How to induce resistance to the misinformation effect? Characteristics of positive feedback in the reinforced self-affirmation procedure

ABSTRACT

The memory misinformation effect consists in the inclusion in witness testimonies of information from sources other than the given event. In the present article, research which aims to make people resistant to misinformation is presented. It is based on reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), a method designed to enhance participants’ self-confidence and therefore make them more willing to rely on their own memories instead of external sources. RSA includes self-affirmation and positive feedback. In the present research, the efficacy of various kinds of positive feedback was explored. The results of Experiment 1 suggested that positive feedback relating to memory (MemRSA) is effective in reducing the misinformation effect, while positive feedback relating to general cognitive ability is not. In Experiment 2, the superiority of MemRSA over inefficient feedback relating to attention was demonstrated. In Experiment 3, MemRSA was again effective, and more effective than inducing convictions about the independence of judgements, but this also reduced the misinformation effect. The results are discussed from the perspective of witnesses who remember the correct information yet rely on external sources due to a lack of confidence in t aforementioned heir memories.     

Extra Effort During Memory Retrieval May Be Associated with Increases in Eyewitness Confidence

When testifying in court, witnesses are motivated to try as hard as possible to give an accurate account. This study tested the proposition that extra effort by eyewitnesses during a memory test can lead to higher confidence ratings without any accompanying changes in accuracy. Participant-witnesses answered multiple-choice questions about a classroom visitor who had spoken 5 days earlier. In the high-motivation condition participants could earn prizes based on their memory test performance; in the low-motivation condition there were no special incentives. Although the motivation manipulation did not affect mean witness confidence, the confidence–accuracy and effort–accuracy correlations were substantially smaller in the high-motivation condition than in the low-motivation condition. Furthermore, the confidence ratings for those participants who reported expending high levels of effort in both motivation conditions were significantly higher than the confidence ratings for the low-effort participants, despite the fact that response accuracy did not differ as a function of reported effort. These findings have important implications for understanding how pressures to perform well in the courtroom can affect eyewitness confidence.     

Reinforced self-affirmation as a method for reducing the eyewitness misinformation effect

The misinformation effect occurs when an eyewitness includes information in their account that is incongruent with the event they witnessed, and stems from being exposed to incorrect external sources. Yet little research has been undertaken on techniques that could protect eyewitnesses from the influence of misinformation, despite the dangerous consequences of distorted testimony. In this article, a method of enhancing self-confidence, called reinforced self-affirmation (RSA), was proven to reduce the misinformation effect in five experiments. First, participants watched or heard an original event take place. They were then exposed to post-event material containing false information about that event, and finally they were given a memory test about the original material. The RSA, which took place either before the post-event material or before the final test, consisted of self-affirmation (recalling the greatest achievements in life) and external positive feedback (simulated ‘good’ results in a memory test or fake favourable results on personality tests). A meta-analysis of all five experiments revealed that the overall effect of RSA on reducing the misinformation was significant (effect size of 0.94), suggesting that this technique has the potential to be developed for practical use to make eyewitnesses less vulnerable to misinformation.     

Public Eyewitness Confidence Can Be Influenced by the Presence of Other Witnesses

Four experiments were conducted to examine whether witnesses' public confidence ratings differ from their private ratings when there are social pressures to use confidence as an impression-management tool. In all four experiments, participants answered questions about a source event (a series of faces in the first three experiments and a simulated crime scene in the fourth). Half of the responses and confidence ratings were given privately and anonymously, and half were given publicly in front of one or more mock jurors. Two central findings emerged from the results. First, public confidence differed from private confidence only when there was more than one witness; when there were no other witnesses, public and private confidence were the same. Second, the direction of the change in public confidence in the multiple-witness settings was influenced by whether or not there was a possibility of being contradicted by the other witnesses. When there was no chance that the participants' responses could be contradicted, they raised their confidence ratings in public; when there was a chance that the other witnesses might contradict them, the participants lowered their public confidence ratings. The results are discussed in terms of self-presentation theory and implications for the legal system.     

Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later

The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling concerning suggestive eyewitness identification procedures (Manson v. Braithwaite, 1977, 432 U.S. 98) has not been revisited by the Court in the intervening 30+ years. Meanwhile, scientific studies of eyewitnesses have progressed and DNA exonerations show that mistaken identification is the primary cause of convictions of the innocent. We analyzed the two-inquiry logic in Manson in light of eyewitness science. Several problems are discussed. Ironically, we note that suggestive identification procedures (determined in the first inquiry) boost the eyewitnesses’ standing on three of the five criteria (used in the second inquiry) that are used to decide whether the suggestive procedures were a problem. The net effect undermines safeguards intended by the Court and destroys incentives to avoid suggestive procedures.

When Does Evidence of Eyewitness Confidence Inflation Affect Judgments in a Criminal Trial?

Two studies investigated perceptions of eyewitness confidence inflation: increases in a witness's confidence between the time of the identification and the trial. Experiment 1 (N = 90) demonstrated that, for White participants, assessments of the strength of the defense case, the eyewitness's view, and participants' confidence in the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when there was evidence that the eyewitness's confidence increased over time (mere inflation condition), compared with a control condition. In addition, assessments of the defendant's guilt and the eyewitness's accuracy were more favorable to the defense when the eyewitness was aggressively challenged about the change in her confidence report (inflation + challenge). Experiment 2 (N = 360) demonstrated that, for Hispanic participants, sensitivity to confidence inflation did not interact with manipulations of the eyewitness's or defendant's race (White vs. Hispanic). In addition, the confidence inflation effect did not replicate with the Hispanic participants. Results are interpreted in terms of the ingroup bias in legal judgments and directions for future research.     

Interviewing Witnesses: The Effect of Forced Confabulation on Event Memory

After viewing a crime video, participants answered 16 answerable and 6 unanswerable questions. Those in the "voluntary guess" condition had a "don't know" response option; those in the "forced guess" condition did not. One week later the same questions were answered with a "don't know" option. In both experiments, information generated from forced confabulation was less likely remembered than information voluntarily self-generated. Further, when the same answer was given to an unanswerable question both times, the confidence expressed in the answer increased over time in both the forced and the voluntary guess conditions. Pressing eyewitnesses to answer questions, especially questions repeated thrice (Experiment 2), may not be an effective practice because it reliably increases intrusion errors but not correct recall.     

A Problem with Double-Blind Photospread Procedures: Photospread Administrators Use One Eyewitness's Confidence to Influence the Identification of Another Eyewitness

In Experiment 1, photospread administrators (PAs, N = 50) showed a target-absent photospread to a confederate eyewitness (CW), who was randomly assigned to identify one photo with either high or low confidence. PAs subsequently administered the same target-absent photospread to participant eyewitnesses (PWs, N = 50), all of whom had viewed a live staged crime 1 week earlier. CWs were rated by the PAs as significantly more confident in the high-confidence condition versus low-confidence condition. More importantly, the confidence of the CW affected the identification decision of the PW. In the low-confidence condition, the photo identified by the CW was identified by the PW significantly more than the other photos; there was no significant difference in photo choice in the high-confidence condition. In spite of the obvious influence exerted in the low-confidence condition, observers were not able to detect bias in the photospread procedures. A second experiment was conducted to test a post-hoc explanation for the results of Experiment 1: PAs exerted influence in the low-confidence condition because they perceived the task as more difficult for the eyewitness than in the high-confidence condition. Independent observers (N = 84) rated the difficulty of the confederate's task as higher in the low-confidence condition compared with the high-confidence condition, suggesting that expectations of task difficulty might be driving the effect observed in Experiment 1. Results support recommendations for double-blind photospreads and emphasize that the same investigator should not administer photo lineups to multiple eyewitnesses in an investigation.     

Can a witness report hearsay evidence unintentionally? The effects of discussion on eyewitness memory

Abstract

When eyewitnesses are exposed to misinformation about an event from a co-witness, they often incorporate this misinformation in their recall of the event. The current research aimed to investigate whether this memory conformity phenomenon is due to change in the witness's memory for the event, or to social pressures to conform to the co-witness's account. Participants were shown a crime video and then asked to discuss the video in groups, with some receiving misinformation about the event from their discussion partners. After a one-week delay some participants were warned about possible misinformation before all participants provided their own account of the event. In Study 1, participants made remember/know judgments about the items recalled, and in Study 2 they indicated the source of their memories. Co-witness information was incorporated into participants’ testimonies, and this effect was not reduced by warnings or source monitoring instructions, suggesting memory change may have occurred. However, there was some indication that remember/know judgments may help distinguish between ‘real’ memories and co-witness information.