Subnational Taxes in Developing Countries: The Way Forward

Both theory and experience in a variety of circumstances around the world suggest strongly that if fiscal decentralization is to produce sustainable net benefits in developing countries, subnational governments require much more real taxing power than they now have. Students of public finance have studied the subject, and practitioners in developing countries have installed many different versions of subnational government tax. In most developing countries there are potentially sound and productive taxes that subnational governments could use: personal income tax surcharges, property taxes, taxes on the use of motor vehicles, payroll taxes, and even subnational value‐added taxes and local “business value” taxes may all be viable options in particular countries. Still, there is no general consensus about what works and what does not. In this review paper, we try and pull together enough evidence to suggest the way forward. We also develop the argument that given political realities one cannot usually decentralize significant revenues to subnational governments without having in place an intergovernmental transfer system to offset at least some of the disequalizing effects that would otherwise occur. Nor does it make sense to think of decentralizing exactly the same package of tax choices to all subnational governments regardless of their scale and scope of operations.     

The early modern origins of contemporary European tax outcomes

What explains variation in tax outcomes between European states? Previous studies emphasise the role played by political institutions, but focus mostly on the input side of politics – how access to power and policy making is structured – and the institutions of relatively recent times. It is argued in this article that output‐side institutions related to the implementation of political decisions also matter and have deep institutional origins. As the classic literature has argued, the early modern period from 1450 to 1800 was formative for the development of fiscal capacity, but European states diverged in the stock of capacity they acquired. This article tests whether these differences still affect contemporary tax outcomes using a novel measure of fiscal capacity, based on the age, extent and quality of state‐administered cadastral records. The empirical analysis shows that, on average, countries with higher early modern fiscal capacity have higher tax revenue today, compared to countries with lower early modern fiscal capacity. This association is robust to different model specifications and alternative measurements. The findings have important policy implications as they indicate how deeply the current fiscal problems of the continent are entrenched, but also point to what needs to be prioritised within ongoing tax reforms.     

Tax decentralization and local government size

This paper investigates the relationship between fiscal federalism and the sizes of local governments. While many empirical studies emphasized that grants encourage the growth of local public spending and local taxes constrain it, they are more silent regarding the effects of different types of tax autonomy. The paper addresses this issue by arguing that tax decentralization as organized on tax bases used only by local governments (tax-separation), rather than on tax-base sharing, would restrain local public expenditures. Using an unbalanced panel of OECD countries, the key finding is that only property taxes—mostly based on a “tax-separation” scheme—seem to favor smaller local governments. Thus, while tax decentralization is a necessary condition for limiting the growth of local governments, it does not appear sufficient, as tax-separation schemes among government levels would in fact be required.     

The incentive effects of property taxes on local governments

This paper applies the ideas of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) to local property taxes. When local governments maximize their revenues, property taxes provide incentives for adequate amenity provision. Local amenity provision determines property values which then determine local tax revenues. As long as the demand for housing is inelastic, property-taxes will provide stronger incentives for local governments than lump-sum taxes. As current property values reflect expectations about future amenity levels, property taxes create incentives for even the most myopic government to invest for the future. Local property taxes can also act to limit the incentives of localities to tax; there are cases where higher levels of local property taxes lead to lower overall tax burdens. These ideas are applied to the tax reform in the late 1970s; one reason that tax reform may have been so successful is that in a period where land prices are driven by many forces other than government amenities, property taxes lose their value as incentive devices.     

How Municipal Property Tax Responded to State Aid Cuts: The Case of Massachusetts Municipalities in the Post‐2001 Fiscal Crisis

This empirical study examines municipal property tax responses to state aid cuts during the post‐2001 fiscal crisis. Using panel econometric techniques on annual changes in property tax levy by 351 incorporated Massachusetts municipalities in the period of 2002–2006, the results suggest that municipal governments offset about 9 cents of each dollar of net state aid cut through the increase of their property tax rates. It contributes to public finance literature on the extent to which local property tax can be used to stabilize municipal revenues when the intergovernmental revenue shrinks.     

Mayoral Public Sector Work Experience and Tax Collection Performance in Colombian Local Governments

ABSTRACT

Local governments in Latin America tend to have limited capacity to collect taxes. Existing theory explains tax collection performance as a function of political, socio-economic, and cultural factors. Yet across Latin America, tax collection performance varies greatly between localities that are similar along these dimensions. We suggest that organizational capacity, represented by managers' human capital, explains variation in local tax collection performance. We test this theoretical idea against panel data on most Colombian local governments, where elected mayors are the top managers determining the local tax collection strategy. We examine two indicators of tax collection performance: (1) the per-capita amount of property tax collected and (2) property tax collected as a percentage of total property valuation. Controlling for important confounders, the length of the mayor's prior public sector work experience is positively associated with the per-capita amount of property tax collected but not the percentage of total property valuation collected in property tax. Our results suggest that Colombian mayors gain relevant skills over their career. Our study has implications for other developing countries with a similar property tax collection system.     

Bitter Harvest: Intergovernmental Dimensions of the Farm Crisis

The recent and deep recession in American agriculture seriouslyaffected state and local government finances and services in1986. Sharp declines in farm land values began to erode thelocal property tax base in many rural communities, while rapidlyrising property tax delinquencies created more immediate cashflow problems. Many farm states experienced serious budgetaryshortfalls as revenue receipts from state income and sales taxesdeclined or failed to grow at expected rates. Both state andlocal fiscal problems were exacerbated by federal aid reductions,regional economic conditions, and rising service demands. Suchproblems made agricultural policy a major issue in the 1986elections and prompted a proliferation of new policy initiatives,especially by state governments. Some of the policy approachesadopted or being considered raise fundamental questions aboutintergovernmental relations and methods of public service provisionin a rapidly changing policy environment.     

RISING WITH THE TIDE WITHOUT FLIPPING THE BOAT — ANALYZING THE SUCCESSES AND CHALLENGES OF FISCAL CAPACITY BUILDING IN CHINA

While many developing countries experience a short period of economic boom and then spiral quickly into periods of deficit, currency fluctuation, and indebtedness, China has been able to sustain rapid economic growth and maintain solid fiscal capacity for the past 30 years, even during the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s and the global recession in the beginning of the 21st century. This article examines three key strategies behind China's fiscal success — its flexibility in adapting tax policies to the changing economic and social conditions, its success in realigning the intergovernmental fiscal relationship in 1994 and forcing subnational governments to become more entrepreneurial in revenue generation, and its pursuit of institutional reforms since the mid‐1990s to improve the government's capacity in budgeting and financial management. The article evaluates the implications of the Chinese experience for other developing countries and discusses the future challenges of fiscal reforms in China. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How Governments Respond to Business Demands for Tax Cuts: A Study of Corporate and Inheritance Tax Reforms in Austria and Sweden

How responsive are democratic governments to business demands for tax cuts? We research this question in comparative case studies of cuts in corporate taxes and inheritance taxes in Austria and Sweden. We find that governments, regardless of partisan composition, are responsive to business demands, but that fiscal and electoral goals attenuate responsiveness. In both countries, the limited revenues generated by inheritance taxation and greater alignment of business demands with middle‐class voter interests resulted in governments heading business demands for an abolition of this tax. Goal conflict were larger for corporate tax cuts. In both countries, governments tried to minimize these goal conflict by adopting compensatory policy measures, specifically measures to broaden the tax base and simultaneous tax cuts for low‐income groups. The findings suggest that the policy output of business‐friendly tax cuts reflect a balancing of conflicting goals, rather than outright business dominance.     

Property Tax Responses to State Aid Cuts in the Recent Fiscal Crisis

Many states experienced fiscal crises at the beginning of this decade. Some responded by cutting state aid to local governments. This paper explores the extent to which local governments responded to these aid cuts by raising property taxes. The authors hypothesize that changes in aid help explain the observed differences in per capita property tax revenue changes across states. They find that on average school districts increased property taxes by 23 cents for each dollar cut in state aid. These results highlight the important role that the property tax plays in maintaining the stability of the state and local sector.     

Fiscal Structure and the Post-Proposition 13 Fiscal Regime in California's Cities

Two and a half decades after the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, California state and local governments continue to feel the intended and unintended effects of tax and expenditure limitations. While considerable time has passed since voters enacted Proposition 13, the effects of the property tax revolt continue to be dramatic. This article examines the fiscal structure of California's city governments from 1972 to 2002. The analysis reveals that California's cities have become less reliant upon property tax revenues and more reliant upon charges and fees, and have not increased reliance upon sales tax revenues as much as expected.     

Diversifying Local Government Revenue in Bosnia-Herzegovina Through an Area-Based Property Tax

After a bitter and devastating war, Bosnia and Herzegovina is making slow but steady progress rebuilding its economy and government structure. As normalcy returns, the demand for government services invariably will continue to increase, especially at the sub-entity levels of government. Unfortunately, the current fiscal structure severely restricts the resources available to local governments. This article suggests that Bosnia and Herzegovina consider adopting a property tax as a means to provide much- needed revenue. After describing the current governmental and fiscal system that has evolved since the signing of the Dayton Accords, the authors discuss why an area-based property tax, rather than a more traditional property tax based on capital value or market prices, makes sense for this country in transition.     

经济开放对地方财政收入规模及结构的影响实证分析

使用中国1999—2007年度省级面板数据,实证分析了经济开放对地方财政收入规模和内部相对结构变化的作用。研究表明:贸易开放度的提高显著增加了地方个人所得税、行为税、财产税和非税收入,整体上也引起地方财政总收入的增加;并使地方财政收入中个人所得税、财产税和非税收入比重上升,城建税收入比重下降。投资开放的提升显著增加了地方营业税、个人所得税、行为税、非税及预算外收入,同时减少了地方增值税和企业所得税收入,总体上对地方财政收入有负效应;并提高了地方财政收入中营业税、个人所得税、行为税、财产税、非税收入及预算外收入的比重。由于外资和外贸对经济及税基的作用差异、现行分税制、地方各项财政收入自身特征、地方政府基于多元目标为促进外资投资呈现出的策略行为等,使经济开放对地方各项财政收入规模及其相对结构的影响具有复杂和非一致性。     

Public Opinion on Federalism and Federal Political Culture in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, 2004

This study reports on public opinion surveys on fiscal value,taxation, trust and confidence in governments, and federal politicalculture conducted in Canada, Mexico, and the United States inJune 2004. Compared to past years, support for the federal governmentremains high in the United States, with support for local governmentsurging substantially in 2004. The local property lax is viewedas the worst U.S. lax, followed secondly but distantly by thefederal income tax. Canadians are less supportive of their federalgovernment, and more supportive of their local governments,than Mexicans and Americans. However, Mexicans show low trustand confidence in all their governments, while Americans reportfairly high trust and confidence in all their governments. Onmeasures of federal political culture, Canadians scored highest,Mexicans scored lowest, and Americans fell in between.     

Government Partisanship and Managing the Economy: Japan and Sweden in Comparative Perspective

It is generally taken for granted that countries governed by leftist governments expand social policies and have an affinity for active fiscal policy that implies higher tolerance of deficit‐ridden budgets. In contrast, conservative governments are taken to be less likely to favor welfare expansion, especially when it has negative fiscal consequences. We challenge this conventional wisdom by comparing the reactions of the Swedish and Japanese governments to economic crises during the 1990s. The puzzle is that the Social Democratic governments in Sweden were able to reduce ballooning budget deficits and thus bring the economy back into balance, while still having one of the largest public sectors in the developed world. In contrast, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party governments in Japan have been unable to redress their deficit problems despite having one of the smallest public sectors among the Organisation for Economic Co‐operation and Development countries. We argue that this can be explained by taking into consideration that governments’ tax and spending policies are influenced by bureaucratic structures and institutionally driven public beliefs. By comparing Japan and Sweden, we show how political parties actively seek to make their policy stances permanent by structuring taxation and expenditure policies to create institutionalized support for their policy preferences.     

Determining Factors of E-government Development: A Worldwide National Approach

ABSTRACT

The implementation of e-government aims at simplifying and improving the relationships and transactions between public administrations and their users or customers. In this vein, the objective of this work is to analyze the factors that promote the development of e-government in the national governments of 192 countries worldwide, differentiating between developed and developing countries. Our findings emphasize that the development of e-government requires that countries have a degree of economic development that enables their citizens to have a certain standard of living, both economic and cultural, as well as important internal government reforms which promote administrative effectiveness. Once these essential factors are fulfilled, the national government's online presence is favored by governments that rule with a majority in their parliaments and with an important fiscal capacity.     

On the link between fiscal decentralization and public debt in OECD countries

Excessive borrowing by subnational governments is considered to be one of the perils of fiscal decentralization. On the other hand, fiscal decentralization might ensure the fiscal stability of the public sector by constraining Leviathan governments. Since the impact of decentralized government on fiscal outcomes is therefore ambiguous from a theoretical perspective, we explore this question empirically with a panel of 17 OECD countries over the 1975–2001 period. Our findings suggest that expenditure decentralization significantly reduces public indebtedness, whereas tax decentralization and vertical fiscal imbalances are insignificant.     

The Changing Property Tax and State-Local Relations

The substantial transfer of fiscal power to state government,undermining local government autonomy, characterizes the courseof state-local relations in the last quarter of the twentiethcentury in the United States. Central to this shift is diminishedlocal control of the property tax, a result of the tax limitationsadopted in most states since the 1970s. This article arguesthat control of the property tax is critical to the workingsof local representative democracy, affecting both the discretionof elected officials and participation of citizens. It presentsboth quantitative and qualitative evidence of the centralizationtrend, including changes in property-tax flows and state financesaffecting local governments, an analysis of the comparativeseverity of property-tax limitations, changes in K-12 educationfinancing, and local consequences of the tax limitations.     

Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations: Coordination Failures and Fiscal Outcomes

This article estimates the fiscal impact of coordination failures in intergovernmental fiscal relations. The coordination failures considered here are due to agency problems arising from the delegation of fiscal powers to sub-national governments, and "common pool" problems associated with funding decentralised government spending through intergovernmental transfers. Particular attention is focused on the trade-off between coordination and fiscal decentralisation. Evidence provided for a sample of thirty countries suggests that coordination failures are likely to result in a deficit bias in decentralized policy making, particularly in the case of developing countries, for which the benefits of decentralization may be over-stressed. Developed countries were found to be less adversely affected by coordination failures and have therefore managed to pursue fiscal consolidation in a decentralized setup.     

The effect of school district and municipal government financial health information on local tax election outcomes: evidence from fiscal stress labels in Ohio

A key informational asymmetry in local public finance is the lack of information available to local residents regarding the financial status of the school districts and local governments in which they reside. Given that voters in many states must approve property and income tax increases for these local entities, the lack of full information on the financial status of these local entities may lead to sub-optimal voting decisions. State financial intervention systems have begun to make financial problems more salient to residents, potentially alleviating these informational asymmetries. This paper examines the effect of the Ohio fiscal stress labeling program on voting outcomes and the tax-setting behavior of local officials for school district and municipal government tax referendums. We use a difference-in-differences approach to examine data from over 3000 school district and 2300 municipality property tax elections from 2004 to 2012. While we find minimal evidence that the yes vote share changed for school district referendums following fiscal stress label receipt, we find very large increases (15 to 23 percentage points) in the likelihood of referendum passage for school districts following label receipt. We do not find much evidence of changes in the likelihood of passage or the yes vote share following label receipt for municipalities, but we do find that these voting outcomes rise following label removal. We also find that local officials do not appreciably change their tax-setting behavior in response to these labels, as the size and likelihood of property tax proposal are largely unchanged following label receipt or removal.