The War over Iraq: Selling War to the American Public

The Holocaust has become an important part of the everyday discourse of American life. Indeed, it has become one of the central historical analogies for thinking about U.S. foreign policy in the post-Cold War world. The received wisdom about the Holocaust among most Americans is that the United States and the rest of the civilized world turned away Jews seeking to escape Nazi Germany before World War II, and then sat idly by while the Third Reich murdered nearly 6 million of them during the course of the war. In light of this reprehensible indifference, the United States shares some responsibility for the Holocaust, and it must “never again” allow large numbers of people to be slaughtered because of their race, ethnicity, or religion. Historical analogies are ubiquitous in foreign policy debates. Not only do they routinely shape state behavior, they usually do so for the worse. Hence, we should be wary of all historical analogies and examine them carefully to make sure they are based on sound history and used wisely by policymakers. The widely accepted Holocaust analogy illustrates, in my view, both how analogies are frequently based on a faulty reading of history and that policies based on them have not always served U.S. interests.     

The American Way of Going to War: Mexico (1846) to Iraq (2003)

Prior to the Iraq War, there had been a long series of American wars in which U.S. leaders often maneuvered the other side into “firing the first shot.” This strategy of “passive defense” amounts to an American way of going to war, and it dates back at least to the U.S.-Mexican War. The United States thus retained the moral and legal legitimacy, an asset which is especially important in a democratic political system. The Iraq War represents a fundamental departure from this American way. It might be the worst crisis since Vietnam. but that war was just another entry in the U.S. playbook for how to go to war. The Iraq War not only contradicts longstanding practices in American foreign policy, but it has the potential to issue in far greater international disorder than the Vietnam War. This catastrophe may make future presidents more heedful of John Quincy Adams’ prophetic words: go not abroad in search of monsters to destroy.     

从"美国例外论"的视角看美国对伊战争

本文以作用于美国外交的"美国例外论"为出发点,首先阐明这一政治文化传统的基本内涵,通过个案研究的方法,结合最新形势,分析它对美国发动伊拉克战争决策所产生的影响,并对美国外交今后的走向进行了初步的预测.     

论冷战后美国的强制外交

强制外交与威慑一样,主要依靠武力的潜在运用或者说主要通过威胁使用武力,以达成国家的对外政策目标.强制外交是冷战结束后一个引人注目的国际政治现象,该术语也是当前西方国际关系和战略文献中出现频率很高的重要术语之一.本文在剖析西方强制外交理论的基础上,重点研究冷战后美国所实施的两个典型的强制外交案例,着力阐释当代美国强制外交成功或失败的原因，并扼要进行一些评析.     

美国对伊拉克动武的强势与弱势

3月 2 0日 ,伊拉克战争爆发。美国对伊动武有其强势的一面 :强大的军事力量 ,有利的地缘政治因素 ,凭借阿富汗反恐战争胜利的余威 ,伊拉克实力大大削弱 ,萨达姆在国际社会缺少支持。同时 ,美国对伊动武也有其弱势的一面 :理由不充足 ,指控缺少说服力 ;冲击国家主权原则 ,缺少合法性 ;美国的单边主义受到多极化的掣肘 ,西方大国间存在着深刻裂痕 ;战争受到多数穆斯林国家反对 ,加剧了穆斯林世界的反美情绪 ;战争违背历史潮流 ,违背世界人民的和平愿望     

The Future of War and American Military Strategy

The outcome of ongoing debates over the future of American military strategy will play a critical role in shaping the foreign and military policies of the United States over the next decade. Traditionalists worry about the shift towards emphasizing counterinsurgency (COIN) operations and irregular warfare, believing that the use of force is often ineffective in COIN situations and the American military should concentrate on planning for conventional war. In contrast, COIN advocates argue that the United States must focus its efforts on preparing for the wars it is most likely to fight, irregular wars. However, both schools of thought rely on assumptions about the future security environment that may reveal another path forward. First, although it seems intuitive to view irregular warfare as the dominant future concern, it is exceedingly difficult to predict accurately the future security environment, as the last 20 years have clearly shown. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the character of emergent threats will depend on how the United States focuses its resources. Paradoxically, no matter what it emphasizes, the military threats the United States is or will be most capable of defeating are the ones it is least likely to face, since potential adversaries will be deterred and seek other ways of confrontation. However, with some smart and careful investments, including the recognition that not all parts of the military have to be optimized for the same task, the United States military can both lock in its conventional dominance and continue to improve its ability to succeed in the irregular wars most likely to dominate the landscape in the short to medium term.     

伊拉克战争对拉美经济的影响

美国发动的对伊拉克的战争是一场速战速决的战争。笔者认为,伊拉克战争对拉美经济有以下影响。 在美洲开发银行第44届年会上,与会者对拉美经济的增长尚持乐观态度。但战争爆发后,一些     

论冷战时期美国的南中国海政策

冷战期间,南中国海地区成为两大阵营、美苏争霸的主要场所之一,也是美国对苏、对华遏制的重点地域之一。南中国海争端虽然凸显于20世纪70年代,但在50年代就已出现,因而美国在南中国海地区的遏制战略就不可避免地要与南中国海主权问题联系在一起,这是美国逐渐形成对南中国海主权争端的立场、政策的起点和基础。本文拟对冷战时期美国对南中国海争端的立场和政策作一探讨,以期更深入地认识冷战后美国大力介入南中国海争端的深层战略考虑。     

冷战后美国对朝政策中的国会因素

冷战结束以来 ,美朝关系几经波折 ,始终没有摆脱冷战的阴影 ,至今仍处于敌对状态。本文认为 ,伴随着冷战后国会权力的复兴 ,美国国会通过宪法赋予的权力和其它途径 ,在美国对朝政策的三个主要阶段分别起着不同程度的负面作用。从冷战结束之初到美朝《框架协议》签订的第一阶段里 ,国会极力要求总统对朝鲜采取比较强硬的政策 ,但影响不大 ;在《协议》签订到克林顿任期结束的第二个阶段里 ,国会一直是限制美朝关系发展的一支强大阻碍力量 ;目前这个阶段 ,国会基本上配合总统执行对朝强硬政策。     

伊拉克战争与美国的大战略失误

美国发动对伊战争有着长远的战略考虑,但伊拉克战争本身在目标和手段上都无助于实现或推进美国在“9.11”事件后所确立的大战略目标。美国在伊拉克战争期间的大战略失误,突出地表现为大战略目标与单个军事行动目标之间的模糊和抵触,大战略目标与手段之间严重失衡。长远地看,如果美国偏重于单边主义和军事力量,其巩固“单极”世界的图谋会遇到更大的国际障碍。     

战后日本人饮食消费方式的变化

一、前言 饮食文化是代表饮食和人类之间的关系，并丰富人类饮食生活的一种智慧宝库。饮食是一种看似平常又极为重要的事情，“它是人类生存和改造身体素质的首要物质基础，也是社会发展的前提”。“饮食文化是人类有关饮食实践的多方面经济社会生活的各种表现形式的总和，它是跨越物质文化和精神文化的许多领域，又具有自己独特内涵和外延，是组成网络又具有独特神韵的一种文化体系”。     

试论冷战时期美国对拉美的经济援助

经济援助是冷战时期美国对拉美政策的重要组成部分。这一政策的嬗变经历了四个阶段 :第二次世界大战后～ 1 960年、1 961～ 1 972年、1 973～ 1 980年、1 981～ 1 991年。其中 ,第一阶段和第三阶段是援助的低谷期 ,第二阶段和第四阶段是援助的高峰期。经济援助政策的实质不是促进拉美国家的经济发展和社会进步 ,而是维护美国在西半球的战略安全利益及美国私人资本在拉美的利益     

冷战后美国大战略的理论思辨

冷战结束之后,美国思想界掀起了一场关于美国未来国家大战略的理论辩论.对于冷战后美国大战略的利益与目标、威胁与挑战、手段与途径等问题,不同学派根据各自对国际政治现实的理解提出了纷繁复杂的理论模式.关于大战略的辩论在很大程度上也就是关于国际关系理论的辩论,因此,本文从现实主义与自由主义、孤立主义与国际主义、单边主义与多边主义三个主要视角对各种大战略模式及其论证思路进行了比较分析和逻辑疏理.     

Lincoln's Gamble: Fear of Intervention and the Onset of the American Civil War

Few studies consider how civil war onset can be influenced by third parties and by the belligerents’ perceptions of third party actions. I show that the American Civil War, a war largely ignored by civil war scholars, sheds insights into how anticipation of third party intervention influences the decision-making process within the target state and how the possibility of third party intervention can influence the onset and escalation of civil war. The American Civil War is an especially interesting case for exploring the role of third parties in civil war initiation since, unlike most cases considered by the existing civil war literature, the American Civil War is an instance of nonintervention: the third parties (the European powers in this case) mattered despite staying out of the conflict. Specifically, I argue that fear of foreign recognition (particularly by the British) played an underappreciated (if not the decisive) role in the earliest stages of the American Civil War by influencing Lincoln's decision to authorize the first major battle of the war at Manassas Junction, Virginia.     

伊拉克战争对美拉关系的影响

3月20日,美国等国家在未经联合国授权的情况下对伊拉克开战,现在战争已进入尾声,伊拉克战后重建问题已提上国际社会的议事日程。那么,这场战争会对美拉关系产生什么影响?美拉关系会由此而发生改变吗?     

The Case of the Missing Hegemon: British Nonintervention in the American Civil War

Balance of power theories have come roaring back into prominence in recent years as international relations theory grapples with new developments, including offshore balancing and soft balancing. Recent works demonstrate the importance of more than just the distribution of power, and have addressed the role that domestic politics plays in balancing. One overlooked aspect of this debate, with implications for offensive realism and the current discussion on the United States and soft balancing, is the role that nonintervention conventions play in decision making. British nonintervention during the American Civil War presents a case at odds with offensive realist theory, as Britain should have intervened to protect its national interests—cotton, trade, and shipping—while also restraining a regional hegemonic power. Domestic cleavages, democratic peace norms, and public opinion pressures do not sufficiently explain this behavior. Instead, this paper posits that nonintervention was a result of British adherence to precedents and conventions.     

Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935-37. The role in this process of the argument that America's own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America's security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.     

Conceptions of National Security and American Entry into World War II

During World War II, official definitions of the requirements of United States national security were extended beyond the defense of the western hemisphere to include preventing any single power dominating Eurasia. This article challenges the commonly expressed view that this change was due to a belief that a strategy of continental defense would no longer suffice to protect the physical safety of the United States. The focus is on the period between Munich and Pearl Harbor when U.S policy moved away from the principle of non-involvement embodied in the neutrality legislation of 1935–37. The role in this process of the argument that America’s own safety was dependent upon the European balance of power, particularly because of the dangers posed by the development of aviation and the possible suborning of Latin America, is critically examined. It is argued that the broader conception of America’s security requirements reflected both a consciousness of the unique power of the United States to determine the outcome of the war and an implicit belief that the values and interests for which the nation should be prepared to fight extended beyond physical security.