伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

American Grand Strategy in a World at Risk

If there is no single long-standing American grand strategy, one nonetheless sees through the course of U.S. history the tracks of a grand strategy. It started with the idea of a U.S. monopoly in the Western Hemisphere, along with balances of power in the chief theaters of the world; with belief in the primacy of sea and air power and the need for an economic system to support these; and the objective of transforming international politics. Since 9/11, even if the strategic hierarchy, intensity, and political basis have changed, the Bush administration has largely been continuing in this same project, with a sensible strategy but poorly considered tactics.     

冷战后美国大战略的理论思辨

冷战结束之后,美国思想界掀起了一场关于美国未来国家大战略的理论辩论.对于冷战后美国大战略的利益与目标、威胁与挑战、手段与途径等问题,不同学派根据各自对国际政治现实的理解提出了纷繁复杂的理论模式.关于大战略的辩论在很大程度上也就是关于国际关系理论的辩论,因此,本文从现实主义与自由主义、孤立主义与国际主义、单边主义与多边主义三个主要视角对各种大战略模式及其论证思路进行了比较分析和逻辑疏理.     

Grand Strategy after the Vietnam War

The perceived history of the Vietnam War profoundly influenced American discussions on grand strategy during the postwar period. The two largest schools of thought, one favoring confrontation with the Soviet Union and the other favoring engagement, drew lessons from the war based upon differing historical interpretations and used those lessons as support beams in constructing grand strategy. Compelling world events during the Carter presidency caused only a few individuals to shift positions in the debate, but one of those individuals was Jimmy Carter himself. Subsequent discoveries by historians indicate that the confrontation school understood the war's history and the postwar world better than did the engagement school and consequently crafted a superior grand strategy. The post-Vietnam debate contains numerous parallels to present-day discussions of grand strategy and offers a variety of lessons salient to contemporary strategic formulation.     

American Grand Strategy after Iraq

To the extent that a grand strategy can be discerned in the first year of the Obama Administration, its defining features are not a break from the past but continuity. As the President himself has analogized since taking office, crafting grand strategy is like parallel parking. He has only been able to make changes to grand strategy around the margins since a number of existing commitments limit his freedom of action. This article first identifies the structural determinants of grand strategy, pointing to the international distribution of power, American bureaucracy, and public as the key sources of strategic constraint and opportunity. It then shows how shifts in these factors—comparatively less U.S. power, an overstretched military organized around counterinsurgency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and an American public weary from an aggressive grand strategy—produced a shift in grand strategy that predated the 2008 election and that remains consistent with the current strategic setting. It is for these reasons that the 2008 “change” election has produced considerable continuity in American grand strategy.     

Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935–37. The role in this process of the argument that America’s own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America’s security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.     

Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935-37. The role in this process of the argument that America's own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America's security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.     

China's Power and Will: The PRC's Military Strength and Grand Strategy

China's international behavior exhibits elements of both threat and peaceful intentions. Greatly increased defense budgets, the acquisition for more advance weapons systems, and certain pronouncements of the leadership argue for the threat scenario. Beijing's efforts to enhance the PRC's soft power, its more active participation in international problem-solving activities, and certain pronouncements of other leaders can be taken as evidence for more peaceful intentions. Even assuming that the leadership's motives are not benign, a combination of domestic weaknesses and foreign resistance could thwart them. The future is not predictable.     

The Future of War and American Military Strategy

The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.     

第二次世界大战后武力使用规范的演进

在国际法体系中,武装冲突法可谓编纂得最为完备的一个分支。经过数百年的积累和铺垫,第二次世界大战后武力使用规范逐渐发展成为完整的规范体系并呈现出四大特征:即为了适应国际关系的新变化武装冲突法扩大了适用范围;使用核武器是否合法成为国际法的重要问题;出现了在武装冲突中"反向"使用武力以达到实现和平目的的新方式——联合国维持和平行动以及在武装冲突中出现了大量作为作战手段而使用的性暴力行为等。然而进入21世纪以后,武装冲突的形态与样式均发生了重大变化,一方面,以无人机、自主作战机器人、纳米生物武器和网络战为代表的新型作战手段方法层出不穷;另一方面,非国家行为体在武装冲突中使用武力的情况有所增加,更出现了私人军事安保公司等法律地位在国际法上尚处于空白的交战主体。以朝核危机为标志,核武器对于国际和平与安全的巨大的潜在甚至是现实的威胁再次凸显,迅速成为国际政治和国际法中的热点核心议题。值得注意的是,即使武装冲突法的基本原则依然相对稳定,但是不断出现的新作战手段和方法,仍然给国际法和国际安全提出了一系列亟须应对的新挑战。     

Grand Strategy: The Fundamental Considerations

Grand or national strategy has emerged as a critical issue in security studies. Adam Garfinkle recently opined that American grand strategy has died a silent death. Too much attention has been devoted to definitions, or debates over the utility of strategy. Not enough consideration has been given to the complexities of actually building a robust strategy amidst that effectively integrates all elements of national power within a complex bureaucracy. Oddly, the exclusion of politics contradicts our understanding of war and conflict. Likewise, not enough attention has been applied to the fundamental components of building a competitive strategy that can be sustained over time. This essay offers an introductory discussion of the basic considerations or components of national strategy.     

世界化石大观园

特殊的地层地貌,使朝阳赋存了极为丰富的化石资源,极具科研价值。朝阳古生物化石主要形成于生物演化过程中最关键的时期,即1．2亿-1．5亿年前中生代的晚侏罗世到早白垩世。目前在朝阳境内发现的中生代叶肢介类、介形虫类、昆虫类、鱼类、两栖类、爬行类、鸟类、哺乳类、植物类等化石,几乎囊括了中生代向新生代过渡的所有生物门类,构成了一个系统的完整的“热河生物群”。创下了数量最多、种属最全、层位最多、密度最大、保存最完整、科研价值最高的六个“世界之最”,无愧为“世界古生物化石宝库”的美誉。     

“美利坚帝国”论与美国的大战略

“美利坚帝国”论是在新的历史条件下 ,以较过去更直言不讳、更不加掩饰的形式出现的美国支配全球论。它是当今世界力量对比状况的一种突出的反映。 2 1世纪初的美国 ,正在形成新的大战略。不管以何名之 ,也不管其制定者是否使用了“帝国”一词 ,这一战略的宗旨正在于支配世界和改造世界 ,造就和保证一个君临天下式的“美利坚帝国” ,使 2 1世纪成为又一个“美国世纪”。