Strength of Evidence,Extraevidentiary Influence,and the Liberation Hypothesis: Data from the Field

To examine relationships between strength of evidence (SOE) and extraevidentiary variables in the context of Kalven and Zeisel’s (The American Jury, 1966) liberation hypothesis, post-trial questionnaire data were collected from judges, attorneys, and jurors associated with 179 criminal jury trials. SOE ratings were strongly correlated with jury verdicts on the three most serious charges against the defendant, and several extraevidentiary variables (i.e., pretrial publicity, trial complexity, charge severity, and foreperson demographics) were moderately correlated with verdicts. Extraevidentiary-verdict relationships remained significant when SOE was controlled, although extraevidentiary variables yielded only modest improvement in classification accuracy beyond SOE. In partial support of the liberation hypothesis, several case-related extraevidentiary variables were significantly related to jury verdicts only when the prosecution’s evidence was rated as moderately strong.     

The role of alternative hypotheses in reducing bias in forensic medical experts’ decision making

Medical opinions are often essential evidence in criminal cases but relatively little is known about the factors that impact forensic doctors’ decision making. This research examines the role and impact of having an alternative hypothesis while forming a medical opinion. A scenario-based experiment with forensic doctors (n = 20) was conducted. In two out of three scenarios, the existence of alternative hypotheses impacted the actual opinions reached, the confidence in the judgments and the perceived consistency with the plaintiff hypothesis. Investigative and legal actors should be aware of the possibility of biases and importance of having alternative hypotheses when requesting and evaluating medical opinions.     

意见证据规则要义——以美国为视角

意见证据规则是证据规则的重要组成部分。尽管意见证据规则在我国的立法层面已初步确立,但相关的理论研究仍然十分薄弱。鉴于意见证据规则在美国适用最为广泛,发展最为成熟,本文力图以美国为例,全面介绍意见证据规则的基本内容,分析其价值内涵、法理基础,阐释其适用的难点,探讨专家意见可靠性的属性定位,研究意见证据规则下终极问题原则基本被废弃的根本原因及专家意见受到的限制,进而就意见证据规则在我国的适用提出管见。     

A Third Verdict Option: Exploring the Impact of the Not Proven Verdict on Mock Juror Decision Making

In most adversarial systems, jurors in criminal cases consider the binary verdict alternatives of "Guilty" and "Not guilty." However, in some circumstances and jurisdictions, a third verdict option is available: Not Proven. The Not Proven verdict essentially reflects the view that the defendant is indeed culpable, but that the prosecution has not proven its case beyond a reasonable doubt. Like a Not Guilty verdict, the Not Proven verdict results in an acquittal. The main aim of the two studies reported here was to determine how, and under what circumstances, jurors opt to use the Not Proven verdict across different case types and when the strength of the evidence varies. In both studies, jurors were more likely to choose a Not Proven verdict over a Not Guilty verdict when the alternative was available. When evidence against the defendant was only moderately strong and a Not Proven verdict option was available (Study 2), there was also a significant reduction in the conviction rate. Results also showed that understanding of the Not Proven verdict was poor, highlighting inadequacies in the nature of judicial instructions relating to this verdict.     

Religious Characteristics and the Death Penalty

Using one mock trial scenario, this study investigated whether religious and demographic factors were related to death penalty attitudes and sentencing verdicts. Those who favored the death penalty differed from those who had doubts about the penalty in gender, affiliation, fundamentalism, evangelism, literal Biblical interpretism, beliefs about God’s attitudes toward murders, and perceptions of how their religious groups felt about the death penalty. These relationships generally held after mock jurors were death qualified. Gender, fundamentalism, literal interpretism, beliefs about God’s death penalty position, and perceptions of how one’s religious group felt about the death penalty predicted death penalty sentencing verdicts. Future research could determine whether using peremptory challenges to exclude potential jurors based on religion can help lawyers choose a more favorable jury. The present research was supported by the National Science Foundation award number 0351811, the Society for the Psychological Study of Social Issues, the American Psychology-Law Society, and the University of Nebraska Law-Psychology Program. This research was presented at the 2006 conference of the American Psychology-Law Society. The authors are grateful for the research assistance of Nick Fanning and Beth Herschlag and for the helpful comments from Brian Bornstein, Rich Wiener, Bob Schopp, Dick Dienstbier, and several anonymous reviewers.     

医疗损害鉴定意见存在问题与对策

鉴定意见作为专门性问题的鉴定结果,是诉讼案件得以正确处理的重要依据,其对诉讼结果的影响不言自明。鉴定意见不仅关乎证据制度,也涉及司法体系和诉讼程序。医疗领域的诉讼因裁判者囿于知识的局限,鉴定意见的作用更为突出。长期以来,鉴定问题已严重影响到司法裁判的效率与公正。本文通过梳理鉴定意见在医疗损害诉讼各环节中存在的问题,剖析鉴定方式、鉴定主体、文书内容以及审查采信方面等问题的成因,提出确立以自然人为中心的“鉴定人——专家辅助人”的“双翼”医疗损害鉴定人制度,规范鉴定意见内容和表述方式,完善质证程序等措施。     

The impact of different types of expert scientific testimony on mock jurors’ liability verdicts

Participants in two experiments acted as jurors for a personal-injury case containing different types of expert testimony. In both experiments, the defendant was more likely to obtain a verdict in his favor when his expert presented anecdotal case histories than when the expert presented experimental data. Participants’ liability judgments were correlated with their perceptions of the experts’ credibility (experiments 1 and 2) and were moderated somewhat by their need for cognition and preference for numerical information (experiment 2). The results are discussed in terms of reasoning heuristics such as the base-rate fallacy.     

澳大利亚联邦法院对专家证据的采纳

I. Introduction
The opinion evidence of experts is an exception to the general rule that witnesses can only give evidence of that which they have seen or heard and may not give evidence of inferences which arise from their observations and from that which they have heard.     

The effect of ambiguous question wording on jurors’ presumption of innocence

ABSTRACT

Research suggests that jurors misunderstand the presumption of innocence. However, past studies have not asked participants to estimate the defendant’s probability of guilt, setting aside the fact of charge and indictment. We conduct two studies to explore the impact of this question wording on estimates of the probability of guilt/innocence by jury-eligible Mturk workers. In Experiment 1 (N?=?275), question wording (legal, factual and ambiguous) was varied within participants and revealed significantly higher estimates of innocence in response to the legal than the factual or ambiguously worded question. In Experiment 2 (N?=?303), question wording was manipulated between participants both before (prior) and after (posterior) the presentation of evidence. Prior estimates of guilt were significantly lower in the legal than factual or ambiguous conditions. Question wording also predicted posteriors, and these in turn predicted verdicts. These results suggest that imprecise wording may have contributed to concerns about jurors’ understanding of the presumption of innocence, highlighting the need for further research. Link to associated OSF page: [https://osf.io/ywuxr/?view_only=b2148ffd1f674e62b66d31ed6593e586].     

The Use of Religion in Death Penalty Sentencing Trials

Both prosecutors and defense attorneys have presented religious appeals and testimony about a defendant's religious activities in order to influence capital jurors' sentencing. Courts that have objected to this use of religion fear that religion will improperly influence jurors' decisions and interfere with their ability to weigh aggravators and mitigators. This study investigated the effects of both prosecution and defense appeals. Prosecution appeals did not affect verdict decisions; however, use of religion by the defense affected both verdicts and the weighing of aggravators and mitigators. These results could be due to differences in perceived sincerity and remorse that are conveyed in the various appeals.     

Gruesome Evidence and Emotion: Anger, Blame, and Jury Decision-Making

Judges assume that gruesome evidence can influence juror verdicts, but little is known about the manner in which the influence is manifested. In a 2 × 3 study that varied the gruesome content of photographic and verbal evidence, gruesome verbal evidence did not influence mock juror emotional states, and had no impact on the conviction rate. Mock jurors who saw gruesome photographs, compared with those who saw no photographs, reported experiencing significantly more intense emotional responses, including greater anger at the defendant. The conviction rate when visual evidence in the form of gruesome or neutral photographs was included was significantly higher than the conviction rate without photographic evidence. Mean ratings of the inculpatory weight of prosecution evidence by mock jurors presented with gruesome photographs were significantly higher than those by mock jurors who did not view any photographs. Further analyses revealed that mock juror anger toward the defendant mediated the influence of the gruesome photographs in enhancing the weight of inculpatory evidence.     

专家证人模式与司法鉴定模式之比较

专家证人模式与司法鉴定模式是英美法系和大陆法系在解决专门性事实问题上两种不同的模式。两者在法律文化基础、有关专家的诉讼地位和资格、程序启动、质证、证据能力和证明力上都有很大的不同。然而,由于两种模式都存在其固有的缺陷,近年来各国都在进行相应的改革,出现了相互融合和借鉴的趋势。     

Emotions and Attributions of Legal Responsibility and Blame: A Research Review

Research on the effects of emotions and moods on judgments of legal responsibility and blame is reviewed. Emotions and moods may influence decision makers in 3 ways: by affecting their information processing strategies, by inclining their judgments in the direction of the valence of the emotion or mood, and/or by providing informational cues to the proper decision. A model is proposed that incorporates these effects and further distinguishes among various affective influences in terms of whether the affect is provoked by a source integral or incidental to the judgment task, and whether it affects judgment directly (e.g., by providing an informational cue to judgment) or indirectly (e.g., by affecting construal of judgment target features, which in turn affects the judgment). Legal decision makers' abilities to correct for any affective influences they perceive to be undesirable and normative implications for legal theory and practice are briefly discussed.     

An Examination of Jury Verdicts for Evidence of a Similarity-Leniency Effect,an Out-Group Punitiveness Effect or a Black Sheep Effect

Archival data from cases adjudicated by jury in El Paso and Bexar County, Texas, were used to test whether a similarity-leniency effect, an out-group punitiveness effect, or a black sheep effect (BSE; J. M. Marques, V Y. Yzerbyt, & J. P. Leyens, 1988) influenced jury decisions. Defendant ethnicity, jury ethnic composition, and strength of evidence against the defendant were coded for 418 closed noncapital, felony cases to test their impact on trial verdicts and sentence lengths. Results indicated complex relations exist among juror and defendant characteristics and their influence on trial outcomes. No support was found for any of the theoretical models as predictors of jury decision-making. Strength of evidence was the most influential variable for both verdicts and length of sentences. Case strength, defendant ethnicity, and jury composition were related to sentence lengths.     

A HEAVY THUMB ON THE SCALE: THE EFFECT OF VICTIM IMPACT EVIDENCE ON CAPITAL DECISION MAKING*

The past several decades have seen the emergence of a movement in the criminal justice system that has called for a greater consideration for the rights of victims. One manifestation of this movement has been the “right” of victims or victims' families to speak to the sentencing body through what are called victim impact statements about the value of the victim and the full harm that the offender has created. Although victim impact statements have been a relatively noncontroversial part of regular criminal trials, their presence in capital cases has had a more contentious history. The U.S. Supreme Court overturned previous decisions and explicitly permitted victim impact testimony in capital cases in Payne v. Tennessee (1991) . The dissenters in that case argued that such evidence only would arouse the emotions of jurors and bias them in favor of imposing death. A body of research in behavioral economics on the “identifiable victim effect” and the “identifiable wrongdoer effect” would have supported such a view. Using a randomized controlled experiment with a death‐eligible sample of potential jurors and the videotape of an actual penalty trial in which victim impact evidence (VIE) was used, we found that these concerns about VIE are perhaps well placed. Subjects who viewed VIE testimony in the penalty phase were more likely to feel negative emotions like anger, hostility, and vengeance; were more likely to feel sympathy and empathy toward the victim; and were more likely to have favorable perceptions of the victim and victim's family as well as unfavorable perceptions of the offender. We found that these positive feelings toward the victim and family were in turn related to a heightened risk of them imposing the death penalty. We found evidence that part of the effect of VIE on the decision to impose death was mediated by emotions of sympathy and empathy. We think our findings open the door for future work to put together better the causal story that links VIE to an increased inclination to impose death as well as explore possible remedies.     

“CSI效应”对香港华人群体的科学证据感知评估

电视是向公众传递信息的强大媒介。最近,法庭科学和刑事司法相关题材内容在各种媒体激增,伴随着公众对法庭证据的期望提高,"CSI效应"(犯罪现场调查影视剧效应)应运而生。本研究对CSI效应的探讨有两个方面的贡献。第一,验证了在香港中国人群中是否存在CSI效应。第二,采用模拟陪审团模式,从实证角度出发全面考察CSI效应。研究发现,尽管涉及法庭科学证据的媒体报道数量确实在某种程度上影响了参与者对法庭证据的感知,但这种感知并不影响参与者对法律的判断。法庭科学题材影视剧的观众在控方仅出示法庭证据时不可能判定被告有罪,在仅出示证词时也不可能判定被告有罪。当提交法庭证据时,唯一判定被告有罪的重要预测因素是参与者对科学证据可靠性的评价。本研究的结果表明在香港不存在CSI效应。     

Mock Jurors’ Reactions to Selective Presentation of Evidence from Multiple-Opportunity Searches

Prior to trial, litigants sometimes conduct broad investigations in which there are multiple opportunities to find supportive evidence by chance alone. During trial, litigants may selectively present only the most helpful evidence uncovered by their investigations. Two experiments examined whether mock jurors appreciate that the evidence they hear at trial may be a selective and unrepresentative sample of underlying facts. The data suggest that people do understand the significance of multiple-opportunity searches for legal inference. However, they may not consider the possibility that evidence was strategically selected from a larger sample space of facts unless that sample space is identified.