State and business in Taiwan’s economic diplomacy under the Lee Teng-hui administration and the implications for current cross-strait relations

This study suggests that a modified theory of new classical economics is useful in assessing Taiwan’s economic diplomacy during both the Lee Teng-hui and current administrations by means of a holistic perspective (levels of analysis). ‘Business‘ is the independent variable in the analysis. The theory of new classical economics implies that the utilities of Taiwanese investment are more effective than the contradictory political objectives of the Taipei government. The impact of business on the result of economic diplomacy is the unintentional easing of tensions across the Taiwan Strait while Taiwanese businesses have pursued profits. Collectively, businesses have strengthened the security of the Taiwanese state, while the Taiwanese government has pursued inconsistent policies (other variables) since President Lee took office. The holistic perspective is heuristic for understanding and explaining Taiwan’s economic diplomacy during the Lee Teng-hui administration. This approach produces the recommendation that the government provide disinterested and effective judicial systems and conclude investment guarantees, double taxation and free trade agreements to help Taiwanese businesspeople. In a wider context, Taiwan’s economic diplomacy aims not only to serve the interests of the government or state but also to further the interests of the Taiwanese state as a whole, including all residents of Taiwan.     

Multi-layered justice and security delivery in post-conflict and fragile states

This paper examines the value of an alternative approach to SSR policy, namely a multi-layered one in post-conflict and fragile state environments. It begins by arguing that there is a state-centric bias in current SSR policy and practice. This contradicts development principles of a ‘people-centred, locally owned’ approach in post-conflict and fragile state contexts. The SSR's state-centric approach rests upon two fallacies: that the post-conflict and fragile state is capable of delivering justice and security; and that it is the main actor in security and justice. The paper goes on to present the outline of a multi-layered strategy. This addresses the issue of who is actually providing justice and security in post-conflict and fragile states. The paper continues by describing the accountability mechanisms that could be pursued by SSR programmes in support of this approach. The conclusion is that the advantage of the multi-layered approach is that it is based not on the state's capacity, but on the quality and efficacy of the services received by the end user, regardless of who delivers that service.     

Anatomy of a government massacre: Abuses of hostage‐barricade protocols during the Waco standoff

A systematic evaluation of the FBI's crisis negotiations with the Branch Davidians during a 51‐day standoff in 1993 is conducted. The analysis uncovers extensive violations of basic hostage‐barricade standards and protocols. The violations appear shortly after negotiations began indicating a premature disregard for the publicly declared goal of a peaceful resolution. Failed negotiations subsequently were cited by FBI officials as a rationale for organizing a violent and dangerous CS gas assault on the barricaded group, resulting in the destruction of the religious community and the deaths of 74 people. The violations do not appear to be random, incidental, or the result of disorganization, as officials claim. The data indicate that the FBI's on‐scene commanders and tactical component of the Hostage‐Rescue Team (HRT) contributed largely to the failed negotiations through methods of increased tactical pressure and psychological warfare providing justification for the high‐risk assault. The thesis is advanced that the HRT command may have pursued furtively what some insiders call a ‘Western’ view of hostage‐barricade incidents ‐ i.e., that negotiations should be used as a means of manipulating people into positions where a tactical solution can be executed. In this context, the standoff is analyzed as a government massacre. Possible motives for this state violence are linked to the sect's defiant posture, aspects of police culture, effective demonization of the sect, and the disturbing trend of ‘militarization’ within law enforcement.     

Measuring the Ambivalence of Religion: Introducing the Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) Dataset

Despite ample anecdotal evidence, previous research on violent conflict has found little evidence that religion is an important factor in organized violence. Quantitative work in this area has been largely confined to the interreligious character of conflict and measures of religious diversity, and has strongly neglected the peace aspect of religion. The Religion and Conflict in Developing Countries (RCDC) dataset helps to fill this gap with innovative and fine-grained data for 130 developing countries between 1990 and 2010. RCDC includes four types of religious violence (assaults on religious targets, attacks by religious actors, clashes between religious communities, and clashes with the state). In addition, RCDC contains data on interreligious networks and peace initiatives. This article demonstrates the usefulness of RCDC by applying our data to a preliminary analysis. The results indicate that interreligious networks are a reaction to identity overlaps and previous interreligious conflict.     

Decolonising the Decolonisers? Of Ontological Encounters in the GMO Controversy and Beyond

Calls for decolonising IR are often focused on the need to decolonise dominant epistemologies. This article explores whether a shift towards decolonising ontology is able to provide a more profound challenge. Decolonising ontology implies acknowledging that there are multiple actual “worlds”, rather than just multiple perspectives on THE (“one”) world. However, I argue that this approach is limited by the representational strategies that are used for making the encounter of multiple worlds legible for an academic audience. Drawing on ethnographic work that anthropologists have undertaken in relation to the GMO controversy as well as broader decolonial work in IR, I maintain that the writing-up of research often entails the settling and stabilising of ontological encounters that have been experienced as unsettling and disconcerting. This move towards stabilisation is grounded in hegemonic, colonial understandings of which questions should be pursued and why: questions that continue to be about determining what “is” (rather than asking what questions would lead to rightful action), that can be answered with the help of all-encompassing concepts (such as the concept of the “pluriverse”), and that provide insights for entire disciplines (such as IR). The article shows to what extent this is detrimental to projects of decolonisation.     

‘Situating’ active citizenship: historical and contemporary perspectives of women's organising in the Pacific

This article examines a 40-year history of women's organising in Fiji, in order to show how the political goals pursued by active citizens can be shaped by an interplay of domestic and international political contingencies. This approach challenges the common and somewhat idealised definitions of active citizenship that focus upon actors' capacity to mobilise collectively behind political goals independent of those that motivate the state or the market. Rather, active citizenship is viewed as a realm of political activity constituted in ways that both reflect and contest contingent factors prevailing globally and locally.     

Internal borderlands: architectures of force and state expansion in India’s central ‘frontier’

India’s Maoist insurgency, a conflict in the geographic heartland of the country, is often portrayed as symptomatic of the underdevelopment and weak governance of the region. Rhetorically, the state has pursued a counter-insurgency strategy premised on a tandem of ‘security’ and development, while emphasising the conflict zone’s rootedness in the nation. This discourse ignores that historically the state has treated the region as a hostile ‘borderland’. This paper argues that the Indian state’s counter-insurgency is structured around a set of strategies of absorption. Drawing on James C. Scott’s examination of Zomia, as well as Henri Lefebvre’s theories of the state and space, this paper examines processes of militarised state expansion. Focusing on the construction of roads, government-controlled resettlement camps, forward operating bases and militarised schools, this paper conceptualises these particular state spaces as ‘architectures of force’: material manifestations of a larger project of highly militarised and acutely violent state-building.     

印度海洋战略析论

作为印度洋地区的重要国家,印度积极推行以称雄印度洋为核心目标的海洋战略,争当海权强国。经过20多年的发展与完善,印度已经形成一套完备的海洋战略思想体系,其体系建构之宏大,远洋海军发展信心之坚定日益引起亚太地区国家的广泛关注。尤其是近年来,印度大举扩充海军军备,意图打造一支攻守兼备的庞大远洋海军,更令周边国家感到不安。如何看待印度海洋战略的内涵和利益指向是包括中国在内的国家应当审慎思量和切实应对的重要问题。     

Towards a framework for local democracy in a war‐torn society: The lessons of selected foreign assistance programmes in El Salvador

This article examines several bilateral and multilateral programmes that were designed to forward El Salvador's transition from a war‐torn society to a democratic polity. Both procedural and substantive democratic strengthening measures were pursued by external donors within the national framework for reconstruction, and independently through larger Central American initiatives. Because links between development and democracy are not clearly understood this article questions the implicit assumption accepted by foreign donors that democracy will be a by‐product of development assistance. To illustrate this point, state‐level procedural reforms and local level reconstruction and reconciliation interventions are assessed. Particular attention is paid to the Development Programme for Refugees, Displaced and Repatriated in Central America (PRODERE) which is compared with two other local level interventions. In a comparative setting, PRODERE highlights the potential of development assistance to open a hitherto exclusionary political arena and add substance to procedural democratic reforms. The article concludes that development interventions that fail to simultaneously address the causes as well as consequences of war‐torn societies cannot claim to alter the balance of power. Hence, they cannot be considered as development assistance that is supportive of transition to democracy.     

Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence in Perspective

ABSTRACT

Small states are just as easily seduced by status and glory as other states. When conceived as situated in a stratified international society, small states acquire an inherent tendency to overcome their disadvantage in conventional power terms through the pursuit of status. Hence, it is precisely because of their position in the international hierarchy, not in spite of it, that strategic ideas based on state size stimulate foreign policy change in small states. This mechanism provides an explanation to the question why the small state of Qatar has pursued such a high-profile diplomatic strategy since its emergence in the late 1990s.     

Is the Sum Greater than the Parts? The Terms of Civil War Peace Agreements and the Commitment Problem Revisited

The dominant theoretical approaches to civil war negotiations in the field of political science have sought to explain both the scarcity and high failure rates of negotiated agreements in civil conflicts. This historical pattern, however, has fundamentally changed in the last two decades as changes in international norms and laws, as well as the increased prevalence and competence of peacebuilding professionals, now require conflict actors to have a greater commitment toward negotiations and the enforcement of agreements. While actors in interstate wars seek to avoid accountability, civil war actors seem to embrace the opportunities that these new dynamics create to achieve broad‐based reforms across numerous areas of policy and government. The result, we suggest, is that stakeholders evaluate agreements based on their potential to accomplish an array of sociopolitical objectives. In addition, for strategic and practical reasons, they perceive that those agreements that include more reforms across multiple policy sectors will have the greatest potential. Our examination of nearly two hundred agreements found evidence that the peacemaking potential of a negotiated agreement between civil war adversaries is greatly enhanced when reforms are pursued across many different policy domains. Conversely, our analysis suggests that the greater the number of policy areas left untouched by a peace agreement, the more likely the stakeholders will be to follow that agreement with additional negotiations to enhance that agreement, or, alternatively, the more likely that violence will resume.     

Political Violence and the Illicit Economies of West Africa

This comparative analysis draws on field research in several West African countries to illustrate the dynamic relationships between political violence and organized crime in this sub-region. These relationships are often transactional, and almost always on a temporary basis. While some alliances of convenience may be forged, in other cases an adversarial relationship exists between organized crime and terrorist networks. In some cases, key actors within West African governments have benefited from these relationships. We then examine recent policies and strategies pursued by the U.S. and the international community that, in the name of combating terrorism, seek to constrain the illicit economies of the region, but in doing so may do more harm than good. The article concludes with some policy recommendations based on this analysis.     

Re-conceptualizing State Responsibility: Human Security Protection, Confl icts and Governance

Different from the perspective of traditional national security, human security is an essential component of non-traditional security. Human security is influenced by multi-dimensional factors. Human security will be threatened if one or more of these dimensional factors get twisted. Such threats, once accumulated to a certain level, may trigger a confl ict. While some factors may have a low correlation with confl ict, some other factors may have a multiplying effect in triggering the confl ict. Further, confl ict may be triggered by a single factor or multiple factors. Poor governance may lead to escalation of confl icts. Deep understanding of triggering effects and their correlation with confl icts is essential to addressing the root causes and the management of conflicts effectively. Concepts of human security, state responsibility of protection and neo-interventionism have been developed in succession. Though the people-centered security framework draws global attention, it should be recognized that there is no international consensus on an optimal type of governance. However, according to the Charter of the United Nations, the primary responsibilities of human security protection should be rested on the government of a state. The principle of sovereignty remains the fundamental principle of international relations, which should be the guiding principle for addressing human security issues.     

重塑国家之责：人的安全保护、冲突与治理

与传统的“国家安全”观相比,“人的安全”观是非传统安全领域中的重要内容。人的安全受多维度影响。其中一个或几个维度出现问题,人的安全就受到威胁;威胁达到一定程度,就可能导致冲突。这些维度构成冲突诱因。冲突诱因呈现多元化。有的诱因与冲突相关度较低,有的诱因对诱发冲突具有乘数效应。就触发状态而言,冲突可能由单一因素诱发,亦可由多种因素叠加引发。如果治理失当,会导致冲突恶化。一个国家要有效地治理冲突,就应当对导致冲突的诱因及相关度有深刻理解,如此方可对症下药。人的安全概念、国家保护责任与新干预主义是相继形成的三个概念。应当说,尽管以人为中心的安全框架日益被全球关注,但应当采取何种治理形式,何种治理形式属于最优方案,在国际社会中并未达成共识。但是,根据《联合国宪章》的精神,保护人的安全的责任首先在于当事国政府。主权原则仍是国际关系的基本原则,是解决人的安全问题必须遵守的根本准则。     

The Taiwan Strait: A Continuing Status Quo of Deadlock?

Relations across the Taiwan Strait have demonstrated over the past 50 years a cyclical nature, revolving between states of limited tension or conflict and generally peaceful and politically acceptable stalemate. Individual policy directions followed by all of the three main actors in cross-Strait relations--China, Taiwan and the United States--continue to be pursued with a high degree of ambivalence, as countervailing political imperatives mean that any policy contains within itself the seeds for its own reversal. Any equilibrium is consequently inherently unstable, yet also drives relations back to a status quo of deadlock from which a new cycle can again commence. Given the full range of objectives on all sides, there is little likelihood of the presently existing deadlocked status quo moving towards a stable resolution. The state of neither war nor peace will continue in the Taiwan Strait, but the margin for error in probable future cycles of tension and stability remains very small.     

Pioneers of peace research — Lewis Fry Richardson: Apostle of math

Most studies of economic sanctions have concluded that they are ineffective as instruments of foreign policy. In a previous effort, we applied the spatial model of bargaining to the question of sanctions effectiveness to identify the‐conditions under which sanctions can be expected to “work.” In this paper, we refine that analysis by examining the impact of domestic politics in the state that is the target of the sanctions. Sanction episodes may be examples of two‐level games in which the domestic game within both parties affects the international game and vice‐versa. Here, we take a first cut of applying this approach to the analysis of sanctions effectiveness. We extend the spatial model to focus on how sanctions affect the internal political bargaining within the target state. From this, we determine how state policy should change (or not) as a result of the sanctions. We use the basic model to identify general hypotheses regarding the nature of sanctions and their effectiveness and we evaluate some of these hypotheses using cases in which the United States imposed sanctions on Latin American countries for human rights violations.     

Partners but not Allies: West European Co-operation with China, 1978–1982

The late 1970s’ decline of bipolar détente and economic problems in the developed world, on the one hand, and the Sino–Soviet conflict and the start of the Chinese reform programme, on the other, led to converging interests between the People’s Republic of China and Western Europe. Against this background, this analysis compares how the governments of Britain, France, and West Germany pursued their China policies between 1978 and 1982. Whilst supporting the PRC’s reform process in multiple ways, shared strategic objectives were not sufficient for the creation of a de facto alliance.     

The EU and the Bosnian Civil War 1992–95: The Capabilities–Expectations Gap at the Heart of EU Foreign Policy

Abstract

Using the empirically driven case study of the European Union's response to the Bosnian civil war 1992–95 this article assesses the effectiveness of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), through Christopher Hill's ‘capabilities–expectations gap framework’. In assessing effectiveness it explores both the expectations placed on the EU and the capabilities the Union was able to deploy. Moreover, this research suggests that the EU was ineffective in responding to the Bosnian crisis. The EU pursued a rigid strategy of diplomatic and economic foreign policy, failing to generate the political will to attempt alternative approaches. This research argues that the capabilities–expectations gap framework is a useful tool for conceptualising the EU's effectiveness but that it under-specifies the importance of the end result of the policy.     

Microstate Democracy: Majority or Consensus; Diffusion or Problem-Solving?

While several studies suggest that small country size is conducive to democracy, the understanding of this link between smallness and democracy is still less than complete. By examining the nature and profile of microstate democracy in the year 2005, this article aims at promoting a better understanding. Two research tasks are pursued. First, the article investigates if microstate democracy is predominantly about majority democracy, or alternatively consensus democracy, or a blend of majority and consensus. Second, while testing the validity of diffusion and rationality assumptions for explaining country choices of democratic form, the article aims at drawing forth a better appreciation of the foundations of microstate democracy. The findings indicate that smallness is particularly conducive to majority democracy, and that diffusion goes a long way to explain this small state preference for majority rule. However, the microstates within the majoritarian framework are often inclined to resort to non-majoritarian choices, and elements of rationality are therefore in the picture as well. Small size does not appear to associate systematically with culture to the exclusion of rationality or with rationality to the exclusion of culture.     

Guilt by association: The link between states�� influence and the legitimacy of intergovernmental organizations

Unfavorable views toward a particular state will result in skepticism about the legitimacy of IGOs in which that state possesses influence. The more extensive the avenues of influence, the stronger this “guilt by association.” The rationale is two-fold. First, a state that possesses institutionalized influence (e.g., a veto) within an intergovernmental organization faces substantial difficulties in credibly committing to non-interference with organizational activities. Second, even if a state somehow could commit to abstention from overt interference, it may exert covert ideational influence if it already has embedded its values into an IGO. Elites and laypeople alike recognize the avenues of influence that fuel guilt-by-association. With statistical analyses of public opinion data from 35,397 people in 23 countries, I provide the first systematic evidence that guilt-by-association exists: for the United States, Russia, Japan, and Pakistan, vis-à-vis the United Nations, World Bank, and International Monetary Fund. The evidence is robust to numerous alternative specifications. The findings contribute to international relations scholarship by enhancing our understanding of threats to IGO legitimacy and by providing concrete evidence for a mechanism by which antipathy toward powerful states matters in the international realm.