatory inspectors, based on an examination of the municipal enforcement of agro‐environmental policies in Denmark. Our findings make three contributions to the regulatory literature. One contribution is to add empirical support for theorizing about inspectors' enforcement styles as consisting of multiple components, rather than a single continuum. We show that inspectors' enforcement styles comprise the degree of formalism and the degree of coercion that they exercise when carrying out inspections. A second contribution is in showing the relationship of different types of enforcement styles to the two underlying dimensions of the concept. A third contribution is an examination of the ways in which inspectors' enforcement styles relate to their enforcement actions. The consistency of our findings with those of other studies suggests that the dimensions and types of inspectors' enforcement styles that we observed in Denmark can be generalized to other settings.     

管制行业反垄断执法权配置分析——以管制度为视角

管制行业在不同程度上存在着反垄断执法问题,其执法权配置有多种模式可供选择,但从管制度的角度看,这一执法权配置应是从行业管制机构向反垄断专门执法机关逐步移转的过程,这也是大多数国家或地区立法与实践的发展趋向,因此,我国相关立法也应作相应完善.