电子化政府:政府再造新范式

电子化政府不仅是一个新概念,而且是一种新的政府管理模式,其内涵在于建立一个虚拟政府,为公民提供方便、 高质量的公共服务。电子化政府的建立成为世界范围内政府再造的新趋势。本文分析了电子政府对政府治理和服务的创 新,进一步提出了我国构建电子政府的政策选择。     

A distributional theory of government growth

This article presents a closed form solution for time-consistent taxation and public spending in a dynamic game between government and median voter. Extending Meltzer and Richard’s static analysis of government size the article offers a theory of growth of government. At low stages of economic development the median voter, identified as a relatively poor worker, prefers to have no or only small redistributive taxation in order to foster savings. Through this channel he expects improvements of his labor productivity and wage. At higher stages of development, however, when capital is relatively abundant and prospects of further labor productivity gains through capital accumulation are smaller, the incentive to tax and redistribute income rises. Yet, in line with previous work on growth and infrastructure spending the median voter prefers a constant share of productive public spending at all times. Hence, government growth is solely driven by an expanding welfare state.     

A partisan model of government expenditure

Partisan models of budget politics largely concentrate on the size of government, budget deficits and debt, but most theories have little to say as to what the effect of party politics on both the size and the composition of budgets is. This paper seeks to extend previous literature in two directions. First, a model of spending preferences is developed that relates actors' preferred level and allocation of expenditure to electoral gains from fiscal policies. Second, changes in both total expenditure and the expenditure mix of two budget categories are analyzed for the effect of parties' spending preferences as stated in their election manifestos. Using data on 19 OECD countries from 1971 to 1999, the paper finds support for general partisan hypothesis. The results suggest that the actual spending preferences of parties matter whereas they do not indicate that parties of the left consistently differ from parties of the right in their spending behavior.     

Democracy and the demand for government redistribution: A survey analysis

This article uses survey data to study the impact of democracy on the demand by poor citizens for government redistribution. Taking the well‐known Meltzer‐Richard theory as the point of departure, three arguments are presented as to why such a demand should be stronger in democracies than in autocracies: in democracies low‐income groups are: (1) exposed to elections that can make a policy difference: (2) better informed about the income distribution; and (3) better equipped to process such information. The argument receives empirical support in a Bayesian multilevel analysis which combines 188 World Values Surveys with cross‐sectional and longitudinal macro data from 80 countries.     

A genealogy of the government of poverty

This paper contributes to a genealogy of the discourses and government of poverty. It offers a statement of what might be understood bya genealogical perspective and method, and then focuses on the emergence of a ‘liberal mode of government’ of poverty in the early nineteenth century, of which the reformed poor law in England is emblematic but not exhaustive. The emergence of this mode of government is followed through a series of related transformations of the older systems of the relief and administration of ‘the Poor’, best understood as a dimension of ‘police’ in its archaic sense. The conditions of the problematization of this older system of government in matters of population, economy, police, and so on. This emergence has implications for the formation of a national labour market, notions of self-governance and responsibility, forms of patriarchy and household, and issues of morality, philanthropy, admkinistration, and the state. Above all, it is within this liberal mode of government that we can witness both the constitution of poverty as a field of knowledge and invention, perhaps for the first time, and also the various surfaces of emergence for what will become ‘the social’. The implications of this liberal mode of government for our present are far from exhausted.     

Reapportionment: A study in comparative government

The periodic redrawing of electoral boundaries is a necessity in any equitable single-member representative system. It is approached in very different ways in the United States and in Britain. In America, against a background of continuous intervention by the courts, party politics and legislative fixing are endemic. Britain (and the other established democracies of the Commonwealth) have all turned increasingly to neutral commissions that are in theory (and, on the whole, in practice) blind to considerations of party advantage. This article explores how this contrast has developed. The reasons behind the profound differences in procedure offer unexpectedly rich insights into comparative government.     

Science vs. government: A reconsideration

A content analysis is made of arms control arguments made in the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations and its Subcommittee on Disarmament by five groups: government scientists, academic scientists, politicians, military persons and citizens.It is found that government scientists are closer in their argumentation to other government persons than to their fellow scientists. It is argued that access rather than professionalism is the important independent variable to consider in predicting policy-related behavior.The author wishes to thank Professor Davis Bobrow for his advice throughout the course of this study.     

Modeling government behavior in collective bargaining: A test for self-interested bureaucrats

This paper tests for self-interested behavior by local-government bureaucrats engaged in collective bargaining with public employee unions. A theoretical model is developed that shows the effect of Niskanen-style bureaucratic self-interest in the two standard bargaining models: the demand-constrained model and the efficient-bargain model. These predictions are then tested using national cross-section data on unionized police, fire, and sanitation workers.We wish to thank the Institute for Government and Public Affairs at the University of Illinois for its support of this research. Also, we thank Larry Kahn, Fran Blau, and Pablo Spiller for useful comments. Errors, of course, are ours.     

The demand for local government goods

Abstract. This paper analyses the spending preferences of local government elected politicians. It is argued that the median voter model is inappropriate in multi-party systems that provide multiple government services, and that the preferences of the representatives are consequential to local resource allocation. We develop a micromodel in which service demand is conditioned by exogenous public revenue, prices, and demographic factors. We hypothesise that politicians demands are affected by party affiliation, public sector occupation and committee assignment. The estimates of the micro demand functions are based on data pertaining to Norwegian local governments. It is found that the estimated income elasticities correspond approximately with elasticities of output studies. Party affiliation has an impact on demand patterns, while government occupation and committee appointment are major determinants of politicians desired allocation of public services. Further analyses reveal that the numerical strength of parties impacts weakly on the actual service allocation, whereas the representation of government employees has occasional effect. The budgetary allocations are imperfect expressions of the elected council's underlying preferences.     

A study on the rising of service-oriented government

With the development of the society, governments strengthen their functions and expand the scope of management, as well as administrative agencies and staffing increases, resulting in organization overstaffing, bureaucracy and public expenditure can not survey burden. From the 70s of 20th century, the model of managerialism-based government began inefficient, and appeared fnancial crisis, managing crisis and trust crisis, which led to large-scale administrative reform. In this reform, a lot of theories appeared. To redefine the functions of government and look for the way to achieve the government functions become the requirement of the age and the focus of attention. The paper is to show the defects of traditional managerialism-based mode and the new requirements of people and society, by researching into the rising of service-oriented government, so as to enhance the construction of the service-oriented government in China.     

Corruption and government size: A disaggregated analysis

Using annual state-level data over 1983–1987, this paper examines the effect of government size on corruption by public officials by including both demand and supply side incentives for engaging in corrupt practices. Our objectives are twofold. First, we assess the relationship between the incidence of corruption and overall measures of the size of the federal government and the state-local sector in each state. Second, we explore what kinds of government activities are more likely to be successful in deterring abuse of public office. Our results are generally supportive of Becker's “crime and punishment” model. Regarding the primary focus of the paper, our results show that government size, in particular spending by state governments, does indeed have a strong positive influence on corruption.     

A new framework for testing the effect of government spending on growth and productivity

Does government spending have a positive or negative effect on economic growth? The results of earlier empirical studies give mixed results. In this study we suggest a new method for testing the effect of different kinds of government expenditure on productivity growth in the private sector. The focus on productivity in the private sector and the use of disaggregated data makes it possible to avoid or mitigate a number of methodological problems. The major conclusions, which are quite robust, are that government transfers, consumption and total outlays have consistently negative effects, while educational expenditure has a positive effect, and government investment has no effect on private productivity growth. The impact is also found to work solely through total factor productivity and not via the marginal productivity of labor and capital.     

Good government and sustainable anti-corruption strategies: A role for independent anti-corruption agencies?

Aid donors are increasingly seeking to link assistance to sustainable reform, including the provision of a responsible and responsive political and legal framework, the improvement of recipient countries' social, health and educational prospects, and the promotion of economic development and liberalization. Much attention is given to the first of these because of the size and cost to the state and the perceived constraints it exercises on the longer-term changes to the economy and society; in general terms, good government is an essential precondition for good governance and economic development. Increasingly donors have focused on corruption, both as a core obstacle to the encouragement of good government, and on the steps taken to dealing with it as evidence of commitment and the will of recipient countries to their introduction. While the types of activity associated with corruption are readily identifiable, as are the means to attempt to deal with it, it is usually much more difficult to determine effective implementation, particularly with limited resources at a time when longer-term political and economic reforms are also being promoted. It is therefore especially important that, in relation to corruption and good government, a practicable, effective and sustainable means is available to deal with corruption from preventative, investigative and reform perspectives.