Rethinking the Battle of Ideas: How the United States Can Help Muslim Moderates

There is little disagreement in Washington that the United States is losing the so-called Battle of Ideas, and there is a surprising consensus on what needs to be done: “reach out” to Muslim moderates. Bolstering moderate voices in the Muslim world is indeed crucial to the fate of the War on Terror, but “reaching out” to them is no solution. In fact, it is the last thing Muslim moderates need, since it deepens their legitimacy problems. The West's criticism may do more to help Muslim moderates become a political force to be reckoned with than its love ever could. This “cruel to be kind” rhetorical strategy can, and should, be combined with open material support for Arab and Muslim civil society, but crucially without regard to political orientation. Such a policy has its drawbacks and it will be a difficult sell, but it is the only way to make progress in the Battle of Ideas.     

Nuclear Terrorism Redux: Conventionalists, Skeptics, and the Margin of Safety

The casual media observer might well believe that nuclear terrorism is highly likely in the United States and it is a question of “when, not if.” This is the view of the “conventionalists.” But there is a second school, the “skeptics,” that believes the nuclear world is more secure than at any time in history and that the possibility of a nuclear terrorist event is overstated. This article articulates arguments made by these two schools of thought and develops a framework for analyzing the issue. It concludes that while enhanced national and international vigilance against nuclear terrorism is necessary, when viewed through an historical lens, today's margin of nuclear safety may actually be higher than in the past.     

U.S. Aid for Foreign Justice and Police

The fundamental objective of the United States in its efforts to reform justice systems abroad has been to develop effective institutions of criminal justice that can support transitions to democratic government. Unfortunately, the United States has not been doing this as well as it might, Iraq being the most dramatic case. These efforts lack coherent Congressional oversight and strategic vision, neglect improving the normative quality of local justice systems and developing the capacity to manage by results, and subordinate local reform to the security needs of foreign countries. To remedy these shortcomings, the United States needs to develop and coordinate justice assistance programs that are context specific, recruit and deploy justice specialists from all sectors and levels of the American justice system, incorporate a developmental perspective in justice assistance programs, and formulate programs that are based on proven “best practices.”     

The Enduring Power of Isolationism: An Historical Perspective

Are Americans becoming more “isolationist”? Four years ago, for the first time since the Vietnam War, almost half of those polled by the Pew Research Center stated they would rather the United States “mind [its] own business internationally and let other countries get along the best they can on their own” and work to “reduce military commitments overseas” in order to decrease the deficit. Such cautious views about American involvement abroad are on the rise, up ten percentage points over the past decade, according to Pew polls released in 2011 and 2012. A majority of Americans think the United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan too slowly and are reticent to take direct action in Syria. This article explains the long historical context of these recent events to argue for the enduring power and significance of isolationist thought.     

Uganda and U.S. Foreign Policy

Washington's relationships with the “leveraged allies” preferred by realists—those countries that have little choice but to follow America's lead—have long been considered more reliable than in its relationships with the “natural allies” favored by idealists: prosperous, democratic nations that share the goals and interests of the United States. President Bush's foreign policy requires these natural allies, but many U.S. government officials are more wary. Uganda under President Museveni is a model “natural ally” candidate, with its relatively humane and democratic internal policies, but its greater capacity to act without American leverage, approval, or supervision is likely to worry realist career diplomats.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

Hybrid Strategies: The American Experience

The United States has never followed only one grand strategy at a time. In this article, I develop the concept of “hybrid” grand strategies—strategies that vary by time and place, and combine the advantages (or disadvantages) of pure strategic archetypes such as containment, integration, regime change, bargaining, or non-intervention. I argue that hybrid strategies have been ubiquitous in American history, varying more by emphasis and degree than by absolute contrast. Moreover, U.S. hybrid strategies have often succeeded in accomplishing their major goals.     

The Invincible Wilsonian Matrix: Universal Human Rights Once Again

A conservative or realist approach has little appeal in the present debate over American foreign policy. In the twentieth century, according to George F. Kennan, the United States succumbed to “the evils of utopian enthusiasms.” In recent years, this worldview has been associated most closely with the neoconservatives, but even the Clinton administration leaned in the same direction. Crusading moralism has been the recurrent theme of America's self-image as a global power. Whether or not neoconservatives and liberals today are really dedicated to the same democratic political culture as the one that Wilson idealized, a recognizable Wilsonian manner of conceptualizing international relations has come to dominate American politics, reflected in a shared rejection of any foreign policy that is not based on the temporal salvation of humanity. Yet many Wilsonians seem unable to imagine that one can be “moral” without trying to make everyone resemble one's self.     

A New Strategy to Defeat Al-Qaeda in Yemen

While unmanned aerial drone strikes in Yemen are a stopgap measure to degrade the operational strength of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), any long-term strategy focused on success must actively enlist local communities in their own defense in order to defeat the terrorist organization. The United States must move beyond a “butcher-and-bolt” approach and adopt a “forward strategy” focused on mobilizing the local population to confront AQAP while providing communities with realistic good governance, development, and reconstruction initiatives.     

Economic and Security Interests in Southeast Asia

Despite worries that ASEAN is becoming weak, the organization remains as strong as it ever was, given the parameters of its design. Its member countries still tightly embrace the organization's principles, the “ASEAN way.” But simple adherence to those principles can be problematic. ASEAN countries, whose national economic and political interests collide, often appeal to the same principles to back their positions. That tends to pull ASEAN in different directions. Great power policies, particularly those of China and the United States, now exacerbate the situation. At the same time, ASEAN's reliance on multilateral consensus has made it difficult to reconcile real differences among its member countries or develop unified regional responses. That can be seen in issues from the Xayaburi dam on the Mekong River to the South China Sea. The ease with which ASEAN's principles can come into conflict and its consensus-driven decision- making can become deadlocked clearly marks the limits of the “ASEAN way.”     

The Military and SocietyBeyond the Postmodern Era

The degree to which the international security environment had changed after the Cold War became evident with the attacks on September 11. As a result, military forces in the United States (and perhaps in the West generally) are evolving from their Cold War and immediate post-Cold War perspectives to confront transnational and subnational non-state dangers. These changes have significant implications for military professionalism and the relations between the military and society. They are explored through a modified “Postmodern Military” model, called here the “Hybrid” model.     

Stumbling into the Future? The Indirect Approach and American Strategy

The United States has yet to reconcile its strategic culture to the realities of the post-9/11 era. In the absence of a consensus on grand strategy, America's military and civilian leadership is arguing that in a world of “persistent conflict,” America must exercise its power in increasingly indirect ways. This essay explores the current surge of interest in the so-called “indirect approach” and its possible relevance for the strategic environment of today and tomorrow. We briefly consider a strategic framework for an indirect approach, what true implementation would take, and the attendant risks of such a path. Pursuing a global indirect approach in the absence of such a framework could send America stumbling to the farthest corners of the globe only to harm her own strategic interests.     

Europe after the U.S. Pivot

Insofar as Europe's security and cohesion have for decades been premised upon a strong American political and strategic engagement, Washington's intention to “rebalance” to Asia casts a shadow over the sustainability of a stable and coherent geopolitical order on the continent. This article argues that as the United States seeks to rebalance strategically towards the Asia-Pacific region a number of “indigenous” geopolitical trends are becoming increasingly important in Europe: an Anglo-French entente for a “maritime” Europe, a German-French “continental” project of economic and political integration, and Russia's resurgence across Europe's East. The growing prominence of competing geopolitical visions for Europe might even call into question the cohesion and direction of the institutional expressions of the U.S.- engineered Western order in Europe, namely the Atlantic Alliance and the European Union. Increasing geopolitical and institutional contestation, we contend, pose a number of challenges for both U.S. interests and European security.     

The ‘Demand-Side’: Avoiding a Nuclear-Armed Iran

This article examines the historical record of “nuclear rollback” and the motivations for Iran's apparent pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability in order to identify the broad principles that should guide U.S. and international efforts to resolve the nuclear crisis with Iran.¹ The author argues that Iran, like all states, seeks security and respect. For many Iranians, the past three decades provide proof that such security and respect can only be attained with a strategic nuclear deterrent. In 2009, if the United States can show Tehran a genuine path to security and prestige that does not require nuclear weapons, Tehran might give it serious consideration. However, if the United States and the international community fail to address Iran's legitimate need for security or its desire for international respect, Bowman believes it may only be a matter of time until Iran obtains a nuclear weapons capability.     

China and Japan: ‘Hot Economics,Cold Politics’

According to integration theory, growing economic interdependence between China and Japan should have spilled over into more cordial political relations. The opposite occurred, as summarized in the phrase “hot economics, cold politics.” Even as both sides acknowledge the value of cooperation for shared benefit, commercial and strategic rivalries have intensified, calling into question the validity of integration theory.     

The Rise of Gulf War Paradigm 2.0

The adage that “it is always easier to fight the last war” is one that readily can be applied to the United States and its armed forces for not predicting the scale and type of operations encountered in the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan. This article argues that the lack of preparation in the post-invasion phases arose from an institutional attachment to a preferred paradigm of warfare, as exemplified by the Persian Gulf War of 1991. This paradigm, though, has been substantially resurrected and re-configured to suit the fighting preferences of the American armed forces in its protracted encounters in Iraq and Afghanistan. Far from re-orienting its organization and mindset to meet the challenges of so-called counterinsurgency campaigns, as much current advocacy maintains, the military has reverted to the form of warfare it knows best.     

Countering Aggressive Rising Powers: A Clash of Strategic Cultures

The United States has to contend with rising powers ranging from the prc, which is already an economic and political great power and potentially a military threat, to Al Qaeda and the network of Islamist terror organizations, whose means to power remain limited but whose will to power and aggression are great. In the middle are states that already or may soon possess nuclear weapons. Each of these powers has its own “strategic culture” that affects its decision-making, and attention needs to be paid to how the strategic habits of today's rising and aggressive powers might intersect with U.S. strategy.     

Containing Pakistan: Engaging the Raja-Mandala in South-Central Asia

Recent events have refocused attention on Pakistan's role as an epicenter of global Islamist terror and called into question Islamabad's reliability as an ally in the fight against a resurgent Taliban and the hunt for Osama bin Laden. Pakistan in fact suffers from abiding structural pathologies that make it a questionable Western ally at best. In its foreign policy toward Pakistan, the United States would do well to consider the ancient Indian geopolitical concept of the raja-mandala (“ruler circle”), which seeks to balance opposing spheres of influence and exploit the tensions between them. This concept provides the key to containing and eventually eliminating South-Central Asian terror.     

The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

Reputation and U.S. Withdrawal from Iraq

The need to demonstrate America's resolve is a major argument among those who oppose a premature U.S. withdrawal from Iraq. According to this argument, a quick exit from Iraq would be a major blow to U.S. credibility and embolden the forces of radical Islam in their war against the United States. This article assesses this “reputational” argument and concludes that evidence from radical Islamists’ pronouncements gives the argument significant and unprecedented forcefulness. These pronouncements unmistakably call into question the United States’ resoluteness by pointing to America's past withdrawals from theaters of war and declare Iraq as the central front, raising the reputational stake of a U.S. withdrawal from Iraq considerably. The potency of the reputational argument is also unprecedented when it is compared to its similar formulation during the Vietnam War, when it was vague and short of supporting evidence. The reputational argument may play an important rationale in maintaining a substantial level of American forces in Iraq for years to come.