The Future of the 'Radical Centre' in Northern Ireland after the Good Friday Agreement

The 1998 Good Friday Agreement has provided a new political dispensation in Northern Ireland. Through the management of the competing aims of unionism and nationalism, the Agreement hopes to promote cross-community consensus and forge a new, moderate centre. However, the segmental autonomy evident under the consociationalism of the Agreement poses questions of the existing political centre in Northern Ireland. Traditionally, the centre, as represented by the Alliance Party, has rejected unionism and nationalism, believing either to be ideologies to be overcome, rather than accommodated. Under the post-Agreement political arrangements, Alliance has already been obliged to bolster pro-Agreement unionism, through the temporary tactical redesignation of three of its Assembly members as Unionist and through tacit support for selected unionist election candidates. Using the first ever membership survey of the existing centre party in Northern Ireland, this article examines whether its vision of a radical third tradition is sustainable in a polity in which unionist and nationalist politics are legitimised.     

Change beneath the surface: the 2016 Northern Ireland Assembly election

Preceded by a string of institutional crises and sustained political wrangling, the Northern Ireland Assembly election held in May 2016 cemented the grip of the Democratic Unionist Party and Sinn Féin over the province’s power-sharing institutions, while certifying the impasse of their intra-bloc rivals. Eighteen years after the Good Friday Agreement, the electoral campaign continued to feature emotionally charged ethnic appeals. Nonetheless, socioeconomic issues were at the fore of the political debate, contributing to the limited yet significant advance of non-sectarian actors. Beneath the surface of a mainly unaltered Assembly makeup and unchanged ethno-political geography, the vote resulted in a decline in support for the traditional governing parties, particularly in the nationalist camp. In the aftermath of the vote, the formation of an officially recognized Opposition has opened uncharted political waters.     

Political generations in Northern Ireland

Since the late 1980s, Northern Ireland has seen a radical electoral shift away from the historically dominant parties in the Catholic and Protestant blocs – the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) and Ulster Unionist Party (UUP), respectively – towards the traditionally more ‘extreme’ parties – Sinn Fein and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). This change in aggregate support has been accompanied by increasing differences between generations as older cohorts of UUP and SDLP supporters have been replaced by newer cohorts of DUP and Sinn Fein partisans. This is not a result of increased polarisation in values and attitudes (whether overtly political or simply communal intolerance) among younger cohorts who are, if anything, slightly more moderate than their forbears. Rather, this results from the changing political context in which new generations have been socialised – in particular the expanded choice sets facing voters as they have reached voting age. This in turn has positive implications for the consolidation of devolved democratic governance.     

The 1998 Northern Ireland Assembly Election

The result of the assembly election in Northern Ireland in June 1998 was a victory for those who support the assembly, but it was not such a triumph for David Trimble and the Ulster Unionist Party. I will examine both the Unionist vote and the Nationalist vote and the consequences.     

Irish Unification After Brexit: Old and New Political Identities?

This article contends that the outcome of the prolonged dispute about the future constitutional status of Northern Ireland (NI) will be shaped by the emerging dynamic between ‘old’ and ‘new’ political identities in NI. The ‘old’ identities conceived political outcomes as defined by two monolithic ethno-cultural blocs: nationalism (alongside republicanism) and unionism (alongside loyalism). Nationalism and unionism formed the ‘two communities model’ of consociational governance enshrined in the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA). Today, despite the Agreement being in existence for over twenty years, growing numbers of citizens identify with neither ethno-cultural category. Recent elections indicate that more pluralistic ‘new’ political identities are gaining ground at the expense of traditional alignments. The implications for NI's constitutional future are likely to be profound. The emerging constituency of non-aligned voters will have a decisive impact on the final outcome of any border poll on Irish unification. Such voters typically support the cross-community Alliance Party, the Greens, or the left People Before Profit (PBP) party. Crucially, these parties are concerned as much with economic and social issues as constitutional questions. In the context of growing political fluidity, the result of any future border poll remains contingent.     

New members as party modernisers: The case of the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland

Amid the literature on members of political parties, surprisingly little has been written on the potential or actual impacts that can be made upon party strategy or policies by a rapid influx of new members. New joiners may have different outlooks and desires than long-standing members. Although already sympathetic to the party they are joining, new arrivals, if signing up in large numbers, may hold sufficiently revisionist views to be able to re-orientate a political party in a direction not previously taken. Using data from the first-ever membership survey of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland, the largest party in the Northern Ireland Assembly since 2003 and the fourth largest UK parliamentary party since 2005, this article analyses whether more recent joiners of the Party have brought greater pragmatism and moderation to an organisation previously dominated by hardline political, religious and ethnic attitudes. Modernisation from outsiders who become insiders can be a key aspect of party development. The DUP offers one of the stiffest tests of modernisation, given its history of opposition to moderation. This article shows that newer members have tempered beliefs in one of the most robustly ethno-religious parties in Europe.     

Postmodern Europe and the resources of communal identities in Northern Ireland

Abstract. Irish Nationalist and Ulster Unionist communal identities have territorial, cultural and economic resources. Catalysts that have mobilized these resources and produced political action include 19th century famine and the Northern Ireland civil rights campaign of the late 1960s. As we approach the 21st century and the conditions and concepts of postmodernity initiate change in the structure and operation of the state, the European Union may realize its potential to affect the resources of communal identity and produce further change in the constitution and structural alignment of Irish Nationalist and Ulster Unionist identities. EU integration and structural initiatives have postmodernist contingencies that are beginning to redefine the structural space of Northern Ireland. The future development of these contingencies will be a fundamental factor in determining the extent to which Irish Nationalist and Ulster Unionist communal identities escape the embrace of modernity and develop with the postmodern world.     

Northern Ireland: At the Crossroads of Political and Administrative Reform

Northern Ireland is at a political and administrative cross-roads. Politically the Good Friday Agreement has paved the way for devolved government, and administratively the system of Direct Rule from Westminster will come to an end. This article examines the major problems of accountability linked to Direct Rule government and sets out a policy agenda for the new Northern Ireland Assembly.     

The Future of Northern Ireland: the Role of the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement Institutions

Since the 2016 Brexit referendum a series of crises has gripped Northern Ireland's politics. This has had a destabilising effect across society, which has arguably been felt most acutely by political unionism. The Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) of 1998 created a series of institutions to deal with political conflict in Northern Ireland, manage cross-border cooperation and normalise relations between the UK and Ireland. However, many aspects of it have been sparingly and ineffectually deployed, most notably the second and third strands dealing with north/south and east/west relations respectively. In this article, the authors argue that regular use of the institutional arrangements created by the Agreement would help to deal with the challenges currently facing Northern Ireland and help address unionist anxieties over the Protocol. Use of the North-South Ministerial Council (NSMC), the British Irish Council (BIC) and the British-Irish Intergovernmental Conference (BIIGC) should be prioritised. The unresolved issues arising from Brexit require a recommitment to the intergovernmental logic at the heart of the 1998 Agreement, despite the obstacles.     

‘No‐one likes us; we don't care’: ‘Dissident’ Irish Republicans and Mandates

The episodic dissident republican activity evident in Northern Ireland since the Good Friday Agreement has been accompanied by regular assertions from the police, politicians and commentators that dissidents have no backing. This article examines the historic importance of mandates and support for previous and contemporary republican armed campaigns. It explores whether violent republicans have ever enjoyed widespread support in Ireland and assesses the extent to which a lack of backing has precluded violent campaigns. The piece analyses the evidence regarding the lack of sympathy for current dissident violence, assessing the degree to which armed republicanism has reached a new level of isolation.     

The Politics of Transition? Explaining Political Crises in the Implementation of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement

The implementation of the Belfast or Good Friday Agreement has been marked by recurring crises. While each of these has its specific causes, they are symptomatic of contradictions in the underlying conditions of conflict. These made the Belfast Agreement possible, but they also create difficulties in its implementation. The Agreement echoes — not least in its ambiguities — the underlying contradictions, reconstituting the political terrain in terms of them. This has reproduced the tendency toward conflict even among the supporters of the Agreement, whose different responses and ends-in-view reflect the objective uncertainties in the situation. Political crises are likely to continue even after the full implementation of the Agreement.     

Divisor Methods for Sequential Portfolio Allocation in Multi-Party Executive Bodies: Evidence from Northern Ireland and Denmark

Some proportional representation (PR) rules can also be used to specify the sequence in which each party in a parliament or each member in a multiparty governing coalition is given its choice about (unique) desired resources, e.g., "indivisible goods" such as cabinet ministries or executive positions, thus providing an algorithmic method for determining "fair" allocations. Divisor rule sequencing using the d'Hondt method was recently used to determine the ten cabinet positions in the Northern Ireland Executive Committee created under the 1998 Belfast ("Good Friday") Agreement; and such sequential allocation procedures have been used in some Danish municipal governments, and for determination of committee chairs in the European parliament. Here we examine in some detail the procedures used in Northern Ireland and Denmark, with a focus on special features such as the option in Denmark to form post-election alliances.     

Challenging the Leadership: The Party Conference as a Platform for Dissenting Membership Voice in British and Danish Parties of the Left

According to A. O. Hirschman, party members who are dissatisfied with their party's policy have two options: they can either leave the party (exit) or try to change party policy (voice). Research has shown that leadership control over policy is extremely high, leaving membership influence virtually non-existent. On that basis, exit seems the only viable membership reaction to dissatisfaction with party policy. Nevertheless, research has also shown that voice is of great importance to members; hence it is voice that will be the main focus of this article, which examines the circumstances under which party members are likely to opt for voice over exit and what factors are likely to hamper voice. Using a study of the Danish Socialist Peoples Party, the Danish Social Democrats and the British Labour Party, the article shows that despite the odds stacked against them, some party members do make use of the opportunities for voice offered by the party conference, but also that they often face significant obstacles in exercising it.     

Security: Missing from the Northern Ireland Model

The Northern Ireland model is best defined as the framing of the political endgame of Northern Ireland’s conflict culminating in the 1998 Belfast Agreement, otherwise known as the Good Friday Agreement. The Northern Ireland model is popularly portrayed as a negotiated settlement. It focuses primarily on the bargain reached by Northern Irish political parties, assisted by British and Irish governments and mediated by US senator George Mitchell. Academics and officials alike use it to explain how the “Troubles” ended and peace was achieved. Conspicuously absent from this model is security. It also grossly understates the difficulty in dealing with a modern insurgency (the Provisionals) and leans too heavily toward skewed post-conflict thinking that views insurgents as “peacemakers” prevented from making peace because of a manifestly poor security response, particularly that of the police force and its intelligence agency (Special Branch). The perspective of politicians and diplomats who brokered the peace settlement prioritizes political negotiations at the expense of the security response; in so doing, the role of security is undermined and overlooked. Most contemporary academic works promote this outlook. Excluding security, however, thwarts a comprehensive analysis of the Northern Ireland conflict and renders any examination partial and unrepresentative. There is therefore a significant intellectual gap in our understanding of how peace was achieved, which this article redresses. Ultimately, it questions the Northern Ireland model’s capacity to assist in other relevant conflict contexts in any practical sense by arguing that a strategy where security pushed as politics pulled brought about peace. In other words, security played a crucial part because it forced the main protagonists into a situation out of which the Belfast Agreement emerged.     

‘Irish Republic’, ‘Eire’ or ‘Ireland’? The Contested Name of John Bull's Other Island

One of the less visible consequences of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement of 1998 was that it finally put to rest a fifty year dispute between Ireland and the United Kingdom about the names of the respective states. This article begins by outlining the constitutional background to this complex terminological dispute, and then examines it from three perspectives. The first is that of the Irish state itself, which in recent decades has opted unambiguously for 'Ireland'. The second is the British government, which until the end of the twentieth century preferred the labels 'Eire' or 'Irish Republic'. The third is the militant nationalist republican movement, whose terminology was designed to deny the legitimacy of the existing state. The article concludes by examining the political significance of this issue, arguing that while its most obvious importance is symbolic, it has also had real meaning for the identity and for the geographical definition of the state, as well as for the British-Irish relationship.     

The Moral Minority: Evangelical Protestants in Northern Ireland and Their Political Behaviour

It has long been asserted that strong evangelical religious beliefs underpin strong unionist and loyalist political attitudes in Northern Ireland. Although recent literature has argued for a wide diversity of political attitudes amongst evangelicals, this has not been quantified. Based on analysis of the 1991 Northern Irish Social Attitudes Survey and the 1998 Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey, this article argues that evangelicals are attitudinally different to other Protestants in Northern Ireland. However, their distinctiveness arises from their conservative moral attitudes and not, as widely claimed, from stronger unionist political values. Indeed, in terms of party identification, in 1991 evangelicals were less likely than other Protestants to support the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). And although there has been a small shift towards the DUP over the course of the 1990s, it is not due to any strengthening of the unionism of evangelicals, but rather the increasing importance of moral conservatism in predicting voters' party choice in Northern Ireland.     

The Future of Irish-UK Relations: Borders and Identities after Brexit: Introduction

It is apparent that the consociational framework established by the Belfast/Good Friday Agreement (B/GFA) is under threat, while the UK's withdrawal from the EU poses major challenges for maintaining peace, prosperity and social cohesion in Northern Ireland (NI). The contributions to this special collection examine key elements of the post-Brexit reality, with a particular focus on NI and the future of the intergovernmental bodies established by the B/GFA. The implications of the UK government's attempt unilaterally to disapply parts of the Protocol on Ireland/Northern Ireland are examined.     

A touchstone of dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European party systems

Abstract. With the recent acceleration of the integration process of the European Union there has been a rise in political parties expressing either scepticism or outright criticism of the nature of the integration process. Using a four–fold differentiation between single issue, protest, established parties and factions within parties, the first part of the article presents an overview of Euroscepticism within EU member states and Norway. This reveals the diversity of sources of Euroscepticism both in ideology and in the types of parties that are Eurosceptical but with a preponderance of protest parties taking Eurosceptical positions. The second part of the article is an attempt to map Euroscepticism in West European party systems through a consideration of ideology and party position in the party system. The conclusions are that Euroscepticism is mainly limited to parties on the periphery of their party system and is often there used as an issue that differentiates those parties from the more established parties which are only likely to express Euroscepticism through factions. Party based Euroscepticism is therefore both largely dependent on domestic contextual factors and a useful issue to map emergent domestic political constellations.