基于信息不对称的政策决策分析

人们的认知能力、权力配置和决策信息机制等因素对信息分布产生影响.在决策过程中常见的信息不对称包括决策者与一般公众之问的信息不对称、决策者之间的信息不对称以及与政策主客体相关的信息不对称.我国目前的权力配置和决策信息机制强化了决策中的信息不对称.信息不对称不仅影响了决策成本、质量、公正性和复杂程度.而且还对决策者的决策动机、心理产生影响,并强化了决策参与者之间的博弈行为,增加了决策中的道德风险.     

网络监督：打破信息不对称的有效途径

信息不对称是导致腐败现象产生的一个重要根源,在我国主要表现为：官员与民众信息的不对称、腐败者所在组织内部和外部的信息不对称、底层与上层的信息不对称及腐败者与监督者的信息不对称。网络监督是新时代产生的新型舆论监督方式,具有监督主体广泛、信息全面、方便快捷、运作高效等特点,能有效地打破监督主客体间的信息不对称,促进反腐倡廉建设。同时,对于网络监督过程中存在的非理性、权责不平衡和监督群体有限性等缺陷,要有清醒的认识,应逐步加以解决与改进。     

The Effect of Information Asymmetry and Participative Target Setting on Target Ratcheting and Incentives

ABSTRACT

Using the performance evaluation data of Korean SOEs, the impact of information asymmetry within target setting on ratcheting intensity and the ratchet effect is investigated. It was found that ratcheting intensity is substantially greater (lower) for target-setting methods that have utilized limited (plenty of) information on past performance and that the ratchet effect increases with ratcheting intensity. These results indicate that information asymmetry between the superior and subordinates is one of the crucial drivers of the ratchet effect. It was also documented that when subordinates sufficiently beat target, the ratchet effect is much greater for relatively “top-down” target setting than that for relatively “bottom-up” target setting. This finding suggests that securing subordinates’ active participation in the target-setting process can alleviate their effort reduction incentive.     

对称性与非对称性——政党制度再审视

对称性与非对称性是政党制度的两种属性,世界上所有的政党制度都包含着这两种因素的互动。我国政党制度也不例外,在非对称性因素占据优势的情况下,仍然包含着诸多对称性因素,这既包括在世界范围内的对称性因素,也包含着政党制度内部的对称性因素。非对称性与对称性二者之间互相补充和完善,从而使我国政党制度表现出相当程度的韧性和优势。随着我国生产力的不断发展和社会阶层的不断分化,我国政党制度的对称性因素和非对称性因素的发展变化也将更趋活跃。     

基于信息不对称的政策执行分析

政策执行问题一直困扰着政策制定者,在影响政策执行的众多因素中,信息不对称无疑是不可忽视的因素之一,它通常干扰着政策的顺利执行,对这种干扰的认识将有助于我们提前采取若干措施来抑制信息不对称产生的种种不利影响。     

Game Theory, Information, and Deliberative Democracy

We contend that, with a suitably broad notion of rationality and a diverse set of motivations, the game-theoretic tradition is particularly well suited for generating insights about effects of deliberative institutions and that progress in the development of deliberative democratic theory hinges on making proper sense of the relationship between game-theoretic and normative theoretic approaches to deliberation. To advance this view, we explore the central methodological issues at the core of that relationship and address the arguments raised against the relevance of game-theoretic work on deliberation. We develop a framework for thinking about the differences in how the normative and the game-theoretic approaches frame and answer questions about deliberation and articulate an approach to a deliberative democratic theory that builds on the strengths of both of these theoretic traditions, properly informed by empirical scholarship.     

A Low Information Theory of Ballot Position Effect

This article suggests a theory of ballot position effect based on the amount of information present in the electorate while accounting for several alternative hypotheses. The more information that voters have, all other factors held constant, the less a role ballot position will play. Additionally, the role of electoral institutions in mitigating or magnifying the effect is considered. The theories are tested with precinct-level data from city council elections held in Peoria, Illinois, from 1983 through 1999. Position effect is found to account for a bonus of 0.7% to 5.2% of the precinct-level vote share per position on the ballot. The level of aggregate information and the institutional setting explain a significant share of ballot position effect, even while examined in the presence of alternative explanations such as incumbency, endorsement, campaign expenditure, gender, and race.     

Asymmetry and Corrective Public Policy in Contests

The proposal of an inefficient policyusually stimulates a political strugglebetween the affected interest groups. Theresulting wasteful lobbying activities mayreduce welfare, even if the proposed policyis not approved. In this paper weshow that sufficient asymmetry in payoffsnot only tends to reduce lobbying effortsin standard rent-seeking contests, as iswell known, but it is, in fact, a necessarycondition for the implementation of asuccessful effective correctivetax-transfer policy that complements theproposal of the inefficient policy. Such apolicy induces an efficient equilibriumoutcome which is, in addition, optimal fromthe viewpoint of the players that take partin the public-policy game.     

Information flow and party influence: Theory,measurement, and policy consequences

In this paper I present a theory of party influence, based on Bayesian decision theory, as a process in which the voting decisions of individual legislators are influenced by information concerning the votes or intended votes of their rank-and-file colleagues. Procedures derived from the theory are then used to estimate the magnitude of party influence relative to the influence of the president and of party leaders, committee cue givers, and constituents on roll call voting in three policy domains in the U.S. House of Representatives. The results imply that party influence has important short-run and long-run consequences for public policy.     

Prosocial Values and Performance Management Theory: Linking Perceived Social Impact and Performance Information Use

Performance management techniques are presented as control mechanisms to save money and hold bureaucrats accountable, consistent with negative agency theory assumptions of bureaucrats. We propose an alternative theory of performance management that rests on prosocial values. This theory argues that public servants who see the social impact of their work are more likely to use performance metrics. We operationalize performance information use in terms of purposeful use for internal organizational means, and political use for external legitimation. Those who perceive that their work has a strong social impact are likely to pursue both types of uses, to improve both the effectiveness of their services, and to maintain resources. The data come from a cross‐sectional survey of U.S. public and nonprofit employees.     

财政政策与居民消费需求:非线性效应与效应的非对称性

财政政策的凯恩斯效应与新古典效应之争是理论界研究的前沿问题之一.本文认为财政政策对居民消费需求的凯恩斯效应与新古典效应并非相互排斥,反而更有可能相互共存,因此,探讨不同财政时期究竞何种效应处于支配地位才是解决问题的关键.本文首先分别运用凯恩斯和新古典两种理论诊释财政政策工具对居民消费需求的作用机制,然后通过建立居民消费需求的固定效应变截距面板数据模型,并以24个OECD发达国家1980-2007年的跨国数据为例,实证检验了政府消费、税收和转移支付对居民消费需求的影响效应.研究发现:一是政府消费、税收和转移支付在扩张或紧缩两个特殊时期存在显著的非线性效应;二是虽然财政政策工具对居民消费需求的总效应通常都表现为凯恩斯效应,但特殊时期转移支付的总效应则为非凯恩斯效应;三是政府消费、税收与转移支付对居民消费需求的效应在扩张与紧缩两个特殊时期之间有显著的非对称性.     

经典文化与主流文化的主体地位和主导作用

在多元文化并存的现实社会形态下 ,只有不断突出和强化经典文化与主流文化的主体地位和主导作用 ,才能确保文化的民族特点、时代特点和独立个性 ,也才是建构中国特色社会主义文化和实现文化的丰富与发展的正确道路。因为经典文化和主流文化始终是民族精神的支撑点和社会进步的驱动力。     

尊重党员主体地位与发展党内民主

尊重党员主体地位可以激发党员自觉履行义务的内在动力,增强党的整体活力,有助于党员权利的具体落实。当前党员主体地位弱化的原因是:党员民主权利的保障没有充分体现党员的基础地位,党内事务的运作没有充分体现党员的主体意志,党内各项活动没能以党员为中心来展开,党员的主体意识不强。尊重党员主体地位必须加强党内制度建设,切实保障党员的民主权利;建立有效的党内事务运作机制,切实体现党员的主体意志;建立党员关怀机制,奠定以党员为主体开展党的各项活动的基础;转变领导干部、基层党组织与党员的思想观念,增强党员主体意识。     

理论自觉、理论自信与理论创新、理论坚定——十六大以来党对中国特色社会主义理论体系的坚持与创新

理论自觉、理论自信是理论创新、理论坚定的底蕴和基础,理论创新、理论坚定是理论自觉、理论自信的表现和目的.中国共产党是一个以马克思主义科学理论为武装的先进的政党.高度的理论自觉、理论自信,是中国共产党区别于其他一切政党的鲜明特征和根本优势.十六大以来,以胡锦涛为总书记的党中央,凭借着高度的理论自觉、理论自信,明确提出“中国特色社会主义理论体系”科学命题,并对其科学内涵、正确性和重要性等一系列问题进行了深刻的阐述.这对统一全党思想、凝聚社会共识、促进科学发展,具有重大的理论和实践意义.     

论共同正犯的概念、本质和成立要件

共同正犯是刑法中的一个重要概念,研究这一概念对于共同犯罪的定罪和量刑具有重大意义。在德、日等大陆法系国家,共同正犯是法定的共犯种类,我国刑法并未明确规定共同正犯,共同正犯相当于我国刑法理论中的共同实行犯。关于共同正犯的本质,存在犯罪共同说和行为共同说,部分犯罪共同说具有合理性。立足于主客观相统一的标准,成立共同正犯,需要二人以上的行为人在主观上存在共同实行的意思,在客观上存在共同实行的事实。     

人工智能与公共服务的规范前景

人工智能的发展对人类社会提出严峻的挑战,它所蕴含的"人是可被替代的"结论对人的存在价值造成巨大威胁。从公共服务的角度来看,人的可替代性正是政府得以为公众提供服务的前提,所谓服务公众,就是在公众并不亲自管理公共事务的条件下代替公众管理好公共事务。当然,政府要如何代替公众才算是服务于公众,仍需进一步的理论澄清。本文从公共服务的一种规范观念出发,分析了政府借助人工智能来更好地替代公众从而服务公众的条件,试图寻找技术与规范间的契合点,引导技术进步朝着改善公共服务规范前景的方向发展。     

Artificial Morality. Concepts,Issues and Challenges

Artificial morality is an emerging field in artificial intelligence which explores whether and how artificial systems can be furnished with moral capacities. Since this will have a deep impact on our lives it is important to discuss the possibility of artificial morality and its implications for individuals and society. Starting with some examples of artificial morality, the article turns to conceptual issues that are important for delineating the possibility and scope of artificial morality, in particular, what an artificial moral agent is; how morality should be understood in the context of artificial morality; and how human and artificial morality compare. Outlined next is how moral capacities can be implemented in artificial systems in general and in more detail with respect to an elder care system. On the basis of these findings some of the arguments that can be found in public discourse about artificial morality will be reviewed and the prospects and challenges of artificial morality are discussed.     

人的发展:内在动因和社会条件

发展是人类活动的基本取向和价值目标,是贯穿整个人生的主旋律。人之所以始终不渝地追求发展,其深层的原因一方面是出于其自身特有的内在本性,另一方面也是外部生存环境的压力和激励使然,是二者合力作用的结果。在思考人的发展问题和制定社会发展规划时,一定要综合运用内在的人性关怀和外在的规范激励相结合的方法,尽可能地创造出一个既充满人性体贴、人文关怀,又体现制度、机制的先进性、严肃性、公平性、激励性、向上性、文明性、连续性的发展环境,使人的发展和社会发展融为一体、相得益彰。     

Agent credibility and receptivity influences on children's political learning

This study investigates the child's perception of primary agents (parent, teacher, and friend) as political references. It differs in emphasis from earlier socialization studies by adopting the perspective of the child and asking how and why the child regards these agents as authorities. Using two studies (an original and a replication performed a year later with a separate sample), we demonstrate that fifth- and sixth-grade children exhibit two evaluative dimensions, credibility and receptivity. They discriminate among the agents using these two dimensions, and this discrimination is specific to the type of issue. These dimensions affect successful attitude transmission from agent to child: increasing agent credibility and receptivity factors increase opinion congruence.An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1983 meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.