Cheap Hawks, Cheap Doves, and the Pursuit of Strategy

The post-9/11 threats to American security require a complete revision of American national strategy. For too long, presidents have had to favor quick, cheap solutions to crises, unable to count on support from the “homebody” public for long, drawn-out conflicts. “Cheap hawks” among them have hoped that apocalyptic rhetoric will suffice when resources fall short; “cheap doves” hope that by ignoring the threat, it will go away. But with the war on terror, the revival of geopolitics, and ever-accelerating globalization, the U.S. tradition of bellicose rhetoric backed by underwhelming force is a recipe for failure. To effectively manage its threats, America needs a new catechism and to make sure its economic, energy, and military policies support this.     

In Pursuit of a Pacific Strategy:British Planning for the Defeat of Japan, 1943-45

This article seeks to explain why the British pushed for a role in Pacific operations during the Second World War when it faced other strategic priorities in Southeast Asia, as well as a powerful American military that maintained tight control over operational decision-making. Although several quarters in Whitehall, including the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, had doubts about the necessity of a Pacific strategy, there were sensible reasons behind pursuing such a course. It would illustrate to an “anti-imperialist” America that Britain was not only interested in recovering its colonial possessions but also prepared to fight the Japanese on their homeland. More importantly, taking part in the main operations would allow the British to claim a voice at the peace table while helping to encourage the Americans to cement their close working relationship with Britain in the postwar period.     

Deadly Doves: Liberal Nationalism and the Democratic Peace in the Soviet Successor States

This article's purpose is to assess the arguments of democratic peace scholars as they apply to the states of the former Soviet Union. The claim that liberalism is associated with nonviolent means of conflict resolution, in particular, is questionable in the case of newly independent states, in which liberalism bears a closer resemblance to nineteenth-century European liberal nationalism than it does to the universalist liberalism envisioned by theories of the democratic peace. I argue that this nonuniversalist form of liberalism is in fact widespread among the Soviet successor states and that, as a result, liberalism's implications for peace are not nearly as benign as had previously been believed. In other regards, however, the attitudes of elites, the mass public, and liberals are in fact fairly consistent with those posited by democratic peace theory, though relative elite bellicosity declines as the policy-making arena broadens. A democratic peace in the region is therefore viable but particularly vulnerable to national issues, as well as to the effects of concentration of political power in the hands of a narrow group of elites.     

理想追求与实践悲剧:新自由主义评述

近几十年来,在反凯恩斯主义的声浪中,新自由主义作为一股主要的政治经济学理论和意识形态思潮占据了全球主流话语的支配地位,成为我们这个时代明确的政治经济范式.然而,在其理论宣扬的浪漫主义乌托邦神话背后,却是其主导下的政策在世界各地实践所带给我们的残酷现实.因此,如何超越新自由主义与凯恩斯主义的简单循环,解决当下的危机,成为我们迫切需要正视的问题.     

Rhetoric,Legitimation, and Grand Strategy

This introductory framing paper theorizes the role of legitimation—the public justification of policy—in the making of grand strategy. We contend that the process of legitimation has significant and independent effects on grand strategy's constituent elements and on how grand strategy is formulated and executed. Legitimation is integral to how states define the national interest and identify threats, to how the menu of policy options is constituted, and to how audiences are mobilized. Second, we acknowledge that legitimation matters more at some times than others, and we develop a model specifying the conditions under which it affects political processes and outcomes. We argue that the impact of legitimation depends on the government's need for mobilization and a policy's visibility, and from the intersection of these two factors we derive five concrete hypotheses regarding when legitimation is most likely to have an impact on strategy. Finally, we explore who wins: why legitimation efforts sometimes succeed in securing public assent, yet at other times fall short. Our framework emphasizes what is said (the content of legitimation), how it is said (technique), and the context in which it is said. We conclude by introducing the papers in this special issue, revisiting the larger theoretical stakes involved in studying rhetoric and foreign policy, and speculating about how changes in the technologies and sites of communication have, or have not, transformed legitimation and leadership in world politics.     

Roosevelt, Truman and the Development of Postwar Grand Strategy

After its victory in World War II, it was clear that United States should move beyond the disastrous policies of the 1930s, but it was less clear how. Ultimately, a lasting postwar strategy was forged under President Truman. Appreciating how Truman moved well beyond Roosevelt's guiding assumptions is essential to understanding the evolution of American grand strategy. One sees that wartime planning and grand strategy formulation can prove quite inadequate for dealing with postwar challenges. An administration cannot be locked into assumptions, but must constantly test them. Thus, the Truman administration eventually developed and adopted containment and moved far beyond FDR's approach. More substantively, the fundamental geopolitical lesson of World War II and the early Cold War was that the United States must assume the essential balancing role relative to other major powers.     

On Strategy,Grand and Mundane

Is “grand strategy” a useful concept? What is it, and how is it different from “strategy”? Some definitions of grand strategy—as an all-encompassing idea for coordinating the resources of an entire nation to achieve its ultimate goals—are unachievable, overly focused on strategy as a master concept, could unintentionally militarize domestic policy, and blur the lines between strategy and policy. The concept is salvageable. Grand strategy is best thought of as both the intellectual framework or master concept that ties together whole-of-government (but not whole-of-nation) planning, and the long-term pattern of behavior that reveals states’ behaviors and priorities in action.     

结构理论、地理政治与大战略

本文认为,当今大战略研究长期以来一直都深受结构理论的重大影响,这种影响主要体现在当今大战略研究一般都是以国际体系中的权力分布作为主要的自变量,尽管在具体研究中技术因素和地理因素都可以作为干扰性变量,但这些变量并不影响到结构理论的内在逻辑.本文指出,以结构理论为基础的当代大战略研究的主要弊病在于,忽视了技术因素与地理因素的相互作用对大战略运行环境的潜在含义,而对此种相互作用的探讨可在很大程度上向人们提示以其作为主要考察对象的地理政治视角对大战略研究具有的重要意义.     

Landpower,Time, and Terrorism: A Strategy of Lightness in the Counter-ISIS Campaign

The range of strategic ends and contingencies that could require seizing, securing, and controlling territory on land is not diminishing. But the means of employing landpower have repeatedly exhausted the domestic basis and political will to sustain it over time, as in Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan. A way of applying landpower that allows for the essential element of time, sustainable over protracted periods in the court of public opinion, would offer immeasurable strategic value. Drawing on the author's work and observations while deployed to the U.S./coalition headquarters in command of military operations against ISIS, this article suggests that the answer to the dilemma of landpower, however preliminary, lies at the nexus of strategy and cost.     

中国与东盟关系现状、趋势、对策

在中国国际战略环境中,东盟处于十分重要的地位.目前中国与东盟关系正面临着美国“重返东南亚”和南海部分岛屿主权争端矛盾上升的两大考验.我国应高度重视对东盟关系的发展,继续坚持“与邻为伴、以邻为善”的周边外交方针,大力促进双方的全面合作、创新合作、务实合作、互利合作,不断深化双方战略伙伴关系.     

马来西亚工业化：进程、战略及启示

二战后,第三次工业化浪潮风起云涌,许多新独立的民族国家也应势而动,力倡工业化,创造出一个个工业化奇迹,马来西亚工业化便是其中的成功范例之一。一、1957~1981年马来西亚的工业发展由于英国殖民者的长期统治,独立前马来西亚是一个依赖橡胶和锡出口为主的单一种植制的农业国家。民族工业规模小、经营分散、技术落后、基础脆弱,除了一些与其资源有关的消费品工业及少数原材料加工业外,基本上没有其他工业。制造业在国民生产总值中所占比例小,处于非常次要的地位。为改造单一的经济结构,1957年独立后的马来亚政府采取各种措施,发展工业。至19…     

“印太战略”:以美印日澳的战略逻辑、利益与策略选择为分析视角

"印太战略"是美国均势+有限遏制+规制+话语诋毁的混合型战略。它意在前沿、中间地带与后方的三层构建不对称的对华遏制性力量,突破中美双边、单区域战略竞争的狭窄战略空间;在多地域与多维度孤立中国,拉拢更多国家在产业价值链、数字经济等层面与中国切割;制订基础建设投资透明化的新标准,嵌入有利于美国利益的规制;通过国际法、舆论等软性手段抹黑中国的"一带一路"与海权发展。虽然共同逻辑都是制衡中国崛起,但日澳印在策略上强调非对抗性。其中避免成为中国优先反制是日本重要的策略目标;印度在拉达克边界冲突后尚没有形成一个完全倒向美国的战略,因为这必定使其背上沉重的战略包袱,成为美国的附庸;澳大利亚作为地缘政治影响有限的中等国家,在美国反华行动中冲在最前列已使其利益严重受损。而"印太战略"与东盟所推动的包容性、合作安全理念也有着本质的区别,东盟要在"印太地区"发挥中心领导作用,定位"印太"为对话与合作区域。所以由于东盟的抵制、印日澳的消极政策,这个战略形成的攻势将很难保持可持续性,其长期前景并不看好。     

日本技术开发的特点、基础及未来战略

战后 5 0年 ,日本在技术开发方面 ,在成熟市场中进行了技术创新 ,实现了向节省能源、资源和适应环境的体系转变。在技术战略上 ,目前是螺旋型技术开发和并列式技术开发并存 ,在未来的技术革新中 ,应促进技术融合 ,重视制造技术革新 ,并通过政府、企业、大学三者之间的合作来推行研究开发的组织化。     

国际反恐怖主义战略：美国、巴基斯坦与印度

“9.11”恐怖主义袭击事件后 ,随着美国组织盟国准备对阿富汗实施军事打击 ,巴基斯坦的战略地位重新回升 ,美巴之间的密切合作成为美国反恐怖主义行动顺利进行的重要条件 ;印度的合作愿望则因印巴两国的微妙关系而受到美国冷落。印巴在阿富汗政治重建问题上利益迥异 ,同时克什米尔暴力事件也突出了印度自身的反恐怖主义问题 ,这些复杂因素使得美国不得不在南亚维系平衡、险走钢丝 ,为其全局计划增添了新的变数。     

变中生乱,乱中求变——2010国际战略形势评析

2010年的世界乱象丛生,乱中生变,乱中求变,深刻反映了21世纪国际战略形势的基本变化趋势。本文根据变与乱相生相克的战略逻辑,通过国际格局与大国关系变化、亚太崛起和国际地缘政治变化、朝鲜半岛乱局、军事安全形势、世界经济变局、中国外交与战略等多种维度,试图对2010年国际战略形势的特点及其变化趋向进行相对全方位的总体认识、分析。文章认为,2010年国际战略形势虽然乱象丛生,但是,变生乱,乱生变,乱因而不一定是坏事。乱与变相生相克正是21世纪国际战略形势的基本特征和主要趋势。     

霸权·制度·战略——读《霸权之翼:美国国际制度战略》

二战结束,特别是冷战结束以来,美国在世界权力结构的优势地位更加明显,美国霸权的神奇性色彩愈发突出.然而,对于美国霸权在世界政治转型中所出现的新变化,已有的霸权理论模式("霸权稳定论"、"霸权周期理论"、"霸权转移论"等)未能做出迅速而有效的解释,国际关系学界有必要对此而为之.中央党校国际战略研究所门洪华博士新近完成的<霸权之翼:美国国际制度战略>(以下简称<霸权之翼>)一书,[1]就是上述有益探索中的一种尝试.     

李德懋与中国儒家在义利观上的异同

李德懋作为秉承中国先秦儒家思想的儒士 ,在四民观、治生观即诚信的商道德等方面与明清实学思想有相同之处。在此基础之上 ,他确立了自己的制欲观及“完全不败”的经营理念 ,其经济伦理与齐家论的特点相当突出。