Israel: ethnocracy or multicracy?

Much of the recent academic literature that assesses democracy in Israel labels it either as incomplete or flawed, yet such literature employs minimal systematic analysis of how the state is actually governed. Since the 1990s, there has been a tendency to describe the Israeli political regime as an ethnocracy. This article argues that the term ‘ethnocracy’, when applied to Israel, has certain weaknesses and instead proposes the concept of ‘multicracy’ (multiformocracy) as a more appropriate term by which to describe Israel's political organization. It will demonstrate that existing Israeli democratic institutions do not control the state's policymaking in full and that several politically important processes are controlled or at least influenced by various other politically active forces. Whilst these forces can influence, stimulate, inhibit, and otherwise change governmental decisions and actions, they can be labeled as kratiae. While the capacity of Israel's democracy to govern is weak, these other kratiae can intervene in policymaking and the state's regime acts as democracy-dominated multicracy.     

Means of production versus means of coercion: can Russian business limit the violence of a predatory state?

In their most recent works, North and his coauthors (North, D. C., J. J. Wallis, S. Webb, and B. R. Weingast. 2012. In the Shadow of Violence: Politics, Economics, and the Problems of Development. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press; North, D.C., J. J. Wallis, and B. R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press) name the formation of organizations capable of effectively restricting violence in society as a necessary condition for transition from developing societies to societies with sustainable economic growth. However, the mechanisms of emergence and conditions for the operation of such organizations in contemporary developing countries remain unclear. We follow the logic of formation of such organizations using the case study of collective actions of the Russian business community aimed at restricting “state violence” against business. We seek to identify the conditions leading to a shift in the choice of strategies from attempts at informal agreements with extortionists controlling means of coercion to cooperation of businessmen and trace the further evolution of organized forms of collective action. Finally, we assess to what extent the created organizations can be efficient and self-supporting in the long term.     

Intelligence Fiasco or Reasoned Accounting?: CIA Estimates of Soviet GNP

A leading specialist on Soviet economics examines the heavily politicized debate on the CIA's estimates of the rate of growth and comparative size of the Soviet economy during the period 1960-1985. The author finds little evidence to support the common indictment that the CIA seriously misestimated the Soviet growth record. He finds somewhat greater reason to believe that the Agency's comparative size ratios were overstated. And he finds grounds to question whether CIA dealt effectively with the limitations of the size and growth measures in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: P27, P24, P52.     

Somali pirates: villains or victims?

The proliferation of piracy activity off the coast of Somalia has received a fair share of international attention. Its consequences have included a destabilising effect on trade, security and humanitarian aid. This has served to give reason for the deployment of multi-national forces by some of the countries affected by the scourge. While naval patrols have reduced the success rate of piracy attacks in some areas, there has been little respite in piracy incidents with the overall number of attacks and their geographic scope increasing. Piracy off the coast of Somalia has, in fact, evolved into organised syndicates with transnational networks. The problem is that various international actors have largely viewed piracy off the coast of Somalia in terms of threats to their own national interests and security. They have, thus, dealt with the issue in isolation from its wider context, which has not succeeded in ending the attacks. This article argues that to deal with the piracy problem more meaningfully, there is need for a contextual framework beyond addressing the ‘illegal’ activities. Piracy is a complex problem, with political, legal, social, economic, security and even human rights dimensions, and calls for a truly holistic approach that, especially, seeks to address the root causes on land. The article calls for a change in strategies in order to facilitate a ‘local Somali solution’ rather than an international one that is acceptable to the sensibilities of international actors. The article emphasises the need to extend the strong international cooperation demonstrated on the high seas in the fight against piracy to the fight against root causes of piracy onshore.     

Islamic Campus Preaching Organizations in Indonesia: Promoters of Moderation or Radicalism?

ABSTRACT

This article asks whether campus preaching organizations such as the Indonesian Muslim Students Islamic Union (KAMMI) and Hizb ut-Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) serve as potential breeding grounds for radicalism or, alternatively, do they serve as institutions that promote political moderation and prevent radical action among young university-age Muslims. Utilizing insights from inclusion-moderation thesis, it concludes the answer to these questions depends on whether these groups are willing to accept Indonesia’s democratic political system. These determine the tactics the groups chose to promote their agenda to potential recruits. While KAMMI is willing to moderate its strategies, HTI is unwilling to do so and continues to promote its agenda through secretive means, although it formally rejects radicalism and extremism.     

British decline or the politics of declinism?

Books reviewed in this article:
C. Barnett The Audit of War: The Illusion and Reality of Britain as a Great Nation
P. Clarke and C. Trebilcock (eds) Understanding Decline: Perceptions and Realities of British Economic Performance
B. Collins and K. Robbins (eds) British Culture and Economic Decline
A. Gamble Britain in Decline: Economic Policy, Political Strategy and the British State
W. Hutton The State We're In
P. Kennedy The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000
D. Marquand The Unprincipled Society
S. Pollard The Wasting of the British Economy: British Economic Policy 1945 to the Present
S. Pollard Britain's Prime and Britain's Decline: The British Economy 1870–1914     

Official Russian identity discourse in light of the annexation of Crimea: national or imperial?

Close examination and analysis of the Kremlin’s framing of Russia’s annexation of Crimea reveals that domestically it was presented in unprecedented national irredentist terminology, aiming at reunifying the Russian nation in one state. The Russian nation was largely described in ethno-lingual or ethno-cultural terms, while the Russian state was all but explicitly declared as a nation–state of ethnic Russians. The official identity discourse was marked by the recasting and unprecedentedly strong reassertion of boundaries between the Russian and Ukrainian nations, legitimizing Russian claims to Crimea. However, the changing references to the crisis in Eastern Ukraine illustrate how the Kremlin’s identity rhetoric is still mainly guided by considerations of political necessity, rather than dictated by some national or ideological vision. Significantly, the focus of the Russian official identity discourse shifted from the state to the nation. This marks a decisive departure from Putin’s earlier largely statist rhetoric in the 2000s, and a new stage of maturation and official acclamation of national ethnicization trends launched during his third presidential term. After years of sitting on the fence, the Kremlin reinvented itself as an active and initiating player in the nationalism field.     

Decolonisation after Suez: Retreat or Rationalisation?

Did the Suez crisis mark the end of empire in Britain and France, their submission to the political domination of the United States and the beginnings of a ‘new Europe’? Or did it stimulate a rethinking and reformulation of the meaning of empire, its utility and costs? This article argues that the ‘retreat from empire’ was not so much a simple, reflexive response to demands from below but a conscious effort by those from above to find new ways of exploiting the opportunities that the world beyond Europe offered them. Decolonisation, it is argued, is best understood in terms of contemporary business thinking, i.e. a conscious design on the part of managers to ‘downsize’, ‘restructure’, and ‘re‐engineer’ the imperial project. And, as in the corporate world, what might appear to the naked eye as retreat and abandonment may, on closer examination, turn out to be something more ambitious, an attempt to divest the imperial enterprise of unprofitable ventures and to reinvigorate those that are deemed to have untapped potential. After Suez, Britain attempted to demonstrate to the Americans that maintaining their access to middle eastern oil was vital both strategically and economically. They attempted to persuade them that ‘Nasserism’ was second only to communism as a danger to the western alliance, to have them drop their ‘anticolonialist’ rhetoric and to support the Bagdad Pact. In order to combat the anticolonial movement they established a ‘colonial’ bloc at the UN. Assuming that the Suez crisis marked the end of empire has hidden the struggle between Britain and France to redefine its meaning and has concealed the extent to which ambitious designs continued to persist in the contest to determine the future shape of a ‘united’ Europe — a struggle in which neither the British nor the French regarded themselves as pawns of the Americans in the Cold War, but rather one in which they attempted to move the powerful new American piece around the chess board in the middle east, Africa and Asia.     

Consociationalism and Centripetalism: Friends or Foes?

Two schools dominate the literature on democracy in divided societies: consociationalism and centripetalism. The first advocates group representation and power sharing while the second recommends institutions that promote multi‐ethnic parties. Although often presented as mutually exclusive choices, in reality many new democracies display a mix. Drawing on the experiences of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burundi, Fiji, Lebanon, Malaysia, and Northern Ireland, this article examines the empirical and theoretical relationship between centripetalism and consociationalism. The aim is to explore the conditions under which they reinforce each other (friends) or work at cross‐purposes (foes). A better understanding of the interaction between consociational and centripetal elements in post‐conflict societies not only yields a more nuanced picture of institutional dynamics, but also holds lessons for institutional design.     

Minimum Winning Electoral Coalitions Under Presidentialism: Reality or Fiction? The Case of Brazil

This article studies the motivations of party leaders to form "minimum winning" electoral coalitions—alliances that cease to be winning if one member is subtracted. In Brazil, concurrent elections stimulate political actors' coordination, and electoral alliances are allowed. In 2002 and 2006, moreover, the Electoral Supreme Court obliged those parties with presidential candidates to replicate this electoral arrangement in the district. Under "verticalization," parties with presidential candidates could not form alliances with rival parties in the concurrent legislative and gubernatorial elections. Verticalization arguably pushed party leaders to form minimum winning electoral coalitions. This new rule forced them to reconsider the contributions of each possible ally in the elections for president, federal deputy, and governor. Examining the elections from 1998 to 2006, this study finds that under verticalization, while parties did form more electoral coalitions with those partners they considered crucial to win, they did so at the expense of policy.     

The October 2011 Kenyan invasion of Somalia: fighting al-Shabaab or defending institutional interests?

This paper asks why Kenya invaded Somalia in October 2011. It scrutinises five possible explanations as to why Kenyan decision-makers decided to invade neighbouring Somalia. The explanations are inspired by different theoretical frameworks. Some are inspired by theories developed to analyse Western societies, whereas others are inspired by theoretical reflections aimed at understanding politics in Africa. It is concluded that the decision to invade Somalia was made because of the institutional and ‘bureaucratic’ interests of the Kenyan Defense Forces (KDF) advanced by a limited number of men of Somali-Kenyan origin who pursued their own interests. Security and economic concerns did play a role, while the paper dismisses that the invasion can be understood as a consequence of the Kenyan government pursuing an ‘international image management strategy’. Theoretically, the paper concludes that ‘Western’ theories may contribute to explaining the launch of ‘Linda Nchi,’ whereas Africa-focused theories like neo-patrimonialism seem less helpful in this particular context.