POST‐ACCESSION POLITICIZATION OF NATIONAL EU POLICY COORDINATION: THE CASE OF SLOVENIA

This article focuses on how domestic and EU‐level political factors affect the functional aspect of the national coordination of EU affairs. Due to the idiosyncrasies of the post‐communist countries which have joined the EU since 2004, an analysis of dynamic changes in the national systems of coordination needs to focus on three factors: (a) functional pressures from the EU; (b) the consolidation of the national party system; and (c) existing traditions of politico‐administrative relations. The international economic and financial crisis is considered as a fourth factor that has affected the first three factors through the increase in the EU's 'informal intergovernmentalism', which adds to the politicization of EU matters. The Slovenian case points to an increased, though selective, politicization of EU business due to both national‐ and EU‐level factors.     

The G‐20 Must Get Serious About Its Commitments

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

How to Save Europe

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

A Robust Vision of Europe

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

Europe Faces Crisis Brazil Solved

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

From China's “Peaceful Rise” to Building Communites of Interest

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

Only Full Integration Can Save Europe

The sovereign debt problem in Europe, ignited by Greece, has morphed into an economic crisis challenging the solvency of major banks and countries as well as a generalized crisis of governance. Lacking the legitimacy of public support, the leaders of the European Union's fledgling institutions have been indecisive and unable to contain the looming danger of financial contagion. Along with the economic slowdown in the United States, instability and volatility in Europe threaten to derail the fragile global recovery. In this section, several former European leaders as well as political figures from the emerging economies offer their ideas on how to fix Europe and stem the global threat.     

Poland's foreign policy since 1989: the challenges of independence

In its first decade of post-communist independence, Poland achieved far more than most dared believe in 1989. Despite domestic political and economic turmoil, it has joined Europe as a new member of NATO and a prospective member of the EU. This article traces the evolution of Polish foreign policy since 1989 over four time periods: First, the early uncertainties from 1989 to 1992 when Warsaw — caught between a reunifying Germany and a collapsing USSR — was intent on solidifying its relations with Central European neighbors. Second, the watershed year of 1993, which witnessed changes in every aspect of Poland's external relations — the demise of Visegrad, first moves toward NATO and EU enlargement, the emergence of serious tensions in Warsaw's relations with the East, especially Russia. Third, the years in the anterooms of Europe from 1994 to 1996, when Poland and its central European neighbors lobbied for early accession to the EU and NATO, while relations with Russia remained in the deep freeze. And fourth, the period since 1997, in which Warsaw has been negotiating its “return to Europe”, joining NATO in 1999 and actively pursuing membership in the EU. These gains have not come quickly or easily; rather, they demonstrate a hard earned consistency in Poland's foreign policy agenda, despite numerous changes in domestic politics, as well as an increasingly realistic vision of the country's place in post-Cold War Europe.     

Where from,where to? New and old configurations in Poland's foreign and security policy priorities

The past 20 years have seen profound shifts in Polish foreign and security policy. Like other states in Central Europe Poland became part of the Euro-Atlantic sphere upon gaining first NATO and then EU membership. Despite such broad similarities, Poland's trajectory since 1989 has been marked by some specific and defining features. Poland has become the most significant player in Central Europe and tends to be viewed in the region as a leader, twinned with this, due to its size and relative strength, Poland is taken seriously at the EU table. At the same time, there has been a palpable shift in Polish Atlanticism and a more skeptical view of the US has emerged. This article explores the sources of these reconfigurations and considers their potential implications.     

Poland's conception of European security and Russia

This article examines the problem of contemporary bilateral relations between Poland and Russia. Its thesis largely attributes the rivalry of these two states in Eastern Europe to conceptions relating to the balancing and bandwagoning of power. This rivalry can be put down to the fact that Polish-Russian relations are being developed within broader global processes such as Russia's relations with NATO, the USA and European Union. The greatest obstacle to the maintenance of mutually beneficial relations is the sensitive issue of security. In recent years Poland has consistently underlined its willingness to reinforce NATO's mutual defense mechanisms by supporting the organization's continued presence in Central-Eastern Europe. This issue has been compounded by Poland's striving to bring the countries of Eastern Europe (especially Ukraine) into closer affiliation with Western institutions favoring European integration, which is evidently perceived as interference in what is regarded by Moscow to be a sphere of Russian influence. This has provoked a number of serious crises in bilateral relations between Poland and Russia since the Euro-Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Russian plans to install new (Iskander) missile systems close to the Polish border and Poland's effective attempts post-2014 to extend NATO presence within its own country testify to the scale of conflicts of interest between the two states and the lack of trust afforded by both sides. The issues highlighted in this paper are of great importance, since they not only enable the complexity of Central European issues to be more fully comprehended but also help to elucidate other global actors' conceptions relating to cooperation with Europe.     

The new face of developing country debt

Developing country debt has been a major preoccupation for development policy makers and practitioners since the debt crisis of 1982. It is a major obstacle to economic and social progress in developing countries. After the resolution of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s and the debt relief initiatives for low-income countries of 1997–2006 concerns about developing country debt seem to have receded. However, there are a growing number of problems that warrant concern, including the accumulation of domestic debt, short-term debt and private non-guaranteed debt, and increasing recourse by low-income countries to international capital markets. At the same time developing countries have strengthened their capacity to oversee and analyse their debt portfolios. Nonetheless, significant weaknesses remain in debt management capacity at the national level. Moreover, the activities of ‘vulture funds’ and the lack of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism reveal major shortcomings in the international institutional architecture that need to be addressed urgently.     

A tale in stone and bronze: old/new strategies for political mobilization in the Republic of Macedonia

The redesign of Skopje’s main square and the wider central area in the last six years has been a top priority of the Macedonian government. The project, called Skopje 2014, provoked intense domestic debate and controversy as well as international reaction and concern. Although officials say that project’s aim is to unify ethnic Macedonians, it has produced several lines of political, intra-ethnic/interethnic as well as intra-cultural/intercultural divisions in the fragile Macedonian society. The aim of the paper is to offer reflections about its mobilizing potential among ethnic Macedonians in a set of social, economic, and political contexts. In that sense, four areas of mobilization are suggested: (1) around new identity markers; (2) around the name dispute and against threats (real or imagined) to the ethnic and national identity; (3) against the internal Other, that is, the ethnic Albanian community, as well as critics of these identity politics; and (4) in reaction to the global financial crisis and problems within the EU.     

‘Refugees Not Welcome Here’: State,Church and Civil Society Responses to the Refugee Crisis in Poland

The Polish response to the crisis that escalated across Europe in 2015, banning refugees from crossing its borders, has been one of the least welcoming in Europe. Poland has been reprimanded by the EU for its lack of solidarity with other countries that accepted refugees. The government’s response was that it does indeed welcome refugees as long as they are not Muslims, since letting Muslim refugees in would be a security risk. The figure of the Muslim terrorist posing as a refugee has become a key trope through which xenophobic nationalist politics have been employed. In this sense, Poland can be seen to be drawing particular inspiration from the Eurosceptic politics of Orbán’s Hungary while also reflecting a broader European trend towards Islamophobia in countries such as France, Germany, Sweden or the UK. This article maps responses to refugees from key public actors. It focuses on how three key players in the Polish public sphere—the Catholic Church, the State and civil society actors—responded to the looming perspective of welcoming refugees to Poland. The paper argues that the Polish response to the so-called refugee crisis should be analysed as subtext to a broader political change in the country towards nationalism that has as its goal to push out all foreign ‘invasion’. Mobilised within this are new and old manifestations of racism, suggesting that Poland’s long history of racial Othering and exclusion has not been sufficiently accounted for.     

Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Regions

Conspiracy theories in Ukraine draw on inherited Soviet political culture and political technology imported from Russia where such ideas had gained ascendancy under President Vladimir Putin. Eastern Ukrainian and Russian elites believed that the US was behind the 2000 Serbian Bulldozer, 2003 Georgian Rose and 2004 Orange democratic revolutions. The Kuchmagate crisis, impending succession crisis, 2004 presidential elections and Orange Revolution – all of which took up most of Leonid Kuchma’s second term in office – were the first significant domestic threats to Ukraine’s new, post-communist ruling elites and in response Ukraine’s elites revived Soviet style theories of conspiracies and ideological tirades against the US and Ukrainian nationalism. Opposition candidate Viktor Yushchenko became the focal point against which the conspiracies and tirades were launched because his support base lay in ‘nationalist’ Western Ukraine and he has a Ukrainian-American spouse. The revival of Soviet style conspiracy theories has become important since Viktor Yanukovyc’s election as Ukrainian president in 2010 because this political culture permeates his administration, government and Party of Regions determining their worldview and influencing their domestic and foreign policies.     

The Return of Political Risk: Foreign-Owned Banks in Emerging Europe

Political risk—risk that investments are damaged by policy action of authorities—increased during the financial crisis due to controversies about the distribution of accumulated losses among stakeholders. Authorities interconnected by cross-border banks considered unilateral policies that minimised losses for domestic stakeholders at the expense of their foreign counterparts. This is at odds both with the assumption behind financial integration which presumes multilateral responses to cross-border shocks and with the typical definition of political risks that ignores the fact that not only host-country, but also home-country authorities can create such risks. This paper recasts the definition of political risk and reviews instances when political risk materialised within the EU banking market between 2007 and 2011. The analysis reveals that the EU regulatory framework needs to be enhanced to contain resurgent political risks systematically rather than through ad hoc interventions of the EU and international bodies.     

Interest Rates and Investment in East Asia: An Empirical Evaluation of Various Financial Liberalisation Hypotheses

The article attempts to shed light on the appropriate interest rate policy in the process of economic development. To this end, we examine whether higher interest rates lead to higher investment (and growth) in four East Asian countries. We find that the investment rate went up with real interest rates up to 9 per cent in all four countries but started declining at still higher interest rates in two of the countries. Further, a banking crisis occurred in each of the three countries for which the real interest rates exceeded 9 per cent. This evidence rejects the ‘neo-structuralist’ argument. Nor does it support unbridled financial liberalisation. Yet, it provides only limited support to Stiglitz's case for ‘mild financial repression (real interest rates near zero)’ since reducing real interest rates from say, 6 to 3 or 0 per cent would have reduced investment. The optimum policy seems to be closest to McKinnon's ‘restrained financial liberalisation’ policy, that is, liberalisation with a moderate upper limit (about 6 or 7 per cent) on the real interest rates.     

Visegrad: Fit for purpose?

Visegrad inter-state cooperation among the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia has faced numerous near-death experiences since its official birth in 1991. Furthermore, it has faced two challenges since the four member-countries’ accession to the EU in 2004. Then Visegrad was eulogized, considered deceased by many precisely for having achieved the apparently ultimate aim of EU membership. Second, having purposefully stated rumours of its death, Visegrad has since 2008 been confronted by issues from outside and ones well beyond its size – the Obama presidency and its apparent abandonment of Central and Eastern Europe in its “reset” strategy towards Moscow; a post-Lisbon EU agenda; strategic reorientations in NATO; and both the general, that is, global, financial crisis and particularly within the EU and regarding the Euro.This article, by contrast, contends that the fundamental changes and challenges that Visegrad has faced enhanced the Group's clear and successful strategy. It identifies and elaborates that strategy, drawing also selectively and thematically on the Group's historical experience since 1991. These strategies include targeted rather than broad selection of aims; retaining an exclusive membership while also inventing variable and flexible mechanisms for adding non-member countries to help them pursue specific initiatives. Through a study of annual Group Presidency agendas and reports, high-level and ministerial meeting declarations and media and secondary source analysis and interviews with National Coordinators, the article contends that the Group continues to promote realistic aims, and provides a unique platform for exercising them. This study concludes that Visegrad, despite the outside challenges remains effective in raising awareness, advancing smaller-scale policies and influencing EU policy towards the Western Balkans and European Partnership (EaP) countries, as well as achieving specific Visegrad initiatives with those states.     

Implementing Regional Policy in Poland: A New Era?

In 2010, Poland launched a new national strategy for regional development which is seen as an assertion of Poland's domestic regional development vision, informed by, but distinct from, EU cohesion policy which has dominated Polish regional policy since accession. A key question is whether a new model of policy implementation is emerging. The strategy includes a commitment to a place-based regional policy model. This implies spatially sensitive policy implementation capable of mobilising the potentials of all territories. However, the concept is vague. Moreover, in Poland this agenda is being launched in a context of entrenched territorial disparities, traditionally constrained policy implementation capacity and institutional change. What are the defining characteristics of place-based implementation systems? What are the challenges to the institutionalisation of the place-based model? Are these evident in delivery frameworks being developed in Poland?     

Quo Vadis Judicial Reforms? The Quest for Judicial Independence in Central and Eastern Europe

This article examines judicial reforms in the new member states of the EU in a comparative perspective. It explores the interactions between domestic and European actors in the Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and explains why the EU has had a differential impact on the way the principle of judicial independence has been implemented nationally. The differential impact of the EU is explained by considering both the nature of EU conditionality and the relationship between the judiciary and the political actors at the domestic level. The comparison reveals that the power of the EU is greater when tensions at the domestic level between judicial and political actors increase.     

关于全球金融经济危机的若干思考

由美国次贷危机引发的世界金融危机和经济危机表明了美国金融霸权的衰落。这是美国经济霸权的危机,也是美国大力推行的市场原教旨主义即新自由主义的危机。这场经济危机显示出当代资本主义的最新特点,即金融产业脱离实体经济片面畸形发展,全球经济过分金融化,因而被称作“全球金融市场资本主义”。目前经济危机还在持续,与此同时,世界政治也开始进入一个动荡不安的高风险的历史阶段。