The effect of the secret ballot on voter turnout rates

Secrecy in the voting process eliminated an important motivation for voting. No longer able to verify the voters' choices, political parties stopped offering payments in return for votes. Within the rational voter framework, it will be shown that these payments were a prime impetus for people to vote. Without a vote market to cover their voting costs, many voters were rational to stay away from the polls. This hypothesis is supported through a series of empirical tests culminating in a multivariate legislative regression. When other electoral laws are controlled for, the secret ballot accounts for 7 percentage points lower Gubernatorial turnout.     

Internet voting and the secret ballot in Norway: principles and popular understandings

The secret ballot is considered a central feature of democratic elections, but its practical implications may be contested when Internet voting (and remote voting in general) is introduced. How do citizens understand the principle of the secret ballot in practice? The issue was brought to the fore in a trial with Internet voting that was conducted in 12 Norwegian municipalities for the 2013 parliamentary election. Based on a representative population survey, we explore how Norwegian voters approached the principle of the secret ballot in the context of Internet voting. A large majority supported the general principle, but the picture became more nuanced when it was put to the test of concrete situations. Unless the situation involved coercion or undue influence, many people were willing to accept that voting can be observed by others – even if this was a breach of legal regulations.     

The Waldegrave Initiative and secret service archives: New materials and new policies

Louise Atherton, Top Secret: An Interim Guide to Recent Releases of Intelligence Records at the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1993). Pp.32. £3.25. ISBN 1 87362073.

Louise Atherton, SOE Operations in the Far East: An Introductory Guide to the Newly Released Records of the Special Operations Executive in the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1993). Pp.59. £3.25. ISBN 1 873162081.

Louise Atherton, SOE Operations in Scandinavia: A Guide to the Newly Released Records in the Public Record Office (London: PRO Publications, 1994). Pp.34. £3.25. ISBN 1 873162154.

FCO Historical Branch, Changes in British and Russian Records Policy: Occasional Papers No.7 (London: Historical Branch, LRD, 1993). Pp.42.

FCO Historical Branch, FCO Records: Policy Practice and Posterity, 1782–1993 (London: Historical Branch, LRD, Second Edition, 1993). Pp.17.     

The free French secret services: Intelligence and the politics of republican legitimacy

The improvised nature of the French political and military entities established in London in 1940 makes the study of relations between the Free French military secret services and political leadership particularly delicate. After initially attempting to respect the traditional separation between military and political authority that had prevailed under the Third Republic, the role of the Free French secret services was progressively politicised by the exigencies of a clandestine war. Moreover, increasingly tense relations between certain leaders of the Resistance inside France and the leadership of the Gaullist secret services, along with preparations for the political reconstruction of France after the war, resulted in a war of successive decrees pertaining to the place of the intelligence services within the government hierarchy. The end result was that the secret services were placed under true direct civilian control. This marked a radical modification of the traditional system which had prevailed during the Third Republic. Free French leader Charles de Gaulle approved of this modification but never appeared to attach great importance to matters relating to the organisation and functioning of the intelligence services.