Does the State Promote Communal Violence for Electoral Reasons?

It has often been alleged, most recently in the recommendations of India's National Advisory Council (NAC), that the Indian state promotes, or is complicit in, Hindu-Muslim violence for political or electoral reasons. But the evidence for the claim has historically been sketchy. In StevenWilkinson's work, Votes and Violence, the argument is that the evidence supporting state complicity is systematic.We examine this argument and find it to be fundamentally flawed.     

How Does Violence Threaten the State? Four Narratives on Piracy

Violence characterized by similar actions, actor motivations, group structures, or level of damage still poses qualitatively distinct genera of threats to states. For instance, “terrorism” can threaten a particular state, be used by a state, or threaten the entire state system. Building on the threat construction literature, this study argues that threat is best understood through narratives on the relationship between violence and the boundary-producing practices that construct the state. Four ideal-typical basic narratives on this relationship are produced—entrant, resource, revisionist, and criminal. Each narrative is then demonstrated by looking at how it was used in a historical case of piracy. The action (piracy as raiding at sea) is held constant while the threat in each varies with the narrative. Understanding how threat is narratively constructed can help us to understand particular historical episodes of violence and state responses to them.     

Democracy through War?

This article brings together three strands of democracy research which have thus far seldom been informed by one another: the empirical research associated with the ‘democratic peace’ thesis, the juridical-normative questions of legality, and moral-philosophical reasoning about just war. Linking the statistical analysis of the democratic peace to the findings of comparative research on democratization and to the normative debates occurring in law and philosophy on just and legitimized wars, there is an inescapable conclusion that: jus ad bellum and jus post bellum criteria must be closely tied. The protection of people threatened by mass murder and brutal violations of human rights requires not only a short-term military intervention, but also the intensive support to establish sustainable rule of law and democracy. External actors intervening for humanitarian reasons equally have a duty to contribute to long-term sustainable state- and democracy-building. Forced regime change and an international trusteeship protectorate can become legitimate and necessary means to guarantee justice after war and to reconcile jus ad bellum principles with duties post bellum. A premature withdrawal of intervening forces, for example in Afghanistan or in Iraq, would amount to a flagrant violation of external actors' post-war duties.     

Does women’s empowerment through policy intervention reduce food insecurity in South Africa?

This article determines the extent to which the food insecurity status of women in South Africa can be reduced by participating in gardening around the homestead, using survey data from 207 women farmers. A household food insecurity average score index and an empirical model that accounts for observed and unobserved factors contributing to food insecurity were employed. The findings reveal that participating in the programme worked to reduce the food insecurity of women significantly, and also show other policy factors that need to be taken into consideration to reduce food insecurity. We recommend that policy interventions towards promoting high participation by women are a sustainable strategy to address food insecurity and to achieve the 2030 agenda targeting an end to poverty and hunger.     

State terrorism? Applying a definitional model

This article has a dual purpose. The first is to propose a model by which acts of state violence may be adjudged to be state terrorism. The second is to apply empirical evidence to the theoretical model in order to highlight some of the obstacles in constructing an indictment of terrorism against a state. It represents an attempt to provide a test of a theoretical model that I have been developing as part of a programme of research into the use of terrorism by states, employing a number of historical case studies representing different types of repressive activity. Using comparative methods I aim to understand the policy‐making process that leads to the use of terror and establish whether there are patterns in the application of terror under particular circumstances.     

Does democracy reduce corruption?

While democracy is commonly believed to reduce corruption, there are obvious endogeneity problems in measuring the impact of democracy on corruption. This article attempts to address the endogeneity of democracy by exploiting the thesis that democracies seldom go to war against each other. We instrument for democracy using a dummy variable reflecting whether a country has been at war with a democracy in the period 1946–2008, while controlling for the extent to which countries have been at war in general. We find that democracy to a significant extent reduces corruption, and the effect is considerably larger than suggested by estimations not taking endogeneity into account. Democracy may hence be more important in combating corruption than previous studies would suggest.     

Does terrorism create terror?

The conceptual and etymological meaning of the terms ‘terror’ and ‘terrorism’ is so closely connected that it seems difficult to distinguish the one from the other. However, by comparing the idea that terrorism inevitably creates terror with the results of recent empirical studies of the psychological effects of terrorist attacks, four different points of view emerge corresponding to four distinct interpretations of the results. It is thus clearly necessary to redefine the terminology relating to terrorism, in order to conduct the discussion on a more rigorous basis.     

Does ethnic voting harm democracy?

A large literature argues that ethnic voting is detrimental to democracy. Ethnic voting may have at least three effects: (1) it can reduce uncertainty over electoral results; (2) it may increase the winner-take-all character of elections; and (3) it can lead to a process of ethnic outbidding. However, few studies have tested the effect of ethnic voting on democracy using large-N quantitative analysis. Previous tests instead look at whether ethnic fractionalization hinders democracy. Yet, ethnic diversity does not necessarily lead to the politicization of ethnicity, and it is only when ethnicity is activated as a vehicle of political mobilization that it can destabilize democracy. This article tests the effect of ethnic voting in 58 democracies worldwide between 1992 and 2015. On balance, the evidence suggests that democracies with high ethnic voting levels tend to see the quality of their democracy reduce over time relative to those with less ethnic voting. Ethnic and religious fractionalization, however, have little effect.     

State of the world 2017: autocratization and exclusion?

This article presents evidence of a global trend of autocratization. The most visible feature of democracy – elections – remains strong and is even improving in some places. Autocratization mainly affects non-electoral aspects of democracy such as media freedom, freedom of expression, and the rule of law, yet these in turn threaten to undermine the meaningfulness of elections. While the majority of the world’s population lives under democratic rule, 2.5 billion people were subjected to autocratization in 2017. Last year, democratic qualities were in decline in 24 countries across the world, many of which are populous such as India and the United States. This article also presents evidence testifying that men and wealthy groups tend to have a strong hold on political power in countries where 86% of the world population reside. Further, we show that political exclusion based on socio-economic status in particular is becoming increasingly severe. For instance, the wealthy have gained significantly more power in countries home to 1.9 billion of the world’s population over the past decade.     

Does Terrorism Pay? An Empirical Analysis

Does terrorism help perpetrators to achieve their demands? Few research questions about terrorism generate as much controversy. This study contributes to the debate in two main ways. First, we identify major limitations within the burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of terrorism. Specifically, we highlight the main methodological problems vexing empirical assessments of whether terrorism promotes government concessions. Second, we present a research design that circumvents those recurrent methodological shortcomings. In short, we find no empirical evidence to suggest that terrorism pays. In fact, multiple variants of the tactic in hostage standoffs impede the perpetrators from coercing government compliance. The negative effect of terrorism on the odds of compliance is significant and substantial across logistic and multilevel logistic model specifications, particularly when civilians are killed or wounded in the coercive incident. These findings have important implications for both scholars and practitioners of counterterrorism.     

Does economic inequality breed political inequality?

Does economic inequality generate political inequality? While there is a large literature on the effect of inequality on regime change and support for democracy, there is little research on its effect on political equality across socioeconomic positions. Yet democracy and political equality, although related, are distinct concepts. While political power tends to be more evenly distributed in democracies than in autocracies, there is substantial variation in both regime types. This study argues that economic inequality should decrease political equality through multiple mechanisms: (1) it increases the resources of the rich relative to the poor; (2) it widens the gap in policy preferences across income groups; (3) it reduces participation; and (4) it depresses support for democracy. Using three measures of inequality and data on more than 140 countries between 1961 and 2008, it was found that economic inequality tends to increase political inequality, even when one controls for the level of democracy. Results hold when the sample is restricted by regime type. Finally, evidence in favour of the mechanisms is provided.     

Does Russia need a general staff?

The institutional arrangements and mechanisms for preventing and managing conflicts will determine the future of European security and the balance of power in a wider Europe. Russian policy and Russia‐NATO relations are anaylsed within the context of the ongoing changes at Russia's southern periphery. The embryos of three distinct security systems are developing ‐ a Russia‐led, a NATO‐led and one led by the international community. The article suggests that instability in the southern periphery in the future will require security cooperation and a joint approach by Russia and NATO countries.     

Does Democracy Decrease Fear of Terrorism?

ABSTRACT

Fear is an integral part of terrorism. Fighting fear can thus be a crucial part of counterterrorist policies. In the case of terrorism, citizens look to the state for protection. Yet, most studies of terrorist fear emphasize individual-level factors. We lack studies that link fear to features of the state, especially whether democratic states are capable of reducing fear among its citizens. Our study aims to fill part of this research gap by asking whether democratic government reduces or increases fear of terrorism. We find that there is substantial cross-country variance in citizens’ fear of terrorism. The results suggest that fear is more widespread among citizens in non-democratic countries compared to citizens in democratic countries. Actual exposure to terrorist attacks has no impact on citizens’ fear of terrorism when we account for whether the country is a democracy or not. Hence, democratic government displays resilience towards fear mongering.     

The Global Economy 2015: Reform through Polarization?

The world’s mediocre growth of 3.3%(source:IMF)in 2014 was striking and is evidence of polarization.Perhaps it heralds new changes in the global economic order.China and the U.S.had the best performing economies,while there was polarization between the economies of the emerging countries and the developed world,as well as within both groups.China began major reforms,and registered a growth of 7.4%in 2014,the lowest in 25 years,yet still the world’s fastest.The U.S.economy grew 2.4%,beating the IMF forecast.The developed economies grew 1.8%(up 0.5 percentage points)while the emerging economies grew 4.4%(down 0.3 percentage points)—a buck in the trend of previous years.There was a sharp polarization last year in the economies of     

Sharing benefits of globalisation through an EU-ASEAN FTA?

In the aftermath of the stalled launch of a new WTO round in Seattle in 1999, Singapore and Japan initiated a joint study into a possible bilateral Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The resulting New-Age Economic Partnership Agreement was signed in 2002, reduced barriers in trade and investment in goods as well as services, technical standards and public procurement. Other FTAs followed including a US-Singapore FTA in 2003. In response, other ASEAN countries initiated negotiations towards bilateral FTAs, such as Thailand with India and Malaysia with Japan etc. Moreover, China declared its intention to enter into a FTA with the ASEAN by 2012. The failure at Cancun in 2003 implies that the Doha Development Agenda will not be achieved within the time-frame set. In this environment, the question of a feasibility of an inter-regional EU-ASEAN FTA is investigated. ASEANs trade policy regime is opening up and the gains of further tariff elimination will be modest, because most ASEAN countries already apply low tariffs, while those of the EU on import from ASEAN are low as well – e.g. for Singapore the tariff rate is merely 1.04 per cent (trade weighted). Nevertheless, a further reduction will benefit both EU and ASEAN because a significant share of imports is intra-firm trade, with EU firms operating from ASEAN as a production platform for the EU markets. However, for an EU-ASEAN FTA to be worthwhile, it must generate benefits on issues relating to non-tariff barriers to trade, esp. technical standards, SPS and mutual recognition of testing. Further significant benefits to EU and ASEAN may be realised by advancing liberalisation of international trade in services (e.g. banking and insurance licences, air and sea transport). Reducing restrictions on foreign direct investment in selectedservice sectors is bound to enhance investment flows from the EU to ASEAN.This article draws extensively on a study directed by the author with Dr. Paul Brenton, Prof. Ludo Cuyvers and Prof. Patrick Messerlin (van der Geest et al. 2003). Research assistance by Ms. Vanessa Sumo and Ms. Roberta Zavoretti is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of the European Institute for Asian Studies or of its sponsors. The author is solely responsible for any remaining errors or inaccuracies. All comments are welcomed at w.vandergeest@eias.org     

Does participation in international organizations increase cooperation?

Recent research asserts that public commitments to international institutions promote behavior that is consistent with institutional purposes. Evidence for this proposition is based almost entirely on studies that compare the behavior of states that have and have not ratified treaties. This paper evaluates instances in which some member states temporarily experience increased entanglement with an IO because they or their nationals serve in a position of authority. Unlike selection into IOs, selection into positions of authority is often governed by a common, observable, and partially exogenous process. I exploit exogenous exit, random assignment to different term lengths, and competitive elections in three contexts: the International Criminal Court (ICC), the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC), and the UN Security Council (UNSC). The evidence implicates that acquiring a position of authority can make states more willing to reject U.S. advances to sign non-surrender agreements, adopt domestic legislation that changes the penal code (ICC case), ratify legally binding treaties (UNHRC case), and contribute to peacekeeping missions (UNSC case). On the other hand, there is no evidence that UN institutions successfully select more cooperative states for positions of authority. Similar research designs can gainfully be employed to identify the causal effects of other forms of institutional participation.     

Does Country-Level Social Disorganization Increase Terrorist Attacks?

This study examines the effects of a measure of country-level social disorganization on levels of terrorist attacks and fatalities in 101 countries from 1981 to 2010. We measure social disorganization as the presence of state instability: revolutionary and ethnic war, adverse regime change, and genocide. The classic social disorganization perspective posits that individuals experiencing these types of rapid social change will be freed from the institutional and informal restraints that bind them to society, and keep them conforming to social norms and laws. We examine the extent to which this reasoning applies to the number of terrorist attacks and fatalities from terrorist attacks occurring in countries. To control for the possibility that better functioning states are better able to prevent terrorist attacks, we include two measures of state capacity. We find that controlling for state capacity and a wide variety of other variables, social disorganization is consistently associated with increases in terrorist attacks and fatalities. We consider implications of the results for future research and policy.