Was Austin Right After All? On the Role of Sanctions in a Theory of Law

In modern jurisprudence it is taken as axiomatic that John Austin's sanction-based account of law and legal obligation was demolished in H.L.A. Hart's The Concept of Law , but Hart's victory and the deficiencies of the Austinian account may not be so clear. Not only does the alleged linguistic distinction between being obliged and having an obligation fail to provide as much support for the idea of a sanction-independent legal obligation as is commonly thought, but the soundness of Hart's claims, as well as the claims of many legal theorists who have followed him, depend on a contested view of the nature of legal theory. If the task of a theory of law, as Joseph Raz and others have influentially argued, is to identify the essential features of the concept of law, then the theoretical possibility, if not the empirical reality, of a sanction-free legal system is what is most important. But if the task of a theory of law is to provide philosophical and theoretical illumination of law as it exists and as it is experienced, then a theory of law that fails to give a central place to law's coercive reality may for that reason be deficient as a theory of law. The question of the soundness of the Austinian account, therefore, may be a function of the answer to the question of what a theory of law is designed to accomplish.     

Gardner on Legal Reasoning

In Chapters 2, 3 and 7 of his new book, Law as a Leap of Faith, John Gardner provides the elements of an account of legal reasoning. It is on the basis of this account that Gardner defends or supports some of the most important theses of his book, viz. theses pertaining to how law can be made, to the relation between law and morality, and to the legitimacy of judicial law-making. A central element of Gardner’s account is a distinction (suggested originally by Joseph Raz) between two forms of legal reasoning, namely, reasoning about the law and reasoning according to law. In this paper I intend to describe and evaluate Gardner’s account. Among the critical remarks that will appear in the paper is the claim that Gardner’s concept of reasoning according to law is overly inclusive.     

论法律适用中的"契约自由"原则——国际合同的自体法

肇始于16世纪的"意思自治"理论,标志着合同准据法理论发展的里程碑,即客观论向主观论的发展,特别是以意思自治为主、辅之以最密切联系原则的合同自体法理论的提出,更是将合同准据法理论推向一个前所未有的高度,它一改过去合同法律适用的机械性做法,强调尊重当事人自主意识,并将契约当做一个整体来看待,体现了国际私法合同法律适用的潮流和趋势。     

国际合同"契约自由"的冲突法规制 --国际合同的自体法

肇始于16世纪的"意思自治"理论,标志着合同准据法理论发展的里程碑,即客观论向主观论的发展,特别是以意思自治为主、辅之以最密切联系原则的合同自体法理论的提出,更是将合同准据法理论推向一个前所未有的高度,它一改过去合同法律适用的机械性做法,强调尊重当事人自主意识,并将契约当做一个整体来看待,体现了国际私法合同法律适用的潮流和趋势.     

An Acquittal for Epistemicism

Scott Soames argues that consideration of the practice of legal judgement gives us good reason to favor the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory of vagueness against epistemicism. Despite the fact that the value of power-delegation through vagueness is evidenced in practice, Soames says, epistemicism cannot account for it theoretically, while the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory is capable of it. In this paper, I examine the two possible arguments against epistemicism that can be extracted from Soames’s account: (1) an argument based on unknown obligations, and (2) an argument based on power-delegation through vagueness. The first argument tries to convince us that, as based on epistemicism, the law has already decided the borderline cases, so that judges have obligatory decisions even in such cases: therefore epistemicism is inconsistent with the discretion of judges in borderline cases. I show that even if we sympathize with Soames’s intuitions concerning the legal practice, the argument he offers is not conclusive since it is either invalid, unsound, or paradoxical. The second argument holds that only the gaps which the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory predicts give judges the possibility of lawmaking in borderline cases. However, by categorizing the vague laws as imperfect laws, the judges can claim the right of lawmaking without any need to refer to gaps in the law. By neutralizing these arguments, I argue that epistemicism is able to explain the phenomena just as well as the partial-definition/context-sensitive theory.     

论提供虚假财会报告罪

提供虚假财会报告罪是一种面临特定伦理基础的法定犯,也是国家通过刑法重建市场信用规则 的一种手段。该罪保护的法益(即犯罪客体)是一种超个人的社会法益,即公司的信息公开制度。 因此,提供虚假财会报告罪犯罪构成模式应由结果本位向行为本位转换,同时,在定罪时也要考 虑量的因索,处罚最值得处罚的行为。     

论社会公共利益和经济法

社会公共利益是比较重要但又很难定义的概念,实践中不乏有借用"社会公共利益"之名侵犯其他利益的事例.经济法与社会公共利益的关系是经济法理论最为基本的问题之一.试从利益的定义及分类、法律与利益的关系、实体法对社会公共利益的规定等方面来探讨社会公共利益与经济法的关系问题,并对社会公共利益的含义、经济法与公益诉讼的关系也提出自己的一些看法.     

Foucault's Expulsion of Law: Toward a Retrieval

This essay argues that there is an important sense in which Foucault gets law wrong—that the pursuit of Foucault's own objectives had the unintended consequence of inhibiting a fruitful interrogation of the place of law in modernity. His immediate concern was with the emergence of distinctive manifestations of modern power that constitute a new configuration, the disciplinary society. The most distinctive feature of his account of the historical emergence of modernity was his expulsion of law from modernity. This "expulsion of law" is found in his metahistorical thesis that law constituted the primary form of power in the premodern era, and that although law lingers on in the doctrine of sovereignty, it is supplanted by discipline and government as the key embodiments of modernity.
The essay proposes an exercise in retrieval, a "retrieval of law," to recuperate much in Foucault's thought that is suggestive for our understanding of law's role in the constitution of modern society. It rejects Foucault's opposition of law and discipline and makes use of his treatment of government and governmentality toward that end. It argues that a more adequate grasp of the place of law in modernity can be developed by establishing that law and discipline are complementary and characteristically combine in the ubiquitous presence of regulation as the mark of the modem condition.     

刑法伦理解释论

刑法解释问题的关键是依照什么价值原则和指导思想来理解和适用刑法条文,对此,迄今为止的各种刑法解释理论都没有给人们以正确、简单的指导。本文提出的“伦理解释论”认为,最好的刑法解释应当在刑法文本用语的最大含义范围内选择、适用最符合公众善恶观念的含义。“入罪解释论”和当下流行的“出罪解释论”都是荒谬和错误的。与“合乎伦理地解释刑法”相比,由谁来解释刑法、用什么方法来解释刑法并不重要。     

民法本质追求探究

作为部门法的民法,源自古代欧洲的罗马法,当时叫“市民法”,后被注入“私法”、“私权法”、“市民社会的法”等诸多信息。中国通过日本从西方民法及至罗马私法那里继受了作为表征基本部门法的民法。西方传统理解民法或私法的实质含义,是在个人与国家对立的基础上进行的。民法以人为中心,以权利为基点,以行为手段,以责任为保障。民法上的人即市民、私人和私主体,含自然人、法人、非法人团体等。近代社会的个人是个人主义的个人,而现代的个人是兼顾社会乃至自然理念中的个人。称民法人是“经济人”、“具体人”、“抽象人”等多是用作分析民法问题的方法。兼顾社会乃至自然的个人主义和自由主义是民法的哲学基础。民法并未真正社会化。民法所涉及的领域是有限的。民法在精神方面追求平等和自由。这些都涉及到民法本位即民法的中心任务和价值标准问题。     

Superego,special juries and a split law: eighteenth-century adultery trials viewed through Zizek’s lens

Over the course of several books, Zizek develops a psychoanalytical account of the symbiosis between the public law and the individual subject’s own acquiescence. It is of course a non-formalist theory, suggesting that formal law alone does not achieve social order. This article applies an element of the theory empirically to a historical question: to the question of how the behaviour of juries in a particular type of 18th-century adultery trial managed to be both the object of contemporary controversy and an expression of normative values. The social ambivalence signalled by that doubleness opens surprisingly well to Zizek’s theory that the power of law is divided between its own public form and the subjects’ expression of superego. The theory of the split law, the hidden supplement outside the system, clarifies the historically-specific example. However, the historical example also illuminates the theory: it suggests how the space for this supplement also exists within the system, which can incorporate and make use of it.

基于事实契约理论的事实劳动关系重述

由于历史的原因,我国劳动法领域形成的关于"事实劳动关系是欠缺书面形式的劳动关系"之通说给劳动者权益保护带来了普遍和深远的损害,其理论依据被认为是德国学者豪普特教授提出的事实契约理论。实际上,根据事实契约理论,事实劳动关系是指无有效之劳动契约而提供从属劳动所形成的劳动关系。该理论虽遭激烈批评,但在有关身份的领域不可被传统契约理论所替代。在合意因欠缺生效要件而被认定无效之场合,事实契约理论为这类"被否定"的用工行为提供了"被承认"的新的理论框架和立法技术。我国《劳动合同法》对无效劳动合同的劳动者一方以民法式保护为原则,以劳动法式保护为例外,存在保护不足、保护过度及违背传统契约法形式理性等问题,需作进一步的反思与调整。     

社会法的部门法哲学反思

社会法的产生机理、演化变革、功能发展、性质或本体、社会法问题代沟与制度需求、主要理论范式等深层次的反思性问题,应在部门法哲学意义上得到关注,应予以跨学科、批判性的研究。社会法的产生机理在于社会保护本能和社会理性,形成了本文所称的"市场化运动推之,社会保护运动挽之"的制衡关系。其性质为构成维系现代产权制度、经济秩序与保障社会权利之间的社会对价关系或新型社会契约。社会法相关的"问题代沟"理论具有广泛的解释力。中国同时面临三代社会法问题,制度需求强烈,应以全球正在探索的第三代社会法为主要资源,科学建构社会法;借鉴多学科理论范式建构社会法法哲学。     

Rights in Criminal Law in the Light of a Will Theory

The will theory of rights has so far been considered incapable of capturing individual rights under criminal law. Adherents of the will theory, therefore, have defended the claim that criminal law does not assign rights to individuals. In this article I argue first, that criminal law does assign individual rights and second, that the will theory of rights may enhance our understanding of these rights. The two major implications of the account are: a volenti non fit iniuria principle for criminal law, and a theoretical framework for an idea of punishment as restitution.     

Legal Theory for Legal Empiricists

There is a widespread view that one does either theory or empirical work, and that theory and empiricism represent distant concerns, opposing worldviews, and perhaps distinct mentalities or personalities. This prevalent view has deep roots and is also the result of pragmatic and understandable tendencies toward division of intellectual labor. Against this view, this essay suggests that the relations between theory and empirical study ought to be understood as more intimate and that making legal theory an explicit focus can improve empirical scholarship. We pursue this claim by articulating a basis for legal theory and by showing how that basis illuminates both the application and design of empirical research on law. Legal theory, we argue, follows jurisprudence in interrogating the law as a set of coercive normative institutions. The upshot of this approach is a recognition that an interdisciplinary analysis of law must rely on both a theory (explicit or implicit) of the way law's power and its normativity align and an account of the way in which this discursive cohabitation manifests itself institutionally. We thus argue that legal theory is necessary in order to draw fruitfully on empirical research and further claim that legal theory provides guidance both for setting up an empirical research agenda on law and for designing research into specific topics.     

论经济法的理论基础

任何法部门都要有理论基础。经济法理论基础应当以讲求法意理论、突出经济法特征和承认其他部门法理论基础为立论之本,并从经济法价值层面推衍出来。以往学界关于经济法理论基础的研究还没能够符合这些条件,故诸说成立的根据不充分;而民商法、行政法、社会法等理论基础对于从经济法价值层面推衍的"整体经济效益"的价值取向及覆盖的法内容,又无力支撑。于是,寻找经济法自身的根本理论支撑就十分关键了。笔者研究发现,经济法为了实现"整体经济效益"的价值取向,必须不断解决个体性经营无序带来的"整体"损害问题,于是,经济法配置的整体性经济权应当是限定个体性经营权的职权。笔者将这一理论称为"限权论"并定位为经济法理论基础。这一理论也是在与民商法的"保权论"、行政法的"控权论"、社会法的"扶权论"等理论基础的界分和协调中形成的。     

行政法上的客观法与主观法

针对如何理解行政法上客观法与主观法的关系,存在三种基本立场。主客观法分离立场认为维护公益的行政法与公民个人权利形成对峙。该立场存在无法关联违法性与侵权性、抱持无视宪法的行政法观等疑问。主客观法结合立场主张从客观法中分出一部分请求权对应行政主体法定义务。该立场存在宪法与行政法平台错位、公益与私益纵向割裂等局限。主客观法统一立场将客观法当作主观法的全部集合,权利由客观法分解得来。该立场是理解行政法主客观法关系的妥当见解。在分配行政与利害调整观念下,特定或不特定复数私人主体间基于行政法律规范的各种利益与不利益冲突、对立并交织而成的利害关系网才是行政实体法律关系的本质,行政法上的实体权利应当由此导出。遵循“利害关系→合法权益”而非“合法权益→利害关系”的逻辑顺序才是判断行政诉讼原告资格的正确方法。     

His master’s voice: H.L.A. Hart and Lacanian discourse theory

H.L.A. Hart’s jurisprudence seems antithetical to Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalysis. Professor Schroeder argues that, in fact, Hart’s concept of law has surprising similarities to Lacan’s ‘discourse of the Master’. Both reject a command theory of law: subjects do not obey law out of fear. Moreover, both insist that the authority of law is completely independent from its content. Anyone seeking to develop a psychoanalytically sophisticated critical legal theory should reconsider Hart. As insightful as his concept of the symbolic is, Lacan has no expertise in legal systems and does not discuss positive law per se. Although he posited a theory of ethics in his Seventh Seminar and the seeds of a jurisprudence are implicit within his theory, he offers no account of legal right, justice or what Hart misleadingly calls ‘morality’. A Lacanian jurisprudence must, therefore, be supplemented by other sources. Moreover, legal positivists should not dismiss psychoanalysis. As insightful as Hart’s jurisprudence is, his theories of legal subjectivity and linguistics are simplistic and his concept of law too narrow. He describes only one aspect of legal experience: obedience to law. He ignores what most legal actors do: Hart’s concept of law excludes the practice of law. Although Lacan’s ‘master’s discourse’ surprisingly parallels Hart’s jurisprudence, Lacan does not restrict the symbolic to the master’s discourse. It requires three other ‘discourses’. Lacan, therefore, supplements Hart. Specifically, Lacan’s fourth discourse describes the excluded practice of law and provides the mechanism by which ‘morality’ can critique law.

社会实在的规范性与公私法的界限——与徐国栋教授商榷民法的“公私法混合说”

民法的＂公私法混合说＂建立在＂强行法说＂基础之上,该理论通过区分任意性规范和强制性规范把私法的范围限于任意性规范。强行法说预设了一种缺少规范性的＂社会实在＂：一方面忽略了法律对社会实在的构造功能,没能看到强制性规范与私人领域的构成性关系;另一方面忽略了通过强制性规范所表达的私人自治的规范性要素,没能看到强制性规范与私人领域之间在合法性意义上的共生性。尽管公私法的划分问题具有可争议性,但强行法说因其对社会实在的理解存在偏差而无法成为一种妥当的公私法界限理论,民法的＂公私法混合说＂自然无法成立。