The Future of the 'Radical Centre' in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement has provided a new political dispensation in Northern Ireland. Through the management of the competing aims of unionism and nationalism, the Agreement hopes to promote cross-community consensus and forge a new, moderate centre. However, the segmental autonomy evident under the consociationalism of the Agreement poses questions of the existing political centre in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, the centre, as represented by the Alliance Party, has rejected unionism and nationalism, believing either to be ideologies to be overcome, rather than accommodated. Under the post-Agreement political arrangements, Alliance has already been obliged to bolster pro-Agreement unionism, through the temporary tactical redesignation of three of its Assembly members as Unionist and through tacit support for selected unionist election candidates. Using the first ever membership survey of the existing centre party in Northern Ireland, this article examines whether its vision of a radical third tradition is sustainable in a polity in which unionist and nationalist politics are legitimised.     

党的领导与中国式善治

我国的国家治理现代化本质是实现中国式善治,根本在于实现人民的主体性,充分保障人民当家作主,充分发挥人民的主动性、积极性、创造性。先锋政党、有为政府、共益市场、有机社会这四个要素,共同保障人民主体性的实现。先锋性政党的领导,是中国善治的关键与根本优势,使得我国善治体系是有为政府而非有限政府,是人民为中心的市场经济而不是资本为中心的市场经济,是有机社会而非市民社会。     

Class,Race Issues,and Declining White Support for the Democratic Party in the South

The Democratic Party in the South has experienced a major loss of white voters in recent decades. Two major hypotheses have been proposed to explain this change. The dominant explanation in recent years has been that race issues have driven whites from the Democratic Party in the South. In this view, defections from the Democratic Party have occurred because whites oppose the party's positions on race issues. In contrast, others have suggested that class divisions have emerged as important, with affluent whites increasingly supportive of the Republican Party because they find its positions more compatible with their interests. Using NES data, this article assesses the evidence for these hypotheses, examining the impact of income position and race issues on partisan behavior since 1952. While both factors affect partisan support, income has come to have a relatively greater effect on partisan support than race issues. The evidence clearly indicates that class divisions in the South have steadily increased and that affluent whites have steadily shifted to the Republican Party. The implications are significant for understanding the dramatic changes in the South in recent decades. Much has been made of the tensions over race issues, and the findings presented here lend further support to the importance of race issues in southern electoral politics. However, these findings also suggest that class divisions are a steadily increasing source of political cleavage in this region. The current state of electoral politics in the South cannot be properly understood unless both of these factors are taken into account.     

Doomed to Defeat? Electoral Support and the Conservative Party

This article recaps the main trends in public opinion and electoral support for the Conservative party since the last general election in June 2001 by examining the overall polling data relating to party popularity. The article also considers by-elections, local elections and leadership change, as well as the most recent elections in 2004. The various challenges the party faces as it attempts to position itself as a credible alternative government to the Labour party under Tony Blair are considered.
Given the clear biases of the electoral system used for the House of Commons, which are certain to benefit Labour substantially even if the Conservatives get close to them in terms of overall vote share, or indeed even overtake them, it still seems unlikely that such success will be sufficient to achieve much more than to reduce Tony Blair's House of Commons majority in 2005.     

Strategic Incentives,Issue Proximity and Party Support in Europe

The Issue Yield model predicts that parties will choose specific issues to emphasise, based on the joint assessment of electoral risks (how divisive is an issue within the party support base) and electoral opportunities (how widely supported is the same issue outside the party). According to this model, issues with high yield are those that combine a high affinity with the existing party base, together with a high potential to reach new voters. In previous work, the model showed a remarkable ability to explain aggregate issue importance as reported by party supporters, as well as issue emphasis in party manifestos. This paper tests the implications at the individual level by comparing a conventional model where issue salience is determined from manifesto data with a revised model where issue salience is determined by issue yield. The empirical findings show that issue yield is a more effective criterion than manifesto emphasis for identifying the issues most closely associated with party support in the minds of voters.     

Angry White Men: Individual and Contextual Predictors of Support for the British National Party

The British National party (BNP) is the most successful extreme right party in Britain's electoral history and is the fastest growing political party in twenty-first century Britain. This article presents the first ever individual-level analysis of BNP supporters, utilising a survey data set uniquely compiled for this purpose. We find that support for the BNP is concentrated among older, less educated working-class men living in the declining industrial towns of the North and Midlands regions. This pattern of support is quite distinct from that which underpinned the last electorally relevant extreme right party in Britain – the National Front (NF) – whose base was young working-class men in Greater London and the West Midlands. Extreme right voters in contemporary Britain express exceptionally high levels of anxiety about immigration and disaffection with the mainstream political parties. Multi-level analysis of BNP support shows that the party prospers in areas with low education levels and large Muslim minority populations of Pakistani or African origin. The BNP has succeeded in mobilising a clearly defined support base: middle-aged working-class white men anxious about immigration, threatened by local Muslim communities and hostile to the existing political establishment. We conclude by noting that all the factors underpinning the BNP's emergence – high immigration levels, rising perceptions of identity conflict and the declining strength of the cultural and institutional ties binding voters to the main parties – are likely to persist in the coming years. The BNP therefore looks likely to consolidate itself as a persistent feature of the British political landscape.     

领导干部要进一步加强党性修养、弘扬优良作风

领导干部要进一步加强党性修养、弘扬优良作风,必须深刻领会胡锦涛总书记的重要讲话精神,充分认识加强党性修养、弘扬优良作风的重要性和紧迫性;要适应党和国家各项事业发展需要,努力提高综合素质;要在认真学习上下功夫,确保党性修养和作风建设取得新成效.     

讲学习、讲政治、讲正气 与党中央保持高度一致

讲学习、讲政治、讲正气 ,是实现全党与党中央保持高度一致的基本途径 ;全党与党中央保持高度一致 ,则是讲学习、讲政治、讲正气所要达到的基本目的之一。讲学习、讲政治、讲正气 ,三者虽各有侧重 ,但作为新形势下党的建设的重要组成部分 ,它们又是一个不可分割的有机整体。三者不仅在内容上相互交叉 ;在关系上相互依存 ,而且在根本作用上 ,更显示出一种“三位一体”的高度统一 ,即从不同侧重点着手 ,加强主观世界的改造 ,推动全体党员尤其是党的领导干部素质的全面提高。一、讲学习 ,提高“与党中央保持高度一致”的主体素质能否做到与党中…     

Maintaining Popular Support for the Chinese Communist Party: The Influence of Education and the State-Controlled Media

Literature on public opinion in China suggests that public support for the Chinese Communist party (CCP) is quite high. No matter how survey questions regarding regime support are phrased, the results are the same. The obvious question arises: how does an authoritarian regime, such as the PRC, garner the support of the vast majority of its citizens? I argue that the exposure-acceptance model best explains the high level of public support in China. This model suggests that educated citizens, who are politically aware, display high levels of political support within an authoritarian regime, but citizens at the highest levels of education are more resistant to political messages and tend to have lower levels of support. However, in a developing country such as China there are unequal educational opportunities for rural and urban citizens. This has a significant influence on how education affects regime support. Despite lower levels of support among the most educated citizens, the CCP still manages to maintain a high level of popular support through strict control over the media and education system.     

The Development of Stable Party Support: Electoral Dynamics in Post-Communist Europe

What conditions help stable patterns of party support to emerge? Using pooled time‐series cross‐section data on election results from 15 East European democracies, the empirical analysis finds that (1) right after a regime change electoral volatility increases while the trend is reversed after democracy has endured for about a decade; (2) ethnic cleavages have no effect on stability while social cleavages affect electoral stability only during economic downturns; (3) both institutions and economic performance influence the stability of party support; however, the effect of the latter diminishes over time when democracies mature.     

The Anti‐Democrat Diploma: How High School Education Decreases Support for the Democratic Party

Attending high school can alter students' life trajectories by affecting labor market prospects and through exposure to ideas and networks. However, schooling's influence competes with early socialization forces and may be confounded by selection biases. Consequently, little is known about whether or how high school education shapes downstream political preferences and voting behavior. Using a generalized difference‐in‐differences design leveraging variation in U.S. state dropout laws across cohorts, I find that raising the school dropout age decreases Democratic partisan identification and voting later in life. Instrumental variables estimates suggest that an additional completed grade of high school decreases Democratic support by around 15 percentage points among students induced to remain in school by higher dropout ages. High school's effects principally operate by increasing income and support for conservative economic policies, especially at an individual's midlife earnings peak. In contrast, such schooling does not affect conservative attitudes on noneconomic issues or political engagement.     

Alternative Ulster? Political Parties and the Non-constitutional Policy Space in Northern Ireland

This article uses data from a survey of the candidates in the 2003 Northern Ireland Assembly election to measure the policy positions of the Northern Irish political parties on scales that are the usual measurements of party policy in Western Europe, such as on economic and social issues, the European Union, morality issues, environmental issues and minority groups. These data were then used to test whether the Northern Ireland party system was conducive to integration or consociationalism, which is the current debate on conflict resolution in Northern Ireland. It argues that this debate has been under-theorised and that empirical data can be used to test the likelihood of either scenario. It concludes that, in most aspects, the Northern Ireland party system tends towards the consociational scenario but there are, nevertheless, aspects which suggest that an integrationist scenario could be produced in the long term.     

Strategic Eurosceptics and polite xenophobes: Support for the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) in the 2009 European Parliament elections

While Euroscepticism is the most important driver of United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) support, other attitudinal drivers – namely dissatisfaction towards mainstream parties and xenophobia – are also important. Examining vote‐switching between first‐ and second‐order elections evidence is found of a distinction between two types of supporter: more affluent and middle‐class ‘strategic defectors’ from the mainstream Conservative Party who support UKIP to register their Euroscepticism, and more economically marginal and politically disaffected ‘core loyalists’ who are attracted to UKIP by its anti‐immigration rhetoric and populist anti‐establishment strategy. UKIP also succeeds in attracting core support from groups such as women who have traditionally rejected extreme right parties such as the British National Party (BNP). This suggests that UKIP is well positioned to recruit a broader and more enduring base of support than the BNP.