The Dangers of Co-witness Familiarity: Investigating the Effects of Co-witness Relationships on Blame Conformity

The purpose of this study was to examine the effects of pre-existing relationships between co-witnesses on statement similarity, after a post-event discussion. Although research studies have attempted to observe the effect of a pre-existing relationship on eyewitness pairs, few have investigated these effects on larger groups of co-witnesses. Four hundred and twenty participants took part in an eyewitness simulation experiment. Participants were placed into groups of five, and viewed video footage of a bar fight. After witnessing the event, participants discussed the event with group members before giving individual statements privately. The study employed a one-way between subjects design with three conditions: (1) participants discussed the event with familiar co-witnesses, (2) participants discussed the event with unfamiliar co-witnesses and (3) participants were not permitted to discuss the event with their co-witnesses (control). It was found that post-event discussion between co-witnesses increased the level of similarity in blame attribution within the eyewitness groups; however, this difference was only significant in groups where eyewitnesses shared a pre-existing relationship. In addition, the level of uncertainty was reduced when eyewitnesses took part in post-event discussions. It is suggested that this might be attributed to an increased level of informational influence between familiar co-witnesses. However, there was no evidence suggesting that post-event discussions led to an increase in false eyewitness statements.     

The prevalence of co-witnesses and co-witness discussions in real eyewitnesses

Abstract

Several laboratory studies have shown that eyewitness discussions can negatively affect memory recall. The current study looked at the prevalence of multiple witnesses using real witnesses at a UK identification suite. We investigated the frequency of co-witness discussion, what the co-witnesses tended to discuss and whether there was an association between this information, and the outcome of the identification. Sixty witnesses at the Force Identification Unit in Brighton (UK) filled out a questionnaire following the identification procedure. Co-witnesses were reported by 88% of the sample, with the average number of co-witnesses being 4.02 (SD=6.52). In addition, 58% of the multiple witnesses had discussed the criminal event with at least one co-witness. The most common areas of discussion were ‘general crime details’ (52%) and ‘suspect details’ (39%). The implications of these findings are discussed.     

Eyewitness susceptibility to co-witness misinformation is influenced by co-witness confidence and own self-confidence

If an eyewitness is exposed to a co-witness statement that incorrectly blames an innocent bystander for a crime, the eyewitness can be influenced by this statement and also blame the innocent bystander for the crime. This effect is known as blame conformity. In two studies, we examined whether or not this effect is influenced by the degree of confidence a co-witness expresses in her incorrect statement (Study 1) and an eyewitness’s own level of self-confidence (Study 2). Participant eyewitnesses first watched a crime video featuring a perpetrator and an innocent bystander, then read a co-witness statement about the crime that either correctly blamed the perpetrator, incorrectly blamed the innocent bystander, or blamed nobody (a control condition). They were then asked who committed the crime. In Study 1, participants who read an incorrect statement were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity when the co-witness expressed a high level of confidence, compared to a low level of confidence, in the accuracy of her statement. In Study 2, participants who were lowest in self-confidence were at increased risk of engaging in blame conformity. The theoretical underpinnings of these effects are considered.     

Consistency amongst pairs: How consistent are child co-witnesses with one another?

Purpose

When multiple children are asked about the same event, the consistency of their reports may be used as a heuristic for credibility. Little research has considered how consistent child co-witnesses are likely to be. In this study, we explored how likely child co-witnesses were to report the same details from a mutually experienced event.

Methods

Pairs of children participated in an educational science event during which the target attempted to coax the children into breaking preestablished rules for the session (i.e., commit transgressions). Children were individually interviewed about their experience on two subsequent occasions.

Results

Co-witnesses tended to be quite inconsistent: 32%–55% of all details recalled were only mentioned by one co-witness. Various factors were associated with co-witness consistency, including delay before the interview, centrality of details recalled, and children's age and forthcomingness.

Conclusions

The findings indicate that inconsistency between co-witnesses reflects a natural memory phenomenon, and that practitioners should be cautious of using co-witness consistency as an indicator of credibility.     

Co-witness Information Can Have Immediate Effects on Eyewitness Memory Reports

When questioning a reluctant witness, investigators sometimes encourage the witness by providing information about what other witnesses have said. Three experiments were conducted to test the combined effects of such co-witness information and suggestive questioning on the accuracy of eyewitness memory reports. Experiment 1 was analogous to the experience of a witness who receives information from an interviewer or questioner about what other witnesses have already said, whereas Experiments 2 and 3 simulated the situation in which a witness receives information directly from a co-witness. In all three experiments, when participants received incorrect information about a co-witness's response, they were significantly more likely to give that incorrect response than if they received no co-witness information. This effect persevered in a delayed memory test 48 h after the initial questioning session in Experiment 3. Accuracy rates were lowest of all when incorrect co-witness information was paired with questioning that suggested an incorrect response. These results have implications not only for the immediate effects on the accuracy of witnesses' memory reports, but also for the impact that even one such inaccurate report can have on the manner in which a case is investigated by the police or other authorities.     

The Effects of Pre-admonition Suggestions on Eyewitnesses’ Choosing Rates and Retrospective Identification Judgments

Pre-admonition suggestion is an identification-relevant comment made to an eyewitness by a lineup administrator before the lineup admonition. Quinlivan et al. (2012) found that their suggestion inflated mistaken identification rates and retrospective identification. However, the suggestion used was a compound statement, making it unclear which component influenced choosing rates. The current experiment was conducted to parse out the effects. Participants (N = 211) viewed a crime video and received either one component of the compound suggestion (a suggestion to pick or that the witness had paid substantial attention), both components, or no suggestion. All participants received an admonition, made an identification choice, and answered questions about their witnessing experience. The results demonstrated that the pick suggestion increased mistaken identifications from a perpetrator-absent lineup whereas the effects of the attention suggestion were restricted to the retrospective judgments. These results show support for the role of secondary (non-memorial) processes in eyewitness identification.     

Effects of Experiencing the Eyewitness Identification Procedure on Juror Decisions

Mistaken eyewitness identifications are believed to contribute to a preponderance of wrongful convictions, underscoring the need to identify methods to help decrease the likelihood of false convictions based on eyewitness testimony. The present study tested the hypothesis that providing jurors with first-hand experience with eyewitness identification procedures could help further sensitize them to the limitations of eyewitness testimony. Eighty college students watched a videotaped mock trial in which the prosecution’s sole evidence was eyewitness testimony. In a 2 × 2 randomized factorial design, we manipulated whether participants heard expert psychological testimony (henceforth referred to as expert testimony) on the limitations of eyewitness identification and whether they experienced an eyewitness identification procedure. As predicted, experiencing the eyewitness identification procedure had a significant impact on juror decisions, suggesting that this procedure could further help reduce the likelihood of wrongful convictions.     

The saliency of gestural misinformation in the perception of a violent crime

Recent research has revealed that misinformation from gestures can influence eyewitness memory. However, it is still unclear whether gestural misinformation can emulate the effects of verbal misinformation on the reporting of major details in serious crimes. To investigate the salience of suggestions provided nonverbally, and how these compare to those made verbally, two experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, participants watched footage of a crime scene and were presented with one of two types of gestures during questioning that suggested different interpretations of the crime. The results confirmed that the gestures influenced responses, with participants altering their interpretation of the crime according to the information gestured to them. Experiment 2 built on this to investigate how comparable gestural influence was to verbal influence. The results revealed that gestural misinformation caused participants to alter their interpretation of the crime and elicited the same effects as verbal misinformation. Across the two experiments, participants were unlikely to identify the misleading gestures or report feeling misled by them. These results reveal new insights into the strength of gestural misinformation and show that, despite their subtle nature in communication, gestures can exert a powerful influence in eyewitness interviews.     

Identifying deviant sexual interest in a sex offender sample using dual-target rapid serial visual presentation task

To investigate the dual-target rapid serial visual presentation (dtRSVP) task as a measure of deviant sexual interest (i.e. a sexual interest in children), we administered a dtRSVP with gender- and age-specific pictorial stimuli to child sex offenders (n = 69), other sex offenders (n = 43), non-sex offenders (n = 14), and community controls (n = 88). We hypothesized that (1) stimuli belonging to the preferred gender and age group presented as targets (both T1 and the subsequent T2) in the serial sequence would be more accurately detected than non-preferred stimuli and that (2) this increased detection would reduce the detection of targets later in the serial sequence (T2) due to an attentional blink. Our findings supported hypothesis 1 and partly supported hypothesis 2. Although we found group differences, individual indices based on detection rates did not allow for individual-level diagnostic categorization of participants.     

What judges know about eyewitness testimony: A comparison of Norwegian and US judges

Abstract

We surveyed 157 Norwegian judges about their knowledge and beliefs about eyewitness testimony, and compared their answers to a prior survey of 160 US judges. Although the Norwegian judges were somewhat more knowledgeable than the US judges, both groups had limited knowledge of eyewitness testimony. The Norwegian judges, like the US judges, frequently differed from eyewitness experts in their responses to such important issues as whether eyewitness confidence is related to identification accuracy at trial and what is the best method for conducting identification procedures. As was true for the US judges, more knowledgeable Norwegian judges had many of the beliefs that may be necessary for reducing and mitigating the effects of eyewitness error. The results suggest that increasing judges’ knowledge of eyewitness testimony may be an important component of the solution to eyewitness error.     

The role of neurological and psychological explanations in legal judgments of psychopathic wrongdoers

Although brain imaging has recently taken center stage in criminal legal proceedings, little is known about how neuroscience information differentially affects people’s judgments about criminal behavior. In two studies of community participants (N = 1161), we examined how mock jurors sentence a fictional psychopathic defendant when presented with neurological or psychological research of equal or ambiguous scientific validity. Across two studies, we (a) found that including images of the brain did not alter mock jurors’ sentencing judgments, (b) reported two striking non-replications of previous findings that mock jurors recommend less severe punishments to defendants when a neuroscientific explanations are proffered, and (c) found that participants rated a psychopathic individual as more likely to benefit from treatment and less dangerous when a neurological explanation for his deficits was provided. Overall, these results suggest that neuroscience information provided by psychiatrists in hypothetical criminal situations may not broadly transform mock jurors’ intuitions about a psychopathic defendant’s sentence, but they provide novel evidence that brain-based information may influence people’s judgments about treatability and dangerousness.     

Can a witness report hearsay evidence unintentionally? The effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Abstract

When eyewitnesses are exposed to misinformation about an event from a co-witness, they often incorporate this misinformation in their recall of the event. The current research aimed to investigate whether this memory conformity phenomenon is due to change in the witness's memory for the event, or to social pressures to conform to the co-witness's account. Participants were shown a crime video and then asked to discuss the video in groups, with some receiving misinformation about the event from their discussion partners. After a one-week delay some participants were warned about possible misinformation before all participants provided their own account of the event. In Study 1, participants made remember/know judgments about the items recalled, and in Study 2 they indicated the source of their memories. Co-witness information was incorporated into participants’ testimonies, and this effect was not reduced by warnings or source monitoring instructions, suggesting memory change may have occurred. However, there was some indication that remember/know judgments may help distinguish between ‘real’ memories and co-witness information.     

On the power of secondary confession evidence

Research on primary confessions has demonstrated that it is a powerful form of evidence. The goal of the current research was to investigate whether secondary confessions – the suspect confesses to another individual who in turn then reports the confession to the police – could be as persuasive. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants read a murder trial containing an eyewitness identification, a secondary confession, and character testimony, and made midtrial assessments of the evidence. Results indicated that the secondary confession was evaluated as the most incriminating. In Experiment 3, participants read summaries of four criminal trials, each of which contained a primary confession, a secondary confession, eyewitness identification, or none of the above. The two confession conditions produced significantly higher conviction rates. Our findings suggest that secondary confessions are another powerful and potentially dangerous form of evidence.     

Investigating Investigators: How Presentation Order Influences Participant–Investigators’ Interpretations of Eyewitness Identification and Alibi Evidence

Presentation order of ID and Alibi evidence was manipulated for undergraduate participants who conducted a simulated police investigation. Experiment 1 found a recency effect when an eyewitness rejected the investigator’s suspect. Experiment 2 also examined order effects, exploring how participant–investigators evaluated alibi information in addition to eyewitness ID information. When investigators saw the witness identify the suspect but also received a strong alibi for that suspect a recency effect occurred, such that whichever piece of information occurred at the end of the procedure had the strongest impact on investigators. Thus, type of evidence and evidence order both had a dramatic influence on participant–investigators’ decisions.     

The impact of general versus specific expert testimonyand eyewitness confidence upon mock juror judgment

Subjects (n=128) initially viewed an eyewitness of high or low confidence. Subsequently, participants viewed a psychologist who gave either espert testimony on the unreliability of eyewitness identification, specific expert testimony, or no expert (control) testimony. Subjects viewing expert testimony believed the eyewitness identified the gunman significantly less often, gave the defendant lower guilt ratings, estimated a lower general percentage of correct identifications under similar circumstances, estimated a lower percentage of general accurate eyewitness testimony, and gave significantly lower ratings to the belief that one can generally tell from eyewitness confidence whether an eyewitness is accurate than subjects in control conditions. Significant differences were also obtained between general and specific expert testimony. Participants viewing specific expert testimony estimated lower general percentages of correct identifications under the circumstances of the crime and reported relying more upon the psychologist's testimony than subjects viewing general expert testimony. Additionally, subjects viewing general expert testimony had significantly less confidence in their gunman vs. innocent person decision than subjects in specific testimony or control conditions. Subjects who viewed the high confidence eyewitness decided that the eyewitness correctly identified the gunman more often, gave the defendant higher guilt ratings, and estimated the general percentage of accurate eyewitness testimony to be significantly higher than jurors in low eyewitness confidence groups. The finding that jurors may continue to rely on eyewitness confidence to gauge the accuracy of the witness even after viewing expert testimony is discussed.     

Criminality,thinking patterns and treatment effects – evaluation of the Swedish cognitive intervention programme ‘new challenges’ targeting adult men with a criminal lifestyle

The cognitive intervention programme ‘New Challenges’ targeting adult men with a criminal lifestyle was evaluated in a pilot study. The participants were divided into a cognitive treatment group (n = 32) and a control group (n = 11). In the control group, six participants had no treatment and five participated in 12-step treatment. The participants were measured pre and post using the Psychological Inventory of Criminal Thinking Styles (PICTS), the abridged version of sense of coherence (SOC), Positive and Negative Affect Scale, and Bergström’s quality of programme delivery (QPD). The results of the treatment group showed that criminal thinking patterns dropped significantly from high values to close to normal level. SOC and positive affect increased significantly in the treatment group. Both SOC and positive affect showed positive correlation with QPD. Regarding the possible influence of the 12-step treatment, there was no difference in the control group between participants receiving 12-step treatment and those not receiving treatment. The main conclusion is that the cognitive treatment programme ‘New Challenges’ can contribute to reduced criminal thinking and increased SOC and positive affect, which may prove to be important precursors of reduced criminality.     

Validation studies in forensic odontology – Part 1: Accuracy of radiographic matching

As part of a series of studies aimed at validating techniques in forensic odontology, this study aimed to validate the accuracy of ante-mortem (AM)/postmortem (PM) radiographic matching by dentists and forensic odontologists. This study used a web-based interface with 50 pairs of AM and PM radiographs from real casework, at varying degrees of difficulty. Participants were shown both radiographs as a pair and initially asked to decide if they represented the same individual using a yes/no binary choice forced-decision. Participants were asked to assess their level of confidence in their decision, and to make a conclusion using one of the ABFO (American Board of Forensic Odontology), INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organisation) and DVISys? (DVI System International, Plass Data Software) identification scale degrees. The mean false-positive rate using the binary choice scale was 12%. Overall accuracy was 89% using this model, however, 13% of participants scored below 80%. Only 25% of participants accurately answered yes or no > 90% of the time, with no individual making the correct yes/no decision for all 50 pairs of radiographs. Non-odontologists (lay participants) scored poorly, with a mean accuracy of only 60%. Use of the graded ABFO, DVISYS and INTERPOL scales resulted in general improvements in performance, with the false-positive and false-negative rates falling to approximately 2% overall. Inter-examiner agreement in assigning scale degrees was good (ICC = 0.64), however there was little correlation between confidence and both accuracy or agreement among practitioners. These results suggest that use of a non-binary scale is supported over a match/non-match call as it reduces the frequency of false positives and negatives. The use of the terms “possible” and “insufficient information” in the same scale appears to create confusion, reducing inter-examiner agreement. The lack of agreement between higher-performing and lower-performing groups suggests that there is an inconsistency in the cognitive processes used to determine similarity between radiographs.