Federalism in a Conservative Supreme Court

After years of maintaining an even balance on questions of federalism,the Supreme Court's views on the federal-state relationshiphave undergone a dramatic transformation with the recent changein the Court's composition. The new conservative majority hasproved willing to protect the states from direct regulationby the federal government in almost all circumstances. It remainsunclear, however, whether the Court will give increased protectionto state regulatory efforts-and whether the Court's new memberswill be willing to respect the autonomy of states that are exercisingtheir authority in an activist (and traditionally liberal) manner.     

Ideological Proximity and Support for The Supreme Court

Although the Supreme Court is a countermajoritarian institution by design, many scholars have contended that without concrete powers, the Court relies on public support for legitimacy. Accordingly, it is important to understand the relationship between people’s ideological proximity to the Court and their support for it. Existing empirical research suggests a correspondence between public opinion and the Court’s positions, but these studies do not directly compare masses and elites in a common space. To address these issues, we conducted an original survey asking respondents about their positions on ten recently decided Supreme Court cases. This allows us to estimate the positions of citizens and justices on the same ideological scale. Further, while some existing theories of perceptions of judicial legitimacy suggest similar relationships between ideological distance and various types of support for the Court, we propose a theory of heterogeneous responsiveness which posits that citizens’ ideological distance from the Court should be negatively related to their approval of and trust in the institution, but positively related to their support for its countermajoritarian function. Our empirical approach finds support for the theory.     

Supreme Court Appointments as a Move-the-Median Game

A three-stage model isolates conditions under which an executive appointment to a collective choice body, such as a court or a regulatory agency, has an immediate bearing on policy. The model strikes a balance between previous formal models that predict either excessive gridlock or excessive policy responsiveness as a consequence of the politics of appointments. I test the model using approximately four decades of data on U.S. Supreme Court appointments. Two hypotheses summarize the unique predictions of the model and are strongly corroborated. A third, less distinctive hypothesis about strategic judicial retirements is weakly supported .     

From Bakke to Grutter and Gratz: The Supreme Court as a Policymaking Institution

Finding the best means for ensuring equal opportunities for women and minorities has long been controversial and initial efforts to do so were addressed by executive orders, and later the historic Civil Rights Act of 1964. However, this paper argues, since its initial Bakke decision in 1978, it is the Supreme Court that has set policy in this area. In the twenty-five years between that decision and the recent Gratz and Grutter decisions, the court has shifted in its stance, in many cases declaring unconstitutional what it once sanctioned. That shift has not resulted from changes in laws or new amendments to the Constitution, nor can it be seen as reflecting public opinion, as that is not clear-cut. Rather, affirmative action policy has reflected the ideological stances of the justices sitting at the time a decision was rendered. The paper concludes with an assessment as to what this means for a democracy.     

Supreme Court Litigants and Strategic Framing

Although litigants invest a huge amount of resources in crafting legal briefs for submission to the Supreme Court, few studies examine whether and how briefs influence Court decisions. This article asks whether legal participants are strategic when deciding how to frame a case brief and whether such frames influence the likelihood of receiving a favorable outcome. To explore these questions, a theory of strategic framing is developed and litigants' basic framing strategies are hypothesized based on Riker's theory of rhetoric and heresthetic as well as the strategic approach to judicial politics. Using 110 salient cases from the 1979–89 terms, I propose and develop a measure of a typology of issue frames and provide empirical evidence that supports a strategic account of how parties frame cases.     

The Separation of Powers and Supreme Court Agenda Setting

This study employs the first systematic, empirical analysis that relies on archival data to examine whether the separation of powers influences justices' agenda votes. It spatially models how justices set the Court's agenda under a sincere approach as well as an SOP approach and compares the competing expectations derived therefrom. The results suggest that legislative and executive preferences fail to influence justices' votes. Across every model tested, the data show justices uninfluenced by the separation of powers. These results provide a strong rejoinder to SOP models, since the Court's agenda stage is the most likely stage of the decision‐making process to show signs of an SOP effect.     

Teaching Judicial Politics Through a Supreme Court Simulation

Abstract

This article describes various iterations of a Supreme Court simulation that we developed for undergraduate political science classes. We address when simulations should be used to introduce a topic to students, and when simulations should be used to develop students’ understanding of a topic after introducing it. In the simulations, we played the role of attorneys delivering oral arguments before the Supreme Court, while students played the role of Supreme Court justices. Students questioned attorneys, deliberated in groups, voted on the merits of the case, and explained their decisions. We varied when the simulation was conducted, with one class doing the simulation before a lesson on judicial decision making and two classes doing the simulation following a lesson on judicial decision making. We evaluate the simulation by using results from student questionnaires that assessed the students' interest in judicial politics, their knowledge of the Supreme Court, and their understanding of judicial decision making. We find that the simulation most effectively accomplished the intended learning outcomes when the simulation was conducted after a lesson on decision making in the Supreme Court, rather than before the lesson. In addition, our results demonstrate that the simulation increased students’ interest in the Supreme Court and their desire to learn more about the institution. Our results have implications for political scientists aiming to enhance student learning through simulations.     

Framing morality policy issues: state legislative debates on abortion restrictions

Policy Sciences - Scholars of “morality policies” have often assumed a signature characteristic of such policies is that advocates will frame them as clashes between fundamental moral...     

Presidents,Supreme Court justices,and racial equality cases: 1954–1984

This research assesses the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in their appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court in racial equality cases from 1954–1984. The research examines presidential preferences in a much more detailed and sensitive manner than previous research. While past research has used presidential party as a measure of the policy preferences of presidents, we examine policy preferences in a very direct manner. Specifically, the preferences of presidents on racial equality issues are gauged by their public policy statements. These statements serve to tap the degree of liberalness, the level of attention, and the level of concern with judicial actions in racial equality matters. The results demonstrate that presidents have been much more successful in appointing like-minded justices than is suggested by the existing literature. In addition, it is shown that prior judicial experience is not related to presidential success. This is discussed in terms of the perennial debate over the political control of the Supreme Court and the congruence of Court policy making with majoritarian values.     

Congress,the Supreme Court,and Judicial Review: Testing a Constitutional Separation of Powers Model

Recent scholarship suggests that the U.S. Supreme Court might be constrained by Congress in constitutional cases. We suggest two potential paths to Congressional influence on the Court's constitutional decisions: a rational‐anticipation model, in which the Court moves away from its preferences in order to avoid being overruled, and an institutional‐maintenance model, in which the Court protects itself against Congressional attacks to its institutional prerogatives by scaling back its striking of laws when the distance between the Court and Congress increases. We test these models by using Common Space scores and the original roll‐call votes to estimate support in the current Congress for the original legislation and the Court's preferences over that legislation. We find that the Court does not appear to consider the likelihood of override in constitutional cases, but it does back away from striking laws when it is ideologically distant from Congress.     

The Norwegian Supreme Court and Equitable Considerations: Problematic Aspects of Legal Reasoning

Legitimacy, confidence and autonomy in the court system are dependent on people trusting the institution to make decisions based on predefined legal rules. Simultaneously, confidence in the system is also dependent on the system's capability to adjust to changes in values in society. The Norwegian courts appear to be increasingly basing their rulings on ‘equitable considerations’. This involves the making of decisions by reference not only to predefined rules – as expressed in structures or pre‐existing legal practice – but also to policy considerations such as utility and fairness. Judicial decisions made with reference to political considerations imply that the courts are arrogating a role that democratic theory reserves for legislators. What happens when ‘equitable considerations’ play a large part in the decisions of the Supreme Court? Does the institution have capabilities and mechanisms that sustain such a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement? I argue that the capability to adjust to changes in society only seems possible if the judges act beyond the domain of traditional judicial competence. Through different kinds of mechanisms, elements of ‘equitable considerations’ over time become hidden and difficult to grasp. On the one hand, this makes it possible for the Supreme Court to sustain a judicial practice as a legitimate form of law enforcement, but simultaneously it creates problems of confidence and legitimacy because the premises for the decisions are not explicated.     

The Supreme Court Prohibits Gerrymandering: A Gain or a Loss for the States?

The 1986 Davis v. Bandemer decision of the U.S. Supreme Courtdeclared partisan gerrymandering to be justiciable, but overruledthe federal district court's judgment that the Indiana legislativeredistricting plan was unconstitutional. The Court split onthe question of justiciability, and those justices who favoredjusticiability disagreed on the appropriate tests to apply intesting a districting plan for unfair partisan gerrymandering.The Court did not specify a clear measure and standard for outlawinggerrymandering. This gives state districting authorities anddistrict courts little guidance in dealing with gerrymandering.If, however, a successful measure and standard are developed,this action is likely to be beneficial to the states.     

The Supreme Court and the Federal System: Federalism from Warren to Burger

The question of the relation of the states to the federal governmentis the cardinal question of our constitutional system. It cannotbe settled by the opinion of any one generation, because itis a question of growth, and each successive stage of our politicaland economic development gives it a new aspect, makes it a newquestion.¹     

Canada: The Supreme Court Sets Rules for the Secession of Quebec

The Supreme Court of Canada ruled in 1998 that neither the Canadianconstitution nor international law allows Quebec to secede fromCanada unilaterally. Secession would require amending the constitution.However, if a clear majority of Quebecers unambiguously optsfor secession, the federal government and the other provinceswould have a constitutional duty to negotiate. This is an obligationthat the court declared to be implicit in four principles that"inform and sustain the constitutional text"—federalism,democracy, constitutionalism and the rule of law, and respectfor minorities. The same set of principles would govern thenegotiations themselves. Accordingly, Quebec could not dictatethe terms of secession, and one cannot assume that agreementwould be reached. If negotiations fail, and Quebec declaresindependence unilaterally, the international community wouldhave to decide whether Quebec's action was legitimate.