Electoral accountability,clarity of responsibility and labor market policy

Does the exercise of accountability in elections have palpable policy effects? Building on recent advances in the economic voting literature, we show that electoral accountability leaves an imprint on labor market policy when left-wing governments are in office. When responsibility for the economy is clear and elections offer an opportunity to claim credit for economic expansion, labor protections and benefits become more generous. However, when clarity of responsibility is low and incumbents can expect to veer electoral responsibility, left-wing governments are more likely to retrench labor market policy. These results hold for policies benefiting both labor market insiders and outsiders. Consistent with evidence that the labor market is the purview of the left, electoral accountability does not condition labor market policy under right-wing governments. We discuss the implications of these results in the context of growing party system fragmentation and weaker accountability across advanced industrial democracies.     

The interaction of monetary policy and wages

This paper focuses on the interaction of monetary policy and wage formation in economies with strong labor unions. Government and unions are viewed as endogenous utility maximizers and the macroeconomic consequences of their strategic interaction are explored with the aid of some elements of simple game theory. Specifically, it is shown (a) how labor unions adjust wages to prices so as to maximize their utility following changes in monetary policy; (b) how the effectiveness of monetary policy is circumscribed without necessarily being nullified by the utility-maximizing reactions of unions; and (c) how the interplay of government and unions can create a persistent tendency towards inflation and unemployment simultaneously.     

Labor market policy: A comparative view on the costs and benefits of labor market flexibility

I review theories and evidence on wage‐setting institutions and labor market policies in an international comparative context. These include collective bargaining, minimum wages, employment protection laws, unemployment insurance (UI), mandated parental leave, and active labor market policies (ALMPs). Since it is unlikely that an unregulated private sector would provide the income insurance these institutions do, these policies may enhance economic efficiency. However, to the extent that unemployment or resource misallocation results from such measures, these efficiency gains may be offset. Overall, Scandinavia and Central Europe follow distinctively more interventionist policies than the English‐speaking countries in the Northern Hemisphere. Possible explanations for such differences include vulnerability to external market forces and ethnic homogeneity. I then review evidence on the impacts of these policies and institutions. While the interventionist model appears to cause lower levels of wage inequality and high levels of job security to incumbent workers, it also in some cases leads to the relegation of new entrants (disproportionately women, youth, and immigrants) as well as the less skilled to temporary jobs or unemployment. Making labor markets more flexible could bring these groups into the regular labor market to a greater extent, at the expense of higher levels of economic insecurity for incumbents and higher levels of wage inequality. © 2011 by the Association for Public Policy Analysis and Management.     

Social capital in the Japanese youth labor market: Labor market policy,schools, and norms

This paper develops the concept of institutional social capital and discusses its importance in the labor market. Institutional social capital is constituted by the resources inherent in an organization (such as a school) and thereby available to members of that organization. This is contrasted with the social capital available to individuals through their own personal networks. In the labor market context, an example of institutional social capital is the ties that schools have with employers who recruit a proportion of their new employees as they prepare to graduate. The paper examines how these ties and the norms governing the important labor market screening role played by the high school developed in post-WWII Japan. I also discuss an important positive externality – social control over students – generated by schools institutional social capital. Finally, I examine current challenges to Japanese high schools institutional social capital.     

The choice of insurance in the labor market

Employment protection and unemployment benefits are considered the most prominent insurance devices for workers to protect themselves against the risk of unemployment. It occurs that societies either choose a high level of employment protection relative to unemployment benefits or vice versa. This paper explains where countries locate on this trade-off. It is argued that higher coverage of voters out-of-the labor force with intra household transfers yields a politico-economic equilibrium with relatively high employment protection and relatively low unemployment benefits. Cross country data and survey data on voters’ preferences are presented that corroborate the outcomes of the model.     

Time-consistent monetary policy under output persistence

This note merges the fact that real activity is persistent with a Barro-Gordon type model of endogenous monetary policy. It shows that persistence crucially affects policy choices. This applies in non-cooperative games with a finite horizon, and in games with an infinite horizon. Always, enforceable inflation announcements move higher when output persistence increases. Policymakers who discount future utility by 10% annually produce about ten times as much inflation under near-hysteresis as in a natural-rate scenario. A change in the policymaker's time preference may affect inflation both ways, depending on present time preference and persistence.     

The introduction of professional regulation and labor market conditions

There has been increasing concern by policy makers about the impact of occupational regulation and the process by which it is introduced. This paper examines the introduction of mandatory licensure laws to replace public certification of registered nurses at the state level. Historical analysis supports the hypothesis in economic models that small groups with concentrated interests like occupations will dominate the introduction of laws and suggests examining changes in labor market conditions may be useful in predicting future demands for legislation. Estimates of an empirical model of the diffusion of licensure across states for nurses suggests this type of quality assurance regulation was introduced first where the quality of services was probably already relatively high and that policies reducing the impact of licensure on geographical mobility may reduce pressure for new laws. Patterns in the introduction of laws also have implications for evaluating their impact.     

Bureaucracy,altruism, and monetary policy

It has recently been argued that the fiscal relationship between the Federal Reserve and the Treasury, by which the Fed keeps a portion of its earnings, imparts an inflationary bias to monetary policy because that relationship gives the Fed an incentive to increase its earnings by increasing the monetary base. This hypothesis is tested within the framework of a Federal Reserve objective function incorporating bureaucratic and social goals, and no evidence is found to support it.     

Unconventional monetary policy spillovers: Evidence from India

Many of the studies on the unconventional monetary policy spillover effects concentrated primarily on the policy announcements of the U.S. Federal Reserve. Using a time series approach, with dummies in the event study framework, this study estimates the monetary policy spillover effects of the unconventional monetary policy announcements of the central banks of four major economic regions: the United States, the United Kingdom, European Central bank, and Japan on the asset prices in India. In addition to that, this study estimates the asymmetry in the responses to positive and negative surprise announcements. The study reveals that unconventional monetary surprises do not have any significant impact on the asset prices in India in a narrow time window.     

European monetary policy and the ECB rotation model

This paper analyses the voting power of individual members of the ECB Governing Council and, in particular, that of the Executive Board in the light of recent information published by the ECB. Using the randomization scheme based on the multilinear extension of games, we modify the standard analysis in three ways. First, we include heterogeneous preferences of the Governing Council members. Second, we address the agenda-setting power of the ECB president. Third, we take into account the dynamic decision setting. We show that the rotation model is able to stabilize the position of the core countries of the euro area.     

Government ideology and monetary policy in OECD countries

Public Choice - We examine the extent to which government ideology has influenced monetary policy in OECD countries since the 1970s. In line with important changes in the global economy and...     

Time inconsistency of monetary policy: Empirical evidence from polls

While the basic model of time inconsistency, put forward by Barro and Gordon (Barro, R. J., & Gordon, D. B. (1983). Journal of Political Economy, 91, 589–610) is widely accepted now, several authors have expressed serious doubts about the empirical relevance of the model in explaining inflation. Interestingly enough, few attempts have been made so far to test for the existence of inflationary biases empirically. Theory predicts a positive correlation between a monetary authority's relative preference for the high employment goal and inflation. Using polling data from six countries as a proxy for public preferences we provide empirical evidence in favor of the Barro-Gordon-model.     

Electoral cycles in active labor market policies

We examine how electoral motives influence active labor market policies that promote (short term) job-creation. Such policies reduce measures of unemployment. Using German state data for the period 1985 to 2004, we show that election-motivated politicians pushed job-promotion schemes before elections.     

Evolution of monetary policy approaches: A case study of Indian economy

The monetary policy framework of India has undergone several transformations reflecting underlying macroeconomic and financial conditions as also the dominant socio‐politico‐economic paradigm. The present study makes pertinent commentary notes on different monetary policy approaches, including, for instance, the era of development planning, the era of monetarism, the era of multiple indicator approach, and the era of inflation targeting in India along with their respective advantages and disadvantages.     

The politics of unemployment: Rates of unemployment and labour market policy

This article analyses the claims advanced by Robert McKenzie about the distribution of power in British political parties. It considers McKenzie's mode of analysis (with particular reference to Labour), his definition of terms, selection of evidence and interpretation of it. The major argument is that McKenzie over‐generalised from the events of the 1950s and 1960s and that subsequent events have severely undermined his thesis.