Strategy and Selection in International Relations

It is widely recognized that many of the samples we use for statistical analysis in international politics are the result of some selection process. Not surprisingly, selection models are becoming increasingly popular. At the same time, the role of strategic interaction has begun to play a more important role in statistical analyses. However, it has not been clear how statistical strategic models and selection models relate to each other, or what the effects are of employing one when the other is the more appropriate model. In this article, I 1) clarify why international relations scholars cannot shield themselves from selection bias simply by assuming their results are limited to a given sample; 2) show how recent statistical strategic models relate to traditional selection models and generalize the two sets of models by deriving a correlated strategic model; and 3) examine the effects of misspecifying either correlated errors or strategic interaction. My results indicate that failure to model the strategic interaction produces worse specification error than failure to account for correlated disturbances. In fact, traditional bivariate probit models appear to be superior only when states are almost completely uncertain about each others' preferences.     

Capability concentration,power transition,and war

Theories of international politics and war are generally formulated at the state, dyad, or system level of analysis. Systemic theories focus on structural attributes of the international system such as the distribution of capabilities. Alternatively, state‐level theories tend to emphasize national attributes, whereas dyadic theories concentrate on relational qualities between paired sets of states. This study presents an analysis of war at these analytic levels and explores the possibilities of synergistic empirical linkage. The results of a simple statistical experiment demonstrate that the two higher levels of aggregation are not separate and independent: The interaction of system and dyad‐level power dynamics is associated with patterns of international conflict, and the integration of shifting capability distributions at these levels produces a more adequate explanation of the sources of major power war.     

Why Should I Believe You? The Costs and Consequences of Bilateral Investment Treaties

Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are the primary legal mechanism protecting foreign direct investment (FDI) around the world. BITs are thought to encourage FDI by establishing a broad set of investor's rights and by allowing investors to sue a host state in an international tribunal if these rights are violated. Perhaps surprisingly, the empirical literature connecting BITs to FDI flows has produced conflicting results. Some papers have found that BITs attract FDI, while others have found no relationship or even that BITs repel FDI. I suggest in this paper that these results stem from statistical models that do not fully capture the causal mechanisms that link BITs to FDI. Extant literature has often suggested that BITs may encourage investment from both protected and unprotected investors, yet the literature has not allowed for a full evaluation of this claim. This paper explores the theoretical underpinnings and empirical implications of an institution that works in these direct and indirect ways, and offers a statistical test that is capable of distinguishing between the two. The results indicate that: (1) BITs attract significant amounts of investment; (2) BITs attract this investment from protected and unprotected investors; and (3) these results are obscured by endogeneity unless corrected for in the statistical model.     

Dyadic Effects,Relevance, and the Empirical Assessment of the Kantian Peace

Dyadic effects to a large extent account for the difficulty of explaining and predicting international conflict. In this study, I derive a statistical model to estimate unobserved dyadic effects in the dyadic analysis of conflict. The proposed model employs a hierarchical modeling approach to estimate dyadic effects, thereby avoiding the problems caused by the use of fixed effects models. Furthermore, it simultaneously addresses the important sample selection issue of identifying relevant dyads. I show that the estimation of dyadic effects significantly improves the model fit and generates several interesting findings. Substantively, this study makes an important contribution to the empirical evaluation of the Kantian peace. It argues that international organizations increase the likelihood of conflict of interest between member states but reduce the probability of militarized conflict. I demonstrate that the positive coefficient of international organizations in Oneal and Russett (1999) is biased in the positive direction. When the proposed statistical model is used, international organizations, together with trade and democracy, reduce the probability of conflict.     

Explaining Costly International Institutions: Persuasion and Enforceable Human Rights Norms

Why do states create enforceable international human rights norms that empower third parties to prevent and sanction domestic human rights abuses? Recent theories suggest that international institutions are shaped not only by power and interests but also by the content of arguments during intensive communication and argumentation processes. Moving beyond the simple notion that "communication matters," I argue that states are likely to be persuaded by arguments that draw on widespread taken-for-granted norms, in particular, prohibitions on bodily harm, the importance of precedent in decision making, and the link between cooperation and progress. This model extends previous theories by specifying mechanisms and scope conditions for international change through persuasion. I illustrate the argument by examining the convention against torture, a costly international institution that allows domestic courts to prosecute crimes that occur in the territory of other states (universal jurisdiction). Because of its enforcement mechanisms, the torture convention poses a difficult case for theories explaining international institutions. If persuasion models can explain even costly institutions, they should be more widely considered as explanations for all kinds of international institutions.     

Power Politics or Public Pandering? An Empirical Investigation of Economic Sanctions and Presidential Approval

How do economic sanctions affect presidential approval? Competing claims have been made about the domestic political consequences of economic sanctions. One claim is that sanctions are unpopular because they have negative economic consequences; another claim is that sanctions are popular because they project an image of strength; and another claim is that sanctions are neither popular nor unpopular because the public is uninformed about international affairs. These arguments imply competing identification restrictions. I test these competing models using a Bayesian Structural Vector Autoregression (B-SVAR) model. The results show that sanctions have a moderate negative effect on presidential approval. I use these findings as a basis for a broader set of auxiliary analyses. Despite received wisdom, sanctions imposed for different reasons against different target states do not produce disparate effects on public opinion. These analyses resolve an important empirical dilemma that weighs on a range of theoretical perspectives in the sanctions literature and highlights fruitful avenues for future research.     

Discursive Multilateralism: Global Benchmarks, Shame, and Learning in the ILO Labor Standards Monitoring Regime

A distinct feature of contemporary international relations is the proliferation of multilateral monitoring regimes. Despite the significance of this for the study of international law and organization, little empirical evaluation of the effectiveness of multilateral monitoring exists. This article examines the effectiveness of the supervisory system of the International Labor Organization (ILO), widely recognized as the prototypical model for all multilateral monitoring regimes. I examine the speech acts and rule-practices of the ILO regime within a hermeneutic/constructivist framework. This yields a set of heuristic hypotheses reflective of the "logic" that guides regime interactions with its member states. This asserts that "shame" influences member states to comply and respond positively to regime obligations. To test this, I statistically generate global benchmarks. These consist of world and regional averages in the behavioral patterns of member states. Quantitative findings demonstrate recidivist patterns of deviance by "global pariahs" set against a statistical background consisting of large-scale normative conformity on the part of ILO member states but configured around some regional variations. My analysis contends that global benchmarking reduces the risks of member state defection from core international labor standards and thereby promotes monitoring by learning or discursive multilateralism.     

Conceptualizing Interstate Conflict: How Do Concept-Building Strategies Relate to Selection Effects?

An essential, but often overlooked, role of concepts lies in how they constitute or define populations. Explicit choices made by researchers about concept structure are tied inextricably to the selection rule for identifying cases to include in analyses. Concept construction issues are absolutely crucial because the concept structure used interacts in various, usually hidden, ways with theories and hypotheses that researchers want to test. The concepts used to select cases may be correlated with common dependent variables hence producing selection bias. We illustrate this potential by exploring international crises as they have been conceptualized by the ICB Project. We show that two alternative conceptualizations of “crisis” produce populations that correlate with common ICB dependent variables. Our empirical analyses pay particular attention to variables related to power because they are particularly susceptible to being influenced by these selection effects.     

Beyond Dyads: Regional Democratic Strength’s Influence on Dyadic Conflict

Over the history of modern international relations research, we have moved from systemic and regional studies to empirical explorations of dyadic interactions. However, our statistical models have put the details of dyadic interactions under a microscope at the expense of ignoring the relevant regional context that these dyads interact in. This development has been in part due to computational limitations, but do we really believe that decision makers interact with one another while ignoring the regional power balance and the wishes of regional powers? In this article, I take a look at the well-researched relationship between democracy and peace by using a multilevel approach to dyadic interactions and the regions they are embedded in. The findings suggest that when the regional power balance favors democracies, it influences conflict between dyads, especially mixed dyads, by increasing the costs of aggression by autocracies and establishing regional norms of cooperation and compromise.     

Repression of the Human Right to Personal Integrity Revisited: A Global Cross-National Study Covering the Years 1976–1993

Here we seek to build on our earlier research (Poe and Tate, 1994) by re-testing similar models on a data set covering a much longer time span; the period from 1976 to 1993. Several of our findings differ from those of our earlier work. Here we find statistical evidence that military regimes lead to somewhat greater human rights abuse, defined in terms of violations of personal integrity, once democracy and a host of other factors are controlled. Further, we find that countries that have experienced British colonial influence tend to have relatively fewer abuses of personal integrity rights than others. Finally, our results suggest that leftist countries are actually less repressive of these basic human rights than non-leftist countries. Consistent with the Poe and Tate (1994) study, however, we find that past levels of repression, democracy, population size, economic development, and international and civil wars exercise statistically significant and substantively important impacts on personal integrity abuse.     

A Universal Test of an Expected Utility Theory of War

Bueno de Mesquita and Lalman's version of an expected utility theory of war has become one of the most widely cited theories of international conflict. However, the testing of the theory has lagged behind its theoretical development. In its most sophisticated formulation, the theory has been tested on only 707 dyad-years, all drawn from Europe between 1816 and 1970. We present a test of the expected utility theory of war (as developed in War and Reason ) on the international system from 1816 to 1984. Specifically, we examine the relationship between the main equilibrium variables derived under the "domestic variant" of the international interaction game and behavioral outcomes using multinomial logit. We find that the equilibria correlate with actual behavior in both the set of all dyads and a subset of politically relevant dyads, even after including a set of control variables. The relationship is somewhat less clear among the population of all interstate-directed dyads, however, with key equilibrium variables having smaller effects at increasing the odds of interstate conflict among all dyads. We also present a new software program, EUGene , which generates expected utility data and can serve as an important data management tool for international relations researchers.     

International Organizations and Government Killing: Does Naming and Shaming Save Lives?

Do international organizations affect government killing? Extant work has studied international organizations' effects on a set of human rights, but has not examined the abilities of specific actors to protect specific rights. I analyze naming and shaming by three types of international organizations (human rights nongovernmental organizations [NGOs], the news media, and the United Nations), focusing on their impacts on a single type of abuse: one-sided government killing. I present a principal-agent theory in which the government develops a preference for killing, and then delegates the murderous task to a set of individual perpetrators. The theory reveals new ways for international organizations to make killing costly, and statistical analyses support my expectations: By calling attention to abusive states, human rights NGOs and the United Nations can reduce both the likelihood and severity of state-sponsored murder. I also find that international organizations are better equipped to prevent killing from the beginning than to limit mounting body counts once it has begun.     

Outside the box: Explaining sanctions in pursuit of foreign economic goals*

Despite a marked increase in research on economic sanctions, empirical work has been constrained to a set of cases where sanctions are used for political or security issues, i.e., “high politics.” Since most theories of sanctions are generalizable to cases of political economy, i.e., “low politics,” this ad hoc empirical restriction is puzzling. This paper examines how well the existing theories of economic coercion can explain sanctions used to extract concessions on trade or regulatory issues. These theories are tested on a data set of 86 observations of the United States using or threatening section 301 action against a variety of target states. The results indicate that a conflict expectations approach is able to explain these cases as well as cases of high politics sanctions. Approaches stressing domestic politics or the use of sanctions as signals are of little use.     

Kantian Liberalism, Regime Type, and Military Resource Allocation: Do Democracies Spend Less?

In this paper, we evaluate the liberal claim that democratic states devote fewer resources to their militaries. Low military spending is thought to avert conflict spirals and release more resources to fund domestic programs. While prominent in many liberal international relations theories, most notably in Immanuel Kant's, this proposition has received little empirical scrutiny. Using several indicators of military resource allocation and data on a wide range of states since 1816, we find empirical support for the liberal argument, although regime type is not necessarily the strongest influence on military resource allocation.     

The Joint Democracy–Dyadic Conflict Nexus: A Simultaneous Equations Model

Many statistical studies in international relations investigate the claim that democracies do not fight one another. Virtually all of these studies employ a single-equation design, where the dependent variable measures the presence or absence of a dyadic militarized interstate dispute (MID). A separate group of studies argues that conflict affects democracy and that its effect could be positive or negative. By and large, these two bodies of literature have not incorporated one another's insights. We argue that democracy and dyadic conflict affect each other significantly and that statistical models that ignore the reciprocal nature of these effects may make incorrect inferences. To test this argument, we develop a simultaneous equations model of democracy and dyadic conflict. Our sample includes all the politically relevant dyads from 1950 to 1992. We find that dyadic military disputes reduce joint democracy and joint democracy reduces the probability of MIDs. Compared with the single-equation estimates in the literature, the absolute effect of joint democracy in our paper is smaller while in relative terms, the effect is similar in size. The effect of joint democracy on MID involvement is considerably smaller for noncontiguous countries than for contiguous ones. The effects of a number of control variables in the MID equation are also found to differ from those reported previously in single- equation–based studies.     

Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises

A number of recent international situations have raised again questions regarding the usefulness of economic sanctions as an instrument of foreign policy. Sanctions continue to be applied in a variety of contexts, yet we have not developed a sufficient understanding of the processes involved to determine when, or even if, sanctions can "work." While a great deal has been written on the subject, there have been neither attempts to subject the theoretical arguments to empirical testing nor efforts to provide systematic theoretical explanations for the empirical results that have been produced. In this article, we attempt to address this shortcoming in the literature. We propose a theory of sanctions effectiveness that is based on the spatial model of bargaining in international crises and use this theory to derive a number of hypotheses regarding when sanctions should produce favorable policy outcomes. We then subject some of the derived hypotheses to an empirical test based on a large number of international disputes. The model suggests that while sanctions will not work in many cases, they can have a slight effect on the distribution of expected outcomes if the costs of the sanctions are sufficiently high relative to the values at stake. The available evidence appears to support these expectations.     

Defining international terrorism: A pragmatic approach

One of the fundamental problems in addressing the phenomenon of international terrorism is that despite a plethora of scholarly work and more than thirty years of inter‐governmental discourse there is still no commonly accepted definition of international terrorism. Existing definitions tend to fall into two broad categories academic and political. Contemporary academic definitions of international terrorism are primarily designed to fit incidents into various statistical models. They are often lengthy, over‐complicated and defy common usage. Governmental definitions of international terrorism tend to be ambiguous to allow the most politically convenient interpretation of events. This paper takes a pragmatic look at the ongoing definitional dilemma in the study of international terrorism. Drawing upon both sides of the definitional spectrum, it charts a middle course arguing for a more lucid and functional definition of terrorism based on primary characteristics which distinguish international terrorism from other types of violence.     

Explaining the behaviour of small states: an analysis of Jordan's nuclear energy policya

Conventional analyses claim that small states bandwagon with leading international powers. The dominant view is that small states' vulnerabilities and limited power hinder their ability to pursue policy goals. This study critiques this position by investigating why and how Jordan continues to pursue a nuclear energy programme despite objections from the United States—its principal ally. By using theories of small states, this study analyses discursive practices in Jordanian policymaking. This approach is used to describe Jordan's nuclear energy policy and posit a logic of the effects that energy insecurity has on the government's perception of Jordan as a ‘small state’. I use this to create hypotheses concerning the conditions under which small states may not simply bandwagon with key international allies, but may have more freedom to pursue their goals than traditional analyses predict. Explanations that assume small states always have limited freedom to pursue policy goals without the backing of key allies are not supported by the evidence considered here.     

The tyranny of distance: Redefining relevant dyads

A variety of definitions of “crisis” plague the study of international crisis. The purpose of the paper is to demonstrate the reasons for the divergence and a possible solution to the problem.

Definitions of “crisis” tend to incorporate a variety of elements. Some focus on the micro‐level of decisionmakers in particular countries; others look at the macro‐level of international system change; still other definitions are multi‐level, incorporating both micro‐ and macro‐components. A second set of differences is rooted in metaphysical assumptions. Some definitions look at “crisis” as something recognized by the mind of the individual, a perceptual process that is basically mental; other definitions, which tend to equate “crisis” with “stress,” assume that “crisis” is a physical phenomenon that can be measured by information flows, physiological tensions, or other objective observable behavior. A dualist approach insists that “crisis” is simultaneously physical and nonphysical is also evident in the literature. A third aspect of “crisis” definitions is whether the researcher seeks to stipulate an arbitrary meaning for the term on the basis of supposed self‐evident logic or whether data are collected prior to an effort to define the term; this is the familiar distinction between rationalism and empiricism, with facet theory as an approach that combines elements of both approaches.

Various approaches attempt to test theories of “crisis” with definitions determined by their metaphysical foundations. The models identified are as follows: hostile interaction, individual stress, physiological overload, organizational response, and cost calculation. Findings based on various empirical tests of the theories show that there is very little agreement in the literature on variables associated with “crisis”; more often than not, if a variable is linked with “crisis” positively in one study, the same variable is either linked negatively or has no correlation with “crisis” in a second study. The source of the empirical divergence may be that the various studies sample different cases—or differing definitions may account for the lack of consensus in the field.

The paper concludes by urging that research on international crisis should be absorbed into larger theoretical concerns that focus on the objectives motivating the studies, as this appears to be one way to maintain definitional uniformity. Studies on crisis anticipation and crisis management should be viewed as efforts at war prevention. Studies on crisis management, which aim to reduce foreign policy fiascoes should be conceived in terms of foreign policy management. Findings of such studies can then be appraised in terms of the goals they seek.     

Across the Great Divide: Integrating Comparative and International Politics

Research in comparative and international politics often deals with the same questions, such as the nature of war, the conduct of foreign economic policy, and the consequences of different political institutions. Yet there is a pronounced gap between these two subfields of political science. In neorealist theory, this gap is to be expected, since the structure of the international system cannot be reduced to facts about its component units. Given the incompleteness of international relations theory, it rarely provides knowledge that is sufficient to explain the actions of the component units. This theoretical insufficiency provides the motivation to bring theories of domestic and international politics closer together. Three attempts to integrate comparative and international politics are discussed in this article. The first derives from the logic of two-level games as originally advanced by Robert Putnam. The second relies on a special application of second-image reversed theory by Ronald Rogowski in Commerce and Coalitions. The third examines the merging of previously distinctive systems of rules and laws among countries in the European Union. This approach does not rely on a single exemplar (as do the first two) but uses a number of institutional and legal theories to conceptualize the domestification of a regional, international political system. Thus, strategic interaction, the domestic effects of international trade flows, and institutional merging of legal systems provide three quite different metaphors for narrowing the gap between our knowledge of domestic and of international politics.