Japanese Labour Unions and Nuclear Energy: A Historical Analysis of Their Ideologies and Worldviews

This article analyses how diverse stances toward nuclear energy were produced and reproduced among Japanese labour unions from the mid-1960s to the mid-1980s, and how these stances of the formative period influenced the subsequent development of inter-union politics before and after the Fukushima nuclear plant disaster in 2011, based on content analysis of union bulletins and other materials of pro- and anti-nuclear energy unions. This article asks three research questions: (i) what factors contributed to pro- or anti-nuclear energy stances of labour unions?; (ii) what elements constituted or framed unions’ arguments on the issue of nuclear energy?; and (iii) what impact did these stances and arguments formed in the early period have on the subsequent development of inter-union politics over nuclear energy, especially in the aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster? The paper shows union ideologies and institutional integration were the factors influencing unions’ stances on nuclear energy. It also analyses the worldviews of pro- and anti-nuclear energy unions based on the three policy styles of technological enthusiasts, moralists and cost-benefiters. The Fukushima disaster reinforced the previously formed division of union ideologies, but considerably weakened the discourse of technological enthusiasm stressed by pro-nuclear energy unions.     

Japan’s search for influence in the Korean peninsula after the Cold War: Aspirations and constraints

This article examines Japan’s search for a more active international role in the Korean peninsula after the Cold War. It argues that Japanese foreign policy toward the Korean peninsula after the Cold War has continued to exhibit a reactive posture due to several important constraints. The United States has remained an important factor in shaping the Japanese foreign policy agenda in the post-Cold War era. Moreover, the Japanese domestic political environment, despite the dramatic political realignment after 1993, has continued to favor a nonmilitary Japanese role in world affairs. Finally, the lingering Korean mistrust toward Japan has hampered Japan’s bid to increase its political profile. Consequently, these constraints ensure that Japan’s independent role in the Korean peninsula will be rather limited in the foreseeable future.     

日本海洋国家战略与北极地缘政治格局演变研究

日本的海洋战略经历了扩张——收缩——再扩张的发展阶段。出于对北极地区的资源、环境、战略价值、经济价值的多方面考量,日本政府近年在海洋国家战略框架下积极参与北极事务,谋求北极权益。日本对北极事务介入力度的加强,也将引起北极地缘政治格局的较大变化。文章首先分析了日本国家海洋战略的发展历程以及未来趋势,指出日本的海洋战略主要受其国家身份认知(发展成为海洋国家或是大陆国家)、东亚大陆地缘政治格局及海洋霸主国——美国的影响,并得出未来日本的海洋战略将呈现出对外扩张的趋势,进而探究了日本国家海洋战略受北极地缘政治格局的影响以及日本海洋战略的未来发展趋势,得出日本未来将制约中国的北极参与战略、缓和对俄关系、并增强其军事力量,最后从俄罗斯、日本、中国、美国4个国家为出发点分析北极地缘政治格局的演变。     

International relations theory and Japanese pacifism: Why didn’t Tokyo go ballistic over North Korean nukes?

Seen from the perspectives of the various Western theories of international relations, Japan’s peculiar armed pacifism can appear very different. Prominent neorealists have predicted that Japan will inevitably develop nuclear weapons; prominent liberals have cited Japan as the model pacifist nation of the future. Over the last five years, it became clear to Japan that North Korea either possessed, or was on the brink of acquiring, nuclear weapons. How would the Japanese government respond to such a critical threat to its security? The case of North Korean nukes suggests that policymakers should be wary of the grim expectations of Western neorealists, at least in regard to Japan.     

The Formation of the New Government in Taiwan and Japan-Taiwan Relations

This article introduces the background of the presidential and congressional election and discusses the reason for the results. The Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) won both the presidential and congress members' elections, which signals emergence of the first real regime change in Taiwan. However, the style of the Tsai government isn't the same as that of the Chen Shui-bian government and will probably adopt a more modest policy on the cross-strait issue. On the other hand, the Nationalist Party (KMT) lost the election so severely that it's so difficult to recover the situation. On this point, it’s possible that the policy framework of Taiwan, like a two party system, will change drastically in the near future. Foreign policy, especially policy regarding Japan, will be changed by the new government. Actually, the People's Republic of China (PRC) government basically didn't interfere with Ma's foreign policy, so Ma could achieve many foreign policy initiatives. He concluded an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with Singapore and New Zealand, and agreements for investment and fishing with Japan. However, the PRC probably won't provide enough room for foreign policy for the Tsai government.     

Energy Transition by Conviction or by Surprise? Environmental Policy from 2009 to 2013

With the inauguration of the new federal government in 2009, many Germans were afraid of a rollback in energy and climate policy. Indeed, Christian democrats and liberals extended the operational lifespan of nuclear power plants but also continued with the previous green energy policy, known as Energiewende (energy transition). Beginning with a strong ideological separation, the Fukushima accident in Japan provoked a u-turn in nuclear policy, leading the government to abandon the lifespan extensions and to intensify the implementation of Energiewende, which became one of the core policy projects of the Merkel II cabinet then. Moreover, a new kind of consensus atmosphere was established which helped to settle some controversial environmental problems. Albeit policy outcomes concerning Energiewende were rather mixed, energy and climate policy was a rather low ranking issues during the federal election campaign in 2013.     

Dulles’s second visit to Japan: The Tokyo talks of 1951

In January–February 1951, intensive negotiations were conducted in Tokyo between the Japanese and American governments about Japan’s roles in American strategy in Asia. The United States expected Japan to play two vital roles in the cold war. The first was that Japan could act as a potential offensive base from which to mount warfare against Soviet Russia and communist. China. the second was that Japan would serve as a supplementary balancer in the maintenance of the balance of power in Northeast Asia through the reactivation of her defense forces. This article, examining the Japanese government’s preparations for the Tokyo talks, discusses Japanese-American negotiations on a bilateral base arrangement and rearmament. It is argued that, although the United States succeeded in securing Japan as a major strategic base in the cold war by obtaining Japanese agreement to the U.S. proposal for stationing requirements for post-treaty American bases and troops, it failed in having Japan accept a U.S. plan for the revitalization of Japanese power because of the Japanese government’s reservation about rearmament.     

The transformation of hi no maru in postwar Okinawa: from symbol of hope to object of contempt

Starting in the early 1950s, the Japanese flag hi no maru was a cherished symbol in Okinawa of the movement for an end to the postwar U.S. military occupation and reversion to Japanese sovereignty. The flag represented an appeal for liberation from U.S. military rule that dragged on for twenty years (1945–1972) after mainland Japan regained its sovereignty in 1952; and, for elimination, or at least reduction, of the overwhelming size and number of American bases on the island. However, the 1969 Okinawa Reversion Agreement between the U.S. and Japanese governments broke both of the Japanese government’s promises that, after reversion, Okinawa would have no nuclear weapons, and that U.S. bases would be reduced to mainland levels. The grossly disproportionate U.S. military remains to this day, and a “secret agreement” permits the United States to bring back nuclear weapons. Today many in Okinawa associate hi no maru with this discriminatory policy which imposes 74 percent of the total U.S. military presence in Japan on this small island prefecture comprising 0.2 percent of the nation’s land area. For historians, the flag also represents atrocities committed by Imperial Japanese soldiers during the Pacific War and the Japanese government’s continuing reluctance to acknowledge them.     

Taiwan’s Anti-Nuclear Movement: The Making of a Militant Citizen Movement

Social movement studies have constantly focused on research relating to movement strategy, without reaching a consensus on the most viable strategies for realising a movement’s goal. Instead of conceptualising movement strategy as merely a product of movement leaders’ rational calculations, this article analyses a case of strategy shift attributable to leadership replacement and unexpected events. This article examines the significant breakthroughs achieved by Taiwan’s anti-nuclear movement following Japan’s Fukushima Incident in 2011, as well as the 2014 Sunflower Movement in Taiwan. It argues that a militant citizen movement came into being because a new wave of activism employed non-partisan leadership and demonstrated a willingness to employ disruptive tactics. Mounting protests generated a split among members of the traditionally pro-nuclear Kuomintang political party, which was forced to halt the construction of the fourth nuclear power plant in 2014. With the regime change in 2016 that brought the more environment-friendly Democratic Progressive Party to power, Taiwan is now on course to phase out nuclear energy.     

Seeking a New Role: Japan’s Middle East Policy under Shinzo Abe

With his frequent travels to the Middle East, more than all other Japanese leaders in the past, Shinzo Abe had been destined to ineluctably play a distinctive role in redefining his country’s foreign policy approach toward the region. Essentially, when Abe returned to power for a second time in late 2012, he succeeded to subsequently establish a relatively stable and long-term government which strived to critically reappraise some highly contentious elements of Japan’s internal and external policies. Reassessing Japan’s conventional low-profile orientation to the Middle East was particularly a major objective of the Abe government because the region had turned out to be closely and dubiously connected to some pivotal political and security reforms which Abe had long pursued to achieve domestically. By primarily doubling down Japan’s political engagement in different parts of the Middle East, therefore, Abe took advantage of what his country had capitalized in the region in more recent times to especially accelerate the accomplishment of some other political and security he favored ardently.     

ABE'S NUCLEAR RENAISSANCE

ABSTRACT

Prime Minister Abe Shinzð's nuclear renaissance involves downplaying risks, restarting reactors, building new ones, and exporting reactor technology and equipment. Polls in Japan indicate that the public remains overwhelmingly opposed to Abe's nuclear agenda, but in various national and local elections since late 2012 antinuclear candidates have not fared well. This article examines the disjuncture between public preferences and electoral outcomes and why is it likely that Japan will restart reactors despite widespread concerns about safety, the high costs of nuclear energy, and the lack of a site for permanent disposal of nuclear waste. The safety myth is being recalibrated, but the author argues that it remains based on rosy assumptions in a nation especially prone to massive seismic disasters. The reinstatement of nuclear energy in the 2014 national energy policy marks a victory for the nuclear village, a remarkable example of institutional resilience in the face of extremely adverse developments since the massive earthquake and tsunami of 11 March 2011 that precipitated three reactor meltdowns in Fukushima. Despite extensive revelations about shoddy safety practices in the nuclear industry and collusive relations between regulators and those they regulate, Abe has successfully promoted a nuclear revival that few would have thought possible before his election in 2012. Reactor restarts face a number of hurdles, but the pronuclear lobby now finds it has a policy opening. The summer of 2014 has been a nuclear-free one, but in all likelihood it will be Japan's last for decades to come.     

日本智库对中国崛起的研究

日本智库在对华决策方面发挥着重要作用,目前日本智库对于中国崛起的研究较多。多数日本智库看好中国崛起的前景,认为中国崛起在经济上给日本带来了许多机遇,同时也提出了在军事和战略上的各种隐忧。他们认为应加强同中国的交流与合作,抓住中国崛起带来的各种机遇,另一方面也要针对中国崛起可能带来的威胁加强防范。     

Japan and China: Security interests in the post-Cold War era

This article examines the role of Japan in relation to China’s security interests in the post-Cold War era. The first section assesses Japan as a potential security threat to China at a time when Japan appears to be re-emerging as a great power. It analyzes the possible rise of nationalism in Japan today, including discussion of China’s dispute with Japan over the Diaoyu Islands. The second section looks at how Japan can actually enhance China’s security interests, particularly in the economic sphere. Japan’s contribution to China’s modernization drive is assessed. It is argued that Japan seems to enhance China’s security interests more than it poses a threat, partly because of the economic benefits China derives from trading with Japan, and partly because Japanese foreign policy has hitherto been kept in check by the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty.     

Japan's quest for a permanent seat on the Security Council

In an age of declining American power, more Japanese are now understanding the need for multilateral diplomacy, according to Professor Reinhard Drifte, Chair of Japanese Studies in the Department of Politics at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne, UK. In this analysis of Japan's quest for a permanent Security Council seat, Drifte argues that Japan has to move beyond making simply monetary and procedural contributions to the United Nations, to a position of being ready to offer substantive policy input. For this to happen, he says the whole Japanese policy culture has to change.     

东南亚国家核能发展战略与新动向分析

随着国际油价不断上涨以及能源需求的日渐扩大,东南亚国家将目光转向了核能,泰国、印尼、越南、马来西亚、菲律宾、缅甸甚至柬埔寨等国都相继提出了核能发展战略,并计划于2015年建成东南亚第一座核电站。但这些国家对核能的监管等能力受到东盟内外的质疑,尤其是日本福岛核电站危机后,东盟国家的核能开发战略以及与此相关的环境安全等问题引起全球的关注。东盟国家的核能开发战略可能放缓,但这些国家的核能开发计划不会完全停止。     

从永久中立到依附美国——简析战后初期日本政府的国家安全构想

战后初期的日本政府从非武装化的现状出发,积极需求维护国家安全之路。概而言之,其国家安全构想经历了一个从永久中立国到依靠联合国,再到依附美国的演变过程。日本政府决策层最终选择依附美国,是在美苏对立的国际环境下,在被美国占领这一最大现实中,以"追随强者"的结盟心态做出的重大战略决择。在依附美国构想的基础上形成的战后日本国家安全政策目前正处于重要转型期,安倍内阁的国家安全政策走向特别值得关注。     

Courting the Voters? Policy Implications of Party Competition for the Reform Output of the Second Merkel Government

Understanding party competition as a ‘political market’, we explore its characteristics during the second Merkel government, 2009–13. On the demand side, analysing opinion polls and the Länder election results, we find that the outcome of the next Bundestag election was uncertain. Thus, electoral competition was likely to be intense. On the supply side, opposition parties presented credible alternatives to government policies with regard to social as well as environmental policy. Regarding the Euro crisis, however, a consensus across the established parties existed. Studying three of the most salient policy issues, we identify party competition as a crucial determinant of decision-making. While the debate on minimum wages was substantially shaped by party competition, resulting in ‘anticipatory obedience’, nuclear energy only became affected by electoral considerations after the ‘Fukushima shock’ which resulted in a major policy shift. Regarding the response to the Euro crisis, however, party competition was essentially suspended.     

日本实施FTA战略的进展和挑战

20世纪90年代末,日本对外贸易政策发生了重大转变。日本政府在1999年发表的《通商白皮书》中首次提出了要在坚持多边主义立场的同时,与其他国家或地区签定自由贸易协定(FTA)或与亚洲大多数国家签定经济伙伴协定(EPA)。日本实施FTA战略在经济上的主要原因是日本看到了美国欧盟都在积极开展区域合作,感到自己有被边缘化的危险,政治上的原因是要抵消中国的影响。目前日本正在实施与新加坡和墨西哥的FTA,同时又正在与马来西亚、菲律宾、泰国、印度尼西亚和韩国进行FTA谈判,并考虑与澳大利亚、越南、瑞士和海湾合作委员会六国进行FTA谈判。日本实施FTA战略对国内农业政策和人员流动政策提出了挑战,在国际上对美国尤其是中国提出了挑战。本文通过对日本实施 FTA战略进展作出较为全面的概述,使我们更加感到中国实施FTA战略的必要性和急迫性。     

当前日本实施观光立国战略的研究

2012年底,安倍晋三重新执政之后,为推进观光立国战略的发展,改组了日本旅游行政管理机构,并要求相关部门要紧密合作共同打造"日本品牌",以此吸引外国游客访问日本。此外,日本政府还采取对东南亚国家放松旅游签证管制、开拓穆斯林客源市场以及向世界推广日本饮食文化等措施发展观光立国。虽然日本政府采取了许多措施吸引外国游客赴日旅游,但是由于忽视了中国大陆客源市场的巨大潜力,日本推进观光立国战略发展的政策措施效果将会大打折扣。