Two Logics of Labor Organizing in the Global Apparel Industry

What factors account for labor strategies in global industries? While some scholars point to economic factors and others look to political opportunity structures, an examination of union actions in the Central American apparel export industry over a 14-year period suggests that activists' historical experiences and ideological orientations also strongly influence union dynamics. Left-oriented unions tend to form unions through transnational activism whereas conservative unions most often turn to plant-level cross-class collaboration. Moreover, these two union strategies are interconnected. Successful transnational activism facilitates conservative union formation through a "radical flank" mechanism; the threat of left-union organizing motivates employers to accept unionization by conservative unions to block left unions from gaining influence in the plant. To examine these arguments, this article employs pooled time-series statistical analysis, structured interviews with labor organizers, and process tracing that draws on nine months of field research in Honduras and El Salvador.     

Testing the Hollowing-Out Thesis

In recent years, many economists have argued that governments are discarding pegged exchange rates in favor of alternative exchange rate regimes such as monetary unions and currency boards on the one hand, or floating exchange rates on the other. Capital mobility, such economists argue, has made pegged exchange rates costly to maintain for long periods, and thus the pegging option is being “hollowed-out.” Few, however, have tried to present evidence that capital mobility has a direct effect on exchange rate regime choices. I present two sets of tests using different measures of capital mobility that provide qualified confirmation that developing countries peg less as capital mobility rises. These tests indicate that direct measures of capital mobility have some correlation with de facto exchange rate regimes but not with de jure exchange rate regimes. Capital flows, a consequence of capital mobility, may have a direct effect on the choices of both de jure and de facto regimes. Governments do not make changes in their declared exchange rate policies in rational anticipation of the growing costs of pegging associated with increasing capital mobility. Rather, governments normally adapt their declared exchange rate policies after capital flows have increased and actual exchange rates have become more difficult to manage. The tests also indicate that hollowing-out has not only been the result of systemic factors such as increasing capital mobility and capital flows, but also due to domestic factors such as growing public sector indebtedness and the spread of democracy.     

Protecting labor rights in preferential trade agreements: The role of trade unions,left governments,and skilled labor

This paper investigates variation in the design of labor provisions in preferential trade agreements (PTAs) by focusing on the power of trade unions, the role of government partisanship, and the relative strength of skilled labor. We expect strong trade unions and left-leaning governments to be associated with more, and more far-reaching labor provisions in PTAs. We also expect the strength of skilled workers relative to the strength of unskilled workers to negatively correlate with the depth of labor provisions in PTAs. In addition, the effect of trade unions should be conditional on both the presence of left government and democracy. We test these hypotheses relying on an original dataset of labor provisions included in 483 PTAs signed between 1990 and 2016. This dataset covers 140 different labor provisions that relate to six overarching dimensions. The quantitative analysis finds support for the expectations concerning the influence of trade unions and the role of a country’s skill profile.     

From contention to social bargaining: labour unions and democratic consolidation in Spain

The main objective of this article is to examine how the links between trade unions and affiliated political parties of the left influenced the strategies of labour during the transition and the early years of democracy in Spain. It argues that political partisanship is a key factor for understanding the unions' strategies. After a period of intense labour conflict during the transition to democracy, labour mobilization decreased and Spain's unions and other social actors initiated distinctive processes of social bargaining, starting in 1979. The central argument is that the relationship of unions and political parties in the authoritarian and transition periods was a major factor in conditioning strategies in the post-authoritarian period. In the end, the consolidation of Spanish democracy has led to the strengthening of the main trade unions. Contrary to what happened in other historical periods they used this power to contribute to governability and the consolidation of the new democratic regime.     

Invisible Borders: Economic Liberalization and National Identity

Various developments in the post–WWII global economy have led many scholars of international relations to contend that borders are eroding. My argument takes issue with this, suggesting that borders are not becoming increasingly meaningless; instead, some states are working to endow them with meaning in innovative ways. Specifically, I examine the trade disputes over culture industries during recent GATT and NAFTA talks to demonstrate that some states are shifting their attention from territorial borders to conceptual or invisible borders. Many governments support the removal of borders that serve as barriers to the movement of goods, services, capital, information, and, in some cases, people. Nevertheless, these same governments resist the increasing permeability of borders that provide the boundaries of political community.     

Economic Competitiveness and Social Policy in Open Economies

While many studies have shown that greater trade openness affects the overall size of social spending, this study emphasizes that it also affects types of social policies that a government prioritizes. When faced with deepening trade competition, governments tend to use different policy measures to address the opportunities and challenges stemming from their economic competitiveness in the international market. Policy makers in countries with high relative labor costs are likely to privilege social insurances and income transfer. This is because as high labor costs make their workers more vulnerable in the trade competition, governments seek to protect skilled labor in order to maintain their economic advantage in advanced industries. In contrast, when relative labor costs are low, human capital investment programs are likely to be emphasized to enhance productivity and the quality of labor to capitalize the cost competitiveness of a country’s workers. The findings from empirical analyzes of 26 OECD economies from 1991 to 2012 support these arguments.     

Parties,personalities and political power: legacies of liberal peace-building in Timor-Leste

This article examines the tension between liberal peace-building and local political culture through the lens of party and personality politics in Timor-Leste. It argues that the efforts of the UN peacekeeping mission to promote multi-party democracy cut across the interests of two opposing political forces: the charismatic resistance leader, Xanana Gusmão, who was deeply suspicious of party politics and favoured supra-partisan coalitions; and the dominant political party, FRETILIN, which pursued majoritarian power. Over the 16 years since independence, FRETILIN maintained a strong party identity and the governments it led met strenuous opposition and came to a premature end, while the Gusmão-led or -backed governments formed and survived as pragmatic tactical alliances. The article concludes that although the UN peacekeeping mission guided institutional design to favour political party organisation as the foundation for achieving representational government, the institutions have subsequently evolved in response to local political drivers. While outside actors can seek to influence the formal rules of the game, local political culture will determine how the game is played.     

Who Can Reform the Labor Market? IMF Conditionality,Partisanship, and Labor Unions

Labor market reforms are critical for economic growth. Yet, they are politically contentious, and governments, more often than not, are faced with strong opposition from interest groups. Scholarly work shows that governments often rely on external intervention to implement politically difficult reforms. This is the case with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that typically conditions its financing on the implementation of required reforms. Do borrowing governments benefit from IMF programs to overcome domestic opposition to reform by organized interests? Utilizing a unique new data set on IMF conditionality, I show that partisan and electoral concerns and domestic alliances strongly affect the implementation of labor market reforms, even when the IMF imposes them. When faced with increasing number of strikes, left-wing governments are more likely to implement labor market reforms than center/right-wing governments. However, the left is less likely than the center/right to fulfill its international commitments during election years when labor groups are militant. These findings highlight the left’s unique ability to form pro-reform coalitions and the IMF’s conditional role in removing domestic political opposition to reform. Counter-intuitively, right-wing governments still struggle to reform the labor market, even during economic crises and under IMF programs.     

Schools of democracy: how trade union membership impacts political participation in Africa’s emerging democracies

Trade unions in Africa have become increasingly vocal in calling attention to the widening socio-economic inequalities that have accompanied global market integration across the continent. This article argues that, in their quest to challenge neoliberal policies, labour movements have contributed to processes of democratization in Africa by acting as instruments of political socialization for their members. Using survey data from respondents in 18 African countries, this article demonstrates an empirical relationship between trade union membership and political participation. The article finds that membership in a labour organization increases one’s propensity to participate in a range of political activities. Specifically, labour movements encourage participation by forging “participatory spillover effects”, which mobilize unionists across different arenas of the political landscape. Finally, the article finds that the effect of union membership on political participation is stronger in countries where unions maintain independence from ruling parties. This research contributes to literature on political participation across Africa and furthers our understanding of the role of labour movements in bottom-up processes of democratization on the continent.     

A Nested Game Approach to Political and Economic Liberalization in Democratizing States: The Case of South Korea

South Korea enjoyed high rates of economic growth until the mid–1990s. However in mid–1997 the country went into a severe economic crisis which ultimately resulted in a request for an IMF bailout. Leading up to the crisis, the government had embarked upon democratic liberalization but not much economic liberalization. This research explores why the government would lay the foundation for political reform without creating institutions capable of imposing economic reform on the politically powerful business sector. The absence of such institutions put the government in a position where it could not respond to the emerging economic crisis. The government's inability to act eroded its own position of power and governance. From this perspective, the government's inattention to economic reform appears irrational as it led to a weakening of its own position. We build a model of political and economic liberalization showing that the government was engaged in nested games (i.e., games in multiple arenas) with the political opposition, the labor unions, and the powerful business sector. We develop an argument that strong, antiliberal economic actors create incentive for the government in a democratizing state to refrain from economic liberalization, even while moving forward with democratic liberalization.     

从比较的视角看海外移民的流动性对中国的影响

在经济全球化发展日趋增强的今天,移民活动的状况或本质正越来越表现为流动性而非定居性。移民的流动性,是“人权高于主权”这一国际政治思潮的反映,是全球化发展所产生的一种“跨国逃避”趋势,也是国际政治经济多元化、不平衡发展和各国综合国力竞争的必然产物。本文试图通过对移民流动性的探讨,揭示中印两国海外移民的流动性对两国发展和综合国力提升所共同具有的有益影响,以及中印两国因其海外移民流动性在国际社会中所面临的不同处境。     

The crisis of governance: Present and future challenges

One of the principal challenges facing individual states and the international community is the threat of ungovernability, of the declining ability of governments to govern. This comes in two forms, the rise of a range of internal economic, social, and political problems beyond the ability of governments to cope with; and actions of governments that increasingly alienate their citizens. Ethnic, religious, and political upheavals that leave millions dead or homeless and require increasing international intervention to deal with have become features of the international political landscape. Among the most serious challenges to the stability of governments and to the possibility of sustainable democratic institutions is the rise of various international criminal organizations able to defy local governments and to operate with great freedom across international community does not respond. There must be an effort to strengthen institutions and capabilities to deal with the growing problem of organized crime and ungovernability.     

全球价值链背景下我国地方产业集群升级困境与反思

当今世界经济发展最突出的特点是贸易一体化与生产非一体化,而生产的非一体化使不同国家的产业专注于具有竞争力的战略环节,在全球价值链演化中组织生产.我国地方产业集群拥有丰富的自然资源与劳动力资源,吸引了大量的外来资本,越来越多的外来企业纷纷转入中国内地,在一定程度上促进了经济增长和当地劳动力就业.     

More than a token gesture: NGOs and trade unions campaigning for a common cause

With the passage of the 1999 Asylum and Immigration Act in the UK, a system of vouchers for all new asylum seekers was to be introduced from April 2000. These vouchers were widely regarded as iniquitous in that they discriminated against an already vulnerable sector of society. A unique coalition between two NGOs (Oxfam GB and the Refugee Council) and a trade union (the Transport and General Workers' Union—TGWU) led to a concerted campaign against the voucher scheme that included a range of media work, political lobbying, and public awareness raising. The voucher scheme was eventually scrapped. This article draws various practical lessons on how to develop successful collaborative relationships across different social sectors. The author concludes that the principal lesson is not that NGOs must work with trade unions, but that by working with others, united by a common goal, they can challenge injustice effectively and make a difference to people's lives.     

Unionization and Restrictions on Foreign Direct Investment

Although inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has many benefits for a country as a whole, like trade, it is a source of competition for producers in the host country, with concomitant effects on labor markets. The entrance of foreign multinationals increases demand for skilled labor at the expense of unskilled labor, and also increases the elasticity of demand for labor because multinationals are able to shift production across borders. This raises the question of whether or not labor has an impact on policy toward inward FDI. I suggest that organized labor is a key determinant of the influence of labor on inward FDI restrictions. Not only do unions mitigate the collective action problem facing labor, but unionized workers, regardless of skill level, have incentives to support restrictions on inward FDI because rising elasticity of demand restricts bargaining power. I expect that higher levels of unionization will lead to greater restrictions on inward FDI. I find support for this hypothesis in an analysis of U.S. industry-level formal restrictions on inward FDI between 1981 and 2000. Industry skill intensity, a proxy for the distributional consequences of FDI for labor, does not explain variation in barriers to inward FDI, suggesting that the confluence of interests and influence is necessary for labor to influence policy.     

Trade unions,NGOs, and corporate codes of conduct

The proliferation of corporate codes of conduct generates both alliance and tension between trade unions and NGOs that deal with workers' rights in the global economy. Alliance, because trade unions and NGOs share a common desire to halt abusive behaviour by multinational companies and a broader goal of checking corporate power in the global economy. Tension, because unions and NGOs have differing institutional interests, different analyses of problems and potential solutions, and different ways of thinking and talking about social justice in the global economy. There are fears that codes of conduct may be used to undermine effective labour law enforcement by governmental authorities and undermine workers' power in trade unions. The substance behind the rhetoric on this new generation of corporate codes of conduct is certainly open to question. However, this paper argues that, given unions' weak presence in the global assembly line and the rapid‐response capabilities of many NGOs, such codes are a valuable asset. Trade unions and NGOs still have more in common with each other than either has with corporations, governments, or international organisations that see free trade and free‐flowing capital as the solution to low labour standards. But both need to be clear‐eyed about their differences and their proper roles as they navigate the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead.     

The political economy of labor market deregulation during IMF interventions

This study examines the relationship between policy interventions by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and de jure labor rights. Combining two novel data sets with unprecedented country-year coverage – leximetric data on labor laws and disaggregated data on IMF conditionality – our analysis of up to 70 developing countries from 1980 to 2014 demonstrates that IMF-mandated labor market policy measures significantly reduce both individual and collective labor rights. Once we control for the effect of labor market policy measures, however, we find that collective labor rights increase in the wake of IMF programs. We argue that this result is explained by the impact of union pressure on governments which, in such a context, are imbued with the policy space to respond to domestic interest groups. The study has broader theoretical implications as to when international organizations are effective in constraining governments’ choices.     

International NGOs and unions in the South: worlds apart or allies in the struggle?

In the early 1980s, support for trade unions was a significant component of Oxfam GB's programmes in various parts of the world, most notably Central America and South Africa. In Central America, this was motivated both because organised labour played an important role in popular movements that were pressing for equitable political settlements to the wars ravaging the region, and because unions as such, as well as their members and leaders, were the targets of repression and political violence. This article explores the background to the rise in funding for unions in Honduras, reflects on this experience, and discusses some of the factors that might change a potentially awkward donor‐recipient relationship to one of dialogue and solidarity.     

Are Monetary Unions Inevitable?

With the rapid growth of cross-border competition among currencies, informed observers predict that the new monetary unions are virtually inevitable in many parts of the world. In fact, predictions of such alliances are misleading and almost certainly wrong. Monetary unions necessarily imply a measure of collective action in the issue and management of money. An alliance requires allies—other states with similar preferences and a disposition to act cooperatively. A survey of proposed monetary unions shows that willing partners among sovereign states are just not all that plentiful. Conceivably some governments could be attracted to less demanding forms of monetary alliance, depending on bargaining context. But prospects for many full new monetary unions are dim at best.     

Why is There No Race to the Bottom in Capital Taxation?

This article explains the absence of a race to the bottom in capital taxation by analyzing fiscal competition under budget rigidities and tax equity constraints (fairness norms). We outline a political economic model of tax competition that treats the outcome of tax competition as one argument in the governments utility function, the others being public expenditure and tax equity. In accordance with previous theoretical research, tax competition tends to cause a reduction in taxes on mobile capital and an increase in the tax rates on relatively immobile labor in our model. Yet, our model predicts that governments do not fully abolish taxes on mobile capital. Instead, the government being least restricted by budget constraints and equity norms cuts tax rates to levels slightly below the lowest tax rates of those countries, in which governments are more constrained, where effective constraints are country size, budget rigidities and fairness norms. Analyzing data from 23 Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development countries between 1975 and 2004 we find empirical support for the hypotheses derived from our theoretical model.