Effects of funding mechanisms on participation in multilateral environmental agreements

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - The “rational design approach” to studying international agreements holds that policy-makers evaluate costs and...     

Environmental policy integration among multilateral environmental agreements: the case of biodiversity

The system of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) comprises hundreds of conventions and protocols designed to protect the environment. Institutional interaction within the MEA system raises issues of environmental policy integration (EPI), i.e. balancing different environmental objectives and considerations. Mainstream proposals for enhancing EPI in environmental governance build upon the assumption that environmental institutions are fragmented. However, recent research reveals that the MEA system has been defragmenting over the years such that EPI is less a problem of institutional fragmentation than of effective management of institutional interplay. This paper examines the factors affecting EPI among MEAs by looking at experiences in the cluster of biodiversity-related multilateral agreements. The analysis is based on a series of interviews with MEA secretariat officials and international experts conducted between September 2011 and January 2012. The paper identifies institutional, political and cognitive barriers constraining interplay management efforts. While some have proposed regulatory changes in the cluster, national-level co-ordination appears to be the best way to advance EPI.     

Managing global change for sustainable development: technology,community and multilateral environmental agreements

The purpose of this paper is to consider how international law has sought to mediate between the promotion of environmentally sound technologies and local community participation. It will be suggested that the paradigm of sustainable development presents the most sensible framework through which to consider these issues. The paper will then present three short case studies centred around various aspects of the ongoing implementation of the Rio Conventions, namely the endorsement of sequestration activities within the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the development of an access and benefit sharing framework under the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity and further encouragement of community participation in the 1994 UN Convention to Combat Desertification. In conclusion, the paper will suggest that community participation must be given comparable status with the promotion of technological advances if long-term success is ever likely to be attained.

The politics of multilateral environmental agreements lessons from 20 years of INEA

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - This review article addresses the question: What lessons can we learn from work published in International Environmental...     

The influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit of the Abidjan Convention: implementing multilateral environmental agreements to prevent shipping pollution in West and Central Africa

The Regional Coordinating Unit of the Convention for Co-operation in the Protection and Development of the Marine and Coastal Environment for West and Central Africa (the Abidjan Convention) has under its wings several multilateral environmental agreements including those addressing shipping pollution. Shipping, potentially, has negative impacts on marine fauna and flora and air quality, with implications for public health. The Regional Coordinating Unit seeks to strengthen implementation of the Abidjan Convention by party-states through co-operation with state actors using various pathways based on its internal resources and competencies but the Unit is also starting to explore engagement with potential non-state actors. The ability of the Unit to exert influence on implementation is constrained by domestic politico-administrative institutions. This paper seeks to understand the influence of the Regional Coordinating Unit on the implementation of the Abidjan Convention in the field of shipping pollution. It uses three theoretical perspectives for the analysis: the influence of international environmental bureaucracies, domestic regulatory-politics and transnational governance. The paper shows how these theories are complementary because the influence of international bureaucracies such as the Regional Coordinating Unit cannot be adequately understood through factors internal to their organisation alone but needs to be analysed in relation also to external factors, both domestic politico-institutional ones in states that international bureaucracies work with, and the role of relevant non-state actors in the implementation of multilateral environmental agreements. It is concluded that, although influence cannot be measured directly, it is likely that Regional Coordinating Unit’s influence through its autonomy-centred efforts are quiet strong but negatively constrained by the traditional state-centric responsibility for implementation of international legal instruments where domestic regulatory-politics lack sufficient political will and support from and engagement with non-state actors.     

Flexibility provisions in multilateral environmental treaties

In international politics, intergovernmental treaties provide the rules of the game. In this paper, we investigate the rules under which the contents of treaties may be changed, such as rules for adoption and entry into force and rules for dispute resolution. In the first part of the paper, we describe how frequently these rules are used in practice and how they are typically combined, based on 400 treaties and supplementary agreements from the field of international environmental law. Using correspondence analysis, we show that treaty provisions can be represented by a two-dimensional property space. The detected underlying dimensions express varying degrees of institutionalisation and flexibility, respectively. In the second part of the paper, we place amendment rules into the framework of a formal model in the incomplete contracts tradition. It is shown that there exists a trade-off between the risk of too little flexibility, which leads to frequent inefficient breach of the treaty, and the danger that the binding nature of the treaty and hence, the level of commitment by treaty members, is being undermined if the treaty can be amended too easily.     

Risk-sharing agreements to cover environmental damage: theory and practice

Mordernization has witnessed increasingly new industrial sectors which have the potential to create environmental disasters. The insolvency of risk creators in case of such disasters may lead to insufficient compensation as well as to a dilution of preventive incentives. Insurance is a traditional instrument to address these problems, but is subject to limitations such as the lack of information by the insurers on the risk and limited insurance capacity. The risk-sharing agreement is an alternative which is widely used in high-risk sectors but it received relative little attention in academic literature. This paper analyses the potential of risk-sharing agreements in minimizing total social costs of environmental harmful activities, in comparison with insurance. The comparison shows the advantage of risk-sharing agreements in terms of less demanding information requirements, allowing for mutual monitoring and the potential to reduce administrative costs. However, the analysis also shows that a few conditions need to be met for such advantages to be materialized. This paper then discusses a typology of various risk-sharing agreements and illustrates the different categories with examples from the maritime and nuclear sectors. Based on these experiences, this paper explores the possibilities to expand risk-sharing agreements to other policy areas where environmental risks may emerge.     

The effectiveness of international environmental agreements

Many argue that international environmental agreements (IEAs) can alter states’ cost-benefit analyses by providing crucial information about the costs of environmental degradation. Thereby, IEAs may help to effectively curb environmental pollution. However, previous attempts to empirically measure institutional effectiveness found it difficult to provide credible estimates because they have missed to produce convincing counterfactuals. This study empirically estimates the effectiveness of one prominent example of an international environmental institution, the Long Range Transboundary Air Pollution agreement (LRTAP). It sets forth a transparent identification strategy in light of latest advancements in the causal inference literature and presents evidence for the non-effectiveness of the LRTAP in changing member states’ behavior in terms of anthropogenic emissions of two substances (NO _x and SO₂). By deriving and illustrating the use of difference-in- differences (DID) design in the context of IEAs, this study provides a general methodological tool kit to drawing causal inferences about the effectiveness of international environmental institutions.     

The political economy of international environmental agreements: a survey

This paper surveys the recent literature on the political economy of the formation of international environmental agreements. The survey covers theoretical modelling approaches and empirical studies including experimental work. Central to our survey is the question how the political process impacts different stages of agreement formation and stability. We distinguish the rules defined during pre-negotiations that govern negotiations, ratification and implementation. Strategic delegation and lobbying are directly relevant during the negotiation and ratification phases. Implementation, the choice of policy instruments at the national level, will also be impacted by lobbying and indirectly influence negotiations. We find that the basic theoretical framework for the analysis of international environmental agreements is largely unrelated to empirical approaches. Furthermore, we observe that models of the political process of agreement formation, like for example sequential game models, are yet to be developed.     

Lessons learnt from two decades of international environmental agreements: law

International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics - As Patricia Birnie cautiously and prophetically put it in the inaugural issue of this journal (INEA 1, January 2001, p. 74),...     

Signaling in international environmental agreements: the case of early and delayed action

This paper presents a stylized international environmental agreements game with two regions differing in their preference for environmental quality. If side payments are allowed, cooperation can increase the payoffs accruing to both regions. However, cooperation can be impeded by asymmetric information about the regions’ types and only become feasible once a region has credibly revealed its type. We show how in a two-stage game early (delayed) action can act as a credible signal to reveal private information on high (low) benefits. Yet, the cooperative solution with asymmetric information is Pareto-dominated by the outcome with perfect information.     

Assigning a grass-root NGO role to legitimate organizations as resident watch-dogs in negotiating carbon benefits derived from multilateral funding

The private sector in North Korea is virtually non-existent, and typical forms of grass-root Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) required for forestry carbon trading are not recognized. The state regulates the local forest communities and labor market through central planning and control. Previous researches tend to target grass-root NGOs that were established voluntarily after democratization, while implicitly excluding a state-supervised organization in which residents are members. This paper demonstrates that the carbon benefits secured by forestry projects could be negotiated by a non-voluntary state-supervised organization initially established as a resident watch-dog. Since state-supervised organizations in recipient countries can play a key role in educating grassroots citizens on the true role of NGOs, originated from democratized western countries, this paper will be a valuable reference for accommodating beneficiary obligations specified in multilateral funding. Although North Korea has been selected as a case study for this paper, this kind of peaceful intervention is relevant to other countries that face similar state-supervised resident organizations in implementing multilateral funding projects.

     

The self-selection of democracies into treaty design: insights from international environmental agreements

Generally, democratic regime type is positively associated with participating in international environmental agreements. In this context, this study focuses on the legal nature of an agreement, which is linked to audience costs primarily at the domestic level that occur in case of non-compliance and are felt especially by democracies. Eventually, more legalized (“hard-law”) treaties make compliance potentially more challenging and as democratic leaders may anticipate the corresponding audience costs, the likelihood that democracies select themselves into such treaties decreases. The empirical implication of our theory is that environmental agreements with a larger share of democratic members are less likely to be characterized by hard law. Results from quantitative analyses strongly support our argument, shed new light on the relationship between participation in international agreements and the form of government, and also have implications for the “words-deeds” debate in international environmental policy-making.     

Fairness and participation in evaluation procedures: Effects on task attitudes and performance

A laboratory study was conducted to examine the role of two components of participatory work evaluation procedures on fairness attitudes and work performance. Opportunity for influential opinion expression and knowledge of evaluation criteria were manipulated in a business simulation exercise. Thirty-eight male and 49 female undergraduates worked under a task evaluation procedure that either did or did not allow them to express their opinions to the evaluator. In addition, subjects either were or were not provided with specific information about the criteria to be used in making the performance evaluation, and they received either a favorable or an unfavorable outcome. Questionnaire responses indicated that influential opinion expression enhanced perceptions of procedural and distributive fairness independently of the outcome of the evaluation. Both knowledge of evaluation criteria and perceptions of evaluation fairness correlated with subsequent task performance. The implications of these findings are discussed with respect to understanding the influence of procedural justice on attitudes and task behavior in organizational settings.     

创新社会治理机制：从单方强制到多元协作

创新社会治理机制是社会主义和谐社会建设的重要内容。我国计划经济时期的社会治理机制具有单方性、强制性和索取性的特点。新时期,创新社会治理机制应该实现三个方面的转变:在治理理念上实现从"索取"到"服务"的转变,在社会治理主体上实现从单方到多元的转变,在社会治理方式上实现从强制到协作的转变。     

Medicare and Medicaid programs; hospital conditions of participation; provider agreements and supplier approval--HCFA. Proposed rule

This proposed rule would revise the requirements that hospitals must meet to participate in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. The revised requirements focus on patients care and the outcomes of that care, reflect a cross-functional view of patient treatment, encourage flexibility in meeting quality standards, and eliminate unnecessary procedural requirements. These changes are necessary to reflect advances in patient care delivery and quality assessment practices since the requirements were last revised in 1986. They are also an integral part of the Administration's efforts to achieve broad-based improvements in the quality of care furnished through Federal programs and in the measurement of that care, while at the same time reducing procedural burdens on providers. In addition, in an effort to increase the number of organ donations, we are proposing changes in the interaction between hospitals and organ procurement organizations. The proposed rule also would specify that HCFA may terminate the participation agreement of a hospital, skilled nursing facility, home health agency, or other provider if the provider refuses to allow access to its facilities, or examination of its operations or records, by or on behalf of HCFA, as necessary to verify that it is complying with the Medicare law and regulations and the terms of its provider agreement.     

Licensing lifesavers: possible routes to overcome errors and omissions in licence agreements

Legal context. This article is about the possible ways the correctionof errors in a written agreement can be achieved. These errorsmight be in the way that the agreement has been written or thatthe parties misunderstood the agreement each thought they weremaking. Key points. English law provides a number of ways in which suchmistakes or misunderstandings might be resolved, ultimatelyby a court if further agreement cannot be reached. First, thewritten agreement might simply be unenforceable. If not, thena court might construe the wording in the agreement in a waythat reflects the intention of the parties, implying terms intothat contract, or rectify the words used in the agreement. Practical significance. The intention of the article is to makepractitioners aware of these various routes to remedy mistakeswhich have been made in connection with written agreements.This knowledge will enable an informed approach to be takento resolving the dispute of which the mistake or alleged mistakeis the cause. Negotiations can take place around the possibleeffect of the mistake and the available remedies. This knowledgecan be used to resolve disputes arising out of such errors eitherby negotiation, possibly through mediation, and ultimately byappropriate action in the courts.     

Promises to keep: Enforcement of prepublication agreements and first amendment rights

Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Cohen v. Cowles Media, several courts have found that prepublication agreements are legally binding promises between journalists and their sources of information, and that the First Amendment does not protect journalists from civil sanction for the breach of such agreements. An agreement between a journalist and a private individual not to disclose a source's information or the source's identity might constitute a legally binding commitment, especially if the plaintiff is able to show that a clear and specific commitment was made not to reveal certain information and that as a result of the breach of promise the plaintiff suffered specific harm.

However, the Court's analysis of enforcement of confidentiality promises as having merely incidental effects is flawed. Because it did not balance the enforcement of prepublication agreements against the First Amendment interests in nonenforcement of the agreements, the Court in Cohen departed from its compelling interest analysis of prepublication agreements in Snepp v. United States as well as its previous standards in finding incidental effects of generally applicable laws.