Buddies or Burdens? Understanding the Al Qaeda Relationship with Its Affiliate Organizations

Drawing on organization theory, this article argues that al Qaeda seeks affiliates to expand the scope and scale of its operations, gain the benefits of greater local expertise, better spread innovations, and―most important―endow itself and its mission with greater legitimacy. The conventional wisdom on al Qaeda affiliates emphasizes these benefits and thus paints affiliation as a tremendous boon to al Qaeda that magnifies the danger of terrorism. However, al Qaeda faces a host of problems related to delegation and integration, and often affiliation is a net loss. Divergent preferences and priorities, branding problems, shirking at the local level, adverse selection, and costly control mechanisms all make affiliates of questionable value to the core organization. Although the danger al Qaeda poses may have morphed with the core declining and the affiliates rising in importance, the broader movement is probably less dangerous than it was when the al Qaeda core was at its height. US counterterrorism often magnifies these integration problems and, if done well, can further induce friction, discredit the brand, and otherwise throw sand in the gears. The broader study of al Qaeda and its affiliates also offers insight into the study of organizations in general.     

Disarming Somalia: lessons in stabilisation from a collapsed state

International efforts to resolve the Somali crisis have foundered on one central paradox: the restoration of state institutions is both an apparent solution to the conflict and its most important underlying cause. Somalis tend to approach disarmament and demobilisation—two central pillars of the ‘state-building’ process—with the fundamental question: who is disarming whom? If the answer threatens to entrench unbalanced and unstable power relations, then it may also exacerbate and prolong the conflict. In this paper, the authors examine disarmament and demobilisation initiatives from southern Somalia, Puntland and Somaliland. In southern Somalia, externally-driven disarmament and demobilisation initiatives in support of successive interim ‘governments’ have been widely viewed with suspicion and alarm. In Somaliland and Puntland, Somali-led, locally owned efforts have achieved a degree of success that can be instructive elsewhere. The authors conclude that conventional international approaches to ‘state-building’ in Somalia must be reassessed—notably that security sector issues must be treated not as a purely ‘technical’ issue, but as an integral part of the political process.     

Foreign Influences and Shifting Horizons: The Ongoing Evolution of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb

This article details how prior to the establishment of al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AGIM), Meghrebis—that is, Algerians, Moroccans, Tunisians and others--made up a significant percentage of the foreign fighters in the al Qaeda-led insurgency in Iraq, thus helping to build the trust networks between al Qaeda central and the Maghreb-based groups, culminating in the the 2007 formal affiliation of the Groupe Salafiste pour la Predication et le Combat (GSPC) with al Qaeda. Since then, an emboldened AQIM has evolved significantly, both strategically and operationally.     

From Cottage Industry to International Organisation: The Evolution of Salafi-Jihadism and the Emergence of the Al Qaeda Ideology

Al Qaeda after the invasion of Afghanistan can now be understood as not only an international terror organisation but an ideology which inspires groups with similar goals of a supranational caliphate. The Al Qaeda ideology draws from long standing historical Islamic concepts that date to the time of Muhammad. The ideologues of the organisation, most notably Ayman al Zawahiri, have cleverly used these ideas and the works of other Islamists to create not just a terror organisation but an ideology designed to unite disparate groups of Islamic radicals around the world.     

al Qaeda and Global Governance: When Ideology Clashes With Political Expediency

In recent years, statements by al Qaeda leaders have included references to topics often associated with global-governance proponents’ critique of the state. This article examines the organization's attitude toward symbols of global governance, giving particular attention to its view of the United Nations as the foundation for global governance, and to the manner in which al Qaeda approaches the central questions of environmental threats and human rights. The organization is seeking to insert itself into the discourse of global governance and use it in an instrumental manner; it focuses on anti-Western narrative and seeks to expose the existing order as designed by Western powers, particularly the United States, for self-serving reasons. However, the article argues, notwithstanding al Qaeda's reputation for sophistication in manipulating public opinion, the organization's references to global governance underscore the limitations its rigid ideology imposes on its messaging efforts. Even though adopting the global governance discourse is in line with the group's effort to improve its image, al Qaeda's extremist ideology limits its ability to take full advantage of the benefits this discourse offers.     

Al Qaeda Targeting Israel: Between Rhetoric and Reality

Al Qaeda leaders have often stated their desire to attack the state of Israel. But, while the intent and imperative of killing Israelis and Jews features prominently in al Qaeda rhetoric, it has rarely translated into operational attacks on the state of Israel, its citizens abroad, or Jews more generally.     

Transnational Radicalization,Diaspora Groups,and Within-group Sentiment Pools: Young Tamil and Somali Canadians on the LTTE and al Shabaab

ABSTRACT

In recent years, the Tamil and Somali diasporas have come under intense scrutiny by the media and national security agencies in Canada. This is due to concerns that members of both communities may hold political grievances associated with their respective homelands that could be acted upon by joining or supporting transnational terrorist groups. Drawing on 168 in-depth interviews with youth and young adults in Toronto’s Tamil and Somali diasporas, we provide a comparative analysis of the varying ways that existing sentiment pools can operate to mobilize broad-levels of support for, or vilification of, the framing strategies of the LTTE and al Shabaab, respectively. Our findings show that frames that portray the LTTE in a positive light resonate deeply with the young Tamil-Canadians we interviewed, characterizing a “narrative fidelity” between these frames and the existing sentiment pool. By contrast, there exists considerable disconnect between the framing strategies of al Shabaab, their supporters, and existing sentiment within the Somali diaspora – a divide that illustrates the notion of “framing failure”. We conclude with a discussion of the dynamic nature and inherent malleability of group-level sentiment pools, and highlight why this may be important from a national security standpoint.     

Al Qaeda in Mali: The Defection Connections

The control of northern Mali in 2012 by Tuareg rebels and Islamist fighters aligned with al Qaeda proved a serious challenge to Western counterterrorism policies. This article looks at several aspects often overlooked in discussions of the internal dynamics of al Qaeda-linked groups. Using defections related to the al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) offshoot group, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in Mali as a case study, this article considers the issues of race and legitimacy connected to the group and the threat and policy implications that flow from this analysis.     

A FAREWELL TO THE GREAT GAME? PROSPECTS FOR RUSSIAN-AMERICAN SECURITY COOPERATION IN CENTRAL ASIA

Long before 9–11, Russia and the United States found common ground in their efforts to undermine the Taliban government in Afghanistan, despite serious disagreements over policy in other parts of the world. The events of 9–11, however, changed Russian foreign and security policy drastically. One of the most fundamental and controversial shifts came when President Putin chose not to interfere in US negotiations with the Central Asian states to use their airbases for the US war against al Qaeda in Afghanistan. Putin also offered to use Russia’s oil reserves as a means to stabilize jittery world markets. In return, Russia gained US support for its bid to pipe Caspian Sea oil over Russian territory. More importantly, the US government gave Russia essentially a free hand in its war against separatist Chechnya. While there are many potential scenarios in highly unstable Central Asia that could serve to sour relations once again, Russia and the United States have an unprecedented opportunity to build trust and cooperation through peacekeeping and problem solving in the region.     

The Evolution of Political Violence: The Case of Somalia’s Al-Shabaab

This research investigates the development and expansion of the al-Shabaab movement in Somalia from 2000 to 2013. Initially a marginal player in Somalia, by 2013 al-Shabaab had transformed into the most formidable armed opposition to challenge the nascent Somali government and its allies. During this time period they administered territory domestically, while expanding their tactical repertoire and geographic scope of attacks. After analyzing the historical conditions (2000–2006) from which al-Shabaab emerged, I explore the evolution of this organization through the use of historical process tracing. This entails looking for critical junctures on a global, national, and local level that had a dramatic impact on the future trajectory of the insurgency. The results show that harsh foreign interventions had many deleterious consequences, acting as an initial impetus for armed resistance, while also acting as a continuous source of controversy which al-Shabaab exploited to gain new recruits. Moreover, irreconcilable intra-organizational schisms also contributed to altering the future organizational decisions made by al-Shabaab. The culmination of these results engage and expand the theory of categorical terrorism, offering observations to help scholars and policy makers alike begin to re-conceptualize ways to study terrorism and political violence.     

Research Note: Hassan al-Turabi,Osama bin Laden,and Al Qaeda in Sudan

This research note explores the events and circumstances surrounding Osama bin Laden's stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1996. In particular, it discusses the role that the Sudanese politician, Hassan al-Turabi may have played in the development of bin Laden and al Qaeda. It draws particular attention to the role of the Popular Arab and Islamic Congress (PAIC) in the emergence of a distinctive form of Radical Islam and offers a preliminary discussion of the emergence of particular qualities of al Qaeda ideology.     

The Information Confrontation with Radical Islam

Information has emerged as a critical—potentially the decisive—front in both the global war with violent radical Islam and the overlapping but so far largely unadmitted Cold War with nonviolent radical Islam. In fact, the information front is undoubtedly the closest thing that al Qaeda has to a strategic center of gravity. Unfortunately, America faces an extremely hostile information environment in the Middle East and al Qaeda has proven far more effective at getting its message across than has the United States. A more effective U.S. information strategy would be one that stresses three themes: a democratic critique of radical Islam; an Islamic critique of radical Islam; and a critique of the crisis in Middle Eastern civilization. While these will not necessarily make the U.S. or its policies more popular, they may drive a wedge between radical Islam and potential supporters.     

European Union Training Missions: security sector reform or counter-insurgency by proxy?

With European Union Training Missions (EUTM) Mali and EUTM Somalia, the EU seeks to stabilize countries facing state weakness caused by intrastate conflict. While the EU formally promotes security sector reform (SSR) through its foreign policy, the EUTM missions in Mali and Somalia in one sense can be described as “counter-insurgency by proxy” as military trainees combat local insurgencies shortly upon graduation. This raises the question whether the EUTM missions are consistent with SSR aims, such as creating a security sector that is legitimate, sustainable, and under civilian control, or inadvertently risk contributing to negative side effects in the medium term. Based on extensive interviews in Belgium, Kenya, Mali, Sweden, and Uganda with personnel who either served in or planned these missions, this study analyses factors which hinder the EUTM concept from being fully consistent with SSR and identifies possible policies to ameliorate the risk of unintended side effects.     

Assessing a Decade of U.S. Military Strategy in Africa

The past decade has witnessed a sea change in U.S. military engagement in Africa. With the establishment of a new permanent command, significant increases in security assistance, and the pioneering of new tactics driven by technical innovations in intelligence analysis and drone warfare, the U.S. military has become an integral player in the continent's security. Nevertheless, there exist few assessments of the extent to which increased U.S. military engagement is paying dividends. This article examines how the current U.S. military strategy in Africa is different from those in the past and whether it is meeting the stated U.S. objectives of neutralizing transnational threats while contributing to the continent's political stability. It finds that U.S. performance is mixed, with recent successes at containing the spread of al Qaeda and Islamic State affiliated groups coming at the potential detriment of longer-term regional security. The article concludes with recommendations aimed at helping the armed forces of the U.S. and other regional actors better fight terrorism while managing political risks.     

The Soldier, The State, and The Clash of Civilizations: The Legacy of Samuel Huntington

The major military challenge that the United States faces today is the war in Afghanistan. The U.S. military is engaged in a grueling counterinsurgency campaign against the Islamist movement known as the Taliban, which is based among Pashtun tribes in Southeastern Afghanistan and Northwestern Pakistan, who have never been permanently subdued by a foreign military force. This challenge comes in the wake of that other grueling counterinsurgency war that the U.S. military has had to conduct in Iraq, where its chief adversary was the Islamist movement known as al Qaeda in Mesopotamia. Moreover, the challenge in Afghanistan comes on what could be the eve of an impending military challenge, perhaps even a war, with Iran, as that Islamist state relentlessly moves toward acquiring nuclear weapons. In its entire history of two- and-a-quarter centuries, the United States has never been engaged in an unbroken succession of three wars, in three different countries. Together, the U.S. wars with or within Islamist countries add up to what is a “long war,” indeed.     

Targets and Tactics: Testing for a Duality within Al Qaeda’s Network

One prevailing view treats Al Qaeda as a monolithic entity with a global network of affiliates. Yet, certain affiliates appear more committed to local political and territorial goals – parochial, not global, terrorists. We construct a classification scheme to differentiate affiliates conceptually and empirically, and then track their types over time. We sort Al Qaeda’s network of affiliates using a principal components analysis of terrorist attacks from 1988 to 2012. We show that this aids in identifying latent affiliate types, and interpreting shifts in behavior. We find that despite Al Qaeda’s anti-western rhetoric, there exists a global-parochial divide in which most affiliates are parochial – with anti-Western groups pursuing local political goals even when Western targets remain. By providing an empirical strategy to identify which affiliates are more or less aligned with global terrorism, this research holds implications for the literatures on terrorism and civil war, terrorism and democracy, and the effects of counterterrorism.     

Taking a New Perspective: Mapping the Al Qaeda Network Through the Eyes of the UN Security Council

Network analysis has attracted significant attention when researching the phenomenon of transnational terrorism, particularly Al Qaeda. While many scholars have made valuable contributions to mapping Al Qaeda, several problems remain due to a lack of data and the omission of data provided by international organizations such as the UN. Thus, this article applies a social network analysis and subsequent mappings of the data gleaned from the Security Council's consolidated sanctions list, and asks what they can demonstrate about the structure and organizational characteristics of Al Qaeda. The study maps the Al Qaeda network on a large scale using a newly compiled data set. The analysis reveals that the Al Qaeda network consists of several hundred individual and group nodes connecting almost all over the globe. Several major nodes are crucial for the network structure, while simultaneously many other nodes only weakly and foremost regionally connect to the network. The article concludes that the findings tie in well to the latest research pointing to local and simultaneously global elements of Al Qaeda, and that the new data is a valuable source for further analyses, potentially in combination with other data.     

Hurdles to International Terrorist Alliances: Lessons From Al Qaeda's Experience

Despite the threat posed by international terrorist alliances, the conditions that foster and inhibit these relationships remain poorly understood. When seeking allies outside of their primary conflict and political market, groups struggle to forge credible commitments, particularly the requisite ‘shadows of the future’ and reputations conducive to cooperation, without third-party enforcers. Given their suspicious nature and strong in-group identities, terrorist groups sometimes balk at relinquishing independence for security. Alliances risk precipitating counterterrorism pressure, alienating constituents, and increasing the risk of betrayal. Even groups that enjoy alliance success, like Al Qaeda, experience these hurdles in their alliance. What helped to set Al Qaeda apart from most groups was its ability to navigate these obstacles, though some bedeviled its alliances efforts. This offers under-utilized opportunities for alliance disruption.     

The Al Qaeda Brand: The Strategic Use of the “Terrorist” Label

Al Qaeda leaders have consistently praised the Chechen insurgents as an exemplary front of global jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri recently applauded the steadfastness of the Chechen rebels and indicated that their resolve for jihad is worthy of emulation. Ever since the world found out about a war going on in the Muslim republic in the North Caucasus, Al Qaeda leadership has attempted to represent the Chechen struggle as one of its own battlefields. In turn, the Russian government has tried to justify its policies in the North Caucasus through demonstrating to the world that the Kremlin is fighting nothing less than Osama bin Laden’s agents in Chechnya. The North Caucasus insurgents in turn have embraced some of Al Qaeda’s narratives. While such narratives have proliferated, the factual evidence to show the direct links between the North Caucasus insurgents and Al Qaeda is still lacking. The article examines how terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda use framing for strategic ends. The evidence discussed here suggests that Al Qaeda, the North Caucasus insurgents, and the Russian government have adopted similar narratives. However, the lack of evidence to back up such narratives indicates the differences in reasons driving the convergence of the narratives.     

The EU in Somalia: Furthering Peacemaking and Reconciliation

Since the Transitional Federal Institutions were established after the 2002 Nairobi Conference, the situation in Somalia has seen two drastic about-turns – in opposite directions. In June 2006, starting out from Mogadishu, the Islamic Courts rapidly extended their control over most of south-central Somalia. Now, after the Ethiopean military intervention, the Transitional Government is trying to establish itself in the capital and to effectively exercise its formal authority for the first time. But the military defeat of the Courts has not solved the problems that initially made their success possible. Only reconciliation can create real stability and the European Union can contribute to achieving this. A peaceful and stable Horn of Africa is in the EU's interest, given the risks of it becoming a breeding ground for Al Qaeda-like organisations and a source of immigration. Somalia could also become a test case for solving the problems of a failed state by peaceful means, and an example of the EU's willingness and ability to have an effective dialogue with the Islamic world. Success in Somalia would strengthen the EU as a regional player with Arab and Muslim countries.