Orphans,apprenticeships, and the world of work

This article explores a frequent and important practice in the ancien Régime society, namely, apprenticeship. The apprenticeship contracts of legitimate orphans (boys and girls) who were received in institutions that specialized in caring for them — such as the Trinité or the Saint-Esprit — provide the data for this study. By focusing on these two, it is possible to compare two groups of orphans, as well as differences in the intentions and accomplishments of the institutions in terms of offering instruction and preparation for the working world. This examination focuses on the transition from the institution to society. How did the orphans interpret this transition? And how did administrators perceive their roles? The example of the Trinité and the Saint-Esprit serves to rectify the common image of the hospitals as poor and highly imperfect in terms of education and apprenticeship. It shows that these were genuine training institutions for older children.     

Orphans,apprenticeships, and the world of work: The Trinité and Saint-Esprit hospitals in Paris in the 17th century

This article explores a frequent and important practice in the ancien Régime society, namely, apprenticeship. The apprenticeship contracts of legitimate orphans (boys and girls) who were received in institutions that specialized in caring for them — such as the Trinité or the Saint-Esprit — provide the data for this study. By focusing on these two, it is possible to compare two groups of orphans, as well as differences in the intentions and accomplishments of the institutions in terms of offering instruction and preparation for the working world. This examination focuses on the transition from the institution to society. How did the orphans interpret this transition? And how did administrators perceive their roles? The example of the Trinité and the Saint-Esprit serves to rectify the common image of the hospitals as poor and highly imperfect in terms of education and apprenticeship. It shows that these were genuine training institutions for older children.     

How Reflective and Critical Norm-Usage Paves the Way to the Public Power of Judgement

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that Neil MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage makes it necessary to address the concept of the public power of judgement as the key concept for understanding the democratic legitimization of current law. Therefore, firstly I analyse MacCormick’s conception of norm-usage, secondly I demonstrate that it leads to the idea of the institutionalisation of judgemental–interpretative practice, and thirdly, I show that the latter paves the way to the public power of judgement. Finally, I argue that this power needs to be elaborated in terms of competencies which are broader than legal skills and legal reasoning, and, further, that these competencies condition the use of both legal skills and reasoning. Importantly, MacCormick’s contribution to understanding the public power of judgement—when further developed—may indicate the profound role of comprehending the proper significance of law in a democratic polity and its relationship to the citizenry.

     

The Tantric Context of Ratnākaraśānti’s Philosophy of Mind

The conflicting positions of the two early eleventh century Yogācāra scholars, Ratnākara?ānti and his critic Jñāna?rīmitra, concerning whether or not consciousness can exist without content (ākāra) are inseparable from their respective understandings of enlightenment. Ratnākara?ānti argues that consciousness can be contentless (nirākāra)—and that, for a buddha, it must be. Mental content can be defeated by reasoning and made to disappear by meditative cultivation, and so it is fundamentally distinct (bheda) from the nature of consciousness, which is never defeated and never ceases. That mental content is thus separable from the nature of consciousness is unimaginable to Jñāna?rīmitra, who argues that all mental content cannot be so defeated, nor can it disappear completely, and who concludes that Ratnākara?ānti’s commitment to this idea can be based on nothing but faith (?raddhā). Contra Jñāna?rīmitra, I will suggest that Ratnākara?ānti’s view is based not only on faith, but is also driven by a certain (often implicit) theory of buddhahood, the implications of which he is committed to working out. Because Ratnākara?ānti’s theory of buddhahood is developed in part in his tantric work, our understanding of his position benefits from our reading it in this context, wherein buddhahood and the most effective techniques for attaining it are explored.     

La mediación en casos de sustracción internacional de menores por uno de los progenitores y los acuerdos voluntarios Transfronterizos: El Caso Mexicano

The general goal of the present article is to provide a way of reasoning through a series of conclusions that may contribute to foster a frequently overlooked topic in Private International Law, we refer to the acknowledgement and enforcement of voluntary cross-border family agreements that may as well result in the creation of Soft Law instruments, such as the Guidelines for good practice in mediation. These are definitely enough reasons to try to spare children from irreversible damage arising from international family conflicts that could be mitigated — if not altogether deactivated— through cross-border voluntary agreements, acknowledged and enforced in all jurisdictions involved.     

Independent Self-Construal and Opposition to Affirmative Action: The Role of Microjustice and Macrojustice Preferences

Why are people with a stronger independent self-construal more opposed to affirmative action than those with a weaker independent self-construal? Drawing on prior research, we predicted that this is because the former endorse microjustice principles—which are perceived to be violated by affirmative action—and disregard macrojustice principles—which affirmative action seeks to ensure. In contrast, people with a weak independent self-construal endorse both microjustice and macrojustice. The results from three studies support our reasoning. Our research contributes to theorizing on affirmative action by illuminating the important role of both microjustice and macrojustice concerns in predicting opposition to affirmative action. We discuss the implications of our research within the North American context for increasing people’s endorsement of macrojustice in an effort to mitigate opposition to social policies aimed at redressing societal injustice.     

Screening Biological Stains with qPCR versus Lateral Flow Immunochromatographic Test Strips: A Quantitative Comparison using Analytical Figures of Merit

Biological fluid identification is an important facet of evidence examination in forensic laboratories worldwide. While identifying bodily fluids may provide insight into which downstream DNA methods to employ, these screening techniques consume a vital portion of the available evidence, are usually qualitative, and rely on visual interpretation. In contrast, qPCR yields information regarding the amount and proportion of amplifiable genetic material. In this study, dilution series of either semen or male saliva were prepared in either buffer or female blood. The samples were subjected to both lateral flow immunochromatographic test strips and qPCR analysis. Analytical figures of merit—including sensitivity, minimum distinguishable signal (MDS) and limit of detection (LOD)—were calculated and compared between methods. By applying the theory of the propagation of random errors, LODs were determined to be 0.05 μL of saliva for the RSID? Saliva cards, 0.03 μL of saliva for Quantifiler^® Duo, and 0.001 μL of semen for Quantifiler^® Duo. In conclusion, quantitative PCR was deemed a viable and effective screening method for subsequent DNA profiling due to its stability in different matrices, sensitivity, and low limits of detection.     

How Does the European Court of Justice Reason? A Review Essay on the Legal Reasoning of the European Court of Justice

This review essay analyses two significant recent contributions to the debate over the reasoning of the Court of Justice (CJ). These contributions highlight the impossibility of a wholly scientific and deductive approach to attributing ‘correct’ outcomes to the Court's case‐law. At the same time, their analysis adds significant findings for the debate over the Court's possible ‘activist’ or political role. Following from these contributions, this essay makes two arguments: firstly, that the inability of the Court to anchor its reasoning solely in a deductive form of legal reasoning should encourage the CJ to engage in a more advanced ‘constitutional dialogue’ with the EU's political institutions; and secondly, that truly understanding the Court's reasoning involves a closer analysis of the institutional and personal dynamics influencing Court decisions. Understanding European judicial reasoning may require a closer look at the social and political—as well as doctrinal—context within which European judges act.     

Of Mice and Men: God and the Canadian Supreme Court

Abstract. In a recent 5‐to‐4 decision, the Supreme Court of Canada denied to Harvard University a patent on a genetically modified mouse. In their reasoning, the majority Justices, concerned obviously about the implications of granting the patent for the human case, argue that higher organisms (mammals) are not “compositions of matter” in the sense intended by the Canadian Patent Act. But if a mouse is not a composition of matter, what—indeed, what on earth—is it? As the minority Justices complain, the majority decision smacks of dubious metaphysics and theology. Appealing to a quite unlikely source, the Bible, I show that the distinction between mice and men can be defended without introducing problematic metaphysical and question‐begging theological materials. I also show, en route, that the biblical position on the special status of men and women is not inconsistent with evolutionary theory. Granting a patent on the mouse (as was done in the U.S.A.) is compatible with denying it to human organisms.     

Qiagen's Investigator™ Quantiplex Kit as a Predictor of STR Amplification Success from Low‐Yield DNA Samples,

Qiagen's Investigator? Quantiplex kit, a total human DNA quantitation kit, has a 200‐base pair internal control, fast cycling time, and scorpion molecules containing a covalently linked primer, probe, fluorophore, and quencher. The Investigator? Quantiplex kit was evaluated to investigate a value under which complete short tandem repeat (STR) failure was consistently obtained. Buccal swabs were extracted using the Qiagen QIAamp^® DNA Blood Mini Kit, quantified with the Investigator? Quantiplex kit using a tested half‐volume reaction, amplified with the ABI AmpFlSTR^® Identifiler kit, separated on the 3100Avant Genetic Analyzer, and data analyzed with GeneMapper^® ID v.3.2. While undetected samples were unlikely to produce sufficient data for statistical calculations or CODIS upload (2.00 alleles and 0.82 complete loci on average), data may be useful for exclusionary purposes. Thus, the Investigator? Quantiplex kit may be useful for predicting STR success. These findings are comparable with previously reported data from the Quantifiler? Human kit.     

A Voice for the Fish? Climate Change Litigation and Potential Causes of Action for Impacts under the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement

The seas—all the seas—cry for regulation as a veritable res communis omnium. ² Louis Henkin, Arctic Anti-Pollution: Does Canada Make—or Break—International Law? 65 AJIL 131, 136 (1971).      

Prisons and Crime, Backwards in High Heels

Objectives

Prisons reduce crime rates, but crime increases prison populations. OLS estimates of the effects of prisons on crime combine the two effects and are biased toward zero. The standard solution—to identify the crime equation by finding instruments for prison—is suspect, because most variables that predict prison populations can be expected to affect crime, as well. An alternative is to identify the prison equation by finding instruments for crime, allowing an unbiased estimate of the effect of crime on prisons. Because the two coefficients in a simultaneous system are related through simple algebra, we can then work backward to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of prisons on crime.

Methods

Potential instruments for crime are tested and used to identify the prison equation for the 50 U.S. states for the period 1978–2009. The effect of prisons on crime consistent with this relationship is obtained through algebra; standard errors are obtained through Monte Carlo simulation.

Results

Resulting estimates of the effect of prisons on crime are around ?0.25 ± 0.15. This is larger than biased OLS estimates, but similar in size to previous estimates based on standard instruments.

Conclusions

When estimating the effect of a public policy response on a public problem, it may be more productive to find instruments for the problem and work backward than to find instruments for the response and work forward.     

Prāsaṅgika Epistemology: A Reply to Stag tsang’s Charge Against Tsongkhapa’s Uses of Pramāṇa in Candrakīrti’s Philosophy

Stag tsang, amongst others, has argued that any use of mundane pramā?a—authoritative cognition—is incompatible with the Prāsa?gika system. His criticism of Tsongkhapa’s interpretation of Candrakīrti’s Madhyamaka which insists on the uses of pramā?a (tha snyad pa’i tshad ma)—authoritative cognition—within the Prāsa?gika philosophical context is that it is contradictory and untenable. This paper is my defence of Tsongkhapa’s approach to pramā?a in the Prāsa?gika philosophy. By showing that Tsongkhapa consistently adopts a non-foundationalist approach in his interpretation of the Prāsa?gika’s epistemology, and by showing that he emphatically denies any place for the foundationalist epistemology of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti in the Prāsa?gika system, I will argue that Tsongkhapa’s epistemology emerges from Stag tsang’s criticisms unscathed.     

Metaphorical Use of Algorithm in Legal Reasoning

The current use of big data in the legal framework suggests the idea of algorithm as a new topos of the legal rhetoric. Indeed, in addition to the “rhetoric of algorithm”, an “algorithm of rhetoric” may also exist, in strict connection with an anthropological structure. Even leaving aside its epistemic value, the algorithm is in fact always experienced by the jurist through a metaphorical process, in a very similar way, for instance, to the metaphorical use of graphs in economics (McCloskey). That said, the reasoning about big data is metaphorical as well, and this allows us to believe that there is still a role for pathos and ethos within the legal reasoning. Moreover, and most importantly, the ideal to which the data-based knowledge (the so called dataism) aims—that is, the pretension of being able to map all that there is to know—is metaphorical, too. In this paper I will discuss algorithms and big data in the guise of new topoi. The aim of this paper is therefore to imagine a philosophical-juridical semiotic by means of which it is possible to highlight the persistent difference between reasonableness and reason in the judge’s work. Vis-à-vis algorithms and big data, as well as the rules of law, the judge does not act as bouche de la loi, but rather practices a reason which is irreducibly rhetoric and related to the humanities.

     

Analogical Reasoning as Translation:: The Pragmatics of Transivity

This paper attempts to examine the underlying structure of analogical reasoning in decision making. The immediate (but not exclusive) context is the form of reasoning commonly seen as prevalent in common-law judicial decision making. Following Wittgenstein and Strawson the paper identifies the problem of the contingency of transitivity ofanalogical relations as a serious impediment to analogical reasoning. It then proceeds to offer a method of translation that delineates the borders of contingency and analyticity of transitivity in such cases, as well as proposeshow these borders may be manipulated. The theoretical insight is to treat analogical relations anaphorically, as ``propredicates'.Accordingly, the translation involves constructive functional transformation from the form of meaning as continuum to the form of meaning as n-chotomies. Greimasian semiotics are then critically applied to examine in what sense ``translation' – in this specific sense – can count as the ``deep structure' of analogical/transitive reasoning, and what sucha claim entails in terms of linguistic ideology. Although the model of translation is formal it is not acontextual, and must be supplemented by importation of constitutive practicalconsiderations (i.e. norms) from concrete decision-making contexts. As such this is a case study of the pragmatic functions offormalization – a conception that may seem alien to some. When determining which states-of-affairs are deemed compatible, the formal model is shown to serve as a framework to what eventually becomes a pragmatic device.     

Realizing the unreal: Dharmakīrti’s theory of yogic perception

The Buddhist epistemologist Dharmakīrti (fl. ca. 7th century C.E.) developed a theory of yogic perception that achieved much influence among Buddhist thinkers in India and Tibet. His theory includes an odd problem: on Dharmakīrti’s view, many of the paradigmatic objects of the adept’s meditations do not really exist. How can one cultivate a meditative perception of the nonexistent? This ontological difficulty stems from Dharmakīrti’s decision to construe the Four Noble Truths as the paradigmatic objects of yogic perception. For him, this ontological problem manifests in an epistemological corollary: “impermanence” (anityatā) and other features of the Noble Truths are conceptual, but the adept’s meditative perception of them must be nonconceptual. How can a nonconceptual cognition apprehend a conceptual object? A key aspect of Dharmakīrti’s theory of concepts provides a solution to this problem. Specifically, Dharmakīrti maintains that a concept, when taken as a mental event, can be considered a particular and thus an object of nonconceptual cognition. Taking this approach, Dharmakīrti downplays the notion that yogic perception is an encounter with real things in the world, in part because it is phenomenally akin to hallucination. Instead, what counts for Dharmakīrti—and what differentiates the adept’s realization from the madman’s hallucination—are the salvific effects induced by the meditative experience.     

The Application of Voltammetric Analysis of Δ9‐THC for the Reduction of False Positive Results in the Analysis of Suspected Marijuana Plant Matter

The development of methodologies using inexpensive, fast, and reliable instrumention is desirable in illicit drug analysis. The purpose of this study was based on cyclic voltammetry technique to differentiate the electrochemical behavior of ?⁹‐THC, the psychoactive substance in marijuana, and five different extract plants to yield false positive results after analysis protocol for cannabinoids using thin‐layer chromatography and Fast Blue B salt. After applying a deposition potential of ?0.5 V in a glassy carbon working electrode, the results indicated an anodic peak current at 0.0 V versus Ag/AgCl after addition of ?⁹‐THC solution in the electrochemical cell, and limits of detection and quantification were 1.0 ng mL^?1 and 3.5 ng mL^?1, respectively. Other interfering plants showed distinct amperometric responses. This methodology was useful to detect ?⁹‐THC even in the presence of the Fast Blue B salt, which avoided false positive results for all the studied extract plants.     

Climate Change Litigation,Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA

Climate change litigation is an obsessive preoccupation for many legal scholars. Three different “narratives” can be identified for why scholars find such litigation important to study: litigation is a response to institutional failure, legal reasoning holds authority, and litigation is a forum for the co‐production of facts and social orders. The nature and consequences of these narratives are considered in the context of the first U.S. Supreme Court “climate change” case—Massachusetts v. EPA (2007). This analysis has implications for both how scholars understand their expertise in this area, and how they should foster it.     

Au nom de qui? The European Court of Justice between Member States,Civil Society and Union Citizens

Abstract: How does the quest for legitimacy of the European Union relate to the view the European Court of Justice(ECJ) accords to Union citizens, civil society and to private actors? It is submitted that the ECJ is currently developing a jurisprudence under which citizens, as well as their organisations and corporate private actors, are gradually, and in almost complete disregard of the public/private distinction, being included in the matrix of rights and—a crucial point—obligations of the treaties. The ECJ incorporates civil society actors and citizens, beyond notions of representative (citizenship) and participatory (civil society) democracy, into the body of law and thereby reworks its own and the Union's identity. Two core aspects are explored: the first is the reconfiguration of Union citizenship as a norm which triggers the application of the substantive norms of the EC Treaty. The second aspect of this evolution is the creation of ‘private governance’ schemes, i.e. processes in which, as a rule, private action is regarded as action that has to meet the standards of the Treaty. The analysis shows that the court is disentangling itself from the State‐oriented Treaty situation and drawing legitimacy directly from citizens themselves so that judgments should be pronounced ‘In the Name of the Citizens of the European Union’.

1 European Court of Justice 20 September 2001, Case C‐184/99, Grzelczyk [2001] ECR I‐6193, para. 31.

     

Social justice jurisprudence of clinical education programme: A paradigm shift from legal education to justice education

The legal profession has remained relevant in bringing about positive transformation in society — with leaders, policymakers, and change makers around the world mostly possessing a background in the law. That said, the trust, and positive image, enjoyed by legal professionals continues on a declining path. Considered more glamorous, the legal profession has gone astray from the path of social justice. In this article, I argue that the negative perception of legal professionals is, in large part, because of the way legal professionals are taught and trained in law schools. I argue that legal teaching pedagogy in South Asia, and generally in developing countries, is a product of colonial structure. Even after the so-called decolonisation movement, law schools and universities, for example in South Asia, institutionalised a legal pedagogy unsuited to the epistemic actualities of their societies. A law student in South Asia was and continues to be taught the Western conception of what the law is and its relationship to justice. In a legal culture carrying the transplanted laws of the colonisers, the students of developing countries are meticulously trained in the technical skills of reasoning and interpretation by applying Eurocentric guidelines of positivist construction. In light of this, I propose a shift in legal education: to transform the existing legal education and pedagogy into ‘justice education’. I focus on the ancient principles — located in the Eastern legal philosophy — of empirical reasoning and the importance of the human nature of sociability in arriving at social justice. To combat the tendency of insulating law students from societal problems, I propose a social justice-driven legal pedagogy. I have also reflected on some practices that ‘are’ and highlighted other practices that ‘ought to be’. My thesis connotes that the legal profession has an innate role in building the capability of individuals who are deprived and excluded. In line with it, I present examples of scalable clinical legal education being practised specially by the Kathmandu School of Law that can create multidimensional legal professionalism.