Accountability for Performance in Local Government

The nature of accountability for performance in the public sector is explored in this paper by attempting to answer three questions: (1) How important is accountability for performance? (2) Which of the stakeholders consider themselves accountable for organisational performance, including contracts? (3) Does information asymmetry between stakeholders in regard to performance information affect accountability? This paper reports on research undertaken in Victorian local government based on the responses to a questionnaire by councillors and tier one and two managers. The results of the survey indicate that there is an understanding of accountability for performance, that both managers and councillors are considered to be accountable for performance but that information asymmetry and accountability relationships are problematic.     

Outcomes–Based Performance Management in the Public Sector: Implications for Government Accountability and Effectiveness

Requirements for outcomes–based performance management are increasing performance–evaluation activities at all government levels. Research on public–sector performance management, however, points to problems in the design and management of these systems and questions their effectiveness as policy tools for increasing governmental accountability. In this article, I analyze experimental data and the performance–management experiences of federal job–training programs to estimate the influence of public management and system–design factors on program outcomes and impacts. I assess whether relying on administrative data to measure program (rather than impacts) produces information that might misdirect program managers in their performance–management activities. While the results of empirical analyses confirm that the use of administrative data in performance management is unlikely to produce accurate estimates of true program impacts, they also suggest these data can still generate useful information for public managers about policy levers that can be manipulated to improve organizational performance.     

Incentives in Third‐Party Governance: Management Practices and Accountability Implications

Contract incentives are designed to motivate contractor performance and to provide public managers with a powerful tool to achieve contract accountability. Our knowledge of contract incentives is rooted in contract design, yet as we move beyond contract specification and further into the contract lifecycle, we know little about why and how managers implement incentives. This study assesses public managers’ use of contract incentives in practice and advances theory development. A typology of contract incentives is constructed to capture a comprehensive range of formal and informal incentives, and the factors that influence managerial use of incentives are identified. The findings shed light on the complexities of maintaining accountability in third‐party governance structures and the management techniques aimed at improving the performance of public agencies.     

Performance Measurement in Italian and Spanish Local Governments: Comparative Policy Analysis

NPM reforms have become a global trend and performance management systems are considered suitable to enhance the decision-making process and accountability. The aim of the paper is to carry out a comparative study on the adoption of performance measurement tools in Italian and Spanish (medium-sized and large) local governments. It seeks to find out how widespread these tools are and how their usefulness is perceived. The results show differences between the two countries and that the presence of professional managers – experienced with performance measurement tools – positively affects the adoption of these tools. Moreover, performance measurement tools are perceived as a support for accountability purposes.     

The new public management paradigm and the search for democratic accountability

Can we permit empowered, responsive civil servants to make decisions and be innovative and still have democratic accountability? This important question haunts those who would advocate a “new public management.” The proponents of a new public management paradigm emphasize performance the ability of their strategy to produce results. But they cannot ignore the troubling question of political accountability. They must develop a process that not only permits public managers to produce better results but also provides accountability to a democratic electorate.     

Performance accountability in the UN Secretariat – The conflictual way toward more flexibility

The article investigates accountability structures in the Secretariat of the United Nations (UN) by emphasizing the institutional design and the interaction between member states and Secretariat. Empirical findings indicate that reform endeavors toward a more performance‐based accountability in the UN Secretariat have fallen short. The article finds that mistrust between Secretariat and member states and among the member states themselves is predominantly responsible for the identified shortcomings and outlines how polarized the legislative organs – namely the member states – are. Evidently, a substantial concern of the countries represented in the G77 is that an empowerment of the Secretariat would ultimately lead to an empowerment of the influential donor countries and the permanent members of the Security Council. Consequently, the authors identify three main challenges that have to be handled in order to move toward a more performance oriented accountability structure: The creation of a trusting environment and strategic partnerships between the governing bodies, the further empowerment of senior managers, and a review of the current performance management system. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Do Managers Face a Performance Trade-Off? Correlations Between Production and Process Performance

The existence of multiple goals in public organizations inevitably raises the concern that managers face performance trade-offs. In particular, scholars have expressed the fear that public managers, in order to secure high production performance, are forced to sacrifice performance on goals like equity, accountability, and procedural justice. However, our knowledge of whether such trade-offs exist is scarce. Using an administrative 10-year panel data set of Danish public schools and principals, this article analyzes trade-offs between production performance (measured by student performance and student pass rate) and process performance (measured by equity, accountability, and procedural justice). Results show no evidence of trade-offs. In contrast, principals who succeed in raising student performance generally also succeed in securing high pass rates, high equity, high accountability, and high procedural justice. These results suggest that managers who are able to secure high performance on one dimension of performance will likely also be high-performing on other performance dimensions.     

Principles for Public Management Practice: From Dichotomies to Interdependence

In this essay we explore the relationship between management practices and a basic governance dilemma: how to manage flexibly and accountably. The challenge is both practical and theoretical. Managers must respond flexibly to the changing demands and expectations of the public and the ever-changing nature of public problems, yet they must do so in a manner that provides accountability to the public and political overseers. A dichotomous approach to the study of leadership as management action and the governance structures within which managers operate has inhibited the search for a public management theory that reconciles the dilemma. Emphasis upon managers as leaders typically focuses on the flexible actions managers might take to overcome structural "barriers," while emphasis upon governance structures typically focuses on the essential role of structure in ensuring accountability and restraining or motivating particular management efforts. The practicing manager, however, cannot deal with these aspects of the work separately. Managers must attend to demands for both flexible leadership action and structures that promise accountability. Anecdotal evidence provides illustrations of some of the ways that managers can integrate these demands. We suggest that these efforts point to an alternative theoretical framework that understands action and structure as mutually constitutive, creating a dynamic tension in which attention to one requires attention to the other.     

Disparate Measures: Public Managers and Performance-Measurement Strategies

Over the past two decades, many studies have investigated the scope and significance of performance measurement in public organizations. Nonetheless, there is more to learn about the challenges facing public managers who want to measure organizational outputs and use the feedback to improve performance. Specifically, managers are often faced with redundant measures of the same output, each of which may be preferred by a different political principal or stakeholder. Furthermore, a manager's choice of measures can have serious consequences for both the estimation of agency problems and the success of programmatic solutions. We test these assertions in an analysis of educational organizations in Texas. We find that managers' assessments of organizational performance and decisions regarding solutions depend on the choice of performance measures.     

Public–Private Partnerships and the Public Accountability Question

Public–private partnerships (PPPs) are growing in popularity as a governing model for delivery of public goods and services. PPPs have existed since the Roman Empire, but their expansion into traditional public projects today raises serious questions about public accountability. This article examines public accountability and its application to government and private firms involved in PPPs. An analytical framework is proposed for assessing the extent to which PPPs provide (or will provide) goods and services consistent with public sector goals of effectiveness, efficiency, and equity. Six dimensions—risk, costs and benefits, political and social impacts, expertise, collaboration, and performance measurement—are incorporated into a model that assists public managers in improving partnerships’ public accountability.     

Accountability and Entrepreneurial Public Management: The Case of the Orange County Investment Fund

This article presents a conceptual framework that illustrates four distinct types of accountability environments facing public managers. The framework is used as a heuristic tool to examine the broad facts and contexts surrounding the bankruptcy of the Orange County, California investment pool. The framework also suggests management philosophies and strategies that are appropriate for each type of accountability environment.     

Local government decentralization and the health sector in Tanzania

An evaluation of primary-level healthcare undertaken in Tanzania 1989-91 found that district health managers felt powerless to address health care performance weaknesses, although the district is the unit to which government management functions have been decentralized. In order to understand the managers views, this article analyses the pattern of decentralization within the health system from their perspective. It reviews the hislorical development of government structures and the theory and practice of decentralization within Tanzania. The matrix of accountability for health care has become very confusing, with multiple and cross-cutting flows of authority within and between levels of the system. District health managers have limited authority to take management action, such as managing resources, in ways that would begin to address problems of inefficiency and poor quality of care within primary care. District health management also suffers from weak resource allocation and financial management piocedures. The main obstacles preventing more effective management are: resource constraints; conflicts between the demands for central control and local discretion; limited institutional capacity; and political and cultural influences over the implementation of decentralization. Evaluation of past experience suggests that future policy influencing the organizational structure of government health services must be developed cautiously, recognizing the critical importance of complementary action to develop both institutional capacity and political and economic support for the health system.     

Program Budgeting and Accountability in Local Government

Much has been written about program budgeting and its relevance to improved efficiency and effectiveness. However, there is little discussion about the relationship between the use of program budgeting and accountability. While, organisations using program budgeting focus on the issues of performance, the accountability of management to an elected body, such as a local council has been given little attention. In this article three questions are posed: (1) Is the performance information available to enable councillors to form a judgment about management's performance?; (2) Is management involved in determining issues of policy, such as objectives, programs and performance measurement?; and (3) Are councillors confronted by a greater volume of budgetary documentation but with no increase in time to consider it? The results show that program budgeting does not always enhance accountability in local government.     

Effects of deregulation and performance on government accountability: Role of trust in Korea,Japan, and the United States

Public administration has been struggling to address the balance between conflicting government values. Trust in the study is employed as nodal value to reconcile modern management dilemma concerning conflicting relationships between performance and accountability and between discretion and accountability. Using 2012 International Social Survey Program data, this paper analyzed the moderator and mediator role of government trust among discretion, performance, and accountability in cases of South Korea, Japan, and the United States. This study used factor analysis and ordinary least square multiple regression analysis. The statistical results partially confirmed the hypotheses regarding the mediating and moderating role of trust: (a) the moderating effect of the trust on the relationship between performance and accountability in South Korea; (b) the moderating impact of the trust on the relationship between deregulation and accountability in Japan; and (c) when governments work well, it leads to high level of trust, in turn followed by high accountability in the United States and Japan.     

公共部门人力资源绩效管理问题及对策

本文分析了我国公共部门人力资源绩效管理的现状与不足,提出了完善公共部门人力资源绩效管理的对策。通过建立和完善绩效管理体系,提高人力资源管理者的能力水平,构建科学合理的绩效目标和考核标准,改进考核方法,并且加强绩效考核结果的应用,改进个人绩效。     

EXPECTATIONS AND CAPACITY OF PERFORMANCE MEASUREMENT IN NGOs IN THE DEVELOPMENT CONTEXT

There are many obstacles to promoting learning as an outcome of performance measurement in non‐governmental organizations (NGO) social service providers, especially in less developed countries. Building upon a conceptualization of accountability as a multifaceted set of relationships through which funders, or principals, and non‐profit providers, or agents, jointly shape organizational learning, and performance, this study expands our understanding of how accountability mechanisms affect learning within service providers. This paper explores the role that funders play in shaping performance measurement, or monitoring, practices within NGOs serving disadvantaged children in developing countries. We examined the experience of service providers in Egypt and Colombia to assess how the barriers to use of performance data and learning may be addressed. We conducted interviews using the same protocols with program managers in six non‐profit providers in each country that provide services to children, and we also interviewed major donors in the arena of children's services in the USA. We probed the NGO managers' experiences with performance measurement to identify obstacles and potential solutions to improve the use of the data to promote learning. Our findings support previous research about the potential for upward accountability mechanisms to influence internal learning. We suggest that funders should be held accountable for how the incentives and disincentives they provide to grantees affect their internal learning about how to improve their services. This notion of ‘reverse accountability’ means that funders need to be strategic and intentional when they design reporting mechanisms that affect the learning behaviours within their grantees. In line with our call for reverse accountability, we offer a model demonstrating our notion of the two‐way flow of accountability and we offer recommendations to help improve the performance reporting environment for NGOs who are addressing complex problems with less than adequate capacity. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Taken for Granted? Managing for Social Equity in Grant Programs

Managing for social equity performance has long been a goal without much guidance for public managers. We examine social equity performance in the context of indirect governance through the administration of grant programs and, more specifically, the matching of policy responses (grant funding) to social needs. Grant program managers must allocate funding to match needs while also ensuring accountability, but common administrative models that rely on competition can undermine social equity performance. We develop a unique framework to analyze the relative social equity performance of four models of grant administration in general. These models are defined by whether competitions or formulas are used to select grantees and to allocate funding. We test the implications of the framework in an analysis of funding distributions from the nonentitlement Community Development Block Grant program in four states. Our findings suggest that social equity in grant programs is better served when grantors do not rely solely on competitive grant contracting in the selection and distribution of grant funds, which is typical in grant administration. However, policy makers and managers can design institutional arrangements that utilize competition, but in a manner that does not create a bias against more socially equitable funding decisions.     

Why Be Accountable? Exploring Voluntary Accountability of Australian Private Ancillary Funds

The aim of this paper is to consider why Private Ancillary Funds (PAFs), endowed philanthropic foundations with no public reporting requirements, engage in accountability in its various forms. This exploratory, qualitative study reports on perspectives on accountability from 10 semi‐structured interviews with PAF managers and/or trustees from three Australian states. Through the lens of March and Olsen's (2011) logics of action and Karsten's (2015) typology of motivational forms for voluntary accountability, findings show that although logics of appropriateness and consequentiality explain many reasons why PAFs engage in voluntary accountability, some reasons do not fit comfortably within either logic. The findings challenge conceptions embedded in much non‐profit accountability literature that motivations for and purposes of accountability are linked with sustainability and survival. By examining this subset of non‐profit organisations subject to limited regulatory accountability, a clearer understanding of motivations for voluntary accountability is achieved.     

Local management of aid-funded projects

Local management means giving responsibility for the implementation and management of development projects to people and institutions in the recipient country. The main arguments for local management are that it offers the potential to increase the responsibility and accountability of national institutions and should help to build a cadre of experienced local project managers. These are all important contributions to sustainable development. There are, however, some constraints on the effectiveness of local management, including the limited supply of good managers and the difficulty of ensuring adherence by those implementing projects to donors' procedures and regulations. The role of donor agencies under local management is yet to be clearly defined. Donor agencies will face difficult professional judgments on whether, when and how to intervene where projects are not being competently managed by national institutions.