Errata Volume 47

p. 4 I. 10. For Iro read Ivo p. 5 I. 35. Delete Dr p. 12 I. 10. For Carnavon read Carnarvon I. 16. For Bloemfoentein read Bloemfontoin p. 21 I. 26. Read, He was only emerging from a stage where hegrew enough for himself I. 35. Insert only after not I. 36. For or read but more I. 39. Insert merely after moment I. 40. For District Council read Legislative Council I. 42. For every read many p. 54. I. 53. For Ibo-Efi read Ibo-Efik p. 62. Under Junco read Coloniales p. 69. I. 14. For Obadeyando read Obadeyanedo p. 75. I. 19. For Colonel read Sir Stewart p. 79. I. 23. For Masubas read Mabubas p. 93. I. 32. For Salukive read Selukive (and p. 94, I. 29) p. 134. I. 26. For Riyon read Riyom p. 139. I. 17. Delete the reference to King Farouk p. 146. I. 31. For island read islands p. 184. For H. D. HOOPER read H. M. GRACE p. 190. I. 34. For lobolo read lobola (and I. 36)      

Correction

A number of errors from the last number have come to light.On p. 280, 1. Io, the site of the new Uganda land project cannotbe North-west of Lake Albert if it is to be in Bunyoro. theSources on p. 329 require a certain modification. For AfricanMorning Post, one should read Gold Coast Observer. For Bulletinde l'nstitud Centrafricain, Bulletin de l'Institut des ÉtudesAfricaines, for Congo Ocersee, Kongo Oversee. One should alsoadd the useful Books for Africa to the list for Britain andl'Egypte Contemporain for Egypt. It is also necessary to pointout thatmanysources found useful in the past have for one reasonor another, ceased to flow and cannot always be recalled evenby an act of memory. On p. 341, on the last line of the reviewby J. A. Barnes, external should read eternal. The principalcovey of errors comes however in a paragraph on the top of p.347. The title of the German book is Mythe, Mensch und Umwelt,it is published in Bamberg, one writer is Harald von Sicard,the Nyama beliefs are West African, nor can they be strictlycalled a cult. On p. 384, the reference to the Belgian guiderather misses the point when spelt with two l's. It should readTracelers, as it does in American English.      

ERRATA: VOL. 44, No. 175

P. 53, 1.6. For "only" read "more than". P. 87, 1.3. For "Father" read "Son".      

ERRATA

The name of the reviewer of Bantustans: A Trek Towards The Future(P.296), in the October, 1964 issue was omitted. The reviewwas by Marjorie Juta. Claude A. Collard's review of Britainand Nyasaland (P.291), in the same issue had a sentence whichwas misprinted to read: "However, he points out that those,including himself, who saved Nyasaland after the second greatwar can only marvel that so much was done with so little." Itshould have read: "Who served Nyasaland."      

Correction

For once, there are few corrections to make, apart from obviousmisprints, like the word Nelhi for Delhi on p. 219, 1. 7, andothers less obvious: a comma after moran, who do not like work(p. 208,1. 9 from the end). I have, however, been asked by thewidow of Arthur ffoulkes, who was mentioned in the history ofthe Society as one of the most vivid of early contributors tothe Journal, to make one or two small amendments. Her husbandwas not a Captain, and the reference to funeral customs camein a longer study of The Company System of Cape Coast Castle.His death at the time was given out as due to blackwater fever,but it is believed that he was poisoned by order of the priestsof the fetish Borgya and Abirva, which he had been ordered toroot out.      

Telecentres and transformations: Modernizing Tanzania through the internet

This article argues that a discourse which constructs the Internetas an inclusive development tool that can be deployed in strategiesfor modernizing Africa has become hegemonic among developmentdonors and telecommunications organizations. Based on researchcarried out in and around three Internet cafes in Dar es Salaam,and one Multipurpose Community Telecentre (MCT) in Sengerema,this article takes issue with this discourse and suggests thatthe geographies of inclusion and exclusion created by the Internetare more complex. For Tanzania’s information and communicationtechnologies (ICT) elites, the Internet will shape the populationinto knowledge- and market-seeking, productive citizens, stimulatingnational growth. For Internet cafe users and non-users, theInternet has become a marker of modernity, a way for peopleand places to indicate their relative level of development,and Internet use is currently dominated by leisure, communicationand information relating to global popular culture. However,the article demonstrates that development interventions whichturn the symptoms of poverty into technical problems to be solvedwith technological responses are inherently flawed, since thefailure to deal with the causes of poverty means that the majorityof Tanzanians continue to be excluded from the ‘informationsociety’. An earlier version of this article was presented at the AfricanStudies Association Annual Conference, New Orleans, 11–14November 2004, and to the Postcolonial Seminar at the Universityof Leicester, 8 December 2004. ^1. World Bank, Knowledge for Development: World development report1998/99 (Oxford University Press, NY, 1998). ^2. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001: Making new technologieswork for development (Oxford University Press, New York, NY,2001). ^3. Donors include Department for International Development (DFID),Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Swedish Agencyfor International Development (SIDA) and United States Agencyfor International Development (USAID) (the Leland Initiative);NGOs include the International Institute for Communication andDevelopment; multilateral initiatives include the InternationalTelecommunications Union (ITU), the G8 (Dot Force), United NationsEconomic Commission for Africa (UNECA) (the African InformationSociety Initiative) and United Nations Educational, Scientificand Cultural Organization (UNESCO). ^4. D. Ott and M. Rosser, ‘The electronic republic? The roleof the Internet in promoting democracy in Africa’, Democratization7, 1 (2000), pp. 137–55. ^5. M. Jensen, The African Internet – A Status Report, 2002,<http://www3.sn.apc.org/africa/afstat.htm> Accessed on27 October 2002. ^6. M. Castells, End of Millennium. The Information Age: Economy,society and culture, Vol 3 (Blackwell, Oxford, 1998), p. 161. ^7. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001, p. iv. ^8. Accenture, Markle Foundation, and UNDP, Creating a DevelopmentDynamic: Final report of the digital opportunity initiative,2001, <http://www.opt-init.org/framework.html> Accessedon 30 October 2002, p. 68. ^9. UNDP, Human Development Report 2001; World Bank, Knowledge forDevelopment; World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21^st Century?(World Bank, Washington, DC, 2000). ^10. R. Cline-Cole and M. Powell, ‘ICTs, "virtual colonisation"and political economy’, Review of African Political Economy31, 99 (2004), pp.5–9; K. Gyekye, ‘Philosophy, cultureand technology in the postcolonial’, in E. Eze (ed.),Postcolonial African Philosophy: A critical reader (Blackwell,Oxford, 1997), pp. 25–44; F. Nyamnjoh, ‘Global andlocal trends in media ownership and control: implications forcultural creativity in Africa’, in W. van Binsbergen andR. van Dijk (eds), Situating Globality: African agency in theappropriation of global culture (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands,2004), pp. 107–46; Y. Z. Ya’u, ‘The new imperialismand Africa in the global electronic village’, Review ofAfrican Political Economy 31, 99 (2004), pp. 11–29. ^11. R. Meier, ‘Late-blooming societies can be stimulated byinformation technology’, Futures 32 (2000), pp. 163–81;D. Polikanov and I. Abramova, ‘Africa and ICT: a chancefor breakthrough?’, Information, Communication and Society6, 1 (2003), pp. 42–56; M. B. Robins and R. L. Hilliard(eds), Beyond Boundaries: Cyberspace in Africa (Heinemann, NH,2002). ^12. M. Green, ‘The birth of the "salon": poverty, "modernisation"and dealing with witchcraft in southern Tanzania’, paperpresented at the American Anthropological Association AnnualMeeting, Chicago, 18 November 2003; S. F. Moore, ‘Post-socialistmicro-politics: Kilimanjaro, 1993’, Africa 66, 4 (1996),pp. 587–606. ^13. United Republic of Tanzania, National Information and CommunicationsTechnologies Policy (Ministry of Communications and Transport,Dar es Salaam, 2003). ^14. The three urban cafes were located in Dar es Salaam, where atotal of 279 customers completed open-ended questionnaires overthree days in August 2001. One city-centre cafe attracted mostlybusiness, government and office workers, while the other twocafes were located on main roads in the residential suburbsof Mwenge and Magomeni. The fourth location was the Internetcafe at the Sengerema Multipurpose Community Telecentre, wherethe same open-ended questionnaire was put to 265 customers inAugust 2003. Semi-structured interviews with customers and focusgroup discussions with non-customers were held, and 299 townresidents were interviewed to contextualize the questionnaireresponses. ^15. ‘Paul Wolfowitz at the World Bank: A regime changes’,The Economist, 2 June 2005; T. Kelsall, ‘Shop windowsand smoke-filled rooms: governance and the re-politicizationof Tanzania’, Journal of Modern African Studies 40, 4(2002), pp. 597–620; C. Mercer, ‘Performing partnership:civil society and the illusions of good governance in Tanzania’,Political Geography 22 (2003), pp. 741–63. ^16. United Republic of Tanzania, National Information and CommunicationsTechnologies Policy, p. 1. ^17. Ibid. ^18. Ibid. ^19. Accenture et al., Creating a Development Dynamic. ^20. SIDA, A Country ICT Survey for Tanzania (SIDA, Dar es Salaam,2001). ^21. Ibid. ^22. National Bureau of Statistics, Tanzania Household Budget Survey2000/01 (National Bureau of Statistics, Dar es Salaam, 2002). ^23. World Bank, Tanzania Country Brief, 2004, <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEXT/TANZANIAEXTN/0,,menuPK:287345~pagePK:141132~piPK:141107~theSitePK:258799,00.html>Accessed on 20 June 2004. ^24. The main donors have been IDRC, ITU, UNESCO and Danida, in collaborationwith other international partners including the British Council,Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), UNDP, World HealthOrganization (WHO) and national governments. ^25. COSTECH, Progress Report to International Development ResearchCentre (IDRC) as from January 2001 to February 2003 (COSTECH,Dar es Salaam, 2003). ^26. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^27. Planning Commission and Regional Commissioner’s OfficeMwanza, Mwanza Region Socio-Economic Profile (Dar es Salaam,1997). ^28. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^29. Tanzania Cotton Board, Prices Paid to Farmers for the Last 12Years, n.d., <http://www.tancotton.co.tz/Producer%20price%202001-02%20season.htm>Accessed 15 May 2004. ^30. Sengerema MCT, Annual Report 2002 (Sengerema, 2002). ^31. COSTECH, Progress Report to IDRC, p. 1. ^32. NBS, Tanzania Household Budget Survey. ^33. COSTECH, Progress Report to IDRC. ^34. In 1999, a major ISP in Dar es Salaam analyzed the materialbeing accessed by its customers and found that 55% of it wascategorized as pornography (personal communication). ^35. See, e.g. <www.clickz.com, http://www.pewinternet.org/> ^36. B. Wellman and C. Haythornthwaite (eds), The Internet in EverydayLife (Blackwell, Oxford, 2002), p. 18. ^37. Ibid. ^38. A. Bahi, ‘Internet use and logics of social adaptationof youth in Abidjan cybercafes’, CODESRIA Bulletin 1–2(2004), pp. 67–71. ^39. W. van Binsbergen, ‘Can ICT belong in Africa, or is ICTowned by the North Atlantic region?’, in W. van Binsbergenand R. van Dijk (eds), Situating Globality: African agency inthe appropriation of global culture (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands,2004), pp. 107–146. ^40. International Development Research Centre, ‘African Telecentres:A pioneering experience’ (unpublished document), n.d. ^41. D. Miller and D. Slater, The Internet: An ethnographic approach(Berg, Oxford, 2000). ^42. L. Mehta, ‘From darkness to light? Critical reflectionson the World Development Report 1998/99’, Journal of DevelopmentStudies 36, 1 (1999), pp. 151–61. ^43. Van Binsbergen, ‘Can ICT belong in Africa’, pp.111–115. ^44. World Bank, Can Africa Claim the 21^st century?, p. 2. ^45. J. Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development’,depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho (Universityof Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN, 1994). ^46. B. Weiss, ‘Thug realism: inhabiting fantasy in urban Tanzania’,Cultural Anthropology 17, 1 (2002), p. 100. ^47. C. Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernity in West Africa (Universityof Chicago Press, London, 1999). ^48. A. Perullo, ‘The life that I live: popular music, agency,and urban society in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania’ (unpublishedPhD dissertation, Indiana University, Indiana, 2003); Weiss,‘Thug realism’. ^49. N. Ng’wanakilala, Mass Communication and Development ofSocialism in Tanzania (Tanzania Publishing House, Dar es Salaam,1981), p. 63. ^50. Perullo, ‘The life that I live’. ^51. A. Appadurai, ‘Disjuncture and difference in the globalcultural economy’, Public Culture 2, 2 (1990), pp. 1–23;D. Miller, ‘Could the Internet defetishise the commodity?’,Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 21, 3 (2003),pp. 359–72. ^52. J. Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity: Myths and meanings ofurban life on the Zambian copperbelt (University of CaliforniaPress, London, 1999), p. 212. ^53. All unattributed quotations refer to interviews conducted duringfieldwork. ^54. From fieldnotes. ^55. From fieldnotes. ^56. K. Askew, Performing the Nation: Swahili music and culturalpolitics in Tanzania (University of Chicago Press, London, 2002). ^57. Sengerema MCT, Annual Report, p. 6. ^58. Guardian, 6 August 2001. ^59. Ibid., 24 July 2001. ^60. Daily News, 27 June 2001. ^61. Askew, Performing the Nation. ^62. Miller and Slater, The Internet. ^63. See, e.g., A. Appadurai, Modernity at Large: Cultural dimensionsof modernity (University of Minnesota Press, London, 1996);Ferguson, Expectations of Modernity; U. Hannerz, ‘Epilogue:on some reports from a free space’, in B. Meyer and P.Geschiere (eds), Globalization and Identity: Dialectics of flowand closure (Blackwell, Oxford, 1999), pp. 325–30; B.Meyer, ‘Visions of blood, sex and money: fantasy spacesin popular Ghanaian cinema’, Visual Anthropology 16 (2003),pp. 15–41; Weiss, ‘Thug realism’. ^64. W. Arens and I. Karp (eds), Creativity of Power: Cosmology andaction in African societies (Smithsonian Institution Press,London, 1989); I. Kopytoff, ‘Ancestors as elders in Africa’,Africa 41, 2 (1971), pp. 129–42. ^65. My thanks go to Clare Madge for this insight. ^66. Weiss, ‘Thug realism’.     

Correction

For some reason, the only corrections received in the last Quarterconcern the United Nations in its various forms. General Daubentonwrites to point out that the study of kwashiorkor, referredto on p. 3, 1. 19, of the present volume, was undertaken bythe World Health Organisation, as well as by the Food and AgriculturalOrganisation. A learned letter from Mr. F. R. Bray, of the InternationalLabour Office, points out the connections between the legendThe Deeds of Bokari, printed on p. 61, and the Polynesian legendof Mauitikitiki. This connection exists, but not in the originalversion, only in the mind of the teller, E. Bankole Timothy.Finally, Dr. Chalmers Wright complains of the reference to theUnited Nations publication on inquiries into household standardsof living, made in the Shorter Notices on p. 172, pointing tothe 40 columns of material provided for the inquirer. I shouldhave thought that this might have been surmised from the precedingsentence in the notice, which refers to a list of most of thefield investigation in the past decade or two. The criticismof the actual content of the notice still remains, in my opinion,valid.      

West African Voices: 2

Last quarter, we gave an example of traditional West Africanpoetry, broadcast in the Regional transmission of the B.B.C.Readers may be interested now to read some examples of originalwriting in English, of which other illustrations were printedin African Affairs a year or two     

What harm? Kenyan and Ugandan perspectives on khat

What harm does khat actually do to users and the communitiesin which they live? In this article, the health-related, social,economic, and religious arguments of Kenyans and Ugandans forand against khat consumption are reported. The medical evidencefor harm from khat is far from compelling, and the East Africandebate on khat is informed by local political discourses thatoften are closely connected to issues of ethnicity and the controlof resources. As a result, the harm attributed to khat consumptionis contested. The objective of most local efforts to curb theuse of khat in East African towns is the reduction of socialand economic ills. Yet, eliminating khat consumption would notreverse the problems that it is identified as causing. ^1. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. ^2. See, for example, Roy Porter and Mikulas Teich, Drugs and Narcoticsin History (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995); JohnGoodman, Paul E. Lovejoy, and Andrew Sheratt, Consuming Habits:Drugs in history and anthropology (Routledge, London and NewYork, 1995). ^3. Daniel M. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life or the devil’scud? The debate over qat (Catha edulis) in Yemeni culture’,in Ross Coomber and Nigel South (eds), Drug Use and CulturalContexts: ‘Beyond the west’ (Free Association Books,London, 2004), pp. 101–118. ^4. Ezekiel Gebissa, Leaf of Allah: Khat and agricultural transformationin Harerge, Ethiopia 1875–1991 (James Currey, Oxford,2004). ^5. UNODCCP, The Drug Nexus in Africa (UN Office for Drug Control& Crime Prevention Monographs, Vienna, 1999); H.M. Adamand R. Ford (eds), Mending the Rips in the Sky: Options forSomali communities in the 21^st century (Red Sea Press, Lawrencevilleand Asmara, 1997). ^6. Neil Carrier, ‘Miraa is cool: the cultural importanceof miraa (khat) for Tigania and Igembe youth in Kenya’,Journal of African Cultural Studies, forthcoming. ^7. ESRC Award (RES-143-25-0046): ‘The Khat Nexus: trans-nationalconsumption in a global economy’. ^8. The British colonial authorities attempted to ban khat in Kenyabetween 1945 and 1956 but found regulation unworkable. ^9. Paul Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation in Kenya’sMeru District (University of Florida, unpublished PhD thesis,1994). ^10. Neil Carrier, The Social Life of Miraa: Farming, trade and consumptionof a plant stimulant in Kenya (University of St Andrews, unpublishedPhD thesis, 2003). ^11. M. Ahmed and M. Garret, Proceedings of a Seminar on Khat andHealth (Tower Hamlets Health Strategy Group, London, 1994);H.A. Utteh, ‘The plight of Somali refugees in Europe,with particular reference to Germany (1993)’, in Adamand Ford, Mending Rips, pp. 449–59. ^12. Mark Horton and John Middleton, The Swahili: The social landscapeof a mercantile society (Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 2000). ^13. Interview with Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr of Lamu. ^14. Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation. ^15. Interview with Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr. ^16. Thanks to Imam Mahmoud Abdulkadr and committee members for providingcopies of campaign correspondence. Photocopies of correspondencein the possession of the author. ^17. Undated leaflet, issued by Nairobi office of UNODC, is entitledKHAT: (Catha edulis). ^18. UNODC, KHAT: (Catha edulis). ^19. See, for example, John Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise: Theinstitutionalized use of the drug qat in North Yemen (ReidelPublishing Company, Dordrecht, 1987). ^20. M. Dhadphale and O.E. Omolo, ‘Psychiatric morbidity amongkhat chewers’, East African Medical Journal 65, 6 (1988),pp. 355–9. ^21. M. Kithure, ‘Price of miraa. Your brain or the twig’.The Daily Nation, Nairobi, 17 May 2001. ^22. Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation; Carrier, The SocialLife of Miraa. ^23. W.J. Eggling, The Indigenous Trees of the Uganda Protectorate(The Government of the Uganda Protectorate, London, 1951), p.79. ^24. Carrier, ‘Miraa is cool’. ^25. New Vision published articles on khat on 20 January 1994, 25May 1994, 26 May 1994, and 19 December 1994. Reviewed by SaidiFamau. ^26. 30 May 1998, New Vision. ^27. A.O. Ihunwo, F.I.B. Kayanja, and U.B. Amadi-Ihunwo, ‘Useand perception of the psychostimulant, khat (Catha edulis) amongthree occupational groups in south western Uganda’, EastAfrican Medical Journal 81, 9 (2004), pp. 468–73. ^28. The interviewers, Musa Almass and Mzee Hasan, were trained bySusan Beckerleg. The results were analysed using SPSS12. ^29. There is little research on the effects of khat on libido, potency,and fertility. However, Hakim found a weak association betweenkhat use and abnormal seminal fluid analysis profiles. See.L.Y. Hakim, ‘Influence of khat on seminal fluid amongpresumed infertile couples’, East African Medical Journal79, 1 (2002), pp. 22–28. ^30. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^31. See Gebissa for an account of the spread of Ethiopia khat linkedto the introduction of modern transportation in the Horn ofAfrica. See also Carrier, ‘The need for speed’,Africa, forthcoming. ^32. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 237. ^33. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, p. 108. ^34. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 194. ^35. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^36. See Goldsmith, Symbiosis and Transformation; Carrier, The SocialLife of Miraa. ^37. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 193. ^38. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 18. ^39. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, p. 104. ^40. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 232. ^41. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise. ^42. Varisco, ‘The elixir of life’, pp. 111–12. ^43. Kennedy, The Flower of Paradise, p. 108. ^44. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 3. ^45. A. Almeddom and S. Abraham, ‘Women, moral virtue and Tchat-chewing’,in M. MacDonald (ed.), Gender, Drink and Drugs. (Berg, Oxford,1994), pp. 249–58. ^46. Gebissa, Leaf of Allah, p. 11. ^47. Almeddom and Abraham. ‘Women, moral virtue and Tchat-chewing’,pp. 249–50. ^48. Ihunwo, et al., ‘Use and perception of the psychostimulant,khat’, p. 472.     

Islam in Mali in the neoliberal era

If before 11 September 2001, many praised Mali as a model ofdemocracy, secularism and toleration, many have now begun toexpress concern about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism inMali. I consider a number of recent public debates in Mali overmorality, so-called women’s issues, and the proposed changesin the Family Code and show how the perspectives of many Malianson these issues are not new but rather relate to longstandingand ongoing debates about Islam, secularism, politics, moralityand law. What is new is the way in which some Muslim religiousleaders have been articulating their complaints and criticisms.Since the guarantee of the freedom of expression and associationin the early 1990s, there has been a proliferation of independentnewspapers and private radio stations and new Islamic associationswith a coterie of increasingly media-savvy activists. I explorehow some Muslim activists have used such outlets to articulatethe concerns of some ordinary Malians, who face the contradictionsof living as modern Muslim citizens in a modernizing and secularizingstate where, in this age of neoliberal governmentality, theallegedly un-Islamic seems to be always just around the corner. Portions of the paper have been presented at the workshop, ‘Islam,Society and State in West Africa’, Rutgers University,New Brunswick, 29 March 2003; at the symposium, ‘Constructionand Dissemination of Islamic Knowledge in Africa’, IndianaUniversity, Bloomington, 19 April 2003; and at the conference,‘Governance and Insecurity in West Africa’, NorthwesternUniversity, 13–15 November 2003; and at UniversitätBayreuth. ^1. United States Agency for International Development, ‘Assistanceenvironment’, in USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 11. ^2. Economist Intelligence Unit, ‘The political scene’,in EIU Country Report: Mali (EIU, London, March 2002), p. 47. ^3. See Joshua Muravchik, ‘Freedom and the Arab world’,The Weekly Standard, 31 December 2001. ^4. ‘Overview’. USAID MALI: Country Strategic Plan 2003–2012(USAID, Bamako, Mali, 2002), p. 18. Such sentiments were alsoexpressed in journalistic accounts published shortly after 11September 2001. See, for example, Douglas Farah, ‘Mali’sMuslim clerics send troubling message: fragile democracy seenas vulnerable to extremism’, Washington Post, 30 September2001, p. A24; Kader Konaté, ‘Mali. Le danger islamiste’,Le Continent, 14 September 2001, p. 1. ^5. See Joan Baxter, ‘Challenging tradition’, BBC Focuson Africa Magazine, January-March 2002, pp. 48–50. Otherexamples include Nicolas Colombant, ‘Mali’s Muslimssteer back to spiritual roots’, Christian Science Monitor,26 February 2002, p. 8. ^6. These included various Western media outlets and several Maliannewspapers. ^7. James Ferguson and Akhil Gupta, ‘Spatializing states:toward an ethnography of neoliberal governmentality’,American Ethnologist 29, 4 (2002), pp. 981–1002. ^8. For critical perspectives on the fashionable civil society approachto ‘good governance’ in Africa, see John L. Comaroffand Jean Comaroff (eds), Civil Society and the Political Imaginationin Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999);Béatrice Hibou and Richard Banégas, ‘Civilsociety and the public space in Africa’, CODESRIA Bulletin1 (2000), pp. 39–47. ^9. For example, Sunjata, the mythical founder of the medieval Malianempire, Mansa Musa, the Muslim rulers of Macina (r. nineteenthcentury), al-Hajj Umar Tall (d. nineteenth century), the Kuntashaykhs of the Timbuktu region, and Shaykh Hamallah (d. twentiethcentury), to name only some of the most prominent. ^10. For an example of how such ‘orthodoxy’ changes overtime and space in Mali, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Muslimproselytization as purification: religious pluralism and conflictin contemporary Mali’ in Abdallah A. An-Na’im (ed.),Proselytization and Communal Self-Determination in Africa (Orbis,Maryknoll, NY, 1999), pp. 228–45. ^11. Two studies that have received quite a bit of attention areAnna L. Tsing, In the Realm of the Diamond Queen: Marginalityin an out-of-the-way place (Princeton University Press, Princeton,NJ, 1993); Charles Piot, Remotely Global: Village modernityin West Africa (University of Chicago Press, Chicago, IL, 1999). ^12. See Gregory Starrett, ‘The political economy of religiouscommodities in Cairo’, American Anthropologist 97, 1 (1995),pp. 51–68. ^13. On these developments, see Robert Launay and Benjamin F. Soares,‘The formation of an "Islamic sphere" in French colonialWest Africa’, Economy and Society, 28, 4 (1999), pp. 497–519;Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Islam and public piety in Mali’,in Armando Salvatore and Dale F. Eickelman (eds), Public Islamand the Common Good (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, 2004);Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy: History andauthority in a Malian town (Edinburgh University Press, Edinburghand the University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 2005). ^14. Malians with access to satellite television have a wider arrayof choices, which are hard to quantify. ^15. Some of the themes in this section are treated at greater lengthin my book, Islam and the Prayer Economy. ^16. Partha Chatterjee, The Nation and Its Fragments (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1993). ^17. See Seydina Oumar Diarra, ‘Haut Conseil Islamique du Mali’,Info-Matin, 18 January 2002, p. 5. ^18. Benjamin F. Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy, p. 212. Seealso David Robinson, Paths of Accommodation: Muslim societiesand French colonial authorities in Senegal and Mauritania, 1880–1920(Ohio University Press, Athens, OA, 2000); David Robinson andJean-Louis Triaud (eds), Le temps des marabouts: Itinéraireset stratégies islamiques en Afrique occidentale françaisev.1880–1960 (Karthala, Paris, 1997). ^19. Many Malians also regularly apply diverse principles from ‘custom’,which is often referred to as laada (from the Arabic) in theregion’s vernaculars. ^20. For one example, see Benjamin F. Soares, ‘Notes on theanthropological study of Islam and Muslim societies in Africa’,Culture and Religion, 1, 2 (2000), pp. 277–85. ^21. Ahmad Uthman Bah, Diya’ al-ghasaq manzuma nasihat al-shabab(Matba’at al-najah al-jadida, Casablanca, Morocco, 1992). ^22. See, for example, Amadou Tall, Dimensions de l’Islam (DarEl Fikr, Beirut, Lebanon, 1995–1996). ^23. On Haïdara and his career, see Soares, ‘Islam andpublic piety’ and Soares, Islam and the Prayer Economy.Cf. Dorothea Schulz, ‘"Charisma and Brotherhood" revisited’,Journal of Religion in Africa, 33 (2003), pp. 146–71. ^24. See Louis Brenner, Controlling Knowledge: Religion, power andschooling in a West African Muslim society (Indiana UniversityPress, Bloomington, IL, 2001). ^25. Cf. Olivier Roy (trans. C. Volk), The Failure of Political Islam(Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1994); Olivier Roy, GlobalizedIslam (Columbia University Press, New York, NY, 2004). ^26. Cf. Armando Salvatore, ‘Social differentiation, moralauthority and public Islam in Egypt: the case of Mustafa Mahmud’,Anthropology Today, 6, 2 (2000), pp. 12–15. ^27. For a discussion of Haïdara and his association’srelation to Sufism and Sufi orders, see Soares, Islam and thePrayer Economy. ^28. This was also a topic of discussion in some print media. See,for example, Cheick Sidya Diombana, ‘La jeunesse et lafoi en l’Islam’, La Roue, 25 October–3 November1993, p. 5. ^29. I am grateful to Roman Loimeier for making his copy of thissign available to me. ^30. See, for example, ‘Déclaration finale des associationsislamiques du Mali concernant les valeurs islamiques et àpropos du programme d’action de Beijing rélatifaux droits des femmes’, La Roue, 22–31 January 1996,pp. 3–5. ^31. For a discussion of some of the controversy around excision,see Bettina Shell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa: Culture, controversy, and change (Lynne Rienner,Boulder, Colorado, 2000). For campaigns against excision inMali, see Claudie Gosselin, ‘Handing over the knife: Numuwomen and the campaign against excision in Mali’, in BettinaShell-Duncan and Ylva Hernlund (eds), Female ‘Circumcision’in Africa, pp. 193–214; Jean Sanou, ‘Lutte contreles mutilations génitales feminines’, Le Soudanais,22 November 2000, p. 3; Yousouf Camara, ‘Réligionet excision’, Le Tambour, 22 June 2001, p. 3; MamadouBlodin Sissok, ‘Religion et excision. Quand les chrétienss’engagent contre les mutilations génitales féminines’,Info-Matin, 29 June 2001, p. 8. ^32. See, for example, Mady M. Dembélé, ‘L’excisionest un poids des traditions, elle n’a rien de religieux’,Les Echos, 18 July 2001, p. 5. ^33. See C.H. Sylla, ‘Interview exclusive. Le Présidentdu Collectif des islamistes parle’, Le Républicain,16 May 2001, pp. 1, 4–5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘L’excisionau Mali. La position des musulmans’, Nouvel Horizon, 30January 2001, p. 5; Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Interdire l’excisionest une atteinte grave’, Le Républicain, 31 January2001, p. 5. ^34. ‘Brèves’, Le Politicien Musulman, 18 March–18April 2002, p. 8. ^35. Leaflets produced and distributed by AISLAM (Association islamiquedu salut) in the author’s possession. ^36. See Mamadou Keïta, ‘Les imams à l’affûtdes jouisseurs’, Nouvel Horizon, 23 November 1998, p.4. ^37. Mohamed Kimbiri, ‘Boycottons "Miss Cedeao" ’, NouvelHorizon, 16 October 1998. See also Mamadou Keïta, ‘MissCedeao’, Nouvel Horizon, 2 November 1998, p. 5. ^38. Yoro Sow, ‘Incertitudes pour la tenue du Congrèsdes homosexuels’, Sud Info, 8 December 1999, p. 4. ^39. However, some prominent Muslim religious leaders, most notablyChérif Haïdara, would eventually take positionsin support of condom use. See Benjamin Soares, ‘Mali:Im Visier der Islamismus-Fahnder’, INAMO 41 (2005), pp.16–18. ^40. Talal Asad, ‘Religion, nation-state, secularism’,in Peter van der Veer and Hartmut Lehmann (eds), Nation andReligion: Perspectives on Europe and Asia (Princeton UniversityPress, Princeton, NJ, 1999), p. 191. ^41. Djibril Traoré, ‘El Hadji Mahmoud Dicko,’Le National, 2 October 2000, p. 5. ^42. El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Declaration du Collectif des associationsislamiques du Mali’, Info-Matin, 7 May 2001, p. 7. Seealso El Hadj Mahmoud Dicko, ‘Déclaration’,Le Républicain, 4 May 2001, p. 7; Amara Diapy Diawara,‘Meeting du Collectif des associations musulmanes du Mali’,Info-Matin, 13 February 2001, pp. 4–5. ^43. See, for example, Michael Taussig, Mimesis and Alterity (Routledge,New York, NY, 1993); Homi Bhabha, ‘Of mimicry and man’,in The Location of Culture (Routledge, New York, NY, 1994),pp. 85–92. ^44. On this heightened sense, see Dale F. Eickelman and James Piscatori,Muslim Politics (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ,1996). For Malian press coverage of the OCI meeting, see, forexample, ‘Organisation de la Conférence islamique.Le monde musulman’, Liberté, 3 July 2001, p. 4. ^45. See the extensive coverage of the meeting in a special editionof Le Continent, 2 February 2001. ^46. For a discussion of some of the proposed reforms and specificcontroversies, cf. Benjamin F. Soares, ‘The attempt toreform family law in Mali’, in Margot Badran (ed.), Genderand Islam in Africa (Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands, forthcoming);Dorothea E. Schulz, ‘Political factions, ideological fictions:the controversy over family law reform in democratic Mali’,Islamic Law and Society, 10, 1 (2003), pp. 132–64. ^47. Birama Fall, ‘Islam et politique. La colère desislamistes contre le pouvoir’, Le Républicain,23 April 2001, p. 1; Belco Tamboura, ‘Le front religieux,un front de plus pour Konaré’, L’Observateur,14 June 2001, p. 6. ^48. C. H. Sylla, ‘Code de la famille et excision. La dernièrevictoire des islamistes sur Alpha’, Le Républicain,10 June 2002, p. 5. ^49. See Christian Coulon, Le marabout et le prince: Islam et pouvoirau Sénégal (Pédone, Paris, France, 1981). ^50. Boukary Daou, ‘Code de la famille et excision. Les musulmansdisent non à Alpha’, Le Républicain, 5 June2002, p. 1. ^51. Cf. Michael Bratton, Massa Coulibaly, and Fabiana Machado, ‘Popularviews of the legitimacy of the state in Mali’, CanadianJournal of African Studies 36, 2 (2002), pp. 197–238;Michael Bratton, Robert Mattes and E. Gyimah-Boadi, Public Opinion,Democracy and Market Reform in Africa (Cambridge UniversityPress, Cambridge, 2005).     

Correction

Readers may have noted a number of misprints in the last number,caused for the most part by special circumstances at the timeof proof-reading. From the January number (p. 21, L 31), theNorthern Rhodesia and Nyasaland Joint Publications Bureau pointout that the 100 titles quoted are not all new, and that theyare producing an average of 12 new books a year, mostly of generalinterest for Africans. On the next page, 1. 22, MacMunn shouldread MacMinn. On p. 90, the figures at American Universitiesarenew arrivals only. On p. 108, R. A. Hudson was Secretaryfor Native Affairs in Northern Rhodesia, not Chief Secretary.On p. 113, the American offer to the Union was for $2m. of driedeggs and millr, the figure quoted being the cost of distribution.On p. 117, Lennox Kew Suwisa should read Lennox Ken Sivrisa.On p. 122, the figure quoted for Egyptian tobacco is the totalrevenue from indirect and direct taxes in 1949. No tobacco isgrown commercially. F. Crawford, in the introduction to theNorthern Rhodesian development tables, should have been describedas Director of Development. In the reviews, the initials ofMr. Puplampu are D. A., not A. D. (as will be seen from hisarticle in this number). On p. 172, the author of the AfricanAngelus was the Rev. Merfyn Temple, and the cost of the bookshould be changed to 3/6 (3/10 post free).      

AIDS, security and the military in Africa: A sober appraisal

This article examines four accepted wisdoms about HIV/AIDS andAfrican armies and in each case concludes that substantial revisionis necessary in the light of emerging evidence. First, it appearsthat military populations do not necessarily have a higher prevalenceof HIV than civilian populations. HIV levels in armies dependon many factors including the demographics of the army, itspattern of deployment, the nature and stage of the epidemicin the country concerned, and the measures taken to controlthe disease by the military authorities. Second, although theepidemic has the potential to undermine the functioning of nationalmilitaries, and may have done so in isolated instances, armiesin general are well placed to withstand the threat. Third, evidencethat war contributes to the spread of the virus is meagre andsuggests that we should be concerned primarily with specificrisks that conflict may entail including population mobilityand changing sexual networks. Lastly, the hypothesis that AIDShas the potential to disrupt national, regional, and internationalsecurity remains speculative. ^1. Roger Yeager, Craig Hendrix, and Stuart Kingma, ‘Internationalmilitary Human Immunodeficiency Virus/Acquired Immunodeficiencysyndrome policies and programs: strengths and limitations incurrent practice’, Military Medicine 165, 2 (2000), pp.87–92. ^2. S. Kingma, ‘AIDS prevention in military populations: learningthe lessons of history’, International AIDS Society Newsletter,4, March 1996, pp. 9–11. ^3. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military: UNAIDS point of view’,UNAIDS Best Practice Collection, May 1998 (http://www.unaids.org/html/pub/publications/irc-pub05/militarypv_en_pdf.pdf,9 January, 2005). ^4. A.E. Pettifor, H.V. Rees, A. Steffenson, L. Hlongwa-Madikizela,C. MacPhail, K. Vermaak, and I. Kleinschmidt, HIV and SexualBehaviour Among Young South Africans: A national survey of 15–24year olds (Reproductive Health Research Unit, University ofWitwatersrand, Johannesburg, 2004). ^5. According to a South African AIDS Law Project press releaseof 23 October 2003, ‘the SANDF has however excluded andcontinues to exclude job applicants with HIV from employmentin the SANDF’ (http://www.alp.org.za/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=229,16 April, 2005). ^6. Yigeremu Abebe, Ab Schaap, Girmatchew Mamo, Asheber Negussie,Birke Darimo, Dawit Wolday, and Eduard J. Sanders, ‘HIVprevalence in 72,000 urban and rural army recruits, Ethiopia’,AIDS 17, 12 (2003), pp. 1835–40. ^7. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^8. Olive Shisana, Leickness Simbayi, and E. Dorkenoo, ‘SouthAfrica’s first national population-based HIV/AIDS behaviouralrisks, sero-status and media impact survey (SABSSM) researchproject’ (Third Quarterly Progress Report, Household Survey2002, Human Sciences Research Council, Pretoria, 2002). ^9. UNAIDS, ‘AIDS and the military’, UNAIDS TechnicalUpdate, 1998 (http://www.worldbank.org/wbi/aidsleadership/dls_AIDS_military_may14.pdf,July 21, 2004); ‘Military populations’ AIDS Briefs(http://www.heard.org.za/publications/AidsBriefs/sec/military.pdf,December 22, 2005). ^10. Tsadkan Gebre Tensae, ‘HIV/AIDS in the Ethiopian military:perceptions, strategies and impacts’ (unpublished paper,2002). ^11. A. Adefalolu, ‘HIV/AIDS as an occupational hazard to soldiers– ECOMOG experience’ (Paper presented at the 3rdAll Africa Congress of Armed Forces and Police Medical Services,Pretoria, 1999), pp. 4–11. ^12. M. Fleshman, ‘AIDS prevention in the ranks – UNtarget peacekeepers, combatants in war against the disease’,African Recovery 15, 1–2 (2004), pp. 9–10. ^13. The same was true in Thailand, where the army responded in advanceof the government. ^14. ‘HIV/AIDS and Uniformed Services: Analysing the Evidence’.Expert Meeting, Cape Town, December 6–7, 2004 called byUNAIDS and attended by Alan Whiteside. ^15. Edward Hooper, Slim (Bodley Head, London, 1990); Edward Hooper,The River: A journey to the source of HIV and AIDS (Penguin,London, 2000), pp. 42–9. ^16. Robert Shell, ‘The silent revolution: HIV/AIDS and militarybases in Sub-Saharan Africa’ in Consolidating Democracy,Seminar Report Series (Konrad Adenauer Foundation, East London,2000), pp. 29–41. ^17. Reinhard Kaiser, Paul Spiegel, Peter Salama, William Brady,Elizabeth Bell, Kyle Bond, and Marie Downer, ‘HIV/AIDSseroprevalence and behavioral risk factor survey in Sierra Leone,April 2002’ (Center for Disease Control and Prevention,Atlanta, GA, 2002). ^18. C. Mulanga, S. Bazepeo, J. Mwamba, C. Butel, J.-W. Tshimpaka,M. Kashi, F. Lepira, M. Carael, M. Peeters, and E. Delaporte,‘Political and socio-economic instability: how does itaffect HIV? A case study in the Democratic Republic of Congo’,AIDS 18, 5 (2004), pp. 832–4. ^19. Taddesse Berhe, Hagos Gemechu, and Alex de Waal, ‘Warand HIV prevalence: evidence from Tigray, Ethiopia’, AfricanSecurity Review 14, 3 (2005), pp. 107–14. ^20. Tim Allen, ‘AIDS, security and democratic governance’,The Hague, 2–4 May 2005. Presentation at expert seminar. ^21. Paul Spiegel, ‘HIV/AIDS among conflict-affected and displacedpopulations: dispelling myths and taking action’, Disasters28, 4 (2004), pp. 322–39. ^22. African Rights, Rwanda: Broken bodies, torn spirits; livingwith genocide, rape and HIV/AIDS (African Rights, Kigali, 2004);V. Randell, ‘Sexual violence and genocide against Tutsiwomen. Propaganda and sexual violence in the Rwandan genocide:an argument for intersectionality in international law’,Columbia Human Rights Law Review 33, 3 (2002), pp. 733–55. ^23. Kaiser et al., ‘HIV/AIDS seroprevalence’. ^24. P. Fourie and M. Schönteich, ‘Africa’s newsecurity threat: HIV/AIDS and human security in southern Africa’,African Security Review 10, 4 (2001), pp. 29–44; M. Schönteich,‘AIDS and age: SA’s crime time bomb’, AIDSAnalysis Africa 10, 2 (1999), pp. 1–4. ^25. Rachel Bray, ‘Predicting the social consequences of orphanhoodin South Africa’ (Working Paper No. 29, Centre for SocialScience Research, University of Cape Town, 2003).     

Small Arms and Light Weapons Among Pastoral Groups in the Kenya-Uganda Border Area

Recent decades have seen an escalation in interethnic resourceconflicts and banditry among pastoralists in the Kenya-Ugandaborder region, fuelled by a growing number of small arms. Statemanagement has been largely unsuccessful and often counterproductivein reducing numbers of small arms. The creation of paramilitaryinstitutions in rural Kenya and Uganda are an example of howlegal arms are entering communities and intensifying the conflictsfurther. Understanding the sources and mechanisms of arms acquisitionis a significant step in curbing the violence. The main sourcesand routes, and the current costs of arms and ammunition areprovided. More important however is to appreciate the complexreasons behind the demand for small arms. Relationships withstates, alienation of pastoral land, cultural issues and questionsof livelihood are all examined, using empirical evidence collectedby the author between 2001 and 2005. ^1. Interview with Rev. John Lodinyo, pastor of Baptist Church,Kiwawa, 31 May 2001. The officer-in-charge of the police notedthat the number of Pokot looking for pasture had increased becauseof the dry spell in the district at the time. ^2. Mustafa Mirzeler and Crawford Young, ‘Pastoral politicsin the northeast periphery in Uganda: AK47 as change agent’,Journal of Modern African Studies 38, 3 (2000), pp. 407–30;Action for Development of Local Communities (ADOL), ‘TheKarimojong response to disarmament: six months later’,(Unpublished report, ADOL/Pax Christi, Netherlands and Kampala,2002); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and SmallArms: The Kenya–Uganda border region’ (Consultancyfor Saferworld, London, 2003). ^3. Interview with former resident district commissioner in Kotido,2 February 2003. ^4. Interviews with victims of small arms injuries including a 15-year-oldvictim in Kanwata, Karamoja, 2001–4. ^5. How the figure is arrived at is unclear: see ‘Disarm them’East African Standard <http://www.eastandard.net/hm_news/news_s.php?articleid=28071>(30 August 2005). ^6. Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBO), ‘National Populationand Housing Census’, (Government report, Kampala, 2003). ^7. For details, see David Anderson, ‘Stock theft and moraleconomy in colonial Kenya’, Africa 56, 4 (1986), pp. 399–416;Richard Hogg ‘The new pastoralism: poverty and dependencein northern Kenya’, Africa 56, 3 (1986), pp. 319–32;Kennedy Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Armsin the North Rift, Northeast Africa (University of Bradford,Unpublished PhD thesis, 2005); Kennedy Mkutu, ‘PastoralistConflict in the Horn of Africa’ [Consultancy for AfricanPeace Forum (APFO)/Saferworld/University of Bradford, 2001];Derrick Belshaw and Joshua Malinga, ‘The Kalashnikov economiesof the Eastern Sahel: cumulative or cyclical differentiationbetween nomadic pastoralists’ (Unpublished report, DevelopmentStudies Association, South Bank University of East Anglia, 1999);Suzette Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable: cattle raidingamong the Kuria’ in G. Aijmer and J. Abbink (eds), Meaningsof Violence: A cross-cultural perspective (Berg, Oxford, 2000),pp. 101–21. Bruno Novelli, ‘Karimojong TraditionalReligion’ (Comboni Missionaries, Kampala, 1999); AugustoPazzaglia, The Karimojong: Some aspects (Camboni Missionaries,Bologna, 1982). ^8. Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Armed Pastoralist Conflicts and PeaceBuilding in Karamoja: The Role of Gender’ [Consultancyfor Netherlands Development Agency (SNV), Kampala, 2005]. ^9. Interviews in Karamoja, various sources, 2001–4. ^10. ‘50,000 guns in wrong hands, says Michuki’ DailyNation <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category-id=1&newsid=56059>(29 August 2005). ^11. Belshaw and Malinga ‘The Kalashnikov economies’. ^12. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Anderson,‘Stock theft’; Natalie Gomez and Kennedy Mkutu,‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence: Building capacity fordevelopment in Karamoja, Uganda’ (Consultancy for SNV/PaxChristi, Kampala, 2004); Mkutu, Armed Pastoralist Conflict .. . the Role of Gender; Ton Dietz, Pastoralists in dire straits:survival strategies and external interventions in a semi aridregion at the Kenya/Uganda border: Western Pokot, 1900–1986(Instituut Voor Sociale Geografie, University of Amsterdam,Amsterdam, Unpublished PhD Thesis, 1987); National Council ofChurches of Kenya/SNV/Semi-arid Rural Development Project (SARDEP)‘Pacifying the valley: an analysis of the Kerio valleyconflict’, (Report NCCK/SNV/SARDEP, Nairobi, 2001). ^13. Heald, ‘Tolerating the intolerable’; Michael Fleisher,‘Cattle raiding and household demography among the Kuriaof Tanzania’ Africa 69, 2 (1999), pp. 238–55. ^14. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms. ^15. John Sislin, John Pearson, Jocelyn Boryczka, and Jeffrey Weigand,‘Patterns in arms acquisitions by ethnic groups in conflict’,Security Dialogue, 29, 4 (1998), pp. 393–408. ^16. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms; Mkutu,‘Armed Pastoralist Conflict’. ^17. For example, the first time I interviewed the Honorable DavidPulkol, the former external security officer for Uganda in 2001,he was on a campaign trail. ^18. Kotido, Panyangara, Nakapelimoru, Kachire, Moroto, Loputuku,Lokitelekapes, Lokitelebu, Kalapata, Losilang, Kanwat Iriri,Namalu, Kangole, Nakiloro, Amudat, Karita, Kotido, Rupa, Musasiaand Kampala in Uganda and Kapenguria, Kachiliba, Alale, Nauypong,Kiwawa and Kunyao in Kenya. ^19. KIA is the senior institution for training upper level policymakers in Kenya. I worked there from 1997 to 2005 (colleaguesadministered the questionnaire whilst I was on sabbatical). ^20. This consisted of officers based in finance, home affairs, transport,the judiciary and foreign affairs. ^21. Communications with Philip Gulliver, Ton Dietz, Michael Bollig,Ben Knighton and John Lamphear. ^22. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^23. Kenya National Archive, Turkana history, Turkana political records,miscellaneous, 1921–45 TURK 159, DC/TURK3/1, p. 90. ^24. Awoundo Odegi, Life in the Balance: Ecological sociology ofTurkana nomads (ACTS, Nairobi, 1990); James Barber, ImperialFrontier (East African Publishing House, Nairobi, 1968), pp.91–106; Augusto Pazzaglia, The Karimojong. ^25. Barber, Imperial Frontier. ^26. Interview with Ael Ark Lodou, Member of Parliament for Dodothin Moroto, Uganda, 12 November 2004. ^27. Interview with James Chere, former raider and Chief of Rupain Moroto, 3 January 2003 and October 2004. ^28. Samuel Makinda, ‘Conflict and superpower in the Horn ofAfrica’, Third World Quarterly, 4, 1 (1982), pp. 93–103;For analysis of countries supplying arms to the Horn of Africaduring the cold war, see also Jeffrey Lefebvre, Arms for theHorn: U.S. security policy in Ethiopia and Somalia 1953–1991(University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, 1991). ^29. Interviews with eyewitnesses and others in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^30. Interviews in Panyangara, Kotido, Moroto and Namalu, 2001–4. ^31. Charles Ocan, ‘Pastoral crisis in Northern Uganda: thechanging significance of cattle raids’, (Report, Centrefor Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^32. Interviews 2001–4. I did meet some young men who had foughtin DRC but were now jobless and originated from the Karimojongarea. ^33. Ibid. ^34. Jan Cappon, ‘Why do communities want arms? Controllingthe demand for small arms, the search for strategies in theHorn of Africa and in the Balkans’, (Report, The Hague/PaxChristi, Netherlands, 2003). There is increasing evidence ofracketeers, but more work needs to be done on this secretivearea. Some evidence exists in Kennedy Mkutu, Guns and Governance:Pastoralist conflict and small arms in the North Rift (JamesCurrey, Oxford, forthcoming). ^35. National Assembly of Kenya, Report of the Parliamentary SelectCommittee to Investigate Ethnic Clashes in Western and OtherParts of Kenya, (National Assembly, Nairobi, Government Press,1992). ^36. Mkutu, Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms. ^37. The term vigilante here refers to a self-appointed body of citizensorganized to maintain order in their local community. For moreon vigilantes, see Les Johnston, ‘What is vigilantism?’British Journal of Criminology 36, 2 (1996), pp. 220–36.For the metamorphosis of vigilante in Karamoja region and itscurrent status, see Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance andSmall Arms. ^38. Interviews with Father John Bosco in Amudat, and others, 2001–4. ^39. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^40. Interviews in Karamoja, November 2004. By the end of 1995, theUgandan government was spending over 60 million UgSh per monthto pay vigilante in Karamoja alone. See ‘Government spendsSh.60m on Karamoja vigilantes’, Daily Monitor, 9 October1995. ^41. Gomes and Mkutu, ‘Breaking the Cycle of Violence’. ^42. Interview, name withheld, in Kampala, 17 May 2003. ^43. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^44. Interview with resident district commissioner, name withheld,in Karamoja, 2004. ^45. Mkutu, Pastoral Conflict, Governance and Small Arms (chapter4). ^46. The Monitor, 22 March 2000. ^47. Inter-African Bureau for Animal Resources (IBAR) and Organisationof African Unity (OAU) pastoral community harmonization meetingheld at Mount Elgon Hotel, Mbale, Uganda, May 2001. ^48. These were recognized by their language especially in Bokora:interviews in Lotome, November 2004. ^49. For more on the disarmaments, see Mkutu, ‘Guns and Governance’;Kennedy Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist conflict and small arms: thechallenges of small arms and insecurity and attempts at managementin Karamoja, Uganda’ (Paper presented at the NortheastAfrica Seminar, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology,University of Oxford, 30 January 2004); From 2004 to January2006, 1,068 arms have been recovered forcibly and voluntarilyin the four districts of Karamoja. See Daily Monitor, 9 January2006. ^50. Confirmed by interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^51. Interviews in kraals in Karamoja, 2003–4. ^52. ‘Protests as state disarms homeguards over clashes’,Daily Nation, 29 November 2004; ‘Police reserves werea threat to security’, Kenya Times, 21 April 2004; ‘KenyaPolice reserve force is disbanded,’ Daily Nation, 10 April2004. ^53. Interview with UPDF soldier in Namalu, 28 January 2003. ^54. Interviews in Namalu, January 2004. The author personally visitedthe kraal where the animals were raided and witnessed the gravesof the children who had been killed in the crossfire. ^55. Interview with Amudat hospital personnel, January 2003; interviewswith several members of the Karimojong and Upe Pokot communityconcurred in 2004. ^56. Interview with Roman Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld,Karamoja 2004. ^57. Interviews with elders in Alale, Kenya, August 2002, and visitto the scene. This was not reported in any press. ^58. Interview with karachunas in Kangole, July 2001; interviewsin Musasia, Nakaplimoru and Pangayangara in September–November,2004, confirmed this. ^59. Interview with elder Koritantoyo in Nakiliro, 2 February 2003. ^60. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^61. Interviews in Karamoja, Uganda and in West Pokot, Kenya, 2001–4,and phone and e-mail communications, 2005. In Namalu and Kangolein Karamoja, warriors could be seen chewing miraa (Khat). ^62. Interview with a SPLA soldier, name withheld, Moroto, 20 June2001. ^63. Ibid. ^64. Interview with James Chere, former raider and now chief of Rupain Rupa, 2003 and 2004. ^65. ADOL ‘Arms trafficking in the border regions of Sudan,Uganda and Kenya’ (Unpublished report ADOL, Kampala, 2001),pp. 202–10. ^66. Interview with elder in Moroto, 20 June 2001. ^67. In the field in October 2004, reliable sources in Karamoja indicatedthat Kony was spotted in Lira. Interviews in Kotido with variouspeople, including Local Council Fives, and in Kanawat, February2003, also confirmed Kony as a source of weapons to pastoralists. ^68. Interviews in Losilang and Kachile, Jie, October–November2004. ^69. Interviews with Somali businessmen who own mines in Karamoja,2003–4; interviews in Moroto, Nikloro and Namalu and visitsto mining areas. ^70. Interviews in Namalu and Mbale, name withheld, 20 June 2001. ^71. Observed in Namalu and Kangole in Uganda and in Alale in Kenya. ^72. Sandra Gray, ‘A memory of loss: ecological politics, localhistory, and the evolution of Karimojong violence’, HumanOrganization 59, 4 (2000), pp. 401–18. ^73. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, p.11. ^74. Father Joachim Omolo Ouko, ‘Clearly famine caught govtnapping’, Kenya Times, 5 January 2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/05jan06/editorials/comm1.html>(5 January 2006). ^75. Interviews in Nakapiripirit, Moroto and Nikoloro and observation,2003. ^76. Riamiriam, ‘The policy advocacy role of Civil SocietyOrganizations (CSOs) in Karamoja: The challenges and successes’(Unpublished report, Riamiriam, Moroto, 2005). ^77. Mkutu, ‘Pastoralist Conflict and Small Arms’, pp.17–18; for numbers of cows paid for brides, see Mkutu,‘Pastoralist Conflict, Governance and Small Arms’,p. 167; ADOL, ‘Karamoja response to disarmament’. ^78. Interview with Peter Lokeris, Minister for Karamoja, in Kampala,January 2003. ^79. Interview with Father John Bosco who is a victim of a gunshotin the knee, St Joseph’s Mission, Amudat, 28 January 2004. ^80. Interviews in Karamoja and West Pokot in Kenya, 2001–4. ^81. Interviews, visits and observations. ^82. West Pokot was formerly known as West Suk. ^83. KNA, District Commissioner West Suk, Annual Report, 1945, pp.2–3. ^84. Interviews and observations, 2001–4. ^85. Ben Knighton, ‘The state as raider among the Karimojong:where there are no guns they use the threat of guns’,Africa 73, 203 (2003), pp. 427–55. ^86. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 443–46;‘Residents plead for army bases at border’, DailyNation, 7 June 2002 <http://www.nationaudio.com/News/DailyNation/today/News/News11.html>(7 June 2002); the government of Kenya was accused of killingresidents under the guise of ‘security operations’.Other examples include the Wagalla, Malkamari and Garissa massacres,where thousands of people were killed and property worth millionsdestroyed. ^87. See ‘Leaders foiling guns surrender plan, says DC’,Daily Nation, 19 September 2004 <http://www.nationmedia.com/dailynation/nmgcontententry.asp?category_id=1&newsid=57473>(20 September 2004). The DC noted that, of the 2,600 arms surrendered,the majority were defective, and some residents were still withholdingthose in good condition. ^88. Ben Okudi, ‘Causes and effects of the 1980 famine in Karamoja’(Report, Center for Basic Research, Kampala, 1992). ^89. Interviews and phone communications Karimojong, NGOs and governmentofficials in Karamoja, 2004–6; Office of the Prime Minister(OPM), ‘Karamoja integrated disarmament and developmentprogrammes: creating conditions for promoting human securityand recovery in Karamoja, 2005–2008’ (Governmentreport, Kampala, June 2005). ^90. Interviews with warriors in Panyangara, Kanawat and Kotido inKaramoja, February 2003 and November 2004. ^91. Knighton, ‘The state as raider’, pp. 426–55. ^92. Not all the UPDF are raiders, in my experience in the fieldsince 2000, I found a lot of them to be very helpful; the conditionsin which they operate need to be considered. ^93. Interviews in Panyangara, Kacheri, Kotido, Musisia, Loputukand Moroto, November 2004. ^94. Interviews in Karamoja, 2001–4. ^95. Interviews with warriors and others, Nakapelimoru and Panyangara,August 2005. ^96. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^97. Interview with warriors in Panyangara airstrip, 7 October 2004;interviews with Lotirir mothers’ group and women in Rupanear Moroto, September 2004. ^98. Interviews in Karamoja, September–November 2004. ^99. Interviews with young Ekwete brew sellers in Jie County andLoputuk, September–October 2004. ^100. Interviews in Kanawat and Kotido, February 2003, and in Losilangand Kachire, November 2004. In some places, there is no governmentadministration. ^101. Interview in Karamoja, November 2004. ^102. Interview with Pastor Samuel Kotiyot, Amudat, 31 May 2001. ^103. Interviews in Kachire, Panyangara and Kanawat, November 2004.Kotido also came up with the same figures. ^104. Interview with reformed raider in Kanawat, 2004. ^105. Interview with Catholic Father in Karamoja, name withheld, 19June 2001 and January 2003. ^106. Interviews in Kotido town, November 2004. ^107. Interview, name withheld, in Alale, 2006. ^108. See Standard Team, ‘Minister: Sh28b needed to fight famine’,Sunday Standard, 8 January 2006; See also John Korir, ‘60billion livestock threatened’, Kenya Times, 4 January2006 <http://www.timesnews.co.ke/04jan06/business/buns7.html>(4 January 2006).     

An open letter/review

Abstract

I first read about you and your book, The Woman Warrior, in the book review sections of several magazines and Sunday newspapers. I read Susan Brownmiller's interview with you in “Mademoiselle” magazine, Jane Kramer's review of your book in the New York Times, and Nan Robertson's interview with you, also in the Times. In addition, several white feminist friends were telling me I should read your book “because it is a powerful, feminist story by a Chinese American woman.” So I read your book.     

ERRATA

Page 3, line 16, for "Clarke" read "Clark". Page 64, line 24, for "Johannesburg" read "Pretoria". Page 101, line 44, for "John" read "James". Page 102, Title, for "Ethiopia" read "Entrea". Page 132, 3 (b) 1953–4, for "23800" read "223,800". Page 160, line 7 from bottom, for "south" read "bush".      

Inadequately self-critical: Rwanda's self-assessment for the African peer review mechanism

During the first stage of the New Partnership for Africa’sDevelopment (NEPAD) peer review process, the country under reviewcompiles a report on the state of economic, political, social,and corporate governance in the country. This article examinesRwanda’s evaluation of its political governance duringthis first stage, as reflected in the January 2005 version ofthis country’s self-assessment report. After sketchingthe compromised political environment in which the report waswritten, it is indicated how this rosy report inadequately addressesa number of serious political problems in Rwanda, such as Rwanda’sinvolvement in the Democratic Republic of Congo, the inadequateseparation of powers in the Rwandan political system, tensionsin Rwandan society, and the flawed presidential and parliamentaryelections of 2003. While it remains to be seen to what extentRwanda either acknowledges its political problems in the finalversion of its self-assessment report, or is censured in thesubsequent stages of the peer review process, it is concludedthat the greater the failure to do either, the greater the doubtthat will linger over the value of the African peer-review exercise. ^1. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Memorandum of understanding on theAfrican Peer Review Mechanism’ (http://www.nepad.org,17 July, 2005). ^2. P. Chabal, ‘The quest for good government and developmentin Africa: is NEPAD the answer?’ International Affairs78, 3 (2002), pp. 447–62; I. Taylor, NEPAD: Towards Africa’sdevelopment or another false start? (Lynne Rienner, Boulder,CO, 2005). ^3. See Taylor, NEPAD, pp. 15–44. ^4. On this problem, see ibid, pp. 61–74. ^5. M. Katzenellenbogen and W. Hartley, ‘No political peerreview, says Mbeki’, Business Day, 31 October, 2002. ^6. T. Mbeki, ‘Critics ill-informed about NEPAD peer review’,ANC Official Home Page (http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/anctoday/2002/at45.htm,27 July, 2005). ^7. Ibid. ^8. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, Rwanda Country Self-Assessment Reportfor the African Peer Review Mechanism (Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat,Kigali, 2005). The 230-page report consists of an introduction,followed by four chapters, each addressing one of the thematicareas set out in the questionnaire. ^9. On Kigali’s ‘official line’, see J. Pottier,Re-imagining Rwanda: Conflict, survival and disinformation inthe late twentieth century (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge,2002). ^10. During the second stage of the peer review process, the countryvisit by the Country Review Team, this team’s ‘priorityorder of business will be to carry out the widest possible rangeof consultations with the Government, officials, political parties,parliamentarians and representatives of civil society organizationsincluding the media, academia, trade unions, business and professionalbodies’: NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines for countriesto prepare for and to participate in the African Peer ReviewMechanism (APRM)’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/aprm/aprmguidelinesforcountryreview200104final.pdf,27 July, 2005). Never mind that ‘representatives of civilsociety organizations’ in Rwanda tend to be not all thatindependent from the government, the NEPAD documents make nomention of possible consultations with embassy staff, the UNand its agencies, international financial instutions, internationalchurch groups and international NGOs — groups that wouldbe able to broaden the perspectives of the Country Review Team. ^11. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration on democracy, political,economic, and corporate governance’, NEPAD Official HomePage (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/2.pdf, 15 July,2005). ^12. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘The African Peer Review Mechanism(APRM) base document’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/49.pdf,22 July, 2005). ^13. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Guidelines’. ^14. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment for the AfricanPeer Review Mechanism’, NEPAD Official Home Page (http://www.nepad.org/2005/files/documents/156.pdf,24 January, 2005). ^15. Ibid. ^16. Ibid. ^17. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM base document’. ^18. According to Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘APRM NationalCommission’, Rwanda NEPAD Magazine 1 (2004), pp. 14–16. ^19. Ibid, p. 14. ^20. NEPAD Secretariat, Final Report: African Peer Review Mechanismcountry support mission to Rwanda, 21–June 24, 2004 (NEPADSecratariat, Midrand, 2004), p. 4. ^21. Ibid. ^22. On the extent of presidential and senatorial appointments, seeGovernment of Rwanda, The Constitution of the Republic of Rwanda(Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Kigali, 2003),Articles 88 and 113. ^23. In May 2003, Pro-Femmes sided with the government and attackedHuman Rights Watch for being ‘divisive’: UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2003’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2003/27744.htm,27 January, 2005). ^24. They were Aimable Kabanda (African Peer Review Focal Point,Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat), Alex Semarintoya (Ministry of LocalGovernment), Solange Tuyisenge (Member of the National Assembly)and James Ngango (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). ^25. US Department of State, ‘Country Report 2003’; UnitedStates Department of State, ‘Rwanda: country report onhuman rights practices 2004’, US Department of State OfficialHome Page (http://www.state.gov//g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2004/41621.htm,23 July, 2005). ^26. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: human rights organizationforced to close down’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470012005,22 January, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: preparingfor elections: tightening control in the name of unity’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/rwanda0503.bck.htm,9 February, 2005). ^27. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Declaration’, op. cit. ^28. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué: The African PeerReview (APRM) support mission to Rwanda’, Southern AfricanRegional Poverty Network Official Home Page (http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0000845/P958-Rwanda_APRM.pdf,31 July, 2005). ^29. Nepad Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^30. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 26. ^31. See Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: observing the rules ofwar?’ Human Rights Watch Official Home Page (http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/rwanda2,15 February, 2005). ^32. See Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:killing human decency’, Amnesty International OfficialHome Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620072000,9 February, 2005); Amnesty International, ‘DemocraticRepublic of Congo: Rwandese-controlled east: devastating humantoll’, Amnesty International Official Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620112001,19 July, 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Observing the rulesof war?’ ^33. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of the Congo:"Our brothers who help kill us" — economic exploitationand human rights abuses in the east’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620102003,19 July, 2005). ^34. T. Longman, ‘The complex reasons for Rwanda’s engagementin Congo’, in J.F. Clark (ed.), The African Stakes ofthe Congo War (Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002), p. 136. ^35. Government of Rwanda, ‘Reply to the final report (documentS/2002/1146) of the Panel of Experts on the illegal exploitationof natural resources and other forms of wealth of the DemocraticRepublic of Congo’ (http://www.afrol.com/Countries/Rwanda/documents/reply_un_resources_2002.htm,15 June, 2005). ^36. Amnesty International, ‘Our brothers who help kill us’. ^37. United Nations, ‘Final report of the panel of expertson the illegal exploitation of natural resources and other formsof wealth of the Democratic Republic of the Congo’, UnitedNations in Denmark Official Home Page (http://www.un.dk/doc/S20021146.pdf,10 February, 2005). See also Amnesty International, ‘Ourbrother who help kill us’. ^38. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^39. Amnesty International, ‘Democratic Republic of Congo:Arming the east’, Amnesty International Official HomePage (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR620062005,14 July, 2005). ^40. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 25. ^41. Amnesty International, ‘Arming the East’. ^42. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^43. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 36. ^44. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^45. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’; USDepartment of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^46. F. Reyntjens, ‘Rwanda, ten years on: from genocide todictatorship’, African Affairs 103, 411 (2004), p. 187. ^47. Pottier, Re-imagining Rwanda, p. 9. ^48. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^49. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^50. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^51. National Electoral Commission, ‘Executive summaries ofNational Electoral Commission reports on the constitutionalreferendum, presidential and parliamentary elections’,National Electoral Commission of Rwanda Offical Home Page (http://www.comelena.gov.rw/english/resumeelection2003.html,18 July, 2005). ^52. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,p. 31. ^53. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^54. European Union Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report2003’, EU Official Home Page (http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/human_rights/eu_election_ass_observ/rwanda/moe_ue_final_2003.pdf,25 July, 2005). ^55. During the presidential elections (August 2003), the incumbent,Paul Kagame, won 95 percent of the vote, while his party, theRwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), won 74 percent of the vote inthe parliamentary elections (September 2003). ^57. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: government slams dooron political life and civil society’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470122004,22 January, 2005); US Department of State, ‘Country report2003’. ^56. The US Department of State referred to the 2003 presidentialelections as ‘seriously marred’: US Department ofState, ‘Country report 2003’. ^58. Amnesty International, ‘Government slams door’;Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: run-up to presidentialelections marred by threats and harassment’, Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470102003,22 January, 2005); I. Samset and O. Dalby, ‘Rwanda: presidentialand parliamentary elections 2003’, Norwegian Centre forHuman Rights Official Home Page (http://www.humanrights.uio.no/forskning/publ/nr/2003/12.pdf,28 February, 2005). ^59. Human Rights Watch, ‘Rwanda: resolve disappearances, assassination’,Human Right Watch Official Home Page (http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/05/04/rwanda133.htm,9 February, 2005). ^60. Amnesty International, ‘Rwanda: deeper into the abyss— waging war on civil society’ Amnesty InternationalOfficial Home Page (http://web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGAFR470132004,22 January 2005); Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^61. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^62. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^63. Human Rights Watch, ‘Preparing for elections’. ^64. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^65. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report 2003’. ^66. Samset and Dalby, ‘Presidential and parliamentary elections’. ^67. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2003’. ^68. EU Electoral Observer Mission, ‘Final report’. ^69. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’. ^70. Rwanda NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Self-assessment report’,pp. 34–5. ^71. US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^72. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Country self-assessment’, emphasisadded. ^73. Amnesty International, ‘Devastating human toll’(http://web.amnesty.org, 19 July, 2005). ^74. As had happened during the previous year, as during 2004 Rwanda’sjudiciary ‘was subject to presidential influence’:US Department of State, ‘Country report 2004’. ^75. N. van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of PermanentCrisis, 1979–1999 (Cambridge University Press, 2001),p. 51. ^76. On this tension, see Chabal, ‘Good government and developmentin Africa’; Taylor, NEPAD. ^77. NEPAD Secretariat, ‘Communiqué issued at the endof the third summit of the Committee of Participating Headsof State and Government in the African Peer Review Mechanism(APR Forum), 19 June, 2005, Abuja, Nigeria’, Institutefor Security Studies Official Home Page (http://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/nepad/aprm/comsum3jun05.pdf,28 July, 2005).     

Reviews

Dates and Date Cultivation of the ‘Iraq.

Mr. V. H. W. Dowson, of the Mesopotamian Agricultural Department, on his election as a member of the Central Asian Society, has presented to the library copies of Parts I. and II. of his monograph on “Dates and Date Cultivation of the ‘Iraq’ (W. Heffer and Sons, Cambridge). Part III. is still in the press.

River Control in Mesopotamia. By E. B. Howell, C.S.I., C.I.E. Quarterly Review for January, 1922.

Pioneers of Progress : Empire Builders : Sir Robert G. Sandrman. By A. L. P. Tucker, C.I.E. London : Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge. 1921. Price : 2s. 6d. net.