Impressions of Indo‐China

The Mizan Newsletter. Issued monthly by the Central Asian Research Centre and St. Antony's College, Oxford. Price Ios. per month, or £6 per annum post free.

Official Histories of the Indian Armed Forces in the Second World War, 1939–45. Historical Section, India and Pakistan. Distributors, Orient Longmans.

Expansion of the Armed Forces and Defence Organization. Pp. 397. 15 charts and graphs; appendices and index. 45s.

Campaign in Western Asia. Pp. 461. 37 maps; plates, appendices and index. 45s.

Reconquest of Burma. Vol. I. Pp. 403. 36 maps and charts; appendices and index. 50s.

The North African Campaign, 1940–43. Pp. 515. 43 maps; plates, appendices and index. 50s.

The Origins of Russia. By George Vernadsky. Oxford, at the Clarendon Press. 1959. 8vo, cloth, pp. xi, 354, 3 figs.

Bibliography of Recent Soviet Source Material on Soviet Central Asia and the Borderlands.

Die Mongolei. Land, Volk und Wirtschaft der Mongolischen Volksrepublik. By Erich Thiel. Isar Verlag Munchen (German). Pp. 495. Ill., maps.

My Golden Road from Samarkand. By Jascha Golowanjuk. Translated by Frances Hogarth‐Gaute. Published by Geo. G. Harrap and Co., Ltd. Pp. 215. 18s.

Egypt in Transition. By Jean and Simonne Lacouture. Methuen and Co., Ltd. 532 pp. Illustrated, index. 35s.

Egypt in the Sudan, 1820–81. By Richard Hill. Issued under the auspices of Chatham House. Published by Oxford University Press. 1959. Pp. 188. Index; map; bibliography. 25s. in U.K.

The English Utilitarians and India. By Eric Stokes. Clarendon Press, Oxford. Pp.350. 45s.

India, Pakistan and the West. The Home University Library of Modern Knowledge. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 242. Index. 7s. 6d.

The Oxford History of India. By the late Vincent A. Smith, C.I.E. Third edition, edited by Percival Spear. Oxford University Press. 1958. Pp. 849. Index; maps; illustrations. 42s.

Malaya. A Political and Economic Appraisal. By Lennox A. Mills. Oxford University Press. Pp. 234. Index. 30s.

Aden. By Sir Tom Hickinbotham. Constable. 1958. Pp. xii + 242. 13 plates; 1 map. Index. Price 21s.

The Near East. By William Yale. University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, Michigan. 1958. Pp. 486 + xix.

Major Governments of Asia. Edited by George McT. Kahin. Published by Cornell University Press (Oxford University Press, London), 1958. Pp. 607. Index, maps, bibliographies. 45s.

Himmelstier und Gletscherlowe. Mythen, Sagen und Fabcln aus Tibet. In langjährigen völkerkundlichen Forschung unter den Amdo‐Tibetern aufgenom‐men von Prof. Dr. Matthias Hermanns, S.V.D., Bombay. “Das Gesicht der Völker,” der zentralasiatiske Kulturkreis, tibetische Dichtung. Im Erich Röth‐Verlag, Kassel, 1955. Pp. 260, with one frontispiece illustration, two maps and six artistic initials. DM. 4.80.

Amiran‐Darejaniani: A Cycle of Mediæval Georgian Tales ascribed to Mose Khoneli, translated by R. H. Stevenson. Clarendon Press: Oxford University Press. 1958. 8vo, cloth, pp. xxxiii, 240.

The Rebel Emperor. By Lady Flavia Anderson. Published by Gollancz. Pp. 356. Index; biblio. 25s.

Mountains and a Monastery. By Peter Holmes. Published by Geoffrey Bles, Ltd. Pp. 191. Ill.; index. 21s.

Gateway to the Khyber. By Robin Bryans. Robert Hale. 1959. 8¾” × 5¾”. Pp. 173. Ill., index. 18s.

Preface to Cairo. A Survey of pre‐Cairo in history and legend. By Kenneth P. Kirkwood. Mutual Press Ltd., Ottawa.     

Imperialism’s effects on China

Abstract

Three years ago in this journal, James Peck argued that “the professional ideology of America’s China watchers” has tended to blind them to certain approaches to modern Chinese history that might be labelled “revolutionary Marxist” interpretations. As an example, Peck argued that the China watchers have explained China’s nineteenth and early twentieth century difficulties (prolonged economic and military weakness, failed reforms and revolutions) by reference to internal factors (culture, social structure), while a revolutionary Marxist perspective would seek explanations in the effects of imperialism. He provided several examples of the types of effects imperialism may have had on China: “The power of the metropolitan countries to block the formation of vital domestic industries in the dependent countries competitive with their own operations; the domination of mercantile over industrial capital; and the subordination of the economic life of a dependent nation to the severe fluctuations of the primary commodities market.” But he did not have space in his article, which was primarily concerned with a critique of existing work in the China field, to provide a fuller outline of what the imperialism approach to modern China might involve.     

China’s National Identity and the Root Causes of China’s Ethnic Tensions

This paper seeks to examine the People’s Republic of China’s (China) self-defined national identity and the consequences on China’s ethnic relations with its ethnic minorities. This paper argues that China’s identity is equated with the identity and culture of its ethnic Han Chinese majority—a narrative originally constructed by the Chinese state which its ethnic Han Chinese majority since indulges in. However, this hegemonic narrative is at the root of interethnic issues and tensions in China today, as further ethnic tensions stem from the resistance of ethnic minorities against Sinicization and the imposition of this “Chinese” identity against them. These phenomena thus both indicate what I term a weak “internal soft power appeal” of Han Chinese Confucian culture for ethnic minorities living in the PRC, and imply that China must adopt a different, more inclusive national identity if it were to maintain ethnic stability in the long term.     

Forecasting US–China Relations, 2015

Abstract

Rejecting the certainty of prediction in favor of a probabilistic approach to forecasting, this paper develops an eight-step forecasting methodology, addressing 1) structural drivers, 2) predetermined elements, 3) critical uncertainties, 4) chance, 5) scenarios, 6) probabilities, 7) signposts, and 8) policy implications, and applies it to the medium-term future of US–China relations. Specifically, it forecasts a 45 percent chance that US–China relations in 2015 will be best characterized overall by a rivals scenario, followed by a 35 percent chance that the US and China will be partners. The chances that the US and China will be allies or enemies are significantly more remote, but real, at 5 percent and 15 percent respectively.     

Reading the Trump Administration’s China Policy

The policy toward China under the Trump Administration is a rare combination of the toughest part of that of the Democratic Party, which is trade, and of the Republican Party, which is national security. The National Security Strategy by the Trump Administration defined China and Russia as competitors. It is the first time for the US Government to be harsh against both China and Russia (the Soviet Union included) since the late 1960s. Though trade is by far the most salient aspect of President Trump’s confrontational China policy, it is in fact a whole-of-the-government approach or pushback that the US government is taking with China, which means that not just the White House but various Departments and the Congress are tough with China, dealing with many issues from trade to human rights to national security. The President might actually be the softest link, almost exclusively focusing on trade. This might be a historic turnaround in US policy toward China.     

Japan’s Growing Hard Hedge Against China

As China accumulates more power, Japan is often overlooked as being capable of affecting China’s continued trajectory because of material differences and narratives of Japan being a reactive state. Yet, Beijing’s strategic planning cannot ignore Tokyo because Japan has the ability to affect the region’s security environment. Feeling its presence and influence becoming relatively smaller, Tokyo has been increasingly proactive in its effort to expand its strategic space and shape the regional environment in ways conducive to its interests. A review of Japan’s approach to China since 1972 reveals that it has shifted away from its traditional engagement policy toward first a soft hedge, followed by a harder hedge that continues to this day. Today’s mix of partnerships and capabilities enable Japan to complicate China’s freedom of action and frustrate its continued rise.     

Japan’s Policy Toward China Under Strong Anti-Chinese Sentiment: A Case of Terminating Yen Loans to China

2004 was the year when the Japanese public's affinity with China dropped dramatically, to 37.6?%, due to anti-Japan riots in China. Now more than 70?% of the Japanese public does not feel an affinity with China. How could such a strong anti-Chinese sentiment influence Japan's policy toward China? This paper considers this question by examining Japan's decision-making process on terminating the much-criticized yen loans to China. Yen loans are a type of Official Development Assistance (ODA) provided by the Japanese government to countries lacking sufficient funds for economic development. China is one of the top yen loan borrowers, and the loans have contributed to China's economic growth and increasing openness. However, in March 2005, Japanese Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura told Chinese Foreign Minister Li Zhaoxing that Japan intended to phase out the yen loans before the 2008 Beijing Olympics and reached an agreement on the matter. Two-and-a-half years later, Japan terminated its yen loans to China, as the foreign ministers had agreed. Through mainly firsthand documents and interviews with government officials, this paper will clarify the following two points: (1) While it is true that the Japanese government significantly reduced its yen loan package to China from 2001 onward due to domestic criticism of China, as pointed out by previous studies, it was not planning to terminate the yen loans as of summer 2004. Instead, the Japanese government was contemplating how to keep providing yen loans to China; (2) Foreign Minister Nobutaka Machimura, who was appointed in September 2004, had pushed for the termination of yen loans to China only after anti-Chinese sentiment rose dramatically in summer 2004, because he felt that continuing the much-criticized yen loans would not benefit stable Japan-China relations. This paper sheds light on the background of the termination of yen loans to China, a major milestone in postwar Japan-China relations that had been unclear until now. Having said this, the more important point of this paper may be that it also shows the influence of strong anti-Chinese sentiment on Japan's policies toward China.     

An “Assertive” China? Insights from Interviews

Abstract

Recent years have witnessed the emergence of a more assertive China. What happened to China's “peaceful rise” and “charm offensive”? What explains the changes in China's foreign policy? According to interviews with Beijing and Shanghai-based analysts, China's assertiveness between 2008 and 2010 can be divided into two waves, each triggered by a different cause. The first wave seems triggered by a sense in Beijing that Washington, DC was more differential to China's interests, and less committed to East Asia. The second wave seems best explained as China's response to what it perceived as a far more assertive and threatening United States. Both waves were amplified by two domestic challenges: Chinese leaders’ hypersensitivity to popular nationalism and poor bureaucratic coordination among an expanding number of foreign policy actors.     

China’s New Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping

Since taking power, the new Chinese President Xi Jinping has talked of “striving for achievements,” signaling a new theme in Chinese diplomacy. This article first examines the changes in Beijing’s foreign policy structure before moving on to examine the three major schools of thought on China’s immediate relations with its neighbors, implying that the policy focus will lie with the “advance westward” school. Moreover, this article highlights how China is maximizing its influence through economic interaction, whilst noting that economics is also being used to punish hostile countries. Furthermore, it notes that China’s next step is to influence change using the multilateral frameworks of the international system, remolding global rules to China’s benefit. The article concludes by examining Beijing’s leadership role, particularly its commitment to non-alliance, and whether Beijing and Washington can rebuild a more suitable model to reflect both country’s ambitions on the world stage.     

Class or Citizenship? Debating Workplace Conflict in China

While a new working class is in the process of remaking itself in China, the latest trend in labour studies has rejected the Marxist tradition which sees the social relations of production as the point of departure for analysing workplace conflict. According to the new current, influenced by post-structuralism, class is only one of the identities articulated by workers, and it can be understood only with reference to their discourses. By critically evaluating an important book by Ching Kwan Lee (Against the Law: Labor Protests in China's Rustbelt and Sunbelt), this article suggests that her approach generalising workers' protests with the notion of citizenship cannot satisfactorily explain the changing pattern of labour protests in China since 2004. By using fieldwork data and connecting the analysis of the social relations of production with the changing patterns of workers' struggle, this paper argues that migrant workers protests are a significant part of the emerging class conflict in China.     

What Does China Want? Discerning the PRC's National Strategy

Abstract

Debates about China's national strategy have surprisingly overlooked an important source: the national strategy as formulated by China's leaders themselves. This article explains how the ruling Communist Party of China formulates its equivalent of a national strategy – defined as the nation's desired end state and guidance on supporting objectives, ways, and means. It explores the current national strategy as published in widely available official documents such as the Communist Party Constitution and Party Congress Work Report, the most recent version of which dates from the 17th Party Congress in 2007. The article considers some implications for observers and policymakers.     

The US–China Relationship and Asia-Pacific Security: Negotiating Change

Abstract

The crucial determinant of Asia-Pacific security is whether the U.S. and China can negotiate their relationship and their relative positions and roles in such a way as to produce sustainable regional stability. This paper examines three alternative scenarios of negotiating Sino-American coexistence: (I) The maintenance of the status quo of U.S. strategic dominance over the region, which China does not challenge; (II) negotiated change, by which the two powers coordinate to manage a more fundamental structural transformation; and (III) power transition, in which there is a significant structural shift in the regional system as a rising China challenges U.S. dominance, with a range of possible outcomes.     

China–Angola aid relations: strategic cooperation for development?

Until recently the international donor community has predominantly consisted of members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). However, China does not entirely conform to the OECD on matters related to aid; it is also not a member of the DAC. Hence, the data on China's aid, as well as its focus, purpose, terms and conditions are controversial because they are not clear. Furthermore, on the receiving end, Angola is equally reticent to discuss its management of state funds. The uncertainties and the opaque nature of diplomatic relations are compounded by a perceived overlap and ambiguity between aid and investment. The objective of the study is to examine China–Angola aid relations and provide critical judgement of it characterising strategic cooperation for the development of Angola.