Can Countries Establish Sovereignty over the Internet?

While the Internet is now a component of people's everyday lives and is becoming more and more convenient, it has also brought about various problems and adverse effects that could be damaging to human rights, corporate interests, and even national interests. In order to address these problems and adverse effects, countries have recently begun to establish national boundaries over the Internet to control it. This article will consider whether countries are capable of establishing sovereignty over the Internet. To this end, first the scope of national sovereignty in terms of the physical entities that make up Internet services, namely, providers, users, network equipment, and network facilities will be defined. Then the four methods for establishing national sovereignty over the Internet from the perspective of social phenomena will be examined. In addition, in examining whether it is possible for countries to secure the power to levy taxes over the Internet, the article will consider the requirements for countries to establish sovereignty over the Internet. Finally, an explanation and attempt to elucidate a new phenomenon involving the movement of corporate earnings to the cloud will be offered.     

Facebook,Contestation and Poor People’s Politics: Spanning the Urban–Rural Divide in Cambodia?

Rural internet use, although still limited, is growing, raising the question of how rural people are using social media politically. As a vehicle of communication that permits the rapid transmission of information, images and text across space and connections between dispersed networks of individuals, does technological advance in rural areas presage significant political transformations? This article investigates this question in the light of a poor result for the Cambodian People’s Party in the 2013 elections, and the subsequent banning of the main opposition party, before the 2018 elections. Expanding internet use in rural areas has linked relatively quiescent rural Cambodians for the first time to networks of information about militant urban movements of the poor. Rural Cambodians are responding to this opportunity through strategies of quiet encroachment in cyberspace. This has had real effects on the nature of the relationship between the dominant party and the rural population and suggests the declining utility of the election-winning strategy used by the party since 1993. However, the extent of this virtual information revolution is limited, since neither the urban nor rural poor are mapping out new online political strategies, agendas or identities that can push Cambodia’s sclerotic politics in new directions.     

Japan’s Diplomacy towards Member Countries of Pacific Islands Forum: Significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting (PALM)

As an island country in the Pacific region, it is natural for Japan to have diplomatic relationships with neighboring island countries. By the early 1970s, Japan started to provide Official Development Assistance (ODA) to two individual island countries in the Pacific region, and, in the mid-1980s, when most of the island countries had achieved independence, Japan’s diplomacy expanded to additional countries. In 1985 then Prime Minister Yasuhiro Nakasone made an official visit to two of the island countries, and, in 1987, official policy expressing support for the Pacific island countries’ independence, regional cooperation, political stability, economic development, and people-to-people exchange was issued. In October 1997, the “Japan-SPF Summit Meeting” with participants of leaders from Japan and 14 South Pacific Forum member island countries/regions and government representatives of Australia and New Zealand was held in Tokyo. The 8^th Pacific Islands Leaders meeting held in May 2018 is symbolic of Japan’s diplomacy toward the Pacific Islands Forum member countries. This article is the author’s personal observation of Japan’s diplomacy toward Pacific Islands Forum member countries and the significance of Pacific Islands Leaders Meeting.     

The Regulatory State in Developing Countries: Can It Exist and Do We Want It? The Case of the Indonesian Power Sector

Abstract

In the rush for development, the regulatory state has assumed the mantle of a new panacea: the instruments and mechanisms necessary for better government, better governance, and better lives. This paper poses two basic questions in response to the rise of the regulatory state and its increasing diffusion into developing countries. First, can regulatory states exist in developing societies or, more accurately, can effective regulatory states emerge and hope to function in a manner similar to their counterparts in developed countries and deliver the types of benefits and outcomes they promise? And second, do regulatory states offer the most effective modalities for delivering enhanced social well-being? By unpacking the concept of the regulatory state and addressing its underlying assumptions and implicit normative values, it is suggested that the modalities of governance entailed in the regulatory state model may not be well suited to developing countries, hurting rather than enhancing governance outcomes. These issues are explored in relation to the Indonesian energy sector, specifically the upstream electricity generation, transmission and distribution sectors, and the machinations involved in governing the sector.     

Lao Wisdom as “Buffer State” in an Emerging Mekong Regional Economy – How a Small Country Behaves among Big Countries –

Lao PDR, located in a geopolitically strategic area of the Mekong region, has served as a “buffer state” without being placed under any one country's influence, contributing to the status quo of regional power balance. The skillful balanced diplomacy of Lao PDR has enabled it to keep this position. Yet, in face of growing Chinese presence, how long will that be the case? With an emerging regional economy across borders in the Mekong region as the background, Lao PDR, a small, land-locked country, has achieved relatively high economic growth rates and has started to attract foreign direct investment in recent years. In this process, Japanese companies have started to invest in manufacturing there, and Japan-Laos business partnership has been taking off. Looking for further development, Lao PDR has been consolidating its position as the “battery of the Mekong,” a net exporter of electricity. By improving its connectivity with neighboring countries, Lao PDR has also been making untiring efforts to become a “land-linked” country, aiming to serve as a “logistic hub” for the region, taking advantage of its geopolitical advantage, Yet, many challenges exist before this goal is achieved.     

The Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) - Pharmaceuticals Transitional Period: Can it Help Build Capacity in African Least Developed Countries (LDCs)?

ABSTRACT

African least developed countries LDCs face unique challenges in the implementation of minimum standards for the protection of IPRs, most poignantly illustrated in the field of pharmaceuticals. This was to an extent recognised by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in providing a transitional period during which LDCs are not obliged to implement the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) Agreement in order to afford them an opportunity to develop a viable technological base in the pharmaceutical sector before being required to provide patent protection for pharmaceuticals. This article explores some options available to African least developed countries LDCs to use the transitional period in a manner that could help develop their pharmaceutical manufacturing capacity. Rwanda has already shown itself to be a pioneer in the use of policy flexibility available in the TRIPS Agreement and related instruments to fulfil the country's demand for essential pharmaceutical products. Therefore, much of the analysis draws on Rwanda for illustrative purposes.